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Abstract 
This thesis is about the consequences of the permanent settlement of former 
labour migrants and the formation of 'new' ethnic minorities in contemporary 
Germany and Britain. It is concerned with the extent to which these 
minorities are regarded as citizens of German and British society and as 
potential citizens of the European Union. 
The core of the argument established here is that there is a link between the 
processes of racialization and nationalism which leads to an exclusionary 
concept of citizenship. This link is concretized by the intermingling of 
nationality and citizenship, or - in other words - the racializing concept of 
membership, as reflected in law or in the perception of law by civil society. 
The question of whether or not citizenship functions, or could function, as a 
mechanism for inclusion and participation for former post-war labour 
migrants of non-European origin and their descendants is central to the 
thesis. The ways in which, and the reasons why, settled immigrants do not 
enjoy fully equal status as citizens in German and British society is examined. 
In addition, as both countries are members of the European Community, a 
secondary aim is to discuss how these issues are reflected, or dealt with, on 
the European level. 
The empirical data used to probe the theoretical discussion of the relationship 
between nationalism, racism and citizenship derive from interviews with 
organizations working in the so-called 'race relations field' to gain insight into 
ethnic minorities' perspective. Furthermore, secondary analysis of attitude 
surveys and opinion polls illustrates civil society's viewpoint which is 
connected to politicians' rhetoric - one of the aspects tested via discourse 
analysis of parliamentary debates on ethnic minorities' related issues. 
Recent supra- and sub-national developments (Le. integration into the 
European Union, the principle of subsidiarity and the establishment of the 
Committee of the Regions) lead to the suggestion of a three-layered 
conception of citizenship with three levels of collective identity, i.e. local, 
national and European. It is argued that the local level is probably the most 
effective to resist the power of racism and nationalism. 
Finally, it is argued that only a concept of citizenship unrelated to nationality 
(Le. ethnic descent) can function as a mechanism for the inclusion of 'new' 
ethnic minorities. Citizenship can in this way become the source of a new 
post-national or post-conventional identity based on residential criteria. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 General introduction 
a) Background 
Virtually every advanced industrialized countryl has experienced 
international labour migration in the form of legally admitted foreign 
workers, undocumented aliens, political refugees or permanent immigrants. 
There are an estimated thirty million foreign workers and unauthorized 
aliens in all parts of the world, with an additional fifteen million political 
refugees (Miller 1981: preface; Castles 1993:18). The movement of people 
across national borders has undoubtedly become a global issue and will likely 
become an even more salient one in the future as the economic inequalities 
and the global knowledge about the existence of these inequalities increase. 
Of the world's approximately thirty million foreign workers and 
undocumented aliens, almost half are to be found in western Europe. These 
migrants originally came during the post-war period as workers to meet the 
growing demand for labour. Despite a general tendency in Europe towards 
restrictive immigration policies in the early 1970s, intensified family 
reunification as well as 'family formation'2 (Menski 1994) have resulted in a 
continuous or even higher proportion of immigrants, and meanwhile the 
permanent settlement of some 15 million foreigners in western European 
countries has become the new reality (Layton-Henry 1990). Among European 
Community member-states, Germany has the highest number of foreign 
residents with currently around 7 million. The largest group in 1991 was the 
Turks (1.9 million) (OEeD 1995). Germany is followed by France with a 
foreign popUlation of 3.6 million (Castles 1995:298) and Britain where the 
number of foreign citizens was 2 million in 1990 (OECD 1995). In the latter 
case, however, when British-born persons of Afro-Caribbean and Asian origin 
are included, the overall population of immigrant origin is estimated at 4.5 
million (Castles 1995: 300). 
1 The term 'industrialized' instead of 'capitalist' is used here to acknowledge 
that the phenomenon of 'migrant labour' also existed in socialist countries 
(such as the former GDR). However, the focus will be here on western 
European countries with capitalist economies. 
2 'Family formation' refers to the situation in which, for instance, a 
Turkish or Asian person who is a permanent resident in Europe, marries a 
person from the country of origin who is then allowed - more or less easily 
depending on the host country's regulations - to join the spouse in Europe 
(Men ski 1994). 
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Set against a general trend towards restrictive policies dealing with 
future immigration in western Europe are various differing socio-political 
responses of each individual state to the situation of newly settled ethnic 
minorities (Hammar 1985b). In the German context, the dominant aspect of 
the government's 'foreigners' policy' (Auslanderpolitik) was a double strategy 
of integration and 'assistance to return' (Ru.ckkehrforderung). In contrast to 
the de facto permanence of the immigrants' settlement, the immigration status 
of former 'guest-workers' is still officially denied as reflected in the absence of 
a governmental immigration policy and the continuous official claim that 
Germany is not a country of immigration (Layton-Henry 1990:8; Martin & 
Miller 1990:9; Schonwalder 1995:423). 
Britain, as opposed to Germany, solved its manpower shortage partly 
through recruitment from its former colonies in the Caribbean and the Indian 
sub-continent (the highest number of labour migrants came in actual fact 
from Ireland) and granted members of the Commonwealth a privileged status 
as citizens until the introduction of the first Immigration Act in 1962. In sharp 
contrast to Germany, legal equality of the ex-colonial immigrants bound up 
with paternalistic colonial traditions of British society led, as early as the 
1960s, to developments of various ideas about integration (Bahringhorst 
1991). However, similar to Germany, a double strategy was implemented, 
although of different character: On the one hand, harsher immigration 
legislation, and on the other, measures of inclusion such as the introduction of 
the 'Race Relation Acts' began to be introduced in the early 1960s (Lay ton-
Henry 1992). The final aim was the same in both countries: to limit primary 
labour migration. With increased secondary immigration (i.e. family 
reunification and formation) and fairly unsuccessful 'return policies', 
immigrant or ethnic minority communities of a considerable size developed 
as permanent parts of both societies. 
b) The topic of the thesis 
Given this very brief portrait of immigration in Germany and Britain, 
this thesis examines the question of whether citizenship functions, or could 
function, as a mechanism for inclusion and participation for settled, post-war 
labour migrants of non-European origin 3 and their descendants. This means 
3 More precisely, it should be people of 'non-western European origin' as 
Turkey is usually listed (e.g. in statistics on migration flows) under 
'Europe'. In other words, the focus will be here on people who come from 
countries which are not members of the European Union. 
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that in the German context, the focus will be on the experience of the Turks, 
who are by far the largest non-European minority, and on the experiences of 
the diverse ethnic minorities from the Indian sub-continent and the West 
Indies in the British context (see Appendix I for figures). 
The presence of settled non-European immigrant populations of an 
unprecedented size4 and diversity "constitutes a major challenge to the 
concept of citizenship in modern industrial democracies" (Layton-Henry 
1990:vi). Large communities of foreign residents have been established in 
western Europe and high proportions of these "as yet, .... show little sign of 
following the path of previous immigrants by integrating, assimilating and 
becoming naturalised citizens of their new countries of work and residence" 
(Layton-Henry 1991:107). 
This thesis is an investigation of the ways in which, and the reasons 
why, these settled immigrants do not enjoy a fully equal status as citizens, 
despite their long periods of residence and the emergence of subsequent 
generations raised and/ or born in German or British society. Although these 
migrants generally enjoy secure rights of abode, their political and social 
participation in the countries of residence is challenged in many ways, such 
as by right-wing extremist parties and neo-nazi movements (usually in a 
crude and open way) as well as by members of mainstream parties, 
supporting a general climate of restrictive immigration/ inclusion policies. 
Rights to citizenship are central to the issue of who should be included 
in the national society as a participating member with full access to civil, 
political and social rights - the three main elements of citizenship, according 
to Marshall (1950) - and who should be treated as an outsider with lesser 
rights. However, exclusion from socio-national membership is also reflected 
in the mingling of nationality and citizenship laws, whereby the notion of 
'descent' impedes the acquiSition of citizenship. Furthermore, not only the 
dimension of rights and laws is central to the issue of inclusion, but also the 
wider dimension of social participation and recognition within civil societyS. 
Hence, in addition to citizenship / nationality as a legal status, the aspects of 
identifying a national/ citizen and recognizing a 'newcomer' as belonging (or 
not belonging) to a socio-national community are also highly relevant. 
4 Today, 2.5% of the European Community'S population are legal migrants 
from non-European countries (Garcia 1992:14). 
5 The term'civil society' is meant here to refer to the 'indigenous' majority. 
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1.2 Integration into the research context 
a) The particular cases of Germany and Britain - a comparative perspective 
This thesis is mainly a comparison of the socio-political responses to 
post-war labour migration in Germany and Britain. The primary purpose of 
discussing these two 'nation-states' is to show that, despite particular 
historical circumstances, there have been similar trends with regard to the 
citizenship status of permanent non-European immigrants and their 
descendants in both societies. As Britain and Germany are members of the 
European Community, an investigation will follow of how this trend is dealt 
with, or reflected, on the European level, i.e. whether the European 
Community has made any difference to national policies of immigration and 
inclusion. 
Generally speaking, the benefits of comparison are that such an 
analysiS helps to illustrate, firstly, the complex issues involved in different 
historical and cultural contexts of immigrant-receiving countries and, 
secondly, an understanding of the dissimilarities and similarities of 
immigrant peoples' socio-political status in Britain and Germany. In terms of 
broad characteristics, the comparative analysis of Germany and Britain 
involves two less divergent societies rather than highly divergent ones. This 
can be shown with regard to their 'societal frameworks' (for instance, such 
features as being highly advanced industrial societies based on democratic 
political systems within the framework of a nation-state and as being de facto 
multi-ethnic societies). 
Apart from sharing similar societal frameworks, there are differences 
with regard to their histories of developing national membership (based on 
national identity) and their histories of immigration. A detailed comparison 
of Britain and Germany, however, will show that despite these different 
histories, different concepts of membership to the nation-state have become 
more similar when approached from the point of view of immigrants. 
Although these different histories have resulted in different statuses of formal 
citizenship (Le. in legal terms) for immigrants in these hvo countries, there 
have been similar processes of 'ethnicization' (Bos 1993) or 'racialization' 
(Sma111994) of the concept of membership. Citizenship and nationality tend 
to be coterminous. 
Existing comparative studies which contextualize citizenship and 
immigration have not emphasized the latter point strongly enough. Brubaker, 
for example, presents Germany and Britain in the introduction to his edited 
4 
book Immigration and the Politics of Citizenship in Europe {,. North America (1989) 
- a historical account of nation-formation processes - as rather opposing 
examples by emphasizing the early periods of these processes6. Thus, he 
neglects the post-war developments during which unprecedentedly large-
scale immigration of non-Europeans took place resulting, as suggested by Bos 
(1993), in similar 'ethnicization'7 processes of the concept of membership in 
both countries. 
Comparative studies of societal responses to immigration, such as by 
Layton-Henry (1990) and Hammar (1985b), rightly point out the liberal 
position of Britain with regard to naturalization procedures, dual nationality 
and the granting of voting rights to its ethnic minorities, as opposed to 
Germany's illiberalism in this respect. However, these studies, which are in 
places somewhat descriptive, fail to emphasize the particular British historical 
circumstances which resulted in a more liberal position vis-a-vis its labour 
migrants, i.e. the peculiarity of the Empire with regard to Britain's concept of 
common subjecthood and the colonial link between Britain and most of its 
post-war immigrants. Moreover, they fail to show post-war tendencies of the 
British and German position approaching each other (Le. from liberal to less 
liberal in the former case and from extremely exclusionary to less 
exclusionary in the latter case) with similar exclusionary implications for 
ethnic minorities. 
In the post-war period, Germany and Britain have accommodated 
comparatively large numbers of labour migrants from non-European 
backgrounds with non-Christian religions. They both stopped immigration of 
workers during the early 1970s and since then implemented harsher and 
harsher immigration legislation or other types of control. In both countries the 
'ethnic' or 'racial' issues have been major components of daily politics (van 
Dijk 1993) which have been recently characterized by a certain revival of 
nationalistic and anti-immigrant tendencies8. The restrictive immigration 
policies are, however, not confined to the right-wing/ conservative discourse, 
6 This is done by Brubaker in more detail in his book Citizenship and 
Nationhood in France and GermanY (1992) in which the British situation is 
not discussed. 
7 'Ethnicization' in the context of the acquisition of citizenship refers to 
the shift from the territorial principle to the principle of blood-relatedness 
or, in other words, from ius soli to ius sanguinis. 
8 For right-wing/conservative British political discourse see Gilroy (1987), 
Barker (1981), eees (1982); for German right-wing/conservative political 
discourse see Faist (1994a+b). 
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but it has been suggested that all of the governments elected to office in 
Germany and Britain took a strong stand on immigration as well as asylum 
(Small 1994; Faist 1994a+b; Layton-Henry 1991). This has certain implications 
for settled immigrants in that they are pictured as undesired or even 
criminalized in the context of immigration control and repatriation (Castles 
1993:24). Nonetheless, it seems to be in particular the New Right's discourse9 
which revived a form of "racially based theory of nationalism" (Cohen 
1994:202) where "the process of national decline is often presented as 
coinciding with the dilution of one homogeneous stock by alien strains" 
(Sarup 1991; as quoted by Cohen, ibid.). This sort of discourse also involves 
the question of 'scapegoating' of immigrant populations in times of socio-
economic crises. Statements put forward in both countries which centre upon 
the 'scrounging of welfare service' or defending a narrow nationalism - for 
whichever reason - do much harm by rendering respectability to intolerant 
ideas. 
Ethno-centric or racist views as to who should qualify as a full member 
of the national community are either enshrined in constitutional form, as in 
the German case, or in immigration legislation, as in the British case. 
Discourses around 'repatriation' of immigrants have played an important role 
in both countries (Small 1994; Bahringhorst 1991), although a clear policy, by 
which immigrants were offered financial support for returning to their 
countries of origin, existed only in Germany. Thus, despite ideals of freedom, 
equality and democracy, both countries have systematically excluded a 
significant portion of their population from the benefits of such ideals. 
Another aspect of common ground shared by Germany and Britain 
with regard to their socio-political structure can be found in their 
membership of the European Community. It has to be noted, however, that 
Germany was among the founding countries and Britain did not enter until 
1973 - a fact which partly explains the different levels of commitment to the 
European idea10 and the differing perceptions of the role of the Community. 
This is also likely to have an impact on the understanding of European 
citizenship. Therefore, although with the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty 
both countries are equally involved in the process of European integration 
and in the materialization and development of European citizenship, the 
actual ideas behind these processes might not be the same. The latter is of 
9 For a brief over-view of New Right's schools of thought see Grant (1993). 
10 For more details on the British re-orientation from the 
Empire/Commonwealth towards Europe see George (1990 and 1991). 
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crucial interest here regarding the issue of granting European citizenship to 
peoples of non-European background living permanently in Ee territory. 
Moreover, a comparative analysis of Britain and Germany should enable the 
assessment of the likelihood that the European Community could harmonize 
the various policies of inclusion (e.g. nationality laws, anti-discrimination 
legislation) that already exist in the individual member-states. 
With regard to academic discourse, in both countries a considerable 
amount of literature has been produced on historical and ideological aspects 
of nationhood, citizenship and/ or nationality. However, in Britain there has 
been an emphasis on research into what Banton has called the 'race relations 
problematic' (Banton 1991; see also Wrench & Solomos 1993:157; Wilpert 
1993:67). A comparative analysis of Germany and Britain is useful to explain 
why there is a lack of such theorizing of racism in contemporary German 
society and why there is a difference in concepts, as reflected in the 
terminology of racism versus Ausliinderfeindlichkeit (hostility towards 
foreigners). 
Furthermore, there seems to be a new trend among 'British' academics 
towards a greater interest in ethnicity and nationalism rather than 'race 
relations' (Anthias 1995). Authors such as Barker (1981), Gilroy (1987) and 
Miles (1993) argue that racist discourse now revolves more around cultural 
identity and national boundaries rather than biological concepts. This line of 
argument has, however, so far not been contextualized with the issue of 
citizenship - neither in Germany nor in Britain. 
It will be emphasized throughout this thesis that, despite historical 
differences and quite different policies of inclusion, the effects of nationalism 
and racism have had similar results in Germany and Britain viz. racialized 
'new' ethnic minorities who are excluded from citizenship and whose social 
and cultural position is mostly below that of the majority. 
There is, among others (which are mainly the subject of the chapter on 
racism), one terminological issue which needs clarifying when employing a 
comparative analysis of Britain and Germany. This comparison is that of two 
nation-states. However, in the British case, the overwhelming concentration 
of ethnic minorities from former colonies are resident in England and all the 
sources of the empirical data (groups and organizations interviewed) are 
located in England (in fact in London). In addition, there is this complex issue 
of Irish, Scottish, Welsh and English identity incorporated in the whole of the 
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United Kingdom. It seems, therefore, almost more appropriate to refer to 
England. However, all legal provisions (the national as well as the Ee 
legislation) regarding citizenship hold for the entire United Kingdom. Also, 
contemporary attitudes and conduct towards outsiders seem to have their 
larger British manifestation. Ireland is viewed in this respect as a special case, 
as its historical attachment to Great Britain has not been as long as that of 
Wales and Scotland. More importantly, its attachment to Britain has always 
been violently contested by certain parts of the Irish people so that it is 
preferred here to exclude Ireland (in particular from the discussion of racism 
and its history). Thus, this analysis will be mostly confined to Great Britain 
(which is referred to here as Britain out of mere convenience), and only in 
sections dealing with historical developments will a clear differentiation be 
made between England, Scotland and Wales. 
In the case of Germany, only post-war labour migration into the 
western part will be discussed. The situation of labour migrants in the ex-
GDR was different and will be ignored here. However, the country has been 
reunited since 1990 and the new socio-economic problems - having resulted 
in rising anti-foreigners sentiments - affect former guest workers' social 
position in the East and West (RathzeI1995). Therefore, reference will always 
be made to the whole of Germany, unless stated differently. 
b) The analytical framework 
Inclusion and exclu.sion 
The perception of long-term residents of non-European background as 
permanent settlers and an integral part of the resident population requires 
their inclusion into the sodo-national community to achieve sodal justice and 
to maintain social peacel1 . Thus, only those issues which have an impact on 
the socio-Iegal inclusion of immigrant minorities and which test their 
legitimate membership are considered. The outcome of insufficient inclusion 
would be exclusion 12 which may be based on legal mechanisms (such as 
II It might be useful at this point to explain the difference between 
inclusion and integration as suggested by Soysal (1994). Inclusion means 
legal and organizational incorporation by state-policies and refers to a 
macro-level process whereby the migrant becomes part of the host polity. 
Integration involves the adjustment by the migrant to the host society 
under the assumption of an individual, micro-level process. 
12 Exclusion is not understood here as total exclusion which would mean 
preventing the entry of all immigrants and the total refusal of 
naturalization etc. 
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sharp distinctions between the rights of citizens and non-citizens, complicated 
naturalization procedures) or on informal practices (based on, e.g., racism and 
nationalism within civil society). 
Citizenship and the effects of nationalism and racism 
The main argument established here is that there exists a link between 
racism and nationalism, both of which are understood as ideologies (or 
discourses) and practices. The relationship betw·een nationalism and racism-
which is regarded as symbiotic whereby neither can be given an absolute 
priority over the other - is reflected on the state level within the intermingling 
of nationality and citizenship laws as well as within the perception of civil 
society. Thus, it is argued that this relationship has exclusionary implications 
for 'new' ethnic minorities' citizenship status. 
As the majority of modem states established a link between citizenship 
and nationality, "nationality is considered as a necessary, if not sufficient, 
condition for the exercise of citizenship" (Leca, in: Mouffe 1992:21). Thus, in 
the context of inclusion of immigrants, citizenship raises a number of issues, 
"in one case concerning national identity and the historical role of nation-
states as the pre-eminent modern form of organization of a political 
community" (Bottomore, in: Marshall & Bottomore 1992:85), and in the other 
case, concerning rights and 'liberties' (Held 1991) of individuals living in a 
state. Immigrant peoples' membership of a state might be accorded formal 
recognition in law, while their presence and participation as full citizens is 
still questioned within civil society. 
Nationalism is here understood as the ideological or discursive 
articulation of national identity, i.e. as ideologies or "discourses in which 
[collective, N.P.] identities and counter-identities are conceived and through 
which they are sustained" (Bauman 1992:678) 13. In other words, the construct 
of the 'nation' tends to depict 'the people' with the notion of descent and 
blood-relatedness, or - as suggested by Arendt - as "one super-human family 
that we call 'society' and its political form of organization called 'nation-state'" 
(1958:29). As a result, clear boundaries (or lines) are drawn between those 
13 For a brief explanation of the difference between 'ideology' and 
'discourse' see Hall (1992b:291-295). The author of this thesis is aware of 
these differences, but decided not to settle on one of them as in the material 
cited here either one of these terms is employed depending on the 
respective author's perspective. 
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who belong and those who do not belong to the sociD-national community. 
''These lines are essentially established within the laws of nationality, but they 
are not at all restricted to these formal relationships." (Goulboume 1991:17). 
The distinction between belonging and non-belonging is, however, not only 
one of the main purposes of nationalism, but also of racism. Therefore, it is 
argued here that national identity and identity as a 'race' are intermingled. 
Identity 
There are many forms of identity but only one is of interest here, 
collective identity. It is described by Passerin d'Entreves as a 'we' identity 
which is not given but which must be constantly negotiated. "[T]he creation of 
a 'we' with which we are able to identify both ourselves and our actions ... [is a] 
process of identity-construction [which] is never given once and for all, and 
[which] is never unproblematic. Rather, it is a process of constant 
renegotiation and struggle, a process in which actors articulate and defend 
competing conceptions of cultural and political identity." (in: Mou££e 
1992:157). 
One form of collective identity is nationality (as distinct from 
nationality as a legal status). As a feeling of cultural togetherness, nationality 
is suggested by Heater (1990) to be a mental construct which does not 
necessarily have to correspond with a sense (or the perception) of being a 
citizen. 
National identity should not be confused with other types of identity. 
The aspect which distinguishes nationality from other types of identity 
derives from the fact that it is a source of individual identity within a 'people' 
which is seen as the basis of collective solidarity. The 'people' "is the mass of a 
population whose boundaries and nature are defined in various ways, but 
which is usually perceived as larger than any concrete community" 
(Greenfeld 1992:3). Since the emergence of European nation-states, 
universalistic and particularistic notions of the 'nation' have tended to co-exist 
(RathzeI1995; Bauman 1992) and thus, national identity frequently utilizes 
ethnic or 'racial' characteristics for self-identification as well as for 
establishing "a natural division of the world's population into discrete 
categories" (Miles 1993:62; original emphasis). 
The second form of collective identity is citizenship. One of the 
particular features of an 'identity-as-citizen' is "the way in which it overlays 
the other social identities the individual inevitably feels." (Heater 1990:183). 
These other social identities based on, for instance, class, ethnic or gender 
divisions, can create intense antagonisms. Citizenship as a political identity, 
10 
however, can help to generate an awareness of responsibility for conciliating 
conflicting interests and thus, help to appease social antagonisms. However, 
"as nationality became associated in the ideology of nationalism with the 
doctrine of popular sovereignty, it became important that cultural nationality 
and legal citizenship should correspond." (ibid.:185). Hence, the two sources 
of collective identity, citizenship and nationality, tend to be enmeshed and 
thus, counteract the conciliatory function of citizenship by involving 
exclusionary effects for immigrant minorities. I will argue here, however, that 
not only the identity as a citizen tends to be equated with national identity, 
but also that the identity as a 'national' is linked to the identity as a 'race'. 
Therefore, the drawing of boundaries between insiders and outsiders of a 
socio-national community also involves processes of racialization. This is 
reflected in German and British law as well as within civil society. 
To sum up, the following questions will be dealt with in this thesis: 
How does the relationship between nationalism and racism affect immigrants' 
citizenship status? Can citizenship diminish the power of this relationship? 
To what extent does citizenship function as a mechanism for inclusion? To 
find answers to these questions, the conceptual link between citizenship and 
nationality with its racializing effects on ethnic minorities will be shown in 
the historical and legal contexts of Germany and Britain as well as in the 
wider perception of civil society in both countries. 
1.3 Structure of the thesis (chapter &uide) 
The next chapter contains a discussion of the methods of research 
employed as well as the nature and sources of the empirical data which 
derive from pressure or lobby groups working in the 'race relations' field in 
Germany and Britain and which are about views on racism, national/ 
European identity, and citizenship. 
The chapter following the explanations on methodology and 
empirical data, Chapter Three, will provide a full account of policies of 
immigration or inclusion and measures established by the European 
Community and their possible consequences for the position of non-
European immigrants in the European context. It will be shown that, from the 
perspective of post-war labour migration, the EC has minimal influence on 
matters of inclusion and is rather preoccupied with immigration issues 
revolving around border controls and visa requirements. To illustrate this 
point, the creation of 'Fortress Europe' and its implications on third country 
11 
nationals' position, both within the single member-states and within the 
whole Community as a whole, are investigated. 
Chapter Four deals with the issue of racism and, first of all, explains 
the conceptual divergence in Britain and Germany as reflected in the different 
terminologies employed in both countries (racism versus Ausliinderfeind-
lichkeit). It further outlines existing theories on racism relevant in the context 
of national identity/nationalism and citizenship. These theories will be 
combined or elaborated to approach the issue of racism from the perspective 
of national and supranational (European) citizenship. 
Chapter Five briefly presents the relevant theories behind the 
formation of nation-states and national identity. It will be shown how 
national identity is closely linked to identity as a 'race', internally (identity as 
superior 'race') as well as externally (vis-a-vis the Other, Le. the inferior 'race'). 
In the context of post-war immigration, the new situation that 
unprecedentedly large, settled ethnic minority populations pose to the issue 
of national identity will be investigated with the help of the notion of 'identity 
crisis'. It will be suggested that racializing and thus exclusionary effects of 
national identity still exist. The possibility of a new form of identity, i.e. post-
national or post-conventional, will be discussed. 
Chapter Six outlines the relevant theories on citizenship and describes 
their shortcomings when approached from the point of view of non-European 
immigrants and their descendants. The development of a conception of 
citizenship in this context is attempted. The aspect of citizenship is then 
looked at in more detail in both British and German contexts. In a further 
section, citizenship is approached from the post-national, i.e. European 
Union, level and European citizenship for non-European immigrants will be 
assessed. A final section on future developments explores the potential of 
local citizenship as a possible result of the establishment of the Committee of 
the Regions by the Maastricht Treaty and the principle of subsidiarity. 
Chapter Seven includes material on 'mass discourse' in both countries. 
It looks into the viewpoints held by civil society (i.e. the 'indigenous' 
population) on the racism/ nationalism/ citizenship issues central to this 
thesis as generated by studies on social attitudes and opinion surveys. The 
findings will show a high degree of polarization of 'the public's opinion', but 
will nonetheless enable a broad generalization about the general public's 
attitudes on the relevant issues. 
Chapter Eight covers an elite perspective on the three main issues in 
form of political discourse. Reports of parliamentary debates topicalizing 
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issues of immigration and issues related to ethnic minorities have been 
selected to show the language and definitions being used and the connections 
being made between the relevant elements in this thesis. Both chapters (Seven 
and Eight) will illustrate the inter-relatedness of public opinion and 
politicians' discourse and its effects on ethnic minorities' citizenship status. 
Chapter Nine deals with the data obtained in the interviews structured 
in sections on the same main topics as above: racism, national identity and, 
finally, citizenship. Each section is subdivided into the data obtained from 
'British' and 'German' sources and the EU source. Similarities and 
dissimilarities in the findings will be specially pointed out and references to 
the arguments developed in the 'theory' chapters will be made. 
The final chapter contains the conclusion and future perspectives on a 
more inclusive concept of citizenship. 
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2. Methods of Research 
To understand the relationship between nationalism, racism and 
citizenship and this relationship's impact on immigrant minorities, I reviewed 
the relevant academic literature, ED and governmental reports or documents, 
the constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany as well as leaflets and 
other publications by the interviewed organizations. Public opinion surveys 
were consulted to establish broad generalizations on the part of civil society, 
as well as relevant parliamentary debates to gain insight into an elitist 
perspective of people who are responsible for policy-making and who have a 
certain degree of influence on public opinion. I then wanted to probe the 
findings from the literature and my own thoughts from the viewpoint of 
ethnic minorities. Interviewing of organizations who are actively engaged in 
improving 'race relations' was, therefore, chosen as a method to gain insight 
into: 1. differences and similarities in conceptual thinking in Germany and 
Britain, 2. their views on exclusionary tendencies (based on the combined 
influence of racism and nationalism) of citizenship, and 3. their ideas on the 
possibility for a more inclusive concept of membership in the socio-national 
community as well as on ED-level. 
2.1 Attitude surveys and opinion polls 
A number of surveys and polls, mainly conducted during the 1990s, 
were selected to show trends in the majority population's attitudes vis-a-vis 
ethnic minorities. This was done via secondary analysis of already existing 
data which is admittedly not a perfect method as I did not design the 
questions myself, and as the questions were, therefore, not necessarily the sort 
of questions that I would have asked - neither in terms of wording, nor in 
terms of the issue raised. In particular in a comparative analysis, the fact that 
data derived from questions designed by different researchers at different 
points of time, with possibly different objectives, could be regarded as a 
serious flaw. In addition, the trustworthiness of some of these surveys and 
polls has to be queried as polling institutions or survey teams are often 
'appointed' by governmental ministries or political parties to serve certain 
purposes rather than to reflect 'reality'. It is, however, not an easy task to 
theorize about 'mass discourse', and this method was chosen with the aim of 
establishing very broad generalizations about, and trends in, the attitudes of 
the 'indigenous' population to ethnic minorities related issues. A further aim 
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of the analysis of attitude surveys and opinion polls was to illustrate the link 
between 'public opinion' and 'political discourse'. 
2.2 Discourse analysis 
A selection of key parliamentary debates, held during the 1990s, was 
investigated for the connections made between racialization, nationalism and 
citizenship by well-established and recognized politicians who played a 
crucial role in opinion forming or reflecting. In the British context, these 
debates revolved around the issue of asylum and immigration as ethnic 
minority related issues are rarely debated in the British Parliament; in the 
German context, amendments to the nationality/citizenship law and the 
Foreigners' Law were the main issues debated. Although the German and 
British debates did not topicalize exactly the same issues, they were analysed 
by establishing common rhetorical themes and methods. 
Instead of interviewing, the method of discourse analysis was chosen 
as parliamentary debates are usually more mentally developed and appear in 
the context of attacking the political opponent by claiming to act on behalf of 
the people's will or for the people's good. It was the aim to show MPs' 
involvement in the reproduction of nationalism and racialization by way of 
subtle or indirect forms of rhetoric. It is exactly this type of discourse which 
influences the public more than the bluntness of right-wing extremists who 
are only supported by a minority. 
2.3 The interviews 
After having analyzed the general public's attitudes and the elitist 
perspective of parliamentarians, the next objective was to gain insight into the 
viewpoint of ethnic minorities themselves. 1his was done via interviews with 
representatives of organizations working in the 'race relations' field. 
a) Reasons for choice of method 
There are different types of interviewing methods and for this thesis, 
the semi-structured type was employed. One of the reasons for choosing this 
type of interviewing as a method of research is its qualitative nature 1. This is 
an important aspect as the social world in general is understood here as an 
interactive process, i.e. as constructed by individuals who actively contribute 
1 ••. as opposed to quantitative methods such as surveyor experimental 
research. 
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meaning to it, "both through their interpretations and through actions based 
on those interpretations" (Hammersley 1992:44). Construction and 
interpretation of social phenomena can best be grasped by qualitative 
methods. 
One of the reasons why interviewing was specifically chosen among 
other qualitative methods is that "interviewing offers researchers access to 
people's ideas, thoughts, and memories in their own words rather than in the 
words of the researcher" (Reinharz 1992:19). Interviewing differs from 
ethnography as it does not involve long periods of researcher participation in 
the life of the interviewees (which was not the purpose here). It also differs 
from survey research2 or structured interviewing by including free interaction 
between the researcher and interviewee and, thus, offers opportunities for 
clarification and discussion (Reinharz 1992) - an aspect which is also 
important in the context of power relations (see section on issues of validity). 
As the selected interviewees (see appendix) can be regarded as opinion 
leaders in the 'race relations field' with a lot of experience with, and 
knowledge of, different levels of governance (Le. at grass-root or local, 
national and EC level), their ideas and thoughts are viewed as vital to gain 
further understanding of the workings of racism, nationalism and citizenship. 
Most of the interviewees' previous careers were in politics (local and 
national), administration (local councils) or education (secondary and 
tertiary). Thus, they are familiar with the main problems and concerns of 
immigrant communities and are also in full knowledge of governmental 
policies and of European Community policies - the latter, however, often to a 
less detailed extent. In this capacity, their responses give a valuable 
assessment of the author's theoretical and practical ideas and findings from 
the literature. Moreover, the responses to similar questions in Germany and 
Britain are seen as helpful to work out the differences and similarities in 
conceptual thinking in both countries. 
b) Selection of interviewees 
Interviews were conducted in Germany and Britain with senior 
personnel working in lobby groups/organizations or institutions in the so-
called 'race relations field' (in Germany, this is called 'Ausliinderarbeit'). 
In Germany, the following groups/ organizations were interviewed: 
2 Hammersley & Atkinson (1983), for instance, reject the survey method on 
the grounds that it is incapable of capturing the meaning of everyday 
human activities. 
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• Forum Buntes Deutschland - S.O.S Rassismus e.V. in Bonn 
- Amt fiir Multikulturelle Angelegenheiten der Stadt Frankfurt am Main 
- Aus1i:inderbeauftragte des Senats zu Berlin (two representatives) 
- Tiirkische Gemeinde, Berlin 
- Biindnis tiirkischer Einwanderer in Berlin-Brandenburg e.V. 
- TGB Hamburg e.V. (Bund tiirkischer Einwanderer) 
- WIR - Internationales Zentrum, Hamburg; 
in Britain, the following groups/organizations/institutions were interviewed: 
- Anti-Racist Alliance, London 
- Commission for Racial Equality, London 
- Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants, London 
- Indian Workers Association, London 
- The Runnymede Trust, London; 
At the EC levee the European Union's Migrants Forum was available as 
interviewee. For more detailed information on the interviewees' 
organizations, their functions and objectives, see Appendix II. 
The German lobby groups or organizations were chosen because they 
represent different levels of organizations working at the governmental, semi-
governmental and grass-root levels. They, therefore, represent different levels 
of governance. Further, they are involved in different types of activities all 
centred upon the improvement of 'immigrant' peoples' socio-economic 
position. For example, there are the Commissioner for Foreigners' Affairs in 
Berlin and the Office for Multi-cultural Matters in Frankfurt which are federal 
state, i.e. Uinder, governmental institutions. Their work, among others, shows 
how official policies are implemented, what the official approach is to the 
settlement of the immigrants and what aims there are for the future at the 
official level. Moreover, as these institutions are in daily contact with smaller 
groups which work more at grass-root level, they are aware of both the 
shortcomings of official policies and the demands for improvement as 
expressed by specific ethnic minorities' organizations or individual members 
of ethnic minority communities. 
The remaining associations work at grassroot level and can be divided 
into two groups: the first consisting of those run by Turkish people but not 
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exclusively for the Turkish community. The Turks are the largest post-war 
labour migrant group and ethno-culturally the most distant (Martin & Miller 
1990:10). They were, therefore, selected to express their views on 
citizenship/nationality and racialization. The second group (Forum Buntes 
Deutschland e.V. - S.O.S. Rassismus and WIR Internationales Zentrum) 
represents organizations which were originally established by German 
(indigenous) people to promote inter-ethnic/inter-'racial' relations. The 
Forum Buntes Deutschland e.V. is the only nationally organized lobby group 
having as its members various local and regional groups. 
The British interviewees were also selected because they represent 
different levels of governance and are engaged in a range of activities in the 
field of 'race relations'. The Commission for Racial Equality is the only semi-
governmental organization (set up by the Race Relations Act of 1976) mainly 
dealing with legal cases of racial discrimination. The remaining organizations 
are pressure groups, such as the Runnymede Trust chosen for its specific 
interest in two of the three main issues of this study (national 
identity /nationalism and racism), and the Joint Council for the Welfare of 
Immigrants chosen for its expertise in citizenship/nationality law and 
immigration law. The Indian Workers Association represents the largest 
minority group in Britain, and the Anti-Racist Alliance is, as its name 
indicates, very much engaged in activities against racial discrimination and 
violence. The latter two tend to work at grass-root level. 
The EU Migrants Forum is the only organization established to 
represent immigrants from non-European backgrounds or who are of non-EU 
nationality but resident within an EU-member-state. It is the only European 
wide organized lobby group which is concerned with citizenship issues and 
racial discrimination of non-European immigrants. Within the structure of the 
Community, there is no official institution which works in the 'race relations 
field'. Immigration is dealt with by intergovernmental meetings outside the 
Community; issues of nationality and citizenship are for discussion and 
decision within each member-state (see also Chapter Three). 
Eight interviews with senior personnel of organizations in Germany 
were conducted as opposed to five in Britain. This appears unequal, but it 
happened so because the first two interviews (AusHinderbeauftragte in Berlin) 
were conducted as pilot studies to test whether the interview questions made 
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any sense to the organizations and whether they were able to respond. The 
value of the data collected in these interviews warranted their inclusion in the 
main study. 
2.3.1 Planning, structure, and content of the interviews 
a) Planning 
After selecting the organizations with which interviews would be 
conducted and after designing the interview questions, the interviewees were 
contacted by letter explaining the research objectives and assuring 
confidentiality. In most cases, positive responses were forthcoming. The first 
two pilot interviews had been conducted in December 1993, the remaining 
interviews during the period from February to April 1994. 
b) Structure and content 
The interviews were undertaken with the heads or other senior 
members of staff of the selected organizations and they were structured 
around three main issues: national identity I European identity, racism and 
citizenship. Despite this formal framework of questions (as can be seen in the 
Appendix II!), the interviews were treated as semi-structured and conducted 
according to the development of each interview situation. The number of 
responses for specific questions varied because of variations in respondents' 
expertise about particular issues. In some cases, the interviewees elaborated 
on a particular area of knowledge and interest of their organizations. This 
meant that other issues had to be neglected, but it served the purpose of 
finding out each organization'S priorities and main concerns. In general, 
however, questions about all three areas - national identity I European 
identity, racism and citizenship - were responded to. 
Furthermore, the questions put to the interviewees in Bri tain and 
Germany could not always be identical as certain issues are not discussed 
with the same conceptual thinking and terminology. 
All of the interviews were conducted by the author of this thesis. They 
were tape-recorded with the consent of each interviewee (which was in fact 
given by all of them). Generally speaking, the atmosphere during the 
interviews was very relaxed - apart from two cases which were conducted 
under time pressure due to the interviewees' unexpected delay in previous 
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meetings. As a result, the interviewees' schedules of the day were disrupted 
and, therefore, it was tacitly understood that the interviews had to be kept as 
short as possible. 
The interviews lasted from between forty-five minutes to two and a 
half hours, with the average length of approximately an hour and a half. Most 
interviewees had their own offices or were interviewed at their home and 
thus most interviews were conducted without the presence of other people. 
Interruptions by telephone calls or colleagues/ secretaries were rare and did 
mostly not have a negative impact on the flow of the interviews. 
In almost all cases, it was easy to establish good relationships with the 
interviewees who appeared more than willing to talk. In part, they seemed 
pleased to get attention (a feeling the author had in particular in Germany 
when visiting Turkish organizations) and thus they seemed to be positively 
inclined to express their views on the above issues. 
2.3.2 The analysis 
I started the process of analysis with some systematic procedures such 
as transcribing each interview personally and reading the scripts over and 
over again. The resultant familiarity with the data led to the emergence of the 
sub-themes in each main area of focus (national/European identity, racism 
and citizenship). These themes evolved throughout the whole research as a 
development of my own understanding and experience, academic debate and 
the interviewed organizations' perspectives. This led to a process of selecting 
key concepts and key interview excerpts. 
The categorization of the interviewees' replies under different headings 
was of course not always clear-cut as the issues involved appeared complex 
and interrelated. Replies made to questions on exclusionary aspects of 
national identity, for example, were repeated as aspects of racism and as 
aspects encroaching on immigrants' formal/substantive citizenship. This 
inter-relatedness, however, helped to develop part of the argument of 1. the 
symbiotic relationship between nationalism and racism; and 2. the link 
between identity as a 'race', a 'nation' and citizens with exclusionary effects on 
'new' ethnic minorities' membership - in legal terms as well as sodo-cultural. 
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2.3.3 'Racial matching' - an obstacle to validity? 
One immediate issue arising from this research is that of the practice of 
cross-'racial' interviewingl i.e. the 'racial matching' of interviewer and 
informant. More than half the interviews conducted for this research have 
been with members of an ethnic minority (five out of eight in the German 
context, two out of five in the British case; the interviewee of the EU Migrants 
Forum was also a member of an ethnic minority). 
According to Rhodes (1994), the argument of the critics of cross-'racial' 
interviewing maintains that racism is an inherent feature of British (this can 
also be applied to German) social life and that members of ethnic minorities 
distrust 'white' people in general. Therefore, this mistrust is extended to the 
'white' researcher or interviewer, preventing access or distorting the quality of 
communication. Critics would also argue that people from ethnic minorities 
are not simply inhibited in their communications to a 'white' interviewer with 
the information being passed through a 'white' cultural filter, but that there 
are dimensions to ethnic minorities' experience invisible to the 'white' 
interviewer who is said to neither possess the language nor the cultural 
equipment to understand that experience. "In other words, the lack of an 
insider perspective precludes the white person from access to the black social 
world, whereas necessity has taught black people to be competent in both" 
(Rhodes 1994:549). 
However, it is agreed here with Rhodes, who criticizes the above line 
of arguing, that the relationship of power and the lacking of an insider 
perspective in an interview situation do not always have to work in this way. 
The interviews for this studYI for example, took place in the interviewees' 
work environment (Le. in the offices of the respective institution or 
organization) or in some cases in the respondents' home (EU Migrants Forum, 
Anti-Racist Alliance) which means that the interviews were conducted in 
familiar surroundings. In a similar way as described in Rhodes' own study on 
prospective black foster parents, it was the case that "[t]he interviewer was 
'invited in' on terms largely imposed by the interviewee who decided in 
which room the interview would take place, where the interviewer and they 
themselves would sit, whether and how to answer the interviewers' 
questions, and so on" (op.cit.:549). In the case of this study, the interviewees 
decided on the length of the interview themselves (although a minimum 
amount of time necessary was suggested by the interviewer). In the case of 
the particular circumstances of two interviews, it was tacitly understood by 
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the researcher that it would have been inappropriate to keep the interviewees 
for the desired length of time even, although the delay had not been the 
researcher's fault and in spite of the fact that the researcher had been 
inconvenienced. Therefore, only the main questions were asked. 
Also, as opposed to quantitative questionnaire type of survey research 
during which the researcher determines the interview questions and 
language, employing qualitative techniques leaves the content and language 
more open to negotiation. Thus, U[a] more interactive approach can give 
interviewees greater power in negotiation of the pace and content of the 
interview, to direct the flow of conversation, and to ask questions themselves. 
Where interviews take place in respondents' homes [or offices, N.P.], familiar 
territory generates confidence, the interviewer is invited in as a 'guest' and the 
balance of power is more likely to tilt in the interviewee's favour." 
(op.cit.:555). The aspect of having been invited as a 'guest' was strongly felt in 
the conduct of the interviews for this thesis. It was totally up to the 
interviewees when they were 'ready' for the interviews to start and when to 
finish. Despite a pre-arranged time and a suggested length, the start of the 
interviews were often delayed, as they mostly took place in the interviewees' 
work environment. In this way, the interviews did not interrupt the flow of 
the interviewees' daily work or the completion of a previous task. 
Moreover, as Rhodes rightly remarks, arguments for the exclusion of 
'white' researchers with ethnic minorities on the basis that the relationship of 
power between researcher and researched tends to be unidirectional ignores 
the fact that the researcher is dependant on respondents' co-operation in the 
research process and the negotiation which occurs during the course of any 
exchange. 
In addition to that, Rhodes suggests that the significance of skin colour 
does not have to be the same from start to finish of an interview and more can 
be gained from considering it as an interactive factor in the dynamiC context 
of each interview than from singling it out as the dominating dimension. 
Also, skin colour or ethnic background are not the only 'social signifiers' and 
are not always significant to participants depending on the topiCS discussed. 
Dimensions such as gender, class, age, education and professional status can 
all emerge with different significance during the course of an interview. 
Moreover, according to Rhodes' experience, it may be the case that the 'white' 
interviewer has the advantage of a certain 'stranger value' (op.cit.:551). In the 
interviews conducted for this study, I had the impression that education and 
professional status played an important role in establishing 'common ground' 
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as the interviewees were mostly leading figures in their organizations. In the 
case of the interviews conducted in Britain, I felt, similarly to Rhodes, that 
although being 'white', it was of advantage to be German, i.e. non-British. In 
the case of interviews conducted in both Germany and Britain, it was 
certainly of advantage for me to have experienced living abroad, i.e. to be an 
'immigrant' myself (albeit not in the context of racialization, but certainly in 
the context of the issues of citizenship and national identity). 
However, there still remains the issue of the interpretation usually 
being the sole task of the researcher and as such, it seems inevitably to be 
subject to a 'white' cultural filter. But this is not only an issue in the context of 
'racial' matching as the personal background of the researcher (in terms of 
ethnicity, class, gender etc.) is always reflected in any analysis (Stanley & 
Wise 1993). As for the actual content of this research, the issues of racism, 
national identity and citizenship in multi-ethnic! multi-cultural societies were 
all approached from the perspective of the majority in a critical way. The 
whole content of this research is meant to improve the awareness of the 
majority for ethnic minorities' situations and concerns in the areas 
investigated and this was certainly understood by most of the interviewees. 
The experience of this study has led to an agreement with Rhodes that "in 
certain circumstances and for certain research questions, the 'racial' matching 
of interviewer and respondent may be appropriate" (1994:557; emphasis 
added), but this should not be viewed as a general strategy. Non-racial 
elements can influence the positive or negative outcome of an interviewing 
situation. Also, the power relationship between researcher and researched in 
a 'black-and-white' setting depends very much on the specific research 
content, the research method, and - in the case of interviewing - the actual 
interview situation. Thus, the balance of power in an interview situation of 
'non-racial matching' does not have to tilt in the 'white' interviewer's favour. 
On the whole, the interviews with senior personnel of the selected 
organizations offered valuable insight into the complex workings of racism, 
nationalism and citizenship for ethnic minorities in Germany and Britain (as 
well as the EU as a total) in addition to the governmental or EU reports and 
academic literature. As 'grass-root' organizations or 'mouthpieces' of grass-
root groups, a variety of views were expressed by the interviewees adding a 
number of conceptual and pragmatic aspects to the debate on citizenship. 
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3. The European context 
This chapter will put the issue of immigrants' permanent settlement 
into the wider European context and will investigate the EC's competence 
regarding third-country nationals. 
The creation of the European Community and its organizational 
developments are of great importance in the context of international labour 
migration as it is the best known and most tightly integrated of the regional 
organizations of Europe as far as common economic policies are concerned l . 
Essentially, as the EC was in the first place an economic community, the 
creation of the EC aimed at closer economic integration. In general, this meant 
the creation of a Common Market, including a series of targets for the 
establishment of common economic policies. In particular, this involved the 
free movement of capital, goods, services and people as the gradual aim and 
thus, labour migration was a central feature of EC policy. 
The institutional and policy influence of the European Community on 
migration (internally as well as from outside) will be considered in the 
following sections. The main argument is that the EC has not had any major 
impact on the nationally existing policies to include non-European 
immigrants. Special emphasis will be given to demonstrating the general 
tendency towards stricter border controls and immigration regulations and a 
tendency to deal with these in an intergovernmental structure rather than as 
EC-policies. The predominance of the national level and the little difference 
the EU has made concerning settled third-country nationals will become 
clear. 
3.1. General Community policies on immi&ration - Fortress Europe? 
In the context of immigration from outside Europe and asylum 
policies, the key point arising from the creation of a single Europe in the post-
1992 period is the concern that it wi1llead to the virtual closure of the EC to 
non-EC labour migrants and the creation of what has been labelled a 'fortress' 
(Nederveen Pieterse 1991; Gordon 1989; The Economist 1991; Cohen 1994: 
chapter six), This image of a 'fortress' derives from the relaxation of internal 
border controls within the Community (in order to realize the principle of 
free movement) on the one hand, with the consequence being (for all 
1 At least since the Maastricht Treaty, however, common policies are not 
confined to the area of economics, but have been expanded to include social 
pOliCies. 
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member-states alike) the prevention of entry to non-EC nationals, in 
particular those from the so-called Third World, on the other hand. This will 
require the harmonization of member-states' immigration policies in relation 
to nationals of non-EC countries through a common Ee policy on 
immigration. 
The creation of a 'Fortress Europe' (Le. stricter border controls and 
immigration regulations) seems also to be of concern to settled immigrants. 
To show the implications for these 'new' ethnic minorities, a brief summary of 
the policy developments concerning migration within and from without the 
Community follows. 
Since its inception, the EC - being mainly an economic organization -
seems to have been originally preoccupied with employers' needs for labour. 
Under the 1957 Treaty of Rome establishing the European Economic 
Community, freedom of movement and settlement throughout the 
community was guaranteed to EC workers and their families to enable 
labourers to move to vacant jobs. The EEC Treaty specifies this right by 
stating that the freedom of workers shall be secured within the Community 
and shall also "entail the abolition of any discrimination based on nationality 
between workers of the Member States as regards employment, remuneration 
and other conditions of work and employment" (EEC Treaty, Art. 48[2], as 
quoted by Niessen 1992:677). In other words, the EEC Treaty defines the right 
of free movement as the right of a national of one member-state to move 
freely to another member-state to accept offers of employment and to stay 
there. Community legislation has extended this right to family members of 
EC nationals who do not need to have the nationality of one of the member-
states (Council Directive of 28 June 1990, No. (90/364/EEC), OJ No. L 
180/26). This right of residence has also been extended to students, 
pensioners and other nonsalaried persons (Council Directive of 28 June 1990, 
No. (90/365/EEC) and (90/366/EEC), OJ No. L 180/28 and No. L 180/30). 
The Single European Act signed in 1986 was the next step towards the 
completion of a single European market comprising 330 million EC nationals 
with full free movement and settlement rights as of 1 January 1993. \Vith the 
signing of this Act, negotiations among EC member-states began with the 
intention to remove all their internal borders in order to complete the free 
market of goods, capital, services and labour, which the Treaty of Rome had 
as its aim but which was halted by a general protectionist response due to the 
recession of the 1970s. \Vith the completion of the internal market by 1993, it 
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was viewed as necessary to ensure that external borders be strengthened to 
keep strict control on the admission of non-EC nationals. 
Until recently the EC has not been concerned with the immigration of 
third-country nationals, which has been regarded as a matter for each single 
member-state to regulate. Common immigration and asylum policies, 
therefore, developed on an ad hoc basis as a response to the perceived 
common need to ensure that the opening of Europe's internal borders did not 
entail the free entry and free movement of non-Community nationals. The 
need for some co-ordination was first acknowledged in 1976, when the Trevi 
group (acronym for terrorism, radicalism, extremism, and violence) of interior 
ministers was set up at the instigation of the UK government to co-ordinate 
issues of terrorism. Later, the agenda was to include all the poliang and 
security aspects of free movement, such as immigration, visas and border 
controls. 
Another group, set up to proceed with the abolition of internal 
borders, is the Schengen group with its agreement signed in 1985 (originally 
five members - Germany, France and the Benelux countries, later joined by 
Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece). Border controls were to be abolished from 
1 January 1990, and working groups were set up to develop co-ordinated 
measures on policing Schengen's external borders to keep out unwanted 
people. One year after the Schengen group was established, the Ad Hoc 
Group for Immigration came into existence in October 1986, again at the 
suggestion of the UK, to end abuses of the asylum process. The Ad Hoc 
Group consisted of interior ministers of the Ee member-states and proposed, 
among other methods, sanctions on airlines bringing in undocumented 
asylum-seekers and those with false documents. In 1990, a convention to 
prevent asylum-seekers making more than one application in the EC - known 
as the Dublin convention2 - was signed (Collinson 1994:125) and a draft 
convention on harmonization of controls at external borders was introduced 
during the same year, followed by proposals in 1991 for fingerprinting 
(Webber, in: Bunyan 1993). The plan to fingerprint all asylum-seekers in the 
EU was launched in the summer of 1993 and approved by the EU Council of 
Ministers in November 1995 (Migration News 1996b). 
There are a few more drafted documents which exemplify the general 
tendency towards stricter border controls and stricter immigration 
regulations, such as the External Border Convention (expected to be signed in 
2 Its full title is Convention Determining the State Responsible for 
Examining Applications for Asylum. 
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1991) and 'The Draft Resolution on Family Reunification' (prepared in 1992)3. 
These measures and draft conventions clearly indicate a certain attitude of 
western European governments and EC policy-makers towards non-
Europeans. Since 1973, there has been a remarkable homogeneity of 
immigration and deportation measures converging towards increasing 
stringency in relation to non-EC peoples (Baimbridge & Burkitt & Macey 
1994; Mitchell & Russell 1994; Cohen 1991; Hammar 1985b). The basic policy 
response to the refugee problem, too, has been to erect new barriers around 
Europe in what can only be seen as a concerted movement towards the 
creation of a fortress-type of Europe. However, as there is no common EC 
immigration and asylum policy (apart from a common visa policy, see section 
on Maastricht Treaty), Mitchell & Russell (1994) suggest that the development 
of 'Fortress Europe' that has occurred to date is not so much the result of 
imposed 'top-down' supra-national policy processes, but rather as a growth of 
co-operation between member-states. The drift towards such a 'fortress' has 
not been orchestrated from Brussels but is the result of a combination of 
tougher measures introduced by individual member-states and inter-
governmental initiatives directed towards the harmonization of policy and 
practice (such as Schengen and Trevi). Thus, this co-operation among EC-
member-states in the field of immigration seems to be a persistence of 
restrictive trends on national levels. 
To sum up, 'Fortress Europe' concretely refers to the developments 
around the establishment of the Single Internal Market, to the lowering of 
internal borders by implementing tighter external border controls, and to the 
plans for a 'European visa'. The key point about the creation of a single 
Europe is that it will mean the virtual closure of the EC to non-EC nationals, 
and, therefore, the impact of 'Fortress Europe' will be most sharply felt by 
people seeking asylum and refugee status in the countries of the EC. 
What are the implications of this development for already settled 
foreign workers in the EC? There seems to be rising concern that - with the 
abolition of internal borders - there will be (and already is) an increasing use 
of internal immigration checks such as passport raids by the police 
(Baimbridge & Burkitt & Macey 1994) and the immigration service as well as 
checks by individual police officers on black and Asian people's immigration 
3 S~e for more information on these drafted documents in Appendix I 
~hlC~ dr~ws heavily on Webber's chapter European conventions on 
ImmlgratlOn and asylum (in: Bunyan 1993). 
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status "in the workplace, social security / welfare offices, at train and bus 
stations, indeed in all public and private space" (Allen & Macey 1992:382; see 
also Cohen 1991:13)4. Bjorgo and Witte claim that the restrictive Ee policies in 
this area will also have implications for ethnic minorities already settled in 
Europe as naturalized citizens as "[a] move from external border controls to 
internal controls will have a massive influence on daily life for non-white 
ethnic minorities." (1993:2). This could mean that, although a large number of 
black and Asian people in the UK have full (formal) citizenship rights and 
the theoretical right to freedom of movement within the Ee, it is likely that 
they are not recognized by immigration authorities as Ee nationals and 
therefore subject to questioning about their status. Groenendijk (in: Institut 
fur Migrations- und Rassismusforschung 1992:518) suggests that skin colour 
and cultural difference from the norm (such as clothes or appearance) are 
going to be the criteria for official internal controls by the police. Moreover, 
according to the same author, there is the danger that these new European 
regulations contribute to the legitimization of 'racial' discrimination by civil 
servants and private persons. such as personnel of air companies5 (op.cit.). 
Restricted family reunification policies and the 'primary purpose rule'6 also 
have serious implications for long-term settled immigrants. Furthermore, 
restrictive immigration and asylum policies convey the general message that 
third-country nationals are perceived as a 'problem' quite often related to 
drug smuggling and terrorism. 
There is also evidence of an escalating hostile climate and upsurge of 
racially motivated violence throughout the Ee (Gordon 1989; Bjorgo & Witte 
1993), aggravating the insecure social position of long-term resident non-Ee 
nationals. Various documents on racism and xenophobia have signified the 
deteriorating public attitudes and actions towards immigrants throughout the 
4 The quoted authors do not give any real evidence of these checks and 
raids. In the interviews conducted for this thesis, problems such as closer 
checks when travelling across European borders were mentioned (see 
Chapter Seven), but the issue of internal checks in Britain or Germany did 
not come up. 
S In this context, the European Parliament's Report of the Committee of 
Inquiry into Racism and Xenophobia of 1990 mentions to have received 
"numerous complaints" about "the police and customs authorities". As a 
result, the Report includes Recommendation 69 which demands "That 
Member States renew the instructions given to the various services 
responsible for carrying out checks to avoid any discriminatory 
harassment likely to suggest to the persons being checked that external 
characteristics pertaining to a particular race or category may have 
predisposed them to the checks concerned." (p. 167). 
6 This rul~ refers to the need to 'prove' that in case of marrying a person 
from outSIde Europe, the primary purpose for migration is not economic. 
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EC (1986 Solemn Declaration Against Racism and Xenophobia; 1990 Report 
on the Findings of the Committee of Inquiry into Racism and Xenophobia). 
The danger of Europe becoming a 'fortress' seems, therefore, to be well 
founded, as there are indications of a relationship between stricter 
immigration policies and an intensified hostile climate within the general 
public against non-European peoples - albeit not only as a problem from 
outside, but also from inside with serious implications for would-be 
immigrants and asylum-seekers as well as for settled ethnic minorities. 
3.2 The Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty) 
It has been shown so far that the European Community as such has no 
clear competence for policy making in the field of immigration/ integration 
and asylum matters which are, for that reason, dealt with in separate 
agreements such as Schengen and in groups such as Trevi and the Ad Hoc 
Group. The Maastricht Treaty - the latest amendment to the Treaty of Rome -
represents a new development in this respect and deserves special mention. 
After much heated argument and delays, the Treaty on European 
Union was signed in Maastricht in February 1992. The Maastricht Treaty 
represents a major leap forward towards European integration and abandons 
the initial main emphasis on the economic sphere. The Treaty contains: 
1. amendments and additions to the three existing treaties, namely the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Atomic 
Energy Community (Euratom) and the European Economic 
Community (EEC); 
2. provisions on co-operation in the fields of justice and home affairs; 
3. provisions on the common foreign and security policy; 
4. special rules on social policy (of which the UK opted out). 
Provisions for European citizens (Union citizenship; more details in Chapter 
Six), the goal of a common currency by 1999 at the latest, and increased 
powers for the European Parliament are new in the Treaty on European 
Union. Thus, the Treaty combines for the first time the economic and political 
dimensions on the supranational level, namely economic and financial policy, 
military and foreign policy, immigration, and law and order - the so-called 
three 'pillars' of the EU structure (Bunyan 1993). 
The Treaty defines how the policies of these 'three pillars' are dealt 
with in more details: The Community's institutions are in charge of economic 
29 
and financial policy (first pillar); the second block establishes formal co-
operation on justice and home affairs including immigration policy 
(conditions of entry, residence, movement etc.); the third pillar is built around 
co-opera tion in the field of foreign and defence policy (Dummett & Niessen 
1993). There is also a protocol concerned with social policy. It is not part of the 
general Community policy because it was signed by only eleven member-
states with the exception of the UK. Article 2, paragraph 3 of this Protocol 
mentions "conditions of employment for third-country nationals legally 
residing in Community territory". Callovi (1992) suggests, as the usual 
sentence has been "living and working conditions", that the expression used 
by the new Treaty seems to limit the scope of proposals to economic rights 
and to the working environment. Therefore, according to him, more general 
topics linked to integration and living conditions, such as housing, education, 
health, equality of social rights and opportunities, seem hardly to be part of 
the expression "conditions of employment" and thus, subjects for proposals 
under this Article. 7 
The most important article with regard to immigration matters is 
Article K which is made up of Title VI Provisions on Co-operation in the field 
of Justice and Home Affairs (Dummett & Niessen 1993). This Title does not 
provide for any amendments to the EC treaty but allows for the establishment 
of co-operation between the member-states in the field of Justice and Horne 
Affairs. This does not provide a legal framework for the European Union as 
such. The usual procedure of community legal instruments is that the Council 
and the Commission issue regulations (directly applicable in every member-
state), directives (binding as to the result to be achieved but leave the choice 
of form and methods for incorporating them into national legislation to the 
national authorities), and decisions (binding on those to whom they are 
addressed). The meaning of the 'pillars', however, is that governments agree 
to work together through new channels and thus, these fields of co-operation 
are tackled outside the Brussels structure. 
7 It seems appropriate at this point to include a remark on the difference 
between the EC and the EU which has got terminological implications for 
the remaining sections and chapters. The European Union, as explained 
above, comprises the intergovernmental pillars of justice & home affairs 
and defence, as well as the EC pillar (i.e. the original institutional 
framework). Thus, 'European Union' will refer from now on to the whole 
structure as set out by the Maastricht Treaty, whereas 'European 
Community' will only mean the EC pillar in the pre- and post-Maastricht 
context. 
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The Final Act of the Maastricht Treaty contains declarations of which 
one is relevant to immigration/ integration policies. This is the Declaration on 
Nationality of a Member State which leaves the "question whether an 
individual possesses the nationality of a Member State .... solely ... to the 
national law of the Member State concerned" (European Union 1993:644). 
Nationality law, which is very often linked to citizenship entitlements, is not 
included in the field of EU competence and the treatment of third country 
nationals is not harmonized. 
Among the various critical comments on the Maastricht Treaty, its 
democratic deficit seems to be of particular concern (Dummett & Niessen 
1993; Bunyan 1993). In this context, vVebber (in: Bunyan 1993) views a danger 
of the Maastricht process in that "once the transitional period of 
intergovernmental co-operation comes to an end, these extremely illiberal 
conventions and resolutions, drafted solely from the perspective of policing 
and with no regard to the rights of immigrants and refugees, will be 
incorporated into Ee law ... " (page 153; emphasis added). The aspect of 
'policing' is a very important theme within the political discourse which tries 
to justify the necessity of intergovernmental co-operation within the field of 
home affairs and justice. The allegedly 'urgent need of strict immigration 
controls' has often been linked to crime so that public opinion has 
overwhelmingly taken on these views. One European survey comes to the 
conclusion that the most popular Maastricht measure in all member-states is 
the closer co-operation in fighting drug traffic and organized crime (91% of 
respondents agree with it) and the third most liked measure is immigration 
(76%) (the second was common defence) (European Communities, 
Eurobarometer, No. 39, June 1993). Asked whether certain policy areas 
should be decided nationally or as a jointly on the EU level in 1996, the fight 
against drugs scored highest for European Union policy decision (77%), and 
still 57% of the respondents see immigration policy as better decided jointly 
by the ED (against 37% who prefer immigration to be decided nationally) 
(European Commission, Eurobarometer, No. 44, spring 1996). 
A further element of undemocratic procedures within the ED 
structures is seen in the fact that the Maastricht Treaty has not given more 
power to the European Parliament. Philip (1994) writes in this context that 
parliamentarians seem to get more and more anxious about the uncontrolled 
decision-making processes by which decisions on citizens' rights, asylum and 
immigration matters are being made. There seems to be indeed a lack of 
democratic control. As a whole, Maastricht adds little that is new to the ED 
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countries' collective activities in the fields of immigration and integration and 
does not help to improve the legal and social position of non-European 
residents. 
3.3 The European Parliament 
The European Parliament has always favoured a gradual increase in 
the rights of non-Community nationals in the Union. For example, its 
resolution of 9 May 1985 (OJ No. 141, 1985, p. 462) stressed that the right of 
workers to be reunited with their families should be recognized in accordance 
with the provisions of the European Convention on the legal status of migrant 
workers 8. In a resolution of 15 March 1989 (OJ No. C 96, 1989, p. 61) on the 
social dimension of the internal market, the EP expressed its opinion on the 
social situation of non-Community workers. It called on the Commission and 
the Council to draw up a common policy based on reciprocity for non-
Community workers and their families permanently resident in the 
Community. On 14 June 1990 (OF No. C 175, 1990, p. 180), the EP reiterated 
that the lack of a common immigration policy with regard to non-Community 
migrant workers might lead to pressure on the European labour market. 
There was, therefore, an urgent need for a Community policy in this area. 
In its resolutions of 18 November 1992 (OJ No. C 337, 1992, p. 94) and 
15 July 1993 on European policy on immigrants, the EP emphasized the need 
for non-Community workers legally resident in the EU to enjoy the same 
social welfare rights as other migrant workers who were EU nationals and 
called on the Commission to submit proposals to this effect. Yet again, it 
stressed the importance of the right to family reunion for spouses and 
children under 18 years of age. The member-states were urged to ensure that 
it was made easier for non-Community nationals to become naturalized after 
a reasonable period of legal residence. The right to vote in local elections 
should be given to those who had been legally resident in a member-state for 
more than five years. In a resolution of 25 May 1993, the EP pointed out how 
unreasonable it was that non-Community citizens legally residing in a 
8 The ~uropean Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers (in 
force ~m~e 1983) was sponsored by the Council of Europe - a regional 
organ~zatlO~ comprised of the democratic states of Western Europe and 
establIshed In 1949. The European Convention currently represents the 
fu!thest progression of international human rights law with respect to 
nugrant workers. This is because it concerns itself with the life of migrant 
workers as a whole and not just with respect to the employment 
relationship (Lillich 1984). 
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Community country should require visas in virtually all the member-states, 
thus being subjected to time-consuming formalities when travelling from one 
member-state to another. The EP also considers that a common immigration 
policy should comply with the rules of parliamentary democracy and wants 
the Parliament's role to be strengthened to the extent that the immigration 
issue is made a matter for the Community, which it hopes will soon happen. 
Moreover, the EP is concerned about the increase of racism in Europe 
(mainly directed at non-Community nationals) and set up a committee of 
inquiry in 1984 to carry out a full investigation of the problem. The 
committee's work resulted in a report which formed the basis of a resolution 
adopted by the EP on 16 January 1986. This, in tum, prompted the joint 
declaration on racism and xenophobia by the EP, the Council and the 
Commission on 11 June 1986 (OJ No. C 158, 1986). Since then, the EP has 
dissociated itself from the growing intolerance towards foreigners on several 
occasions, for instance in its resolution on the resurgence of racism and 
xenophobia in Europe and the danger of right-wing extremist violence of 21 
April 1993 (OJ No. C 150, 1993, p. 127). The latest 'action' in this respect is the 
designation of 1997 as European Year Against Racism by the EP. It calls 
therein for the isolation of racist parties (Migration News, vol. 3(6), 1996). 
All these resolutions show very well which sort of activities the EP 
would like to see as part of the EU's responsibilities vis-a-vis third country 
nationals. They also indicate the limitation of the EP's own power. However, 
despite being fairly powerless, the EP represents at least a forum where these 
issues are debated. 
3.4 EU-provisions for third country nationals - a summarizin&: commentary 
So far, I have illustrated the general tendency throughout the EU 
towards stricter border controls and stricter immigration regulations on the 
one hand, and a clear lack of common inclusion policies for non-European 
residents on the other (despite the European Parliament's different stance in 
these matters). 
Internal policies resulting in the materialization of free movement of 
ED nationals goes hand in hand with external policies resulting in the 
creation of 'Fortress Europe'. As for settled third country nationals, there are 
little if any provisions on the ED leve1. As far as ED immigration policies are 
concerned, there is a preoccupation with asylum and border controls. 
Although the member-states of the ED are going to enhance their co-
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operation in matters related to migration, the emphasis is very much on visa 
and admission policies, the control of migratory movements and the crack-
down of illegal immigration. Thus, the only common policies deriving from a 
European consensus are about the need to limit external immigration. 
Common external border controls seem to be agreed upon without solving 
the questions of national immigration policies, of the historical ties of each 
member-state to certain third countries, and of Union power to include third-
country nationals among the 'peoples of Europe' as referred to in the 
Maastricht Treaty. However, Callovi (1992) rightly comments that such 
controls are not the answer to the need for an active policy on immigration. 
According to Dummett & Niessen (1993), immigration policy, at 
Community and intergovernmenta11eve1, is defined not only in terms of 
future immigration but is also considered to include policies on the inclusion 
of immigrants who already reside on Union territory. However, inclusion of 
third-country nationals is not an explicit part of either Community policy or 
intergovernmental policy. Inclusion, according to the above authors, is now 
generally viewed as a matter of providing rights for resident migrants and 
their families and it is meant to promote social policies and educational plans. 
In this way, the responsibilities of the intergovernmental groups and those of 
the EU's institutions overlap. The EU, in fact, deals with social policies, and 
thus it has some competence where third-country nationals are concerned 
(e.g. the Equal Opportunities directives concerning equality between men and 
women apply to all workers). And yet, the Maastricht Treaty prohibits 
discrimination on grounds of nationality only with regard to EU nationals. 
There is, therefore, no explicit competence for EU legislation against 
discrimination on grounds of 'race', ethnic origin or non-EU nationality. 
However, as Dummett & Niessen (1993) suggest, it would be possible to 
include anti-discrimination provisions under the heading of the social and 
economic policy of the Community, if the political will were there. Assumedly 
the political will is partly lacking at the moment as the result of a generally 
poor economic climate with the common tendency towards narrow and 
protectionist nationalism. 
The system of free movement combined with the protection of 
workers' rights, as established by Article 48 and 58 of the Treaty of Rome, by 
certain provisions of the Single European Act (SEA) which amended that 
Treaty in 1985, and by the Maastricht Treaty, can only be enjoyed by EU 
nationals/ citizens and their families (the latter may be of any nationality or 
citizenship though). Thus, approximately eight million (Niess en 1992:678) 
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legally resident third country nationals with official residence and work 
permits - as opposed to illegal immigrants - on EU territory are excluded from 
the right of free movement. The right to cross internal borders is only granted 
to them as tourists and not for seeking a resident permit or employment 
(Callovi 1992)9. What concerns these people from outside the EU is the fact 
that each member-state has retained its sovereign right to admit or refuse any 
third country national. It is for each state to decide upon the legal rights it is 
prepared to grant non-EU nationals and to define its own nationals for EU 
purposes. 
Inclusion in general is, thus, still a matter dealt with on the national 
level, and despite a limited degree of convergence of national immigration 
policies, there remains great divergence. Each EU country's immigration 
history is distinctive, often resulting in special arrangements for 'privileged' 
aliens (such as 'ethnic Germans' from Eastern Europe or the Irish and 
immigrants from ex-colonies in Britain). Thus, the only convergence has been 
an EU consensus on the need to limit future immigration and asylum 
applications. A concerted EU policy, however, which reflects the permanent 
settlement of former labour migrants in the form of legal, social and political 
equality to EU-nationals does not exist. 
F u tu re prospects 
On the basis of the little improvements the Maastricht Treaty has 
brought for third-country nationals, the Green Paper on European Social 
Policy of November 1993 has made recommendations towards a better social 
position for non-EU legal residents. For instance, the Green Paper calls on the 
ED to give consideration to allowing access to employment in another 
member-state to third-country nationals who have acquired a permanent 
right of residence in one of the member-states with the extension of other 
rights which are a corollary to free movement in Union terms. The main 
objective of the Union concerning legally resident migrants should be to 
enhance their social inclusion through equal opportunities in employment, 
education, housing, social security and health care. On the national level, the 
9 The distinction between 'free circulation' and 'free movement' provisions 
is important in this context. For third-country nationals, the former 
proviSions refer to those that allow for short visits to other member-states, 
whereas the latter encompass the wider range of rights associated with 'the 
free movement of persons' under Article 8a of the SEA (Article 7a, Treaty of 
European Union), including the right of establishment and access to the 
labour market (Collinson 1994:146). 
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Green Paper recommends improved education and information as this 
should help to reduce ignorance and lack of understanding of ethnic 
minorities and may counteract racist attitudes. Each member-state should not 
only sanction violence (which is largely already the case), but implement 
comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation to offer an integrated and 
coherent approach to combating racism and discrimination (which is not yet 
the case in every Ee member-state). 
For a future potential agenda, Philip (1994) suggests the improvement 
of the position and rights of long-term resident migrants in the EU who have 
not acquired the nationality of a member-state. According to him, this 
concerns a much broader policy discussion about the evolution of nationality 
policy in the member-states. The refusal of citizenship to long-term 
immigrants is perceived as a real barrier to their inclusion and to social 
cohesion. This aspect will be subject to more details in Chapter Six. 
As yet, however, there is no evidence of purposeful harmonization or 
co-operation in granting nationality (citizenship) to third-country nationals. 
There is still no truly common Union immigration policy, nor a common 
citizenship policy in terms of its acquisition. In actual fact, as Philip 
concludes, "West European societies are open in theory, but not in practice 
when it comes to immigration from outside and within the EU." (1994:188; 
emphasis added). 
The issue of exclusiveness or non-existence of EU policies will re-
appear in subsequent chapters, in particular in Chapter Six in connection 
with citizenship. The following chapter will deal with the question whether 
and to what extent this exclusiveness is based on racialization and how 
racialization ties into the debate around national identity and citizenship. 
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4. Racism 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the first step towards further 
elaboration of the argument of a symbiotic relationship between nationalism 
(as the source of national identity) and racism. This will be done by discussing 
the conceptual roots of racism and by searching for a definition of racism 
which links up with the issue of national identity and citizenship. 
One of the main arguments for including racism in the debate around 
citizenship as a concept of socio-national membership is that racism has been 
an integral part of western Europe's period of modernization and formation 
of nation-states. There is a long tradition within western European societies of 
separating 'outsiders' from 'insiders' on the basis of 'racial' differences. The 
concept to describe similar exclusionary processes as well as the 
dissimilarities within the German and British socio-historical formation of 
their collective identity (as 'race', 'nation' and 'citizens') vis-a.-vis the 'Other' is 
suggested here to be the concept of racialization. 
4.1 History and modernity - general remarks on the roots of racism 
Racism is an important contributor to economic, social and political 
inequality in Britain and Germany today (Mason 1995; Beauftragte der 
Bundesregierung fur die Belange der Auslander 1993a). The groups that 
suffer from the cumulative disadvantages of current racisms1 in both 
countries are mainly those whose origins are from outside Europe. 
Contemporary forms of racism have a long history. They are rooted in 
centuries of oppression and struggle that formed the foundation of relations 
not only between 'blacks' and 'whites', but also between whichever groups 
were defined as 'insiders' and 'outsiders' at a particular point of time. Thus, 
racism has not only functioned to define others, but also as a means for self-
iden tifica tion. 
As for the historical roots of racism, western Europe has been 
suggested to be the crucial place as "racism is inseparable from modernity" 
which "developed from European origins" (Wieviorka 1994:174; emphasis 
added). In this way, Wieviorka rightly claims a certain unity of contemporary 
racisms in Europe by nevertheless viewing racism as a set of ideologies and 
lStuart Hall put this view forward that "[t]here have been many 
significantly different racisms - each historically specific and articulated 
in a different way with the societies ill' which they appear. Racism is 
always historically specific in this way ... " (1978:26; original emphasis). 
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pseudo-scientific doctrines as well as a set of concrete manifestations. In its 
link to 'modernity', racism is widely held to be the outcome of the immense 
changes after the Renaissance, followed by the Enlightenment, the age of the 
democratic revolution and industrialization with Europe at its centre (Jaggi 
1992; Nederveen Pieterse 1994). It developed further in modern times re-
emphasized by mass migrations, the extension of trading relationships, the 
formation of the capitalist economic system, and colonization (Wallerstein 
1987; Wieviorka 1994). Thus, there are a number of factors in the history of 
Europe which rendered Europeans more powerful than others in imposing 
their social categories on other peoples (Banton 1977). 
The emergence of scientific discourse as an important constitutive 
element in the process of modernity has, according to Brah (1994), bearing on 
the analysis of the inter-relationship between racism, ethnicity and 
nationalism. The scientificity of modernity is embedded in the construction of 
Europe's outsiders. "Its grand narratives of 'development' produced 
classificatory hierarchies centred on Europe as the norm for plotting the 
'achievements' of different peoples of the globe" (ibid.). In this way, a euro-
centric view of the world gradually emerged (Jaggi 1992). 
In most western European countries, a specifically crude and (pseudo)-
scientific racism was much more widespread before the Second World War 
than tends to be the case today. Colonial racism postulated the inferiority of 
colonized people of different 'races', and modern anti-Semitism gave a new 
and active dimension to former anti-Judaism (Arendt 1951), climaxing in the 
Holocaust (Bauman 1989). This is the reason why Wieviorka rightly suggests 
the necessity to "introduce a sense of relativity into our perceptions of 
contemporary racism" (1994:176). When discussing racism, the different 
historical manifestations have to be borne in mind with their different types 
of discourses. However, "this idea means not that there is no continuity in 
racist doctrines, ideologies, prejudice or more concrete expressions, but that a 
new era in the history of racism began with the retreat .... of scientific racism, 
the end of decolonization, and, above all, the 'economic crisis' that has in fact 
meant the beginning of the decline of industrial societies" (ibid.).2 
In this context, contemporary sociological literature seems to insist on 
the idea of changing forms of racism or historically specific racisms (Hall 
1988). Furthermore, during the 1980s, some British writers argued that the 
2 Mason, however, would argue in this context that biologically determinist 
formulations have never disappeared and that biological reasoning of 
various kinds is still widespread in popular beliefs about 'race' (1992). 
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contemporary expression of racism in Britain could not be adequately 
explained without considering contemporary nationalism as part of 
exclusionary practices (Barker 1981; Miles 1987+1982b+1993; Gilroy 1987). 
According to authors such as Barker (1981), a distinction should be made 
between a classical, biologically scientific racism and a new racism based on a 
theory Barker refers to as pseudo-biological culturalism. The main point for 
many scholars is that the new racism, sometimes also referred to as cultural 
racism or differentialist racism (Balibar 1991)3, is the main form in the 
contemporary world, while the biological scientific one becomes secondary. 
Wieviorka, however, suggests that this should not be regarded as a 
general theory of racism as firstly, cultural aspects of racism are not new, and 
secondly, "a purely cultural definition of the Other, as well as a purely social 
one, dissolves the idea of race" (ibid.). Whenever there is any reference to 
'race' in a cultural sense, it is usually only regarded as 'racist' when culture 
carries the connotation of nature in the sense of an organistic or genetic (i.e. 
innate) representation of the Other. If the Other is, however, referred to as 
socially inferior or marginalized, it is usually not referred to as racist. And 
yet, as Wieviorka rightly concludes, "in fact, in most experiences of racism, 
the two logics coexist, and racism appears as a combination of them both" 
(1994:183) - a statement which is supported by authors such as Goldberg 
(1993), who acknowledges that it is misleading to treat 'race' as about physical 
difference and ethnicity about cultural difference since cultural difference can 
become treated as generic and unchanging. Furthermore, Mason contests the 
existence of a 'new' racism claiming that "reports of the death of the 'old' one 
[biological racism, N.P.] have been greatly exaggerated" (1992:23). 
As it is agreed here with Wieviorka that 'cultural' and 'biological' 
racism tend to coexist, it is often not possible to separate biological 
explanations of differences in human beings from socio-cultural ones. This 
could also mean that racism is not clearly separable from nationalism - an 
aspect Bauman seems to have had in mind when claiming that nationalism 
(and thus, the emphasis on culture) is the racism of the intellectuals and 
racism is the nationalism of the masses (1992). This view could also be read 
3 Balibar borrows this term from Taguieff. Differentialist racism is"a 
racism whose dominant theme is not biological heredity but the 
insurmountability of cultural differences, a racism which, at first sight, 
does not postulate the superiority of certain groups or peoples in relation to 
others but 'only' the harmfulness of abolishing frontiers, the 
incompatibility of life-styles and traditions" (1991:21). 
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as claiming that the way how distinctions are being expressed depends on 
class and educational level. 
To regard both types - the biological and the cultural - as racism could 
be criticized as taking any form of differentiating between human beings as 
racism, and thus inflating this concept. I argue, however, that the main 
emphasis should not be on the distinction between cultural or biological 
forms of racism, but rather on the historical processes (such as modernization 
and the formation of the nation-state) and purposes involved when 
constructing groups (Le. 'races' or 'nations'). In other words, the emphasis 
should be on the specific material and power relations in which these 
processes are embedded. 
4.1.1 Racism in German and British society 
It is argued here that changing forms of racism have been an integral 
part of both German and British society. Both countries - while in the process 
of economic and political expansion - have made use of conquest and 
exploitation of labour power of people of foreign origin. In the British case, 
slavery (Fryer 1984) and colonialism have played pre-eminent roles revolving 
around the exploitation of peoples of colour which has somehow resulted in a 
'race problematic' in the British Isles. 
Germany had colonies too, but only for a period of thirty years from 
1884 to 1914 - a fact which should not be underestimated in terms of the 
formation of an attitude of superiority towards third world peoples (Mergner 
1992; Melber 1992). Moreover, the 'race' ideologies during German 
colonialism are suggested by Pinn & Nebelung (1992) as having anticipated 
essential elements of the national socialist 'racial mania'. However, Germany 
had not maintained any links to its former colonies after having lost them at 
the end of the First World War - a fact which is also reflected in post-war 
immigration to Germany which did not take place from ex-colonies as in the 
British case. Thus, post-war labour migration had never been of peoples of 
colour and it did not result in the language of 'race' and 'race relations' in 
today's context. This does not mean, however, that Germany has never 
employed the terminology of 'race'. Even though Germany's colonial period 
and the contact to peoples of colour was rather short, its expansionist history -
which is more characterized by moves into eastern Europe, the exploitation of 
eastern European peoples (Herbert 1986), and the Nazi ideology including 
anti-semitism and anti-slavism leading to the use of forced (largely foreign) 
labour and the Holocaust - was clearly accompanied by the ideology of 'race'. 
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In particular during the Nazi-period, the 'Untermensch' (inferior human 
being), although not of colour, but of different blood and different culture, 
was regarded as a separate and inferior 'race'. 
Despite these differences, however, both countries have experienced a 
general history of inferiorizing and racializing other peoples, along with the 
development of a feeling of racial superiority which has been shared with all 
west Europeans in their relations with non-Europeans (Goulbourne 1991). 
4.2 Historical and theoretical groundings of terminology 
As Germany and Britain have quite different histories of immigration 
and have responded to it differently in terms of policies and legal provisions, 
it is not surprising that there are also differences in terminology and concepts 
concerned with racism and racialized groups. In the following section, these 
terminological differences will be analyzed - not only cross-national, but also 
with regard to controversies within each countries' circle of scholars. 
a) 'Black', 'race' and Auslander 
In Britain, the term 'race relations' and the fact that victims of racism 
are referred to as 'blacks' evoke, as suggested by Balibar, a "directly post-
colonial situation and imagery" (1991:6). Moreover, blackness tends to be used 
as a political category encompassing the diversity of ethnic minority groups. 
There are, however, arguments against subsuming all ethnic minorities - the 
Asian communities, for example - within the term 'black'4 (Anthias & Yuval-
Davis 1992; Modood 1992). 
From a German author's perspective, Bahringhorst (1993) argues that 
the 'colour problematic' in Britain has created a situation in which the 
dimension of the so-called 'race' differences is superimposed on the 
dimension of ethnic differences. In her opinion, the domination of the 'colour 
difference' in the public perception has entailed an almost exclusive adoption 
of American models of analysis. She further argues that the relationship 
between ethnic minorities and the British receiving society is said to be often 
simplified, equated with the relationship between Afro-Americans and the 
'white' majority. American strategies to solve conflicts are transferred to the 
British situation with little modification. 
4 See for a detailed account of this debate also Rrah (1992). 
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Noticeable, especially for German observers, is the generally uncritical 
usage of the term 'race' which might have to do with British history being to a 
much lesser extent burdened by an extreme ideology of 'race' when compared 
with recent German history. In contemporary context, the terminology of 
'race' is rejected in Germany partly on the basis of the 'race politics' of the 
National Socialists. I argue, however, that a conceptual understanding of 
differentiating between peoples has to be seen in the context of modern history 
as a whole. Britain - with its distinctive history of a maritime power, of being 
the first country to experience the Industrial Revolution and the first signs of 
capitalism5, slavery and colonialism - was in contact much earlier and to a 
much larger extent with peoples of dark skin colour6 than Germany has ever 
been. In the latter case, anti-slavism and anti-semitism played a much bigger 
role than 'colour' racism. Seno~ak suggests in this context that there is a 
greater reluctance towards using the terminology of 'race' in Germany today 
because of the quite thorough 'coming to terms with the past' 
(Vergangenheitsbewaltigung) which has not happened anywhere else in 
Europe with regard to, for example, colonialism. He goes so far as claiming 
that Germany's special guilt (Schuld) is used by other European nation-states 
to divert attention from historical crimes which they themselves have 
committed (1994:72) - and, therefore, the 'easiness' with the usage of the 
terminology of 'race' in Britain could be partly explained by the lack of a 
critical approach to British (or rather English) history of slavery and 
colonialism. 
The direct contact to peoples of colour does not only playa role in the 
context of the terminology of 'race', but also in the development of a 'black & 
white' dichotomy of which Neveu provides an interesting interpretation. She 
links the usage of this terminology to the (at least legally speaking) equal 
citizenship rights which Commonwealth subjects originally had when 
entering Britain. Post-war immigration was dominated by the movement of 
subjects of the Empire, and thus, "[t]he British situation was not one in which 
the boundary between 'us' (the indigenous) and 'them' (immigrants and/or 
5 This is of importance as Fryer showed that "it was the drive for profit that 
led English merchant capitalists to traffic in Africans. There was big 
money in it. The theory [of racism, N.r.] came later. Once the English slave 
trade. English sugar-producing plantation slavery. and English 
manufacturing industry had begun to operate .... the economic basis had 
been laid for all those ancient scraps of myth and prejudice to be woven 
into a more or less coherent racist ideology: a mythology of race" 
( 1984:134). 
6 See Fryer's whole chapter seven 011 "The rise of English racism" for more 
details (1984:133-190). 
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ethnic minorities) could be drawn along nationality .... [Therefore] 'black' and 
'white' were ready terms to be used." (1989:8). 'Nationality' in this quote must 
mean being a 'British subject'. Neveu seems to refer to the fact that there was 
no clear legal definition of who qualified as a 'British national' during 
imperial days and the immediate post-imperial period. This lack of a legal 
definition was not solved until the introduction of the British Nationality Act 
of 1981. 
In Germany, when labour migration first began under a 
governmentally organized recruitment system in the late 1950s and early 
1960s, foreign labourers came as 'guest-workers'. There was no connection 
between them and former colonies as in the British case. They did not, 
therefore, come as fully equal citizens before the law and were very clearly 
distinguishable from German people with regard to their citizenship status 
and rights 7. 
Officially, they were referred to as 'foreign employees and their 
dependants' (ausHindische Arbeitnehmer und ihre Angehorigen), a term that 
clearly indicates an emphasis on the economic character of migration. The 
migrants used to be popularly known as 'guest-workers' (Gastarbeiter), a term 
that became problematic as it implied that the 'guests' would leave after a 
short period when no longer needed. The term 'guest-worker' thus gradually 
disappeared in the mid-1970s (partly as a result of increased family 
reunification indicating a changed attitude towards permanent settlement on 
the part of the Turkish community and the failure of government sponsored 
'return policies'). Most Germans now speak of 'foreigners' (Auslander) which 
seems to be neutral, but in fact tends to take a pejorative connotation, maybe 
in a similar way as the word 'immigrant' did in Britain a few decades ago 
(Auslander, literally taken, means 'outsider', therefore not part of society). 
Those opposed to discrimination prefer to use the term 'foreign fellow 
citizens' (auslandische Mitbiirger) (Castles 1984), but this is misleading as 
foreigners are not 'fellow citizens', for they are denied crucial citizenship 
rights. Other progressively thinking people are beginning to speak of 
'immigrants' (Einwanderer) as a conscious way of rejecting the official 
7 Rudolph has found that a 'new gastarbeiter system' is being operated in 
Germany, partly as a result of its mounting post-reunification employment 
crisis. In terms of migration systems, the tradition of 'temporary labour 
migration' as opposed to 'permanent settlement migration' is heing 
maintained with this system of contract labour in which hardly any rights 
are being granted. 
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governmental line that Germany 'is not a country of immigration' (Cohn-
Bendit & Schmid 1992; Geissler 1991). However, this term is not acceptable in 
particular to the third generation born and raised in Germany. The 
emergence of second and in particular third generations did not result in the 
official abandonment of the term Ausltinder (which is reflected in the law 
called 'Auslandergesetz' and the official policy referred to as 'Ausltinderpolitik') -
a fact which can partly be explained by the non-existing ius soli principle (by 
which anybody born in Germany would automatically be granted German 
citizenship). As opposed to the official line, it is now widely agreed in the 
academic literature and by people working in the equivalent of what is called 
in Britain the 'race relations field' (AusHinderarbeit) that 'Auslander' is not the 
appropriate term to reflect the reality of the migrants' lives in terms of their 
long periods of residence and contributions to the 'host' society and in 
particular of their children born and/or raised in Germany (Funcke 1991; 
Leggewie & Seno~ak 1993). There is, therefore, increasing pressure on the 
government to change its policies and attitude with regard to inclusion 
policies, such as e.g. procedures of acquiring citizenship (see also Castles 
1984:98; Kulluk 1996). 
But what is the alternative? Apart from 'immigrants' for the first 
generation, the best way out of this dilemma is suggested by some authors to 
be the term 'Nicht-Deutsche' (non-Germans) or Turkish-Germans (Leggewie & 
Seno~ak 1993). The former term seems to be preferable to 'Ausltinder' as it does 
not carry the meaning of people from 'outside'. It indicates that immigrants 
and their children are part of German society (as permanent residents) but 
still do not have German citizenship. The latter hides the fact that these 
people (apart from those who naturalized) do not have full citizenship status. 
I argue that the best solution is not of a terminological nature, but of a 
politico-legal nature, requiring a change in nationality (or citizenship) and 
immigration laws. At present, however, the legal terminology (revolving 
around Ausltinder) forms part of the process of racialization. 
Resulting from the above, the main point is that the conceptual and 
terminological differences in Britain and Germany reflect differences in 
individual histories and patterns of labour migration. Although the different 
terms function in both countries as devices to distinguish between the 
indigenous population and the immigrant minorities, 'black' and 'race' in the 
British case indicate legal equality of majority and minority despite any social 
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exclusion, whereas 'Ausla'nder' clearly refers to a status as non-citizens in legal 
as well as social terms8. 
b} Racism, racialization and 'AusUinderfeindlichkeit' 
As shown in the previous sections, there have been different forms of 
racism throughout history as well as those in the different societies of 
Germany and Britain as reflected in their different terminologies, albeit with 
the same result of excluding ethnic or immigrant minorities. It is argued here 
that the best way of grasping these differences conceptually is offered by the 
theory of 'racialization', first evolved by Miles (1982a, 1989) in relation to post-
war labour migration in Britain, and advanced further by Small (1994). 
Racialization and the British context 
Miles developed the theory of racialization from his critique of what he 
has described as the 'race relations problematic' in which he argues that 'race' 
should not be given analytical status, but that racism should be the object of 
study (1982a, 1989). One of the main purposes of this critique seems to be to 
detach the issue of racism from the sole context of 'ex-colonial' immigrants 
who were distinct by their colour as previously done in studies by, for 
example, Rex (l983). In much of his work, therefore, Miles gives evidence to 
processes of racialization occurring in a 'non-black-and-white' context9. 
Summarizing the usage of the term 'racialization' in the literature, 
Miles concludes that "there is minimal agreement that the concept be used to 
refer to a representational process whereby social significance is attached to 
certain biological (usually phenotypical) human features, on the basis of 
which those people possessing those characteristics are deSignated as a 
distinct collectivity." (1989:74). Miles himself employs the concept of 
8 On the European level, the language of 'black and white' can clearly not 
be employed as the history and origin of immigrants on the continent tend 
to be very different and, thus, have resulted in the acceptance and use of 
different terminologies. In this thesis, I decided - although this might not 
be a perfect solution - to use the term 'ethnic minorities' or to make precise 
reference to the origin of former immigrants (such as Afro-Caribbeans, 
Indians, Pakistanis, Turks etc.; see also Modood et al. 1994). The 
expression'ethnic minorities' (for a detailed definition see Castles 1993:28, 
footnote no. 3) seems to recognize best that immigrants and foreigners 
whose roots lay in post-war labour migration have become permanent 
members of society. In the German context, however, this hides the fact 
that large parts of the long-term immigrants do not have full citizenship 
rights. Therefore, when referring to the particular German case, the term 
'immigrant' or 'immigrant minorities' will be employed. 
9 See, for instance, his chapter on Irish labour migrants (1982a). 
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racialization to refer "to the historical emergence of the idea of 'race' and to its 
subsequent reproduction and application" (op.cit.:76). Rather than accept the 
idea of 'race' as a biological given, this perspective requires the examination of 
the conditions under which specific processes of 'racialization' have taken 
place. If 'race' has not got anything to do with biology, Small concludes that 
the relative implications of multiple factors such as economics, politics, 
demography, culture, ideology and myth should be unravelled in patterns of 
'racialized relations' (1994:33). 
Small suggests progression to an analysis of 'racisms', 'racialized 
relations' and 'white' people. Such a focus "questions the existence of 'races', 
looks at how groups not previously defined as 'races' have come to be defined 
in this way and assesses the various factors involved in such processes" 
(1994:30). In Small's opinion, the problem with a sole focus on 'black' people is 
that it depicts the 'black' population as a cause of racialized antagonism, 
rather than it being a consequence of 'white' attitudes and actions. Thus, "the 
problem is not 'race' but 'racisms', not relations between 'races' but relations 
which have been racialized, not the physical attributes of blacks or their 
presumed inferiority, but the motivations of non-blacks, and the obstacles 
they impose" (ibid.). The concern with racisms, racialized relations and 
'whites' transfers the attention from the notion that 'black' people are a 'race' 
to the historical process whereby Europeans racialized other peoples, as for 
instance in the case of Africans (Banton 1977) and the Irish (Miles 1982a). 
Small concludes that when examining the process of 'racialization', common 
beliefs about 'races' and 'race relations' will result in the acknowledgement 
that they have more to do with the attitudes, actions, motivations and 
interests of powerful groups in society, and less with the characteristics, 
attitudes and actions of those who are defined as belonging to inferior 'races'. 
Therefore, Small abandons the term 'race' by replacing it wi th 'racialized 
group'. 
Both, Miles and Small argue for a 'racialization problematic' which 
assumes that 'races' are constructs which are socially and politically 
generated. This allows an analysis of the changing forms and meanings of 
racism. In this connection, the idea of 'the new racism' is more correctly 
conceived as rearticulated 'racialized discourse', 
However, in his latest book (1994) Small presents the reader with 
rather fixed categories of 'black' and 'white' which are regarded here as being 
as much constructed as 'race'. The most important aspect for the comparative 
nature of this thesis (that racialization can and has transformed a variety of 
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different attributes - not only colour, but also religion, country of origin, 
language - into categories deemed 'racial') has to be emphasized. In this way, 
the conception of racialization can be applied to the German context. 
The German context: Racism or Ausliinderfeindlichkeit? 
Labour migration to Germany differs quite a lot from the British 
pattern. During the Kaiserreich and the Weimar Republic, labourers were 
recruited from Poland and Russia to work in the agricultural sector in the 
eastern regions which suffered chronic labour shortages. In terms of official 
terminology, the phrase auslandische Wanderarbeiter (foreign itinerant workers; 
the part' Wander' implies a short stay without settlement) was adopted and 
was changed later during the Nazi-period to Fremdarbeiter (alien workers) 
who subsequently became during the Second World War Zwangsarbeiter 
(forced labourers). None of these forms of migration for labour were meant to 
result in permanent settlement - a fact which has enjoyed certain continuity 
throughout the post-war era up until the present as there still is no official 
immigration policy. 
The year 1945 constitutes a distinct break with the labour migratory 
pattern which had existed until then. With the separation of West and East 
Germany and the expansion of the Soviet sphere of influence all over eastern 
Europe, immigration to West Germany came from expellees (Vertriebene) and 
Germans from the GDR (Ubersiedler) until the erection of the Wall in 1961 
which brought the influx of the much needed workforce to an abrupt end. 
Slavonic peoples, too, were not available anymore as they were cut off by the 
Iron Curtain. A new source of labour was found in the southern regions of 
Europe and in Turkey, organized in the form of official labour recruitment-
the guest-worker system - which was abolished in 1973 as a result of the 
recession triggered by the 'oil crisis'. As mentioned above, from 1973 onwards 
a terminological and conceptual shift has taken place from 'guest-workers' to 
Auslander. 
This, then, is the background to the theoretical debate revolving 
around the issue of whether Auslanderfeindlichkeit (hostility towards 
foreigners) or racism is the appropriate term and concept when referring to 
the post-war German situation. Since 1945, the term 'racism' has been widely 
treated as a taboo, on the part of politicians and commentators as well as 
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academics10 (Wilpert 1993; academics have, however, provided research on 
post-1945 anti-semitism as e.g. Bergmann & Erb 1991). In general, the only 
groups of people for whom the usage of the term 'racism' has seemed 
acceptable have been right-wing extremists and so-called 'neo-nazis' (Jager 
1993:242). During the last few years, however, this post-war taboo is 
loosening, and the term racism is increasingly used. However, particularly 
when compared with Britain, there is still a lack of research into post-war 
forms of racism as deplored by Jager (1993:12). The discussion in Germany 
has so far been centred around Ausltinderfeindlichkeit (see also Wilpert 1993). 
Even though the Ausltinder-Problematik was publicly addressed and possible 
negative reactions of the population were pointed out by commentators, 
politicians and academics, racism has remained a delicate topic. Bielefeld 
refers to this situation as 'an insufficient political, intellectual and theoretical 
analysis and discussion' (1991:11). 
The reasons for this non-acknowledgement have to be related to 
Germany's recent past and its disastrous experience of the most extreme 
version of racism: the systematic extermination of racialized groupsll. In this 
context, Wilpert notes that today t/[r]acism is identified with genocide" 
(1993:67). However, even though there has been a break from the political and 
ideological system of Nazi-Germany, this break has not been altogether 
complete and a certain continuity has to be admitted. Therefore, the taboo of 
the term 'racism' indicates partly the attempt to get free from the 'guilt 
complex' concerning the shameful events during the Third Reich. The non-
usage of the term 'racism', according to Ruf, has to do with the specific 
political culture of the Federal Republic which tries to detach itself from 
Hitler's 'politics of race' (in: Antrata, Kaschuba, Leiprecht & Wolf 1989). In my 
opinion, the non-usage of the term 'racism' can also be interpreted as the 
attempt to play down the seriousness of contemporary events (such as e.g. 
arson attacks on asylum-seekers' hostels and homes of Turkish people). Thus, 
the taboo of the term 'racism' constitutes a form of repression. 
Apart from the context of anti-semitism and the Third Reich, the only 
other context in which racism seems to be viewed as appropriate is 
lOJ~ger, for example, describes his unsuccessful attempt to find funding 
for his project on 'racism in everyday life' in his publication of 1993 (page 
12, footnote 7): "racism does not exist" was part of the explanation why 
major funding bodies refused to support Jager's project. 
11 Burleigh and Wippermann have shown that not only the Jews were 
victims of the Nazi killing machinery, but also other groups: gypsies and 
'a-socials' such as homosexuals, mentally and physically handicapped 
people, criminals (1991). 
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colonialism and the discrimination of Afro-black people. The underlying 
message is that Germany did not have a significant colonial past, neither has 
Germany experienced large-scale immigration of coloured people, therefore, 
this problem does not exist in the German context. 
Furthermore, the opposition to a language of racism also indicates a 
lack of understanding of both racialization processes and the existence of 
historically different racisms. The term used instead of 'racism' -
Ausltinder!eindlichkeit - is now subject to more and more criticism (mainly by 
academics and journalists) for its inappropriateness: the first part, Ausla'nder, 
supposes that all foreigners are objects of hostility (Kalpaka & RathzeI1990)-
which is not the case as, for instance, EU-nationals and white US Americans 
are not usually regarded as 'foreigners' (see also Forsythe 1989), whilst the 
second part, Feindlichkeit, seems to imply that it is a reaction on a personal, 
individual basis which is understood as 'natural, understandable and rational' 
(Bhavnani 1993). 
What is at stake here, however, is a social problem and not an 
individual one, and therefore, the term 'racism' is considered the better 
concept to describe a general climate as well as institutional forms of 'racial' 
discrimination. This general climate is suggested as having come about via 'a 
racist learning process outlasting generations' (ein Generationen iiber-
dauemder rassistischer Lernprozess; Taggi 1992:24). 
Similarly, Kalpaka & Rathzel note, with regard to the peculiar problem 
Germany seems to have with this type of terminology, that the concept of 
'racism' is not meant to equate today's form of racism with German fascism, 
but it is about choosing a concept which makes the issue of historical 
connection feasible (Frage nach historischer Verbindung; 1990:18) and 
therefore, the term 'hostility towards foreigners' is not acceptable. 
Hoffmann (1991) writes in this context that Ausla'nderfeindlichkeit 
contains a false legitimation of hostility by calling its objects 'foreigners'. 
Discrimination, however, is not caused by lack of citizenship (i.e. by being 
classified as 'foreigners'), but by non-German ethnicity. 
Jaggi (1992) approaches this problem from an analytical point of view 
and criticizes Ausliinderfeindlichkeit for characterizing an attitude which is not 
grounded in theoretical explanatory devices. 
As a result, I argue that the changing ideological/discursive and 
practical forms of racism as well as its changing target groups throughout 
German history, in addition to the fact that Germany has never experienced a 
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'colour problem' as in the case of Britain, constitute strong arguments in 
favour of the above mentioned concept of 'racisms' (multiple forms of racism) 
and 'racialization', Ausltinderfeindlichkeit is not a theoretical concept which can 
explain the changing patterns and target groups of this hostile and 
discriminatory climate rooted in a long history, nor does it help to explain 
mechanisms of social exclusion as reflected for example in immigration and 
nationality laws - which are not elements of individual hostile instances but 
clearly institutionalized general practices. In a comparative analysis, the 
concept of racialization is also of great use to explain why not only Ausltinder 
('outsiders', people with foreign citizenship) are victims of 'racial' 
discrimination but also Inlti'nder ('insiders', people who hold the 'host 
countries' citizenship) of different ethnic backgrounds as in the case of Afro-
Caribbeans and people from the Indian sub-continent living in Britain. 
Therefore, the concept of racialization provides explanations for the 
different citizenship statuses of certain immigrants in Germany and Britain in 
a more useful way than concepts centring upon Aus/{inder/eindlichkeit or the 
'race relations problematic'. In a comparative analysis of countries with 
different migratory patterns, histories and terminologies, racialization is the 
most appropriate concept to grasp the reflection of these differences in 
immigrant peoples' citizenship statuses. 
4.3 Europe. The European Union and Racism 
Europe is widely regarded as having a long tradition of latent and/ or 
overt forms of racism whereby some authors would explain the common 
existence of racism in Europe as a result of modernity (Wieviorka 1994) and 
others would lay the emphasis more on the historical development of 
capitalism within Europe (Miles 1994). However, the unity of contemporary 
forms of racism in Europe should not hide the fact that each country has its 
own social, political and nation-state forming history with its own 
international past (Wieviorka 1994). 
In the context of the European Community, and in particular since 
further European integration was launched in 1992, there has been concern 
about the treatment of third country nationals residing within the EU 
member·states and a new, daunting European racism in the form of an 
institutional phenomenon which is accelerated by the 'building-up' of Europe 
(as 'Fortress Europe') and nurtured by an ideal picture of Europe (Balibar, in: 
Institut fUr Migrations- und Rassismusforschung 1992). This image of Europe 
is described by Solomos & Back as "pan-European Whiteness" (1994:154). 
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Whether the 'European society', which is still in the process of 
construction, results in a 'European racism' is a question also posed by 
Balibar. According to him, the 'European culture' consists historically of two 
ideological models which are specifically racist: the colonial model and the 
anti-semitic model. Both have never been collectively come to terms with and 
have formed, until today, an integral part of 'European identity'. Balibar 
further views the originally differing national forms of racism in Europe as 
influencing each other and recently as even converging to form a new 
phenomenon which could be referred to as 'European racism'. It is an 
institutional phenomenon which functions in a 'racially' discriminatory way 
as it defines for each member-state in an equal way at least two categories of 
migrants with different sets of rights allocated to them, namely ED-nationals 
and non-EU-nationals (third country nationals) (Balibar, in: Institut fUr 
Migrations- und Rassismusforschung 1992; and 1991:6). This new European 
racism seems to be essentially supported by the intensive efforts made to 
harmonize immigration and asylum policies as it happened with agreements 
such as Schengen and organizations such as the Trevi group. These combined 
efforts are characterized by one crucial result: the criminalization of so-called 
'illegal' immigrants or 'illegal' asylum-seekers (Jaggi 1992) which also has 
certain implications on legally residing immigrants (see Chapter Three). 
Another author puts the emphasis slightly differently with regard to 
the causes of racism in western European societies. Castles views 'two sets of 
causes' as decisive: the first of which concerns the history of ideologies and 
practices in connection with the construction of nation-states and colonialism, 
whilst the second set derives, according to him, from "current processes of 
social, economic and political changes" (such as the "rapid pace of change in 
living and working conditions" and the "dissolution of the cultural forms and 
organisational structures of the working class") (1993:25). 
In this context, Sivanandan is quoted by Small as suggesting a pan-
European racism generated by the European Community. This Marxist view 
holds that "[wJe are moving from an ethnocentric racism to a Euro-centric 
racism, from the different racisms of the different member states to a 
common, market racism." (1994:93), Primary motivation for this form of 
racism is, according to Sivanandan, the new competitive pressure felt by 
European capitalists vis-~-vis "American and Japanese capitalists in an 
international economic order dominated by multinational companies, new 
methods of production, distribution and consumption, new technologies and 
the movement of capital to labour" (ibid.), The interest of European capitalists 
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is said to be the maximization of economic benefits of 'Third World' labour by 
minimizing the political and social costs, and it is met by the creation of a 
'Fortress Europe' "with conditions of entry that suit the economic need of 
capital, while totally disregarding the personal, social and economic needs of 
workers" (ibid.). One result of this new Europe is the presence of migrants, 
guest-workers and undocumented aliens without proper citizenship rights. 
Miles objects to the idea of a European racism as put forward by 
Sivanandan and Balibar. Although he acknowledges criteria of similarities, 
such as immigration control, as well as processes characteristic for all of 
western Europe such as the general crisis of the nation-state and structural 
mass unemployment, Miles emphasizes that these criteria and processes are 
"neither unilinear, nor identical in their extent or effect, within and between 
the different nation states of Europe" (1994a:552). Moreover, he stresses the 
different histories of migration which western European societies have 
experienced as well as different histories of laws on nationality and 
citizenship, of different racisms targeted at different groups of people and 
under different historical circumstances (such as colonialism), and of their 
place within the emergence of the capitalist world economy. In his view, the 
notion of 'European racism' is employed to homogenize and totalize a wide 
range of ideologies and practices, and therefore he suggests lito talk of a racist 
construct of the idea of Europe" instead (1994b:203). 
And yet, I argue that, with this view, Miles ignores racializing or 
discriminatory effects of policies created by the European Union as a unity 
despite the different histories of immigration in each member-state. These 
might only be reproductions of similar policies on the national level, but they 
gain a different dimension in their capacity as European-wide practices and 
they indicate the exclusiveness of the Union to non-European immigrants. In 
a different piece of writing, however, Miles clearly makes this distinction by 
referring to the context of the changing features of racism whereby he draws 
again on Balibar's work: "[W)hat we might call the dominant official racism 
that underlies the creation of an EU immigration policy is a racism of 
oppression (d. Balibar 1991 :39) and spatial exclusion which has the primary 
effect of redefining the ideological concept of Europe, and of who has the 
right to a European identity and to reside in Europe, rather than a racism of 
extermination." (1994a:557, original emphasis). The idea of racism as the result 
of EU-policies is, however, only seen here in the context of immigration and 
not in the context of exclusionary effects of European citizenship for settled 
third-country nationals. 
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In terms of cultural identity, statements by distinguished politicians 
referring to the European Union have been described as defining a "Christian 
club" (Seno<;ak, 1994) whereby Muslims and Jews are not necessarily spatially 
excluded but probably more so culturally - in particular in the case of long-
term resident third-country-nationals. This seems to confirm Miles' 'racist 
construct' of Europe. A shared racialized identity is also clearly expressed in 
the often quoted 'Bruges speech' of 1988 by the then Prime Minister of Britain, 
Mrs. Thatcher: 
"Too often the history of Europe is described as a series of intenninable wars 
and quarrels. Yet from our perspective today surely what strikes us most is 
our common experience. For instance, the story of how Europeans explored 
and colonised and - yes without apology - civilised much of the world is an 
extraordinary tale of talent, skill and courage." 
(quoted by Solomos & Back 1994:154). 
These arguments lead to the conclusion that a clear distinction has to be made 
between racisms existing in each individual EU member-state and the 
racializing effects as the outcome of the creation of the European Union as a 
whole (in form of legislation and ideology / discourse) - i.e. a distinction 
between racism in Europe (as a common phenomenon) and European racism 
(as the outcome of EU policies). These two separate levels, however, have to 
be treated as related as it cannot be denied that despite particular histories of 
each member-state, the Union is based on a long history of racialization 
processes as a universal phenomenon. There are common racializing 
tendencies in each EU member-state, such as phases of rising right-wing 
extremist parties and racist violence (see edited book by Bjorgo & Witte 1993). 
This common history might be the reason for racialization or racial 
discrimination as the outcome of common EU policies or non-policies - an 
assumption which suggests that national practices are perpetuated on the 
European level. The aspect of common racializing tendencies and the issue of 
whether the EU has made any difference to national practices are looked into 
in more details as follows. 
European racism and racism in Europe 
On the supra-national level, the basic document with which the EC 
was set up in 1957, the Treaty of Rome (which contains the constitution of the 
EC), does not explicitly mention racism. The Treaty does not guarantee any 
protection to those who do not receive equal treatment on the basis of 'race', 
colour, religion, or ethnic origin. The Treaty does, however, forbid 
discrimination on the grounds of nationality, but only if that discrimination 
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occurs against Community nationals and their families. On an individual 
level, very few nation-states in Europe have legislation which allows concrete 
forms of racism to be declared illegal (Bhavnani 1993). 
Although the Treaty of Rome does not contain any explicit mention of 
racial discrimination, there has been growing concern over this issue, in 
particular on the part of the European Parliament - which has a special stance 
(albeit with little political power) within the institutional structure of the EU 
on matters of immigration/integration (as pointed out in the previous 
chapter). The Report of the European Parliament's Committee of Inquiry into 
Racism and Xenophobia (1990) and Ford's book Fascist Europe: The Rise of 
Racism and Xenophobia (1992) - an adaptation of the report drawn up on behalf 
of the Committee of Inquiry into Racism and Xenophobia - focus on common 
racist features in EU member-states such as right-wing extremist political 
parties and organizations which have spread all over western Europe as well 
as right-wing and 'racially' motivated violence and attacks12. The report is 
based on more or less official documents and declarations as well as hearings 
of ministers and civil servants responsible for combating racism and forming 
legislation in that field (Ford 1992:5). It mentions opinion-surveys and, in 
particular in the British case, forms of institutional racism (such as 
recruitment into the police and the army), however, in the 'country by 
country analysis' it focuses on right-wing extremist political parties and 
organizations as well as racially motivated violence. Thus, it tends to neglect 
the more subtle, less overt, forms of racism among elites in the field of 
politics, economics, the media and education as identified by Van Dijk (1991 + 
1993). 
In the section on the 'country by country' analysis, the report tends to 
focus on the political situation in Europe at the end of the 19805 which was 
characterized by the presence of extremist right-wing parties that are 
commonly considered (except by themselves) as being racist. These parties 
formulate blatantly derogatory opinions about minorities and immigrants 
and attribute most of the socio-economic problems to minorities or 
immigrants as the illusionary solution voters may be attracted to. It might be 
debatable how influential these parties are, in terms of actual seats in national 
governments and the European Parliament they do not seem to be very 
powerful. The problem of their presence, however, does have serious 
12 As Bjorgo & Witte remark, this report as well as other studies of the same 
phenomenon "tend to discuss racism, right-wing extremism and fascism in 
general without specifically analysing racist violence as such" (1993: 13) - a 
shortcoming the above authors hope to overcome in their edited book. 
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implications in that they affect the political positions of other parties. Because 
of competition for voters or for other political reasons, there seems to be a 
tendency, among the more conservative parties in particular, to adopt some of 
the anti-minority attitudes of the extreme right, as has been the case most 
notably for the conservative parties in Great Britain (see Messina 1990), 
France and Germany. Quite often the extreme right-wing parties and sections 
of the traditional conservative parties also promote anti-European sentiments 
and narrow nationalism. This rather more subtle type of anti-
foreigners/minority attitudes is, however, neglected by the above report. 
In this context, Wrench & Solomos write that "European politicians 
and policy-makers are more willing to condemn racism if it is seen as the 
activity of loony extremists, but are less willing to undertake action which 
would imply that racism in both its ideological and practical manifestations 
forms part of the structure of European societies" (1993:157-58). 
In its more general section on Community action since 1986, the above 
mentioned report deplores that no significant changes in national anti-racism 
legislation have been made nor has there been any action at the Community 
level "to confront and tackle the root causes of racism and xenophobia" (p. 99). 
The 1986 Joint Declaration against Racism and Xenophobia is confirmed in 
this report as a non-binding declaration without any recommendations to the 
various member-states (p. 100) and as "sheets of paper, with no means of 
checking whether or not the recommendations are put into practice" (p. 101). 
In its section on the 'cultural field', the report mentions the mass media's role 
in presenting ethnic minorities in an often 'poor' and 'biased' way (p. 137). 
However, apart from the media and their role of providing information 
about, to and by ethnic minorities, the report does not include any other 
forms of cultural racism and thus, it only touches upon the many forms of 
everyday racism as identified by Essed (1991). She partIy relates problems of 
racism to the "domain of conflict between the dominant and the dominated 
group" (1991:185) with regard to norms and values as well as to another 
cultural source of conflict concerning the "definitions of social reality" (ibid.). 
Reports such as the Inquiry into Racism and Xenophobia only 
investigate forms of racial discrimination on the national level of each EU-
member-state. It does not consider at all the racializing effects the European 
Union as a whole has on ethnic minority groups residing in its member-states. 
Nonetheless, I argue that there exists a distinction between 'racism in Europe' 
and 'European racism' as the outcome of EU policies. A supranational level of 
racialization cannot be denied. The rather abstract idea of a European identity 
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in the form of 'white and Christian', based on a long history of domination of 
other peoples, as well as the more concrete provisions of European citizenship 
as established by the Maastricht Treaty (for more details see chapter on 
citizenship) certainly result in a new category of racial discrimination by 
privileging EU-nationals over non-EU-nationals despite their long periods of 
residence. Also - as was discussed in the previous chapter - the commonly 
restrictive EU policies in the field of immigration and asylum have negative, if 
not racializing, effects on the established ethnic minorities. It seems, however, 
that this European racism is a result of racism in Europe. The history of 
racialization had begun long before the establishment of the European Union 
and it seems, therefore, that this phenomenon which originally manifested 
itself at the national level is now perpetuated at the European level. 
4.4 State, national identity and citizenship - a brief contextualization 
The main aim of the remaining chapters is to provide evidence for the 
assumption of a symbiotic relationship between racism (or racialization) and 
nationalism (as the source of national identity) and to assess the effects of this 
relationship on immigrants' citizenship status. 
As mentioned previously, the two sets of ideologies/ discourses on 
racism and nationalism show certain similarities in that they are both sources 
of human collective identity and both categorize human populations into 
discrete groups, each of which is presumed to have unique characters. Both 
seek to naturalize the difference they construct, and both invoke narratives of 
origin referencing defined territory as the natural home of a specific racialized 
group with its defined cultural traits. Authors such as Banton have pointed 
out that modern ideas about class, nation and 'race' - arising "from the same 
European milieu" (1977:3) - share points of similarities and that it is unwise to 
study them in isolation. 
There is an important sense in which the ideology/discourse of the 
'nation' emerged as an embodiment of changing notions of sovereignty so that 
a notion of political representation within territorially bounded new political 
units or states is central to it. Thus, as the latest works by Jackson & Penrose 
(1993), Miles (1993) and Anthias & Yuval-Davis (1992) seem to have in 
common, an ideology/discourse of 'nation' underpins the formation and 
organization of the nation-state. This ideology (or discourse) developed 
historically as part of a political project aimed at challenging the hegemony of 
the monarchy and aristocracy. 
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However, shifts in meaning associated with the idea of 'race' also 
played a central role in mediating the tremendous upheavals, disruptions and 
transformations in social relations during the emergence of the nation-states. 
"When the old usage of the term 'race' in the sense primarily of a 'lineage' lost 
its purchase because the future destinations of members of the newly 
emerging classes could no longer be totally fixed by their birth or social 
origin, the concept of 'race' came to refer to an innate, physical quality. It came 
to signify an imaginary biological principle asserting the moral, physical and 
intellectual superiority of the dominant classes over the social orders at home 
and the 'subject races' abroad" (Brah 1994:809). The similar socio-historical 
changes the ideology / discourse of 'race' and 'nation' have undergone will be 
subject to the following chapter. It will be shown - with special reference to 
Germany and Britain - how identity as a racialized group is very closely 
linked to the identity as a 'nation'. 
Furthermore, as the identity as a racialized group and as a 'nation' is 
reflected in the intermingling of nationality and citizenship laws, concrete 
forms of racialization are perpetuated by the granting or non-granting of full 
citizenship whereby long-term third country nationals tend to be at a 
disadvantage socially, politically and economically. 
As suggested by Jackson and Penrose, the nation-state is "a crucial 
locus for the articulation of racist ideologies because of the extent to which it 
embodies the idea of 'race' and legitimizes it through the gran ting or 
withholding of citizenship." (1993:9). When governments regulate the 
movement of people across political boundaries and decide upon whom to 
grant what type of socio-political membership, they work with a concept of 
what their nation is and/or should be. Immigration/integration policies, 
nationality law, citizenship rights and the historical formation of national 
identity, therefore, have to be seen in a context. The exclusionary effects of 
these policies and laws "have served the project of nation-building by 
protecting the integrity of a national character which is thought of as founded 
on tradition and grounded in experience" (Smith, in: Jackson & Penrose 
1993:53). It should not be forgotten, however, that ideas about 'national 
identity' and identity as a racialized group are not only reflected in 
citizenship/nationality laws or other legislation (Le. on the state level), but 
also within civil society which means that exclusionary and racializing 
ideology / discourses and practices find their larger manifestation within all 
levels of sOciety. 
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As a result of this chapter, the concept of racialization is regarded here 
as the most convincing concept to investigate the notion of socio-Iegal 
exclusion from citizenship through the notion of nationality and national 
identity. The following chapter will show the racializing processes involved 
in the socio-historical formation of both German and British national 
identities which have implications for the ways in which those two societies 
have responded to post-war labour migration and their willingness to vest 
these people of different ethno-cultural backgrounds with full citizenship 
rights. 
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5. National identity & exclusion 
The main aim of this chapter is to argue that there is a close 
relationship between national identity and the identity as a 'race' in the 
German and British context. 
The formation of Germany and Britain as nation-states will be 
discussed briefly to show that their formation has origins in the long process 
of modernization which resulted in a gradual shift from 'subjecthood' to 
'citizenship', However, when the development towards national large groups 
began to be of a particularistic nature (Le. ethno-culturally defined), this 
development entailed the distinction between 'insiders' and 'outsiders' based 
on ethnic or racial differences. In this way, the conceptual link between 
'nationality' (in the sense of ethnic descent) and 'citizenship' was established. 
The racializing effects of this link (and thus, the symbiotic relationship 
between nationalism and racism) will be discussed below with regard to 
German and British internal formation of national identity as well as vis-a-vis 
'the outsider', The same effects will then be examined in the post-1945 context 
with the help of the notion of 'crisis of identity'. The problem of the traditional 
concept of national identity in the context of post-1945 multi-ethnic/multi-
cultural societies might be solvable by developments towards a post-national 
identity (in the European Union context) and by Habermas' alternative 
conception of a 'post-conventional identity'. 
5.1 Some theoretical remarks on the formation of nation-states and national 
identity 
There is a body of literature which contextualizes the emergence of 
nations and nationalism with the process of modernization. Liah Greenfeld's 
Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity (1992), Mann's contribution in the edited 
book titled Transition to Modernity (1992) and Joseph R. Llobera's The God of 
Modernity - the development of nationalism in western europe (1994) all make this 
link with modernity - which reminds one of a similar link which was 
suggested by Banton (1977) in his discussion of racism. 
Elias has explained this development with reference to the concept of 
the 'civilization process' (1992a+b), running from the late medieval to the 
S9 
early modern period1• All three authors (Elias, Greenfeld, Llobera), however, 
agree that the word 'nation', originally referring to the 'elite', became to be 
applied to the whole population of the respective country and was thus made 
synonymous with 'the people'. 
The equation of the two concepts, nation and people, implied the 
elevation of the general populace. The people were thus denoting a positive 
entity by acquiring the meaning of the bearer of sovereignty and by forming 
the basis of political solidarity. National identity in its distinctively modern 
sense is an identity which derives from membership in a 'people' which is 
characterized by its definition as a 'nation'. As opposed to pre-modern times, 
a national population, although stratified, is perceived as essentially 
homogeneous being only superficially divided by the lines of status and class. 
Both Greenfeld and Elias make clear that there is a link between 
'nation'-formation and state-formation. This relationship is viewed by both 
authors as the transition from people being subjects to people being citizens -
a process starting during the second half of the 18th century. Thus, the nation-
state formation process is connected to the gradual democratization and 
political incorporation of all social strata. This development is seen in the 
context of modernization (Greenfeld) or of civilization (Elias). In this way, 
nation-states are linked to the phenomenon of nationalism2 which is the source 
of national identity as a mass belief. 
Greenfeld, along with other authors such as Smith (1994), places 
England (not Great Britain!) as the first nation in the modern world. 
Individualistic, civic nationalism (which regards nationality, at least in 
principle, as open and voluntaristic) then developed. Particularistic 
nationalism (which views nationality as being inherent) in general is 
1 Elias identifies some key mechanisms in the nation-stale formation 
process. The first is referred to by him as the monopoly mechanism, 
meaning the formation of territorial and political monopolies. The second 
is the institutionalization of power by which he means the tendency of the 
state to specialize its functions and to develop impersonal bureaucracies. By 
exploring this process of long term state formation he focuses on certain 
behavioural patterns (etiquette, ritual) developed by the aristocracy 
during the late Middle Ages. The so-called 'civilizing process' thus means 
the gradual imposition of strict rules of behaviour. 
2 It is not of importance here to settle on the issue whether nation-states 
are products of nationalism or the other way round. Both are seen here as 
inter-connected and somehow as re-inforcing each other. 
Also, it should be noted here that there are a variety of theories of 
nationalism in other contexts (Smith 1971; Seton-Watson 1977; Hall 19(3), 
but of interest here is only the Gennan and British context. 
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suggested by Greenfeld as not having emerged until the 18th century. 
Germany is given as one prime example. The same author further claims that 
the dominance of England in the 18th century, followed by the dominance of 
the 'West' in the world, "made nationality the canon" (1994:15). In this way, 
the phenomenon of national identity developed as an international process. 
At the same time, however, every single nationalism was very much an 
indigenous phenomenon. Greenfeld assumes that there must have been 
groups in whose interest it was to import and promote national identity. Prior 
to that, there must have been dissatisfaction with the identity these groups 
had. "A change of identity presupposed a crisis of identity" (op.cit.:14; 
emphasis added). This process of importing the foreign idea of the nation and 
focusing thereby on the source of importation and reacting to it is labelled by 
Greenfeld as 'resentment' ~ a term borrowed from Nietzsche (op.cit.:15)3. The 
reason why this identity is national is explained by the availability of a certain 
type of concept. Thus, national identity is understood as a matter of historical 
contingency rather than necessity. This understanding is similarly expressed 
by Elias in his study on the civilization process, in which he develops a theory 
of nation~formation processes which is void of teleology. 
With regard to the historical emergence of nation-states, the modernist 
conception is adopted here. It takes the nation as the result of 'modern 
phenomena' such as the creation of political and territorial monopolies with 
the gradual shift from subjecthood to citizenship. The elements which 
constitute 'modernity' (and also the actual meaning of 'modern period') are, 
however, contested4• And yet, wherever the emphasis is placed, most of the 
'modernist' theorists seem to suggest the pertinence of one common element, 
and that is the depiction of nations as belief rather than a more material 
phenomenon. Gellner (1983) and Anderson (1983), for example, place an 
emphasis on the nation as a construct, by which they mean the creation of 
myths being part of the make-believe evolving around the origin of a people 
(such as the claim of common ancestry, common customs and vernaculars, 
common territory and a common native history as suggested by Smith 1988). 
3 Mann (1993a) refers to the same phcnomenon as 'gcopolitical rivalry'. 
4 Wallerstein (1987), for instance, places his theory of nationalism within 
the capitalist world-system. Gellncr (1983) providcs a theory which hinges 
upon the requirement of a growth oriented industrial society, and 
Anderson defines the nation as an 'imagined political community' deriving 
from the extensive use of 'print capitalism' (meaning that books were the 
first commodity produced in a massive way generating great profits). 
Uobera (1994) suggests that modcmization as a whole triggered the 
development of nationalism. 
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The constructionalist view of nations has been criticized by authors 
such as Heckmann (1992), who holds that nations also have become reality as 
constructs. According to Nicklas (1994), the idea of the nation as a product of 
elitist or intellectual discourse needed to be internalized by the whole 
population which was attempted through, for example, the education system, 
symbols, and compulsory military service. In this way, a certain level of 
standardization, which is also referred to as homogenization (O'Brien 1992), 
was gradually achieved. National identity is acquired and sustained not only 
through the educational system, but, for example, also through political and 
social rituals, cultural institutions, and the media. Thus, individuals become 
conscious of themselves as having a national identity (Poole 1992). These 
standardizing processes were the prerequisite for the transition from a feudal, 
agrarian society to a modern society based on capitalistic economy (Bade 
1992). R~Hhzel (in: Jager & Januschek 1992) describes these processes as 
horizontal standardization (Vereinheitlichung - of various ethnic groups 
within a unified territory) with vertical standardization happening at the 
same time (of the various strata, of ruling elites and the ruled), which reminds 
one very much of Elias' civilization model. 
Miles (1991+1994) similarly explains the decisive character of a modern 
nation by the fact that the 'dominating class' and the 'dominated classes' come 
to regard each other as belonging to the same national group. Until the 19th 
century, the aristocracy, the working class and the peasants were perceived as 
different 'races' - a fact which Balibar refers to as 'racisme de dasse'.s The 
process of nation-state formation, however, resulted in the creation of 
Grossgruppen (national large groups as an extensive cross-dass community) 
(Hoffmann 1992) and thus, also in a changing pattern of racism: It shifted 
from being a device for internal classification to being used externally. On 
similar lines, Bauman refers to nationalism as a specimen of the big family of 
'we-talks' which are set apart by their exclusivity promoting "ego-centred 
binary divisions" dividing "the world into friends and enemies" (1992:678). 
It is argued here, therefore, that the early meaning of 'nation' (in terms 
of the elite) went hand in hand with racisme de classe and both notions, nation 
and 'race', developed from there into external classificatory devices. Thus, in 
general, there seems to have been a strong connection between the concepts of 
5 A phenomenon which becomes also clear in Eugen Weber's famous study 
on France where he describes that the notion of 'rare' was used to refer to 
peasants (1976:7) until almost the end of the] 9th century. 
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racism and nationalism throughout their existence, supporting the claim of 
their symbiotic relationship. 
5,2 Identity as 'nation' and as 'race': The individual cases of Britain and 
Germany 
a) Formation of English collective identity 
Historically, England is regarded as the first nation that came into 
existence (Kohn 1940, as quoted by Llobera 1994:39). "By 1600, the existence in 
England of a national consciousness and identity, and as a result, of a new 
geo-political entity, a nation, was a fact" (Greenfeld 1994:31)6. The English 
nation is seen by Greenfeld as having been originally based on Humanist 
ideas or ideals as a community of free and equal individuals taking part in the 
collective and political decision making process. However, the 
correspondence between the concept of the nation constituted of free, rational 
individuals and reality was not perfect. "Not all people of England were 
actually included in the nation in this first century of its existence - and many 
would, for a long time, remain outside it." (ibid.). Nonetheless, the 
commitment to the idea of the nation of the political ruling parts of the 
English population meant, as claimed by Greenfeld, an important change in 
political culture having an impact on future developments. 
English nationalism of the 16th century centred on the figure of the 
monarch as the important symbol of England's distinctiveness. The other 
factor that helped the emergence of English national consciousness was 
Protestantism in the form of the Book rendering the English conscious of 
being Christian. This, however, led to the exclusion of English Catholics from 
membership in the nation at this stage. English nationality and religion were 
one, united in the person of Elizabeth I. Reason and 'rationality' were given a 
central place in the notion of an English national character, and science was 
considered the sign of superiority. Its pursuit was a matter of national 
prestige and was used as a yardstick in the cultural competition with the 
other continental nations. These developments lead Greenfeld to the 
conclusion that "English nationalism at this time certainly was not defined in 
6 England happened to become the first nation as the result of certain 
circumstances, the most important of which were, according to Greenfeld 
(1994), the transformation of the social hierarchy and the unprecedented 
increase in social mobility throughout the 1 Gth century, the accession of 
the Tudors to power, and the Protestant Reformtion. The social strurture 
became much more open than had ever been hcfore. 
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ethnic terms. It was defined in terms of religious and political values." 
(1994:65; emphasis added). 
b) Formation of German collective identity 
The development of German nationalism seems to have differed 
considerably from the English in that German national consciousness 
emerged significantly later (Elias 1992c). It was triggered by the Wars of 
Liberation from Napoleonic, i.e. French, domination in the early 19th century. 
German national consciousness developed very rapidly and grew from "birth 
to maturity" between 1806 and 1815 (Greenfeld 1994:277). 
The source of nationalistic ideas was not, as in the English case, the 
aristocracy and the ruling elite, but a peculiar class of educated commoners or 
professional intellectuals, the so-called Bildungsburgertum .. Their status was 
higher than that of the middle class but much lower than that of the higher 
classes, and thus, they found themselves in a marginalized social position 
(Greenfeld 1994; Elias 1992c). Compared to England, the sense of German 
nationality failed to take root in the 16th century partly because of its lacking 
a central authority. Germany at that time, in the form of the Holy Roman 
Empire of the German Nation, meant a number of territories loosely united. 
Religion, too, had more of an opposing effect when compared with England 
as the religious struggles (Catholics versus Protestants) of the first half of the 
16th century resulted in the transformation of the Empire into small 
kingdoms and principalities (Llobera 1994). Thus, the confessional differences 
and the absence of a national dynasty were the realities of the post-
Reformation period and the legacy for internal dissension. 
Elias (1992c) allocates the delay of Germany's national integration 
partly to its geographical location in the centre of Europe. As such, it was the 
main territory where many European wars were fought resulting in ongoing 
shifts of territorial borders. Further, as Elias and Greenfeld both hold, 
Germany's social order remained unchanged for a much longer time than in 
England. The nobility in particular enjoyed long periods of uninterrupted 
and, by comparison, unusual stability. The ancient divisions between 
different strata remained sharp, and the conditions of a static society made it 
virtually impossible for the middle-class intellectuals to be upwardly mobile. 
The Bildungsburger found national identity attractive because it elevated 
members of the national collectivity giving them almost equal status with the 
nobility. 
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The indigenous traditions which formed the basis of the character of 
German national consciousness were Pietism and Romanticism. The latter 
was a movement of thought responding to the fears and frustrations of the 
Bildungsbiirger, generated by the Enlightenment. "[I]t was rationalism that 
Romantics revolted against" (Greenfeld 1994:330). The peculiarity of the 
German people became language and land. 'Nation' was synonymous with 
Yolk, representing "the inner unity and spirit of the people" (op.cit.:364). As 
'nation' was a foreign import, the concept of Yolk was preferred, but both 
concepts meant very much the same. The unique character of the nation came 
to be its language as an object of worship. 'Turn vater' Jahn (creator of the idea 
of the value of exercising) advised in his work Das deutsche Volkstum 
('German peoplehood') from 1810 that "the state should develop the teaching 
of the mother tongue and suggested that the knowledge of German be used as 
a qualification of citizenship" (op.cit.:368) - an element still vital in today's 
evaluation of applications for naturalization. 
Deriving from this ideological background, nationality was ultimately 
based on blood-relatedness. German language was regarded as the Ursprache 
(pure, unmixed language), Germans were the Urvolk (pure people). Thus, 
Greenfeld concludes that "German national consciousness was unmistakably 
and distinctly racist from the moment it existed, and the national identity of 
the Germans was essentially an identity of race" (op.cit.:369; emphasis added). 
She refers to German nationalism as "the most activist, violent, and 
xenophobic species of the phenomenon" (p. 360). The finishing touch to this 
type of nationalism, according to the same author, is to be seen in resentment -
the envy of the successful neighbour France and the feeling of shame over the 
defeat of Prussia in the course of the French revolutionary wars. Both, 
Greenfeld and Elias, hold in a similar way that the particular historical 
circumstances of Germany's nation-state formation have resulted in a 
proneness to ethnic nationalism - which can certainly be read as suggesting a 
symbiotic relationship between nationalism and racism7. This, then, suggests 
an explanation of why and how the combination of nationalism and racism 
under National Socialism was to reach extremes in Hitler's Germany. 
7 It should be mentioned here that 'cthnicity' is mostly regarded as a 
cultural marker or a container of shared origin and characteristics (Rex 
1986). However, it is agreed here with Rattansi who remarks that 'culture' 
and notions of 'shared origin' "smuggle in ideas of shared bioJogJ II (199..J:S3, 
original emphasis) and are, thus, highly suggestive of 'race' and racism. 
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c) Comparative problems 
There are a number of problems with the comparison of the internal 
formation of national identity and its original components in Britain and 
Germany as outlined above. Greenfeld provides the reader with an 
incomplete picture by her comparison of England as the very first nation, with 
its date of emergence being around 1600, and by emphasizing its 'religious 
and political nature' with that of Germany's 'racial' sense of national identity. 
There is no doubt at all with regard to her depiction of Germany8, but her 
analysis of England is flawed by the fact that she does not take into account 
the formation of British national identity which is certainly not only based on 
positive political (Le. democratic) and religious values. By incorporating the 
Welsh, Scottish and Irish nations, there must have been clashes at least with 
the 'religious identity' (Protestantism versus Catholicism) having as a possible 
result the adding of an 'ethnic' component. 
Furthermore, as convincingly argued by Colley, after 1707 (the year of 
the Act of Union joining Scotland to England and Wales), the British "came to 
define themselves as a single people not because of any political or cultural 
consensus at home, but rather in reaction to the Other beyond their shores." 
(1992:6) - whereby Colley does not suggest that the Welsh, Scottish and 
English lost their distinct cultural traits. Her argument continues that the 
sense of a common identity did not develop as the result of integration and 
homogenization of disparate cultures, but rather that "Britishness was 
superimposed over an array of internal differences in response to contact with 
the Other, and above all in response to conflict with the Other." (ibid.). The 
'Other' is here understood as the hostile party in the various wars during the 
period of 1707 and 1837 on which Colley focuses. 
To show that an 'ethnic' (and thus racializing) component was 
involved in the process of the formation of both British and German national 
identities, this issue will be approached from the point of view of the outsider 
or 'the Other'. However, the 'Other' will not be literally understood as the 
'outsider' as described by Colley, but the focus will be rather on ethnic 
8 She does, however, acknowledge that the period she describes is "long 
before the word 'race' acquired its specific meaning and long hefore 
racism, bolstered by the authority of science, became an articulate and 
presumably objective view" (1994:368-69). This is also discussed by Brah 
who questions that nations can be connoted as "a 'racial group' at this stage 
when the word 'race' was not yet part of the vocabulary .... " (199...J:809). And 
yet, Greenfeld is very correct in her understanding of the strong ethnic 
nature of German national identity. 
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minorities on German or British (imperial) territory. The purpose of this is to 
give a historical basis to the exclusionary construction of the 'Other' which is 
considered here as having implications for the perception of post-war 
immigrants. 
5.2.1 National identity vis-~-yis 'the Other' 
Despite the existence of a more complex debate as identified by Cohen, 
the notion of 'Otherness' is used here in a much more simple way (as 
suggested by the same author), namely in the sense that "one only knows who 
one is by who one is not" (1994:198). The Self-Other relationship - as a process 
of exclusion and inclusion - is partly constitutive of national identity (as one 
of the outcomes of the nation-state is the boundary drawing between 'us' and 
'them'). This relationship is subject to continuous defining and redefining 
processes. 
a) The British case 
As already mentioned in the introduction, the case of Britain is very 
special as it actually incorporates four nations9• It has been suggested that 
England has dominated the other three, and I have argued that this 
domination was and is based on a sense of 'racial' superiority. 
There are a number of authors who have stressed the four different 
national identities existing within Britain rendering Britishness rather 
ambiguous (see chapter 7, 8,9 in MacDonald 1993; Samuel 1989; for a more 
historical account see Teich & Porter 1993). Nairn (1977) claims that 
nationalism in these parts of Britain derive from contradictory effects of 
uneven development which resulted in a defensive type of nationalism of 
peripheral countries against the core. The terminology of 'periphery' and 
'core' is strongly suggestive of a colonial context which is in fact adopted by 
Hechter's study of the United Kingdom titled Internal Colonialism (1975) in 
which he seems to follow Nairn by emphasizing the unequal development of 
industrialism within states. He shows how industrialization aggravated 
already existing conditions of economic dependency and inequality of the 
9 According to Uobera, who draws on Smith's typology, the necessary 
criteria for identifying a nation are: a collective proper name, a specific 
myth of common ancestry or descent, clements of culture which are 
shared, and the association with a specific homeland or history 0994:39-
40). England, Scotland, Wales and Ireland are claimed to futritl the 
conditions required. 
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Celtic fringe (Ireland, Scotland and Wales) to England and how this situation 
manifested itself in differential political behaviour and eventually in ethno-
national movements. Furthermore - which is of greater interest here - he also 
underpins the idea that it is difficult to speak of a 'national culture'. What 
exists is better depicted as a core culture dominating the others by . 
establishing ethnic boundaries. Hechter describes the earliest stages of British 
nation-building as 'overland expansion of patrimonial states' and therefore 
prefers the term 'empire-building' (1975:65). This imperial nature of British 
nation-building leads to his suggestion that "[f]rom the 17th century on, 
English military and political control in the peripheral regions was buttressed 
by a racist ideology which held that Norman Anglo-Saxon culture was 
inherently superior to Celtic culture", with the dearest signs of England's 
domination being in Ireland (op.cit.:342; emphasis added)10. English cultural 
superiority entailed gross denigration of Irish culture by treating it with dear 
disdain "as the work of barbarians" (op.cit.: 77). This was reflected in the 
never ceasing attempt to suppress the speaking of the Gaelic language and 
the practising of Roman Catholicism, as well as in "a steady procession of 
Penal Laws" (op.cit.:76). These laws began to be introduced from the early 
seventeenth century onwards, peaking in 1727 when Catholics were 
prohibited, for example, from being members of Parliament, bearing arms, 
education abroad, keeping a public school in Ireland, practising law, and 
acquiring land owned by a Protestant. Finally, the right to vote was taken 
away from Catholics. These legal measures were operated throughout the 
period from 1727 to 1829 - the year of Catholic Emancipation. 
Similarly, but in a different context, i.e. in a later period and not in a 
colonial context, but in an immigration setting, Miles (1982a) suggests that the 
Irish were the object of the articulation of a racist ideology. This happened 
during the 19th century when Irish labour migration to England and Scotland 
started to increase (the largest proportion of labour migrants to England have, 
in fact, come from Ireland). One part of the Irish found employment in the 
agricultural sector which suffered from labour shortage as a result of 
indigenous labour migrating to industrial towns. Another part was involved 
in the improvement of the infrastructure (road, railways). They tended to live 
in the cheapest and poorest accommodation and did mostly semi- and 
unskilled type of work. According to Miles, the Irish exclusion was justified 
by reference to the idea of 'race' and religious adherence - the latter having 
10 Again, here are the same reservations to a terminology of 'race' and 
racism during this period as explained in footnote no. 8 on page GG. 
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been a strong element of English national identity as explained above. In 
certain decades of the 19th century, there was massive opposition to Irish 
migration on the part of the English as reflected in various incidents of 
physical violence and riots. Miles supports his claim for this anti-Irish 
sentiment being a form of racism with evidence found in writings of that time 
in which the Irish are clearly conceived of as a 'race' in the sense of the 19th 
century scientific racism - namely as a separate physical type of people with a 
range of negative social and cultural characteristics (1982a:139-40). Increasing 
pUblicity was given to works on scientific racism, and the mid-19th century is 
said to have been not only the high-spot of scientific racism, but also of Irish 
immigration. The two strands of anti-Irish sentiment and/ or discrimination of 
the Irish and Anti-Catholicism suggest a combined existence of racism and 
nationalism, whereby the boundaries between identity as a 'nation' and 
identity as a 'race' seem to be rather blurred at times. 
Another minority group which was declared a separate and 'alien' part 
of British or English society - and in whose case the link between nationalism 
and racism becomes quite clear too - were the Jews. According to Holmes 
(1979), during the period of 1870 to 1930, the idea of a different 'race' became a 
central element in the construction of the Jews as distinctive to the majority 
population, although without resulting in "a system of official controls similar 
to the 1935 Nuremberg Laws" (1991:108) as in the German case. 
In addition, Lebzelter (in: Kennedy & Nicholls 1981) suggests with 
regard to the same period and place (Le. Britain) that elements of modern 
Jew-hatred are composed of racial, religious, historical and socio-economic 
arguments corresponding to traditional hostility. The novelty about modern 
anti-Jewish sentiments as opposed to traditional hostile reactions was that "it 
was no longer assumed that the Jews should and could be assimilated or 
absorbed" (op.cit.:88). Lebzelter, therefore, concludes that racism was "the 
backbone of modern anti-Semitism" (op.cit.:90) thrusting sole economic, 
cultural or religious arguments into the background. Furthermore, she 
identifies a clear link between racist anti-Semitism and nationalism as the 
"anti-Semitic campaign contained the argument of an alleged Jewish world-
conspiracy directed against British interests." (op.cit.:92). 
The selection of those two examples, the Irish and the Jews, should 
allow the assumption that British national identity did have an ethnic 
component and functioned as an identity of (a superior) 'race' vis-A-vis other 
(inferior) 'races'. Thus, excluding and even racializing implications for those 
minority groups were involved in the formation of a collective identity. 
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Another way of testing British national identity vis-a-vis 'the Other' 
would be to look into ideology/discourse around 'external' colonialism (as 
opposed to Hechter's notion of 'internal colonialism') and the inferiorization 
of colonial subjects. Mann writes in the context of the American colonization 
that "the colonies had institutionalized racism" (1993b:139; emphasis added). 
Fryer devotes a section in his book Staying Power to the nature and origins of 
racism in the context of early colonialism in the West Indies (1984:133-184). 
Cohen (1994), for example, suggests that during colonial/imperial times, the 
term 'English' carried connotations of class, linguistic and cultural superiority 
- an area which can only be touched upon here because of shortage of space, 
but it is assumed that a detailed look into the period of expanding 
imperialism would reveal more evidence of racializing effects of British self-
perception vis-a.-vis other peoples. 
As a whole, there seems to be strong evidence in British history for a 
symbiotic relationship between nationalism and racism, i.e. the formation of 
national identity as an identity of a 'race'. 
b) The German case 
In the German context, there is a parallel example to Irish immigrants 
to Britain, namely that of the Poles. Since the existence of a unified Germany 
in 1871, the largest group of non-German (labour) immigrants were Polish 
peoplell . The political discourse during the period 1880 up to the First World 
War revolved mainly around the admission and re-admission of Polish 
seasonal agricultural workers and to a much lesser extent around 'German' 
Poles, the reason for this laying in those two different 'categories' of Poles. 
The eastern part of Prussia included at that time territory annexed from 
Poland. The Polish population living there actually belonged to the German 
Reich and thus enjoyed Prussian citizenship which allowed them, for 
example, to move on to the western parts of the Reich to find employment in 
the coal-mines of the Ruhrgebiet (Bade 1992). They had been subject to quite 
successful attempts of Germanization (Germanisierungsbestrebungen) in the 
form of anti-Polish 'Prussian protection policies' containing, amongst others, 
11 The peak during this period was reached in 1914 with 1.2 million 
immigrant workers (Bade 1992:312). 
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the prohibition of the usage of the Polish language. As a result, those Poles 
were less regarded as 'dangerous for nationalistic politics'12. 
Those Poles, however, who entered the Reich as agricultural workers 
were mainly from the Russian part of Poland and the Polish territory annexed 
by Austria-Hungary and had, therefore, not been subject to the same 
Germanization policies. They were referred to as Auslandspolen (foreign or 
alien Poles). However, both 'types' of Poles had one element in common, this 
being that their culture was regarded as being inferior to German culture 
(Herbert 1986) - similar to the English superior attitude towards Irish culture. 
They suffered from very bad working conditions with sixteen to eighteen 
hours of work per day. Even Polish women and children were used as a 
source of labour, as for example in brickworks, which was against the law in 
the case of German indigenous women and children (Bade 1992:319). It is 
suggested, therefore, that Polish workers were in a similar social situation to 
the Irish in England: they formed a 'sub-proletarian foreign second-class 
working stratum' (op.cit.:320). 
There is evidence that the inferiorization of Poles was based on 
racialization. Bade quotes a statement by a quasi-governmental source in 
Breslau of 1911, in which Polish workers are referred to as 'unskilled and less 
intelligent' by nature (1992:320). Associations, such as the Ostmarkenverein 
and the Alldeutscher Verband, were founded to promote anti-Polish 
propaganda which "carried in a way racist features" (Herbert 1986:46). In a 
speech, the chairman of the Ostmarkenverein mentioned the behaviour of the 
Poles as giving the impression of a "less educated race" (op.cit.:74). This anti-
Polish propaganda was reflected in practical policies. In Westfalen (western 
part of Germany where the Ruhrpolen settled), for instance, Polish schools and 
the teaching of as well as in the Polish language were forbidden, and the 
request for a Polish priest from the Polish community was turned down 
(op.cit.:7S). All of these policies show similarities to the anti-Irish Penal Laws 
mentioned above. 
Another similarity to the English case, which has been described 
above, is the notion of 'internal colonialism'. As indicated with regard to the 
Auslandspolen, the territory of Poland was partitioned until 1918 - the date of 
the re-establishment of the Polish state by the Treaty of Versailles. As a 
consequence, national ideologists' claims to the superiority of the Germanic 
12 As unification of Germany had only come about in 1871, the presence of 
a fairly large Polish minority was seen as a threat to the still vcry fragile 
nation-state. This was expressed as a fear of 'Po/nisicrung' - Polishization -
of the east of the Kaiserreich. 
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peoples was not only used vis-a-vis the French (as mentioned earlier), but was 
also used to legitimize German rule over former West Slavs and Polish 
territories. Ethnic stereotypes, such as the notorious reference to 
'uncleanliness of the Slavs' entailed a general perception of Germans having 
brought civilization to Slavic peoples in general and to Polish peoples in 
particular (Burleigh & Wippermann 1991:26). "This cultural-political form of 
imperialism was given an historical-messianic quality through the claim that 
the Germans had a 'mission' to resettle territories once inhabited by ancient 
Germanic tribes." (ibid.; emphasis added). 
The racialization of eastern Europeans resulted further in their being 
'used' as forced labourers (Fremdarbeiter) during the period of National 
Socialism (in particular the years of war 1939-1945). Bade refers to this as the 
"largest case of forced mass-usage of foreign labour in history since the 
abolition of slavery during the nineteenth century" (1992:354; free translation). 
Workers mainly from Poland and Russia suffered from the worst treatment 
and the worst working conditions when compared with POWs and forced 
labourers from western Europe13. Thus, they occupied the lowest level of the 
'racial' hierarchy (Bade 1992; Herbert 1986:153). 
A further example which illustrates the co-existence of national 
identity and identity as a 'race' is that of the Jews. The Jewish population in 
Germany experienced rising anti-Semitism from the time of unification in 
1871 14, partly as the result of Jewish migration to Germany from eastern 
Europe between 1880 and 1929. The terms 'east' and 'Jews' carried negative 
connotations "in the language of German nationalistic circles" (Bade 
1992:326)15. During 1918 and 1923, anti-semitic activities increased further 
culminating in the crudest biological-scientific racism of the Third Reich. 
Hitler was very much influenced by the earlier racial-anthropological, racial-
hygienic, and racial anti-semitic theories. In Mein Kampf he "turned them into 
13 There were 2,758,312 Soviets and 1,688,080 Polish forced labourers from a 
total of7,615,970 'civilian labourers' and POWs in 1944 (Herbert 198(>:145). 
14 Antj- Iewish sentiments existed, of course, much earlier and were a 
crucial element in ideologizing a German national identity (see Greenfeld 
1992). The German Jews had gained their emancipation comparatively 
speaking late in 1869/71, and already around 1881 a movement was founded 
which had as its goal the withdrawal of Jewish equality (Bade 1992). 
Antisemitism was a creation of the scientific form of racial anthropology 
during the second half of the 19th century (Pinn & Ncbc1ung ] 992). 
15 Lebzelter writes in this context of a similar altitude towards eastern 
European Jews migrated to Britain/England. She quotes one observer who 
wrote in 1908 that "[t]he r:ast-European Jews arc treated like dirt." (in: 
Kennedy & Nicholls 1981 :<)0). 
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a comprehensive, self-contained, if totally insane, racial-political programme" 
(Burleigh & Wippermann 1991:38). The consequences of this ideology and its 
high degree of political instrumentalization, namely the extermination of six 
million Jews, is a well-known fact. 
5,3 The context of the post-war period 
The post-1945 period has given a new dimension to the issue of 
nationalism and national identity in various respects. As a result of a phase of 
extreme nationalism and national identity based on racial purity during the 
Third Reich, Germany experienced defeat and total collapse. Britain, on the 
other hand, emerged from the war as one of the Allies. However, it could not 
indulge for very long in its victorious position, but had to turn back to its 
problems of continuous economic decline and the gradual break-up of the 
Empire. It seems, therefore, as if the post-war period represents the beginning 
of a new era in the history of nationalism in the wake of the retreat of its 
extreme racist version, the end of decolonization, and the beginning of a new 
'economic crisis'. 
Another aspect which began to give the issue of nationalism and 
national identity a fresh impetus is large-scale post-war immigration of non-
Europeans. The presence of a permanent 'foreign' population of a 
considerable size has resulted, in western Europe, in a common problem of 
national identity despite historically very different approaches to the role of 
immigration in each single western European country. This common problem 
of national identity will be approached by the notion of 'crisis'. 
5.3.1 Identity crisis 
Usually, the issue of 'identity crisis' seems to be related to an 
individual, personal level. However, as Macdonald (1993:8) suggests, not only 
individuals suffer from identity crises, but societies can suffer from it too if 
they have lost hold of their history and roots. Even majority identities need 
not necessarily be secure and unambiguous - a fact discussed by Forsythe in 
the context of German identity (1989). Any question of identity is clearly 
dependent on the social and political environment of a particular period in 
time and on the categories available for the drawing of boundaries. These 
elements - environment and boundaries - are subject to changes and can, 
therefore, result in crises at the moment of redefinition. 
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The era of integration - to borrow a term from Wieviorka (1994) -
during which western European nation-states started their formation 
processes seemed to have been quite successful in integrating three basic 
components of their collective life: an industrial society, an egalitarian state 
and a national identity - a process which was ongoing until the 1960s and 
1970s as suggested by Wieviorka (op.cit.). Since then, however, all western 
European countries have found themselves undergoing a huge 
transformation which has implications for these three components. The 
decline of industrial societies, the fading of the working-class movement and 
the downward mobility of the middle classes, just to mention a few of the 
outcomes of the present economic situation, seem to be (at least partly) 
responsible for increasing national populism and a generall y rising feeling of 
insecurity. This is very likely to be attributed to immigrants, thus involving 
strong anti-migrant attitudes (op.cit.). 
In this context, in most western European countries, political debates 
about nation, nationality and citizenship are activated (see, for example, the 
'New Right' debate), and nationalism tends to become again narrower, i.e. 
loaded with xenophobia and racism. Such a development entails further 
exclusion of those 'outside' the national society - mostly the ethnic minority 
groups - leading to stronger identification with their religious and ethnic 
roots. Thus, the era of integration is suggested by Wieviorka (1994) to have 
changed into an 'era of destructuration'. This post-1945 social and political 
environment is, therefore, the frame of historically different problems of 
national identity. 
a) The British case 
The symptoms of a crisis of national identity acute to Britain are many-
fold. As a country which was once imperialistic, Britain's role in the world has 
been substantially diminished. Significant economic decline and crisis in the 
welfare state has had implications for its self-image. Schnapper, therefore, 
suggests - albeit put in a rather simplistic way - that "[d]ivisions of class, 
gender, region and 'race' - which are no longer transcended by a grand 
imperialist project, or by confidence and pride in a political system ... seem to 
threaten the unity of the country" (1994:131). 
In Britain, the boundaries of national identity have been for a long time 
very imprecisely drawn and understood. Historically, the concept of 
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'belonging' was expressed in terms of being the monarch's subject, i.e. the 
vertical relationship between monarch and individual (Dummett & Nicol 
1990). Since the French and the American revolutions, it has become general 
practice to define nationality in legal codes and/or constitutions, which is, 
however, not the case in Britain. The introduction of the first Nationality Act 
in 1948 is usually quoted as the end of this shortcoming and as having 
destroyed the notion of 'subjecthood' (Brubaker 1989; Dummett & Nicol 
1990). However, according to Cohen (1994), many residues of this status 
remain. 
"It may be argued that these are mere historical residues and denote only token 
power by the Crown. But if we are talking about mere residues, why is it so 
difficult to provide a simple, up-to-date, definitive statement of the limits to 
constitutional monarchy, the nature of parliamentary power, the rights and 
responsibilities that attach to British citizenship, and above all, the parameters of 
a national identity?" (1994:6). 
Prior to the British Nationality Act of 1948, there was the common 
assumption that all who came under the Crown's power were British subjects 
with an emphasis on duties and loyalties to the monarch rather than on 
rights. When large-scale post-war immigration into the core took place, a 
need was seen to clearly identify British nationality - a fact which was not 
only triggered by immigration but also by former dependent territories which 
began to implement their own nationality and citizenship laws, the first of 
which was Canada in 1947. Whereas the imperial notion of British nationality 
seems to have been concerned with who was included, the British Nationality 
Act of 1948 started a process of defining who should be excluded from being 
British. The only brief period when people from the Indian sub-continent and 
the West Indies could come to the core, testing the common status and 
freedom of movement, was between 1949 and 1962 (Goulbourne 1991:95-96). 
With the large-scale influx of these Commonwealth citizens, "it became 
increasingly difficult to uphold the idea that a British identity was exclusively 
a white identity" (Cohen 1994:18). Consequently, post-war British 
immigration law successively restricted access to the UK leading to a 
redefinition as a nation-state (as opposed to a multi-'racial' empire). The four 
main legislative interventions were: 
- the British Nationality Act of 1948 (invention of 'Citizens of the UK 
and colonies' as distinct from 'British subject' and 'British subject 
without citizenship'), 
- the 1962 Commonwealth Immigration Act, 
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- the concept of 'patriality' as introduced by the 1971 Immigration Act 
(allowing immigration only from people with a British parent or 
grandparent) , 
- and finally the British Nationality Act of 1981 which abolished the 
long-standing reliance on sole ius soli (rule of birthplace) and thus, the 
automatic acquisition of British citizenship by birth (Cohen 1994; 
Schnapper 1994). 
In particular the concept of 'patriality' and the introduction of the 'ius 
sanguinis' principle into the Nationality Act of 1981 have been criticized for 
having racializing implications (Gilroy 1987). 
Another factor adding to the identity problems resulting from a radical 
change from empire to nation-state lay in Britain's joining of the European 
Community (George 1990+1991). There is now the pressure of moving 
towards a European identity despite the long historical "ties of kinship, 
economic interdependence and preferential trade arrangements" (Cohen 
1994:17) with the Commonwealth. 
All these identity problems can be summarized by Cohen'S notion of 
'fuzzy frontiers'. He identifies six fuzzy frontiers which render British national 
identity complex: 1. the Celtic fringe, 2. the heritage of the Dominions, 3. the 
Empire and the non-white Commonwealth, 4. the continuing Atlantic and 
anglophone connection,S. the relationship to an emergent European identity, 
and 6. the British notion of and relationship to 'aliens' (1994:7). As a result, 
Cohen concludes that British identity is characterized by a general pattern of 
fragmentation. 
"Multiple axes of identification have meant that Irish, Scots, Welsh and English 
people, those from the white, black or brown Commonwealth, Americans, English-
speakers, Europeans and even 'aliens' have had their lives intersect one with 
another in overlapping and complex circles of identity-construction and 
rejection." (op.cit.:3S). 
The various forms of British identity have shifted throughout history as well 
as space and excluded different types of people. The racializing effects of 
national identity in the post-war period are mainly directed towards black 
and Asian immigrants. 
b) The German case 
In Germany, it was the situation of complete destruction in 1945 which 
caused a radical change in its people's self-perception. The experiences and 
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revelation of the full scale of atrocities during the Third Reich with its 
aftermath of the expulsion from and loss of eastern territories as well as 
national division into two separate states resulted in a general inferiority 
complex combined with a feeling of shame or guilt (Weidenfeld & Korte 1991; 
Buruma 1994). Since then, as Forsythe (1989) suggests, German identity has 
been fragile and of ambiguous quality. People's feelings about being German 
has often been referred to as being bound up with their feelings about the 
recent past (Habermas 1989; Maier 1988) and is, therefore, a rather touchy and 
painful topic. Germanness as a positive identity is "historisch belastet" 
(emotionally burdened as a result of the Nazi past; Forsythe, 1989:151) which 
results, according to Forsythe, in two main attitudes towards being German: 
either complete and total rejection of anything 'national' (Le. symbols, 
terminology) or a more positive view which advocates a 'normal' handling of 
national identity - which is claimed by representatives of the former attitude 
as dangerous since any 'normal' handling of national identity is likely to slide 
back into the pre-war type of nationalism16. During the immediate post-war 
period, the former attitude seems to have prevailed. The memory of the years 
from 1870 to 1945 tended to make people avoid the use of the word 'national', 
as it seemed uncomfortably reminiscent of 'nationalistic' and 'National 
Socialist' (Schwarz, in: Baring 1994). The creation of a positive national 
identity at that time had to fail because of the "shadows cast upon German 
self-understanding and historical consciousness" (Bade 1992:432; free 
translation). In the wake of the 'economic miracle', any feeling of pride in 
being German was dominated by so-called 'economic patriotism' 
(Wirtschaftpatriotismus) (Weidenfeld & Korte 1991). Integration into the 
Western Alliance (Nato) and the European idea helped to ease the 'historical 
burden'. However, not before reunification in 1990, did Germans actually 
have to face the issue of national identity (op.cit.). 
Meanwhile - between the 'national identity crisis' of the immediate 
post-war years and the second wave of crisis following reunification - the 
recruitment of 'guest-workers', in particular of Turkish workers, had largely 
resulted in their permanent settlement, and thus to the establishment of 'new' 
ethnic minorities. Until reunification, German policy towards immigrants 
consisted of maintaining a legal and political distinction between nationals 
16 For a more detailed account of these positions see the publication of the 
complete 'historians' controversy' (IIistorikerstreit) by Piper-Verlag (1987) 
- a debate between Habermas and a number of distinguished German 
historians on the consequences of the Third Reich for contemporary 
German national identity. 
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and foreigners. Even today, German policy has hardly changed, treating 
second and third generations as much as AusJlinder as the first immigrants 
(Cohn-Bendit & Schmid 1992). The traditionally ethno-cultural conception of 
the German nation is still retained in nationality laws (in particular article 116 
of the Basic Law which offers immediate citizenship to all ethnic 'Germans' in 
eastern Europe) and naturalization procedures (Heckmann 1992). The term 
Auslander and non-recognition as a country of immigration indicate this as 
well as the right to nationality being still based on pure ius sanguinis (right of 
descent). Schnapper, therefore, suggests that U[p]olicy of integrating 
immigrants through their participation in economic and social life alone 
without giving them citizenship is in a sense the logical outcome of the 
German national project" (1994:137). 
Reunification entailed a new crisis of national identity in various 
aspects. It is a crisis for West Germany as it has regained full political 
sovereignty (by the final signing of a peace treaty and the gradual withdrawal 
of the allied forces) and thus, has to reinterpret its role in European and 
world politics (Estel 1991; see also Baring 1994). Thereby the terminology of 
the 'nation' with a 'vOikisch' (ethnic) identity seems to be more emphasized 
than ever since 1945, being fundamentally contradictory to the notion of a 
republic - an issue raised by a prominent political scientist (Oberndorfer 
1993). It is a crisis for East Germany as it has to come to terms with economic, 
social and ideological changes created by a new political union of two 
national identities whose historical paths had been diverging for two 
generations. For both, east and west, there is the further task of handling the 
Nazi-past in the light of rising (contemporary) nationalism. The East needs to 
come to terms with its involvement in the Hitler Era which had been 
disguised by the anti-fascist propaganda of communism (Bielefeld 1991). At 
the same time, East Germany has to cope with the revelations of the 
communist regime and the intrigues of the ST ASr. Therefore, the official self-
understanding of the GDR as a 'socialist country' as well as the propagated 
version of a sole Verfassungspatriotismus (constitutional patriotism; Kluxen-
Pyta 1990; Sternberger 1990; Gebhardt 1993) in the West are coming to an end, 
and there is real concern that narrow nationalism might replace these and, 
thus, form a 'wrong' new identity (Estel 1991; Oberndorfer 1993). 
For the ethnic minority communities, too, reunification seems to have 
resulted in more awareness of their position in Germany, and for the first time 
this has triggered a stronger, openly expressed claim for 'an expansion of the 
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concept of Germanhood' to reflect the real com posi tion of German society 
(Leggewie & Seno~ak 1993:11)17. The first generation of immigrants in 
particular has to come to terms with the fact that they have become 
permanent residents and, thus, part of German sOciety. This was never an 
issue for those generations born and brought up in Germany. And yet, they 
too experience identity problems: They actually identify with Germany, but 
as a result of the exclusiveness of German national identity, the difficulty in 
obtaining full citizenship rights and raising nationalism/racism, they tend to 
look back to their ethnic origin as their source of identification (Leggewie & 
Seno~ak 1993). During the rapid process of socio-economic and political 
reunification - with its enforced distributive struggle over scarce resources 
resulting in tendencies towards narrow nationalism, i.e. clearer boundary 
drawing along ethnic lines - the status of ethnic minority communities (in 
particular the Turkish) had been ignored. Despite the fact that they had come 
to think of themselves as legitimate members of the nation-state, they were 
not giving clear political signs (such as full citizenship rights) to confirm their 
belief in being an established part of German society. In other words, the 
immediate incorporation of East Germans did not run parallel to a similar 
incorporation of former guest-workers and their descendants. German society 
as a whole, therefore, still needs to redefine its identity as multi-ethnic or 
multi-cultural. One step towards that would be the legal redefinition of 
nationality which is still based on the ethnic or 'racial' concept of Yolk 
(Heckmann, in: Bielefeld 1991; Hoffmann 1991). 
The above shows that Cohen'S concept of 'fuzzy frontiers' can also be 
applied to the German situation. Problems of national identity occur in the 
context of: 1. the (ex-) GDR-citizens, 2. ethnic Germans from eastern Europe, 
3. long-term resident Ausltinder, 4. heritage of the nazi-past, and 5. 
relationship to other 'aliens' such as asylum seekers. 
German national identi ty shows as much a general pa ttern of 
fragmentation as the British. Both countries need to acknowledge the complex 
composition of their post-war societies. Even today, there are still residues 
from pre-war periods as reflected in the concept of subjecthood and Volk 
which make the search for a national identity so difficult. Ideas of common 
descent, common tradition/culture and common history are very backward 
17 This is also reflected in a series of newspaper articles puhlished on this 
topic following the arson attacks in Molin and Solingcn in 1992. 
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looking and fail to incorporate large sections of ethnic minorities. Ethno-
centristic attitudes and the dominating tendency of majority cultures not only 
disregard the long history of sub-national traditions in Germany and Britain-
which have always existed despite the myth of one national identity - they 
also have exclusionary and racializing effects on ethnic minorities. Part of the 
solution in the search for a collective, aU-encompassing identity, might be a 
new concept of post-national identity. 
5.4 Post-national and post-conventional identity 
Post-national 
The tendencies in the advanced industrialized world towards further 
internationalization suggest a move into a post-national epoch - a concrete 
sign of which is the creation of the European Community. Some authors have 
emphasized the limitations of nation-states in a world which is becoming 
more and more inter-dependent be it economically, culturally, ecologically or 
in any other way (Roche 1992, Robertson 1992, Albrow & King 1990). In the 
context of the European Community, the idea has been expressed that the era 
of the domination of the nation-state in western Europe is coming to an end 
(Nicklas 1993). This is certainly true for common European interests identified 
so far as mainly economic. Mann adds to this common EC defence interests, 
but other than that he holds that "[i]t [the EC] is not yet a state, nor is it 
replacing states" (1993a:128). Thus "European nation-states are neither dying 
nor retiring; they have merely shifted functions, and they may continue to do 
so in the future" (op.cit.:133). Nicklas continues to argue that the 
supranational framework provided by the EU does not change the fact that in 
everyday life smaller entities, such as the region, are much more crucial for 
the formation of identity. The results of a European survey seem to confirm 
this claim by showing that, roughly, the nearer to home the issue, the more 
people prefer their national government handling it (or even local 
governments), and only issues which have to do with external affairs get big 
support for EU action (European Commission, Eurobarometer No. 41, 1994). 
Thus, despite global ecological, economic and cultural interdependencies, the 
nation-state seems to remain the dominating political form of organization 
with strong sub-national traditions as in the German case (federal state 
system!). Castles, too, argues that the nation-state is beginning to lose its 
position as the centre of political identity and power, and thus some of its 
functions, but it is not going to dissolve completely (in: Bielefeld 1991). 
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However, in the context of the European Union, supra-nationality does 
not only mean taking power away from national governments to 
supranational institutions, but it also means the regeneration at sub-national 
levels (urban, regional etc.). The emergence of the EC and its transformation 
into the European Union has created a new situation "with new possibilities 
for European regions and sub-nationalities, 'subsidiarity principle', and in 
particular the development of a Committee of the Regions [which] are 
elements in the creation of a new political space and potential for the exercise 
and development of sub-national forms of citizenship and identity." (Roche 
1994b) 18. 
It is still too early to assume a post-national identity as actually 
existing. However, there seems to be evidence of shifting politics of identity 
away from the national to the supranational (i.e. EU) as well as to the local or 
regional level which might have empowering consequences - with particular 
regard to a potentially new emphasis on local communities (see also Chapter 
Six). 
Post-conventional 
In his attempt to define an alternative concept of national identity, 
Habermas pleads for constitutional patriotism and a post-conventional type 
of identity. The notion of 'constitutional patriotism' was originally developed 
by Sternberger as a solution to rid post-war Germany of any national 
patriotism (1990). Instead of feeling pride for the nation, the object of pride 
and loyalty should be the constitution (symbolizing the 'state' and not the 
'nation') as the sole provision of citizens' rights and liberties. According to 
Sternberger, democracy is only possible in the form of the state, and the state 
is democratic through its constitution. As such, the modern constitutional 
state (Verfassungsstaat) can produce identity. 
This approach towards identity is claimed by Habermas to be too 
rational. Identity, according to him, has to invoke some sense of community 
bond that goes beyond rational adherence to normative propositions. Post-
nationalistic identity requires recognition of inter-dependence and 
community. Habermas tries to overcome the initial incompatibility between a 
commitment to transnational, liberal values and the collective identity 
generated by traditional communities. 
18 For further details, in particular on the subsidiarity principle and the 
Committee of the Regions, see Chapter Six. 
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"If national symbols have lost their influence with the young, if naive 
identification with one's hcritage has yiclded to a more tentative relationship to 
history, if discontinuities are felt more strongly and continuities not celebrated 
at any price, if national pride and collective self-esteem are filtered through 
universalist value orientations - to the extent to which all this is really the case, 
indications of the development of a postconventional identity are increasing." 
(1989:227). 
With this concept, identity derives no longer predominantly from common 
ethnic and cultural properties, but rather from the practice of citizenship. The 
decisive element for the formation of collective identity and 'community 
bond' is, therefore, participation and belonging on the basis of being a citizen. 
In this way, the republican strand of 'citizenship' is detached from the idea of 
belonging to a pre-political community integrated on the basis of descent and 
a shared tradition/history, and thus it reflects the multiplicity and complex 
composition of western European societies during the post-war period. 
In the British context, the concept of post-conventional identity could 
help to overcome the present 'identity crisis' with regard to the monarchy, 
and the last residues of subjecthood could develop into full citizenship. 
Overall, post-conventional and post-national (Le. regional and supranational) 
elements could create a type of collective identity which is inclusive and 
pluralistic. It must be conceived of as a tradition which is open to 
development and change (and thus might even lead to a critical approach to 
the concept of 'tradition'). In this way, the ethnic origin of people would not 
have any negative effect on their legitimate state-membership, and full 
participation could be based on residence criteria instead. 
This concept of post-conventional identity might be difficult to achieve. 
Habermas' idea of identity as a 'sense of community bond' and as a 
'recognition of interdependence and community', however, lead here to the 
argument for local identity based on local citizenship and participation as a 
useful concept to include all long-term residents - an issue which will be 
subject to more details in Chapter Six. 
5,5 Concluding remarks 
The above arguments should have made clear that there is a strong 
connection between the identity as a 'race' and as a 'nation', i.e. between 
nationalism and racialization. More precisely, the above sections underpin the 
argument that these two phenomena - nationalism and racialization - tend to 
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be characterized by a symbiotic relationship19. By creating national, large 
groups and by drawing the boundary between these 'insider' groups and 
'outsiders', nationalism seems to be easily accompanied by racializing effects. 
However, nationalism has not only and still does not only work against 
'outside' groups, but has also the tendency to racialize minorities from 'inside' 
who have been part of the nation from its very inception (such as the Jewish 
population in Germany, and the Scottish and Irish in Britain). 
For clarification of the above, the beginning of this chapter included 
relevant theories examining common features of the genesis of nation-states 
and nationalism resulting in a sense of national identity. Modernization or 
civilization processes have been constitutive of the constructed reality of the 
nation-state and the abolition of a 'racisme de dasse' . Thus, nation-states have 
developed from interior into exterior classificatory devices. However, 
national identity came to co-exist with an identity as a (superior) 'race' as the 
illustration of the British and German cases showed. Therefore, the newly 
achieved superficial stratification by classes (as opposed to pre-modern times) 
and standardization of large national groups (a 'people') have had a negative 
effect on ethnic or religious minorities who did not fit into, or were regarded 
as a threat to, the prevailing idea of national identity and the dominating 
majority culture. 
The sections on the individual cases of Germany and Britain have 
shown the different histories and elements of their individual national 
identities, though with the same result of racialization and ethnic 
exclusionism. The depiction of England as the first ever nation based on 
political and universalistic ideas (Le. territorial or 'civic' basis of membership) 
has been challenged by looking beyond this early historical period (around 
1600) and by approaching the issue of 'nation-state' from the British 
perspective. Internally (in the context of the Scottish, Welsh and Irish nations 
as well as the Jewish minority) and externally (in the context of overseas 
colonies) Britain has been described as an 'empire', i.e. as multi-national or 
multi-'radal'. There is evidence for particularistic tendencies due to the 
domination of the English culture which had exclusionary effects on, e.g., the 
Irish, the Jews and the various colonial peoples. Germany's history as a 
19 Balibar remarks in this context that although "racism is not at all 
functional from the point of view of nationalism", "there is virtually no 
historical example of nationalism without a racist supplement" (1991: 12; 
original emphasis). Therefore, he thinks that "racism is an clahoration and 
forward rush of the contradictions of nationalism." (ibid.). 
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nation-state began in 1871, and the ideological formation of its national 
identity also involved ethnically exclusionary and racializing elements vis-a-
vis its Polish and Jewish residents. 
Developments after the post-war period in both countries resulted in 
'identity crises' with regard to their historical legacies and with regard to 
large-scale immigration of people with rather distant cultural backgrounds. 
These 'new' ethnic minorities tend to be excl uded from a general 
understanding of national identity. 
Based on the above, the following conclusions have been arrived at. 
The traditional concept of the nation, i.e. the myth of common descent, 
common territory, common customs/ culture and common history, has been a 
problematic issue throughout the history of both Britain and Germany. 
Neither country has ever been a 'nation' in the ideal sense (Le. constituted of 
one ethnic people) and most likely never will be, which indicates the 
irrationality of this concept with exclusionary consequences for ethnic 
minorities. 
In the contemporary context, internationalization and globalization 
processes - of which international migration is one crucial feature - reinforce 
the uselessness of the original concept of the nation. In western Europe, 
developments revolving around the establishment of the European 
Community and its further integration into the European Union seem to 
involve the gradual evolution of a post-national identity and the prospects for 
a post-conventional identity detached from the prerequisite of common ethnic 
origin and culture with the emphasis on transnational and subnational values. 
Collective identity would, thus, be based on a sense of community 
materialized by the practice of citizenship and not by descent. In this way, it 
would be inclusive for the whole variety of residents within the state 
community. 
As a whole, it has been shown that the socio-historical formation of 
British and German national identity with its close link to identity as a 'race' 
has resulted in an exclusionary response to immigration and the settlement of 
ethno-cultural minorities. How this response is reflected in the citizenship 
status of non-European immigrants will be more thoroughly examined in the 
following chapter. 
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6. Citizenship 
It is the purpose of this chapter to assess: 1. the effects of nationalism 
and racism on immigrant minorities' citizenship status and 2. the way in 
which citizenship functions or could function to minimize these effects and 
thus, work as a mechanism for inclusion. This assessment will not only be 
made with regard to nationality/citizenship laws and legal rights but also 
with regard to immigrant minorities' recognition as full members by civil 
society. To do so, it is more useful to analyze citizenship along a sub-division 
of formal (in connection with access) and substantive rights. I regard the link 
between citizenship and nationality thereby as a major obstacle to equal 
membership on the formal basis as well as within civil society at large. A 
concept of citizenship which is disconnected from ethnic descent and based 
on residential criteria will, therefore, be argued for to resist the power of 
nationalism and racialization. 
The European dimension to citizenship, i.e. its supranational (Union 
citizenship) and subnational developments (principle of subsidiarity and the 
Committee of the Regions) and their specific implications for ethnic 
minorities will be added to this analysis: a) to show the shortcomings of 
European Union citizenship for the inclusion of non-European long-term 
residents as it stands at present; and b) to seek a new conception of post-
national citizenship. 
Nationality and citizenship - brief definitional remarks 
Both concepts, nationality and citizenship, are a reflection of state 
membership. Whereas 'nationality' implies the passive acquisition of 
membership by birth, 'citizenship' refers to the active carrying out of rights 
and duties. Nationality actually relates to qualification of state membership 
by blood-relatedness or shared culture. However, in academic literature and 
other pieces of writing, nationality is often regarded as a formal personal 
relationship between the state and the individual. As such, it can be purely 
nominal or it can create or imply a legal status entailing rights and duties 
which is sometimes referred to as citizenship (O'Leary 1992). In this view, 
'nationality' and 'citizenship' are intermingled which is also reflected in law, 
as for example in the case of the British Nationality Act (which defines British 
ci tizenship). 
In the context of immigration, however, I argue that the mingling of 
'nationality' and 'citizenship' is not very useful, as post-war immigrants, and 
in particular in the case of the first generation, tend to be of non-European 
85 
nationality, but in the wake of permanent settlement and the birth of 
subsequent generations, immigrants seek full citizenship rights. This issue 
will reappear in more detail throughout this chapter. 
6.1 Relevant theories on citizenship 
T.H. Marshall 
As a starting point of almost all contemporary debate in British 
political scientific and sociological literature on citizenship, T.H. Marshall's 
essay Citizenship & Social Class (1950) is taken in which he argues that the 
modern concept of citizenship is made up of three combined elements - civil, 
political and social. Civil rights are considered by him as rights for individual 
freedom, rights to property, personal liberty and justice. Political rights 
encompass the right to participate in the exercise of political power, whether 
by holding office or by voting. The third, social rights, are rights of economic 
and social security within a modern welfare state. According to Marshall, 
these rights were extended over the last 300 years in a way often described as 
'evolutionary' (Giddens, 1985}1 by coinciding with the rise of capitalism and 
its evolving class structure. 
Marshall views modern citizenship as a process of expanding rights to 
all residents in a capitalist nation-state in order to dismantle class inequalities. 
Therefore, modern citizenship began as a system of rights which developed 
out of market relations and became a system of rights which were to reconcile 
formal equality with the continuity of social dass division. Marshall's answer 
to the problem of capitalism versus democracy was the welfare state. With the 
establishment of the welfare state, he saw the conflict between capitalism's 
tendency to generate social inequalities and class division on one hand and 
the democratic developments on the other hand, solved by the creation of 
citizenship and by its egalitarian and integrative effects. His argument is that 
social citizenship has tended to reduce certain social inequalities whereby he 
thinks in particular of class inequality. Social citizenship is viewed by him as 
the final stage of this development and thus, the evolution finishes here 
having resulted in a virtual guarantee of citizenship. 
Marshall's Citizenship & Social Class explains the nature of citizenship 
in post-World War II Britain, that is, in the context of social reconstruction 
since the rise of the welfare state. It also provides an account of the emergence 
1 Turner (1990) and Barbalet (1988) argue that it is not rIear whether 
Marshall's theory in fact requires an evolutionary perspective. 
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of citizenship in the modern nation-state in terms of the historical 
development of capitalist society. In Marshall's general understanding, 
citizenship is defined as a status attached to full membership of a community. 
Those who possess this status are equal with respect to the rights and duties 
associated with it (1950:28-29). Perhaps the most important aspect of 
Marshall's theory of citizenship is that it addressed explicitly the question of 
the relationship between citizenship and social class. In particular social 
citizenship (Le. welfare citizenship) has tended to reduce certain social 
inequalities and has imposed modifications on class, but has not been able to 
abolish class altogether. 
Summing up, it may be said that Marshall's 'citizenship' describes an 
ideal standard having developed into an 'institution' or 'national status'. His 
principal emphasis, despite having to admit that citizenship as a 'system of 
equality' implies an inevitable conflict with capitalism as a system of 
'stratification', is clearly on membership of, and loyalty to, a common 
(national-societal) civic community. The "extension of the area of common 
experience and common culture" (Young 1967:9) is seen by Marshall as one 
aspect of social change towards the reduction of class divisions as the result of 
the gradual development of a universal status of citizenship. Young suggests 
that Marshall's idea of a growing common national culture can be read as 
implying a corresponding growth of a national consciousness. 
"This consciousness -loyalty to a 'common heritage' and to a 'civilization which 
is a common possession' - is the integrative complement to citizenship" 
(1967:9; emphasis added). 
Thus, Marshall's' concept of citizenship is essentially a concept of integration 
(and inclusion) into a national-societal community. 
Critics 
Many of Marshall's critics take as a point of departure the specific 
period during which Marshall was writing his essay, namely when the 
welfare state had just been established. The welfare state was identified by 
Marshall as a key element in his notion of citizenship because of the new 
opportunities resulting from its provision of social rights to minimum levels 
of well-being for the sick, unemployed and retired (Twine 1994). More 
importantly, by taking immediate post-war Britain as the background, 
Marshall is criticized for taking the socio-political unity of Great Britain for 
granted. Some authors, such as Turner (1986), however, have suggested that 
the question of citizenship within Britain cannot be discussed without 
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reference to the Celtic fringe or the incorporation of the working class 
(Barbalet 1988; Young 1967). More importantly for this thesis, any debate 
around citizenship can not ignore the presence of ethnic minorities of non-
European background involving the issue of belongingness challenged on the 
state level as well as within civil society by nationalism and racism. The above 
criticisms by Barbalet and Young, thus, rightly object to what Turner (1986) 
considers 'a too homogeneous picture of Britain' as provided by Marsha1l2• 
Two main features of Marshall's argument seem to reappear in the 
general critical literature: One concerns the character of the relationship 
between citizenship and class and the other concerns the socially integrative 
character of citizenship. The first aspect has been taken up by Turner (1986) 
who argues that citizenship is not simply about class and capitalism. There 
are now new social movements for social membership and full participation. 
Moreover, inequalities are diverse and not only based on class, as some 
might be less importantly connected with the capitalist-industrial economic 
order. These two points suggest that racialization might playa role in the 
claim for full participation and that racialization might be one feature on 
which inequality is based. 
The aspect that inequalities are not only based on class has been 
similarly taken up, for instance, by Fraser and Gordon who claim that 
Marshall's periodization with its integrative effects of the three stages of 
citizenship "fits the experience of white working men only, a minority of the 
population" (in: van Steenbergen 1994:93). Vogel adds a 'race' dimension to 
this view by arguing that differences of colour, ethnicity and sex might have 
long been removed from the formal, legal qualifications of citizen status, but 
they still have some purchase in the informal mechanisms of today's political 
culture. She refers to the specific disadvantages suffered by these groups as 
'problems of latecomers' to the political arena as they often lack resources that 
are necessary to make full use of the equal entitlements and opportunities 
postulated in the idea of democratic citizenship (in: van Steenbergen 1994)3. 
To re-evaluate Marshall's early theory of citizenship at the end of the 
20th century, various changes in western European societies should be taken 
2 It has to be pointed out that Barbalet and Young argue against this 'too 
homogeneous picture of Britain' in the context of class, and not ethnidty. 
It is, however, only the latter which is of concern here. 
3 Marshall's concept of citizenship has been more extensively criticized in 
the context of gender inequalities by Anthias & Yuval-Davis (1992), 
Meehan (l993a), and Vogel & Moran (1991). 
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into account when discussing the meaning of citizenship. One of those 
changes is the settlement of post-war labour migrants and the emergence of 
'new' ethnic minorities. In this context, Marshall's concept is flawed as it 
takes formal citizenship for granted. The question of membership in a nation-
state, however, can be quite problematic and the intermingling of the 
concepts of nationality and citizenship has the tendency to render the 
acquisition of formal citizenship difficult. Thus, Marshall assumed the nation-
state as the framework and theorized citizenship as a national phenomenon. 
This poses problems not only in the context of immigrant minorities, but also 
in the context of supra-national and sub-national developments (aspects 
which will be returned to at a later point). Moreover, Marshall's rather 
integrative concept of citizenship, as a device to promote social inclusiveness 
among 'insiders', completely ignores the ways in which racialization functions 
to obstruct access to full citizenship (Anthias & Yuval-Davis 1992). Large-
scale post-war immigration in fact has resulted in the tendency to restrict 
access to citizenship in countries such as Britain. In other countries (such as 
Germany), traditionally harsh regulations have hardly been eased. Thus, in 
this context, citizenship is not a unified, homogeneous set of social 
arrangemen ts. 
The context of immigration and cross-national analysis 
This still leaves the question of a conception of citizenship applicable 
to the situation of permanent settlement and the emergence of 'new' ethnic 
minorities. Such a conception should allow the analYSis of the effects of 
nationalism and racism on ethnic minorities' citizenship and the extent to 
which these effects allow citizenship to function as a mechanism for inclusion. 
In legal terms, nationality / citizenship laws are to reflect a society's identity as 
a nation. Therefore, Turner rightly remarks that "any further development of 
the theory of citizenship will have to deal more fundamentally with societies 
in which the struggle over citizenship necessarily involves problems of 
national identity and state formation in a context of multiculturalism and 
ethnic pluralism." (1990:212; emphasis added). The presence of a considerable 
size of settled post-war labour migrants and their descendants challenges the 
intermingled concepts of citizenship and nationality and, thus, the 
fragmentation of identities demands a conceptual redefinition of collective 
membership to render the exercise of citizenship a more equal basis. 
So far, citizenship has been mainly identified with a socio-political 
status conferring a set of rights upon individuals in a nation-state. However, 
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citizenship is not only comprised of rights, but also revolves around a cultural 
dimension, i.e. is based upon a sense of belonging to and identification with a 
socio-political entity. This sense of belonging (or identity) seems to be 
required in national polities in which large numbers of persons are distant 
and largely anonymous to each other. It may help to reduce social distance 
and might function as a basis of solidarity. Therefore, a conception of 
citizenship is needed which can grasp the legal status' dimension as well as 
the dimension of national identity (Le. consciousness of collective 
membership). In this context, acquisition (access to rights) and social inclusion 
of immigrants into citizenship (recognition of belonging) have to be elements 
of such a conception. 
These two dimensions can be distinguished with the help of two 
categories of rights: 
- formal rights (i.e. legal access to citizenship in form of methods of 
acquisition and codification of nationality provisions; civil and political 
rights; this dimension is connected to the state level) and 
- substantive rights (social membership and participation in society as 
a whole; this dimension involves civil society) (Held 1991; Hammar 
1990; Meehan 1991). 
In the case of the latter, however, it is somewhat deceptive to refer to this 
form of citizenship as 'rights' in the same sense as in the case of formal 
citizenship. Substantive citizenship is not about concrete legal (statutory) 
rights but their wider practical realization within society and thus, should 
probably rather be referred to as 'liberties' (as suggested by Held 1991:22). 
Ethnic minority groups in fact largely enjoy formal citizenship rights, 
with the most likely exception being political rights. Most civil rights, for 
example, such as personal liberty and access to justice through courts, are 
treated as human rights and thus, apply to every person regardless of 
nationality and citizenship (Bottomore, in: Marshall & Bottomore 1992). 
However, when including nationality laws revolving around the acquisition 
of formal citizenship based largely on the principle of ius sanguinis, 
racializing elements tend to be involved. Furthermore, there is a difference 
between having formal (Le. legal) citizenship rights in theory and how these 
rights are 'translated' into practical terms (which is expressed here in terms of 
substantive citizenship). In particular, in the British case where membership 
of peoples from former colonies is accorded formal recognition, "this 
recognition is constructed in such a manner that their legitimate presence and 
participation in Britain are nearly always questioned" (Goulbourne 1991:2). 
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Equally important, therefore, is the substantive aspect of citizenship as 
a potential source of exclusionary practices, in particular if understood as 
'social citizenship' in a broad sense as suggested by Roche (1992:3) induding 
work, education, health, quality of life. Some of these practices in areas such 
as housing, work, and education have been taken up by British anti-
discrimination legislation. I argue, therefore, that a definition of citizenship in 
the context of immigrants' settlement has to include the legal and political 
status of formal membership as well as the notion of participation in public 
life and recognition by civil society (substantive membership) in order to 
analyze the combined effects of nationalism and racism. 
Husbands' (1992) dimensions of 'welcome' are another way of 
indicating the level of inclusion or exclusion of immigrant peoples with 
regard to their formal and substantive citizenship status. These dimensions 
are extracted from a mixture of legal, institutional and social spheres 
including the content of immigration (and integration) policies, employment 
policies, naturalization policies, social rights (i.e. access to social-welfare 
provisions and to collective-consumption goods such as social housing & 
public sector education), civil/industrial rights, political rights, equal-
opportunity provisions and the general quality of reception given by the 
receiving country. The latter covers, for instance, the extent to which 
immigrants are targets of racist hostility and their depiction in the media. 
These elements help to operationalize the assessment of citizenship within the 
framework of nation-states which have become multi-cultural or multi-ethnic 
in composition and which are challenged by supra-national as well as sub-
national developments. 
6.2 Citizenship as a legal device - a historical perspective 
Modern citizenship (as opposed to classical forms of citizenship in 
ancient Greece and Rome) is widely considered to have originated during the 
French Revolution of 1789 and is tied to the political and administrative 
framework of the nation-state (Turner 1986; Heater 1990; Hammar 1991; 
Roche 1992; Brubaker 1989; Dummett & Nico11990; van Steenbergen 1994). 
The historical process of territorial integration into states and the emergence 
of the nation-state resulted in the separation of peoples and the creation of 
categories for legitimate membership of national societies. Originally, 
citizenship developed from 'subjecthood' (Untertanentum) and was, thus, tied 
to residence (territorial or residential principle). As a result of territorial and 
political integration into nation-states and a corresponding shift to 
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particularistic ideas about national identity, however, citizenship began to be 
more strongly linked to blood-relatedness (principle of ethnic descent). Thus, 
the process of boundary drawing vis-a-vis 'outside' and homogenizing or 
standardizing processes 'inside' led to the introduction of the principle of 
ethnic descent (Abstammungsprinzip). This continental European development 
was triggered by 'national awakening' (nationales Erwachen) and as a 
consequence, the cultural particularity of a people began to gain more 
importance (Bos 1993; Franz, in: Institut fur Migrations- und 
Rassismusforschung 1992). Common features such as language, tradition, 
history and in particular the imagination of common descent provided the 
"kit for a 'we-consciousness' "(Franz, op.cit.:239). Today, in most western 
European countries, the principle of ius soli (territorial) and ius sanguinis 
(ethnic descent) exist side by side. The purest form of ius sanguinis exists in 
Germany, where the notion of Germanhood (Deutschtum) is still a strong 
element in the citizenship law. 
I argue on similar lines to Bos (1993) that, despite any philosophical 
republican ideas of citizenship about parting company "from the idea of 
belonging to a pre-political community integrated on the basis of descent" 
(Habermas 1994:23), the definition of citizenship within the legal systems of 
Germany and Britain, if not even throughout the rest of western Europe, has 
adjusted during the last 200 years to the criterion of ethnic belonging (in the 
sense of being tied to nationality). This can be partly explained as a response 
to outgoing and incoming migratory movements. Thus, this development is 
prone to entail racializing effects. 
a) The English/British case 
Originally, the English/British citizenship law, which is considered as 
having the longest continuous history of codification (Bos 1993), was based on 
'allegiance to the Crown'4. Every person who owed it became a 'British 
subject' and had the right of entry and settlement. Since before the Norman 
Invasion in 1066, a codified ius soli (born 'within His Majesty's dominions') 
was already established (Dummett & Nicol 1990). Since 1351 the ius sanguinis 
principle was enforced for the English successor to the throne so that 
members of the Royal family who were born abroad could become king or 
queen. The statute De natis ultra mare named a list of individuals '''which 
were born beyond the sea, out of the ligeance of England' and provided that 
4 For a fully detailed historical account of British nationality and 
immigration law see Dummett & Nicol( 1990). 
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they could inherit on the same terms as those born within the ligeance" 
(op.cit.:35-36). This statute was intended to provide for a very limited group 
of persons. Otherwise, the so-called Calvin's Case of 1608 became the most 
important point of reference for English/British law as it represents, within 
the context of the monarchy, a clear formulation of the 'ius soli' principleS. The 
rule and protection of the king obliged the individual to allegiance and to the 
position of the 'subject' (Bos 1993:629). The Glorious Revolution of 1688 did 
not replace this structure as the Parliament was declared the highest 
sovereign and not the people (Dummett & Nicol 1990:59-70). In 1870, an 
important change was introduced by the Naturalization Act. Until then, 
'perpetual allegiance' was only terminated in the case of the individual's 
death. From 1870 on, however, subjects living abroad could renounce their 
citizenship, and naturalization within the dominions was made possible for 
the very first time. 
During the period 1700 to the early 1800s, the Jews constituted one 
minority for whom the acquisition of citizenship was made difficult, if not 
impossible. The Jewish population who had been expelled in 1290 and only 
re-admitted in 1664 soon had legal restrictions placed upon them because of 
their different faith (Holmes 1979). One major limitation those Jews who were 
foreign-born had to encounter centred upon naturalization restrictions. "It 
was generally possible for foreigners to obtain naturalization through 
Parliament but this was not open to Jews since such petitioning was available 
only to those professing the Christian religion" and "it was not until 1825 that 
the sacramental test for naturalization was abolished." (op.cit.:8)6. 
After the Second World War, the British Nationality Act of 1948 was 
implemented as the result of the vagueness of the traditional law and as a 
response to growing nationalism in various Commonwealth countries 
initiating the transition from imperial to national Britain (Goulbourne 1991). 
With this Act, the principle of ius soli (birth on the territory of the United 
Kingdom-and-Colonies) was established alongside the principle of ius 
sanguinis (birth outside the territory to a father there born or there 
5 This case "established that birth as a natural-born subject requires (1) 
that the birth occur within the bounds of the King's dominion and (2) that 
the parents owe obedience to the King at the time of the child's birth" 
(Guendelsberger 1992:388, footnote no. 40; see same page for more details). 
6 The denial of civic rights on religious grounds for Jews, however, 
survived the Catholic Empancipation Act (1829) and the removal of those 
restrictions was not achieved until mid-Victorian years (Holmes 1979). 
93 
naturalized) (Dummett & Nicol 1990:135). Different categories of 'British 
subjects' were created: 
- 'Citizens of the United Kingdom-and-Colonies', 
- 'Citizens of independent Commonwealth countries' with special 
treatment of 'British Subjects without Citizenship', 
- 'British Protected Persons', and 
- the Irish (BOs 1993:629). 
Thus, the general custom of acquisition by birth was now accompanied by 
acquisition by descent. The first generation living abroad obtained citizenship 
via the father's origin whilst following generations could become registered. 
Goulbourne stresses that the introduction of the BNA of 1948, which did not 
stop people from Commonwealth countries entering Britain by retaining the 
imperial definition of 'British'7, was more a response to nationalism in the 
dominions and colonies and that it shows a sense for past responsibilities in 
the light of present realities on the part of politicians and governments. 
From 1962, however, continuous immigration from the 
Commonwealth was brought under control by several changes towards 
implicit ius sanguinis. The restriction was that only those people whose 
parents or grandparents were born in Britain could enter freely. Thus, the 
tendency towards ius sanguinis starting slowly in 1351 and reinforced during 
the 1960s reached firm consolidation with the British Nationality Act of 1981 
which is in principle a ius sanguinis a patre et a matre (Bos 1993:630). This 
historical development - i.e. the 1962 Commonwealth Immigration Act, the 
1971 Immigration Act and the 1981 Nationality Act - dearly demonstrates the 
tendency towards linking citizenship with nationality and hence, towards 
involving an ethnic definition of Britishness by preventing the entry of people 
from non-white Commonwealth countries. 
b) The German case 
In the countries which were later to become the German Reich, the ius 
soli principle was common practice. Citizens were those born on German 
territory, however, citizenship could also be acquired through permission by 
the police or after a certain period of residence (e.g. after ten years in Prussia 
according to a ruling of 1818; Franz, in: Institut fUr Migrations- und 
Rassismusforschung 1992:238). Most of the southern German states had taken 
7 Under 1948 Act, "a person could become a British citizen or subject by 
virtue of being a citizen of a Commonwealth country." (Goulbourne 
1991:96). 
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over this principle from the Code Napoleon. In 1842, Prussia amended its law 
by introducing the principle of ius sanguinisB• Article 13 of this law states 
"residence within Our State alone shall in future no longer determine 
qualification as a Prussian" (cited by Bos 1993:627; free translation). 
The predecessor of today's still valid citizenship law of 1913 (Reichs-
und Staatsbiirgerschaftsgesetz) dates back to the 'law on acquisition and loss of 
federal and state citizenship' of 1870 which was in force in the then existing 
Norddeutsche Bund (north-German federation). With unification in 1871, this 
law was superseded by a modified version called the Reichs- und 
Staatsbiirgerschaftsgesetz. On grounds of the Reich's federal structure, national 
(Reich) citizenship was acquired via federal state citizenship (Bos 1993:627). 
Thus, until 1934, only federal state citizenship in each of the states of the 
German Reich existed, but not a general German citizenship. Passports 
specified the holder as, for instance, 'Prussian' or 'Bavarian'. Even in 1931, the 
Prussian government still expelled 'undesirable aliens' to the neighbouring 
state of Hamburg (Engelmann 1991:23)9. 
The National Socialists were the first to institutionalize legally a central 
German citizenship (Rathzel 1995). Under their regime, the ius sanguinis 
adopted its most narrow definition by which in particular the Jewish 
population came to be excluded. Until Hitler's Machtergreifung (coming into 
power) it had been general practice to include Jewish citizens in the common 
principle of descent. However, as in Hitler's propagated ideology a real 
German had to be of Aryan descent, the people (Volksgemeinschaft) had to be 
'cleansed' of such (Jewish) 'elements'. The first step was the removal of Jews 
from public, i.e. governmental and administrative, positions - a process which 
was started off with the Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil 
Service of 7 April 1933 (Burleigh & Wippermann 1991). In 1933, the law on 
'revocation of naturalization and deprivation of citizenship' was implemented 
8The title of this law is "Gesetz tiber die Erwerbung und den Verlust der 
Eigenschaft als preussischer Untertan sowie tiber den Eintritt in fremden 
Staatsdienst". In the second article, it says "Jedes eheliche Kind eines 
Preussen wird durch die Geburt preussischer Untertan, auch wenn es im 
Ausland geboren ist." (every legitimate child of a Prussian is a Prussian 
citizen via birth, even if it is born abroad) (Ros 1993:(26). 
9 It was only because of this federal citizenship system that Hitler, who had 
been a foreigner 'with a criminal record', could renounce his Austrian 
citizenship in order to be a candidate for president of the Reich. On 
February 1932, he was appointed senior administrative officer 
(Regierungsrat) of Braunschweig by one of his supporters who had shortly 
before become Interior Minister of Braunschweig. With this position, 
Hitler automatically became citizen of Rraunschweig, and thus, citizen of 
the Reich (Engelmann 1991:23). 
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which allowed the cancellation of citizenship of 'undesirable persons' (mostly 
Jews). After the abolition of particular citizenships in the federal states and 
the introduction of a single German citizenship, the next wave of anti-semitic 
legislation was introduced to "achieve legal discrimination, segregation, and 
precision in the question of who was a Jew" (op.cit.:45). From 1935 onwards, 
legal claim to naturalization was abolished. These and other measures 
culminated in the Nuremberg Laws (Nurnberger Reichsgesetze) of 1935 in 
which a citizen (Reichsbiirger) was defined as 'of German and kindred blood, 
who proves by conduct to be willing and qualified to serve the German 
people and the Reich' (Engelmann 1991:242). Under the Reich Citizenship 
Law, Jews were redefined as 'subjects' and distinguished from the definition 
of 'citizens to the Reich' and thus, deprived of their political and civil rights 
which were restricted to 'citizens' (Burleigh & Wippermann 1991). 
For the Federal Republic, Engelmann (1991) and Rathzel (1995) both 
suggest that, although the Nuremberg 'Race' Laws are annulled, the idea that 
citizenship is linked to German nationality (by ethnic descent) has still 
remained in the 'Basic Law' (German constitution). This is reflected in the 
immediate granting of full citizenship to ethnic German immigrants 
(Aussiedler) and refugees from the former GDR (Ubersiedler). The existence 
of article 116 of the 'Basic Law' in which ethnic Germans are defined as 
citizens of the FRG, if residing in the territory of the German Reich as of 1937, 
is, however, not only explained in terms of blood-relatedness, but also as a 
matter of moral and historical duty towards ethnic Germans in eastern 
Europe suffering from alleged or forced collaboration with the Nazis10 (Wolf-
Almanasreh 1992)11, Klusmeyer writes in this context that the 'framers' of the 
constitution saw themselves as "act[ing] on behalf of those Germans to whom 
participation [in establishing the constitutional order) was denied" (1993:84). 
Therefore, they wanted to ensure "that Germans outside the Western 
occupation zones would not, through the creation of this order, lose their 
claim to full rights of citizenship" (ibid.). To this end, the Article 116 was 
established guaranteeing the right of repatriation to any person who had been 
"admitted to the territory of the German Reich within the frontiers of 31 
December 1937 as refugee or expellee of German stock (Volkszugchorigkeit) or 
10 Wilpert rightly asks in this context: "Why then solidarity primarily with 
ethnic Germans? What about the Jews and the gypsies in the cast who had 
to suffer as a result of the Second World War?" (1993:75, footnote no. 8). 
11 See Ferstl & Hetzel (1990) for personal histories of AussicdJcr. 
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as the spouse or descendant of such person" (ibid.)12. Moreover, any 
amendments in the citizenship law during the immediate post-war period 
would have had to acknowledge the separation of Germany and thus, would 
have destroyed the deliberate provisional character of the (pre-unification) 
Federal Republic (B6s 1993). The 'framers' envisaged this provisional state to 
last until the "entire German people could achieve in free self-determination 
the unity and freedom of Germany" (Klusmeyer 1993:85). Therefore, it was 
impossible at this stage to create an individual's citizenship irrespective of 
ethnic nationality. Thus, there are convincing historical and political reasons 
for not abandoning the ethnic component by altering the citizenship law in 
favour of ius soli, in particular during the immediate post-war period. 
However, it is less understandable, and most of the above mentioned authors 
agree, that ius soli was not introduced into the new constitution as a 
supplement (see also John 1990). Even less justifiable is the fact that 
reunification has not resulted in the abandonment of the sole principle of ius 
sanguinis. Today, the same claims to citizenship cannot be denied to 
'foreigners' who have been residing in Germany for long periods or who were 
even born there. 
The above showed the development towards a clear link between the 
legal notions of citizenship and nationality in both Britain and Germany. 
Although this link has a longer history in the case of Germany, it has to be 
remarked again that in the British case, any clear legal definition did not exist 
until 1948 or even 1981. 
During the immediate post-war period, both countries had to come to 
terms with their reduced territorial sizes and with past responsibilities as 
reflected in preferential treatment of Aussiedler/iibersiedler in Germany and 
Commonwealth citizens in Britain (in form of immediate granting of 
citizenship/nationality). In the latter case, post-war developments went 
further to eventually exclude non-white members of former British territories 
from British citizenship. Thus, it does not seem to be too far fetched to claim 
that there is a parallel of ethnic Germans and mainly white Commonwealth 
12 The original version of Article 116 goes as follows: "Deutscher im Sinne 
dieses Grundgesetzes ist vorbehaltlich andcrwcitigcr gcsetzlicher 
Regelung, wer die deutsche Staatsangehorigkcit bcsitzt oder als Huchtling 
oder Vertriebener deutschcr Volkszugehorigkcit oder als dessen Ehegalte 
oder Abkommling in dem Gebiete des Dcutschen Reiches nach dem Stand 
vom 31. Dezember 1937 Aufnahme gefunden hat." (Grundgesctz, Stand 1')94) 
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citizens and the way in which these two groups are given preferential 
treatment in terms of access to German or British citizenship. 
The following section will look into the effects of the above described 
shift towards an ethnic definition of formal citizenship for post-war labour 
migrants. 
6.3 Formal citizenship in the context of post-war labour migration 
The British case 
The acceptance of labour migrants followed very different patterns in 
Germany and Britain. In the latter case, foreign workers have formed a very 
small proportion of its migrant workers. When labour recruitment started in 
1956, it was from the West Indies and thereafter from the Indian sub-
continent, although the highest proportion of migrant labour came in actual 
fact from Ireland (Miles 1982a; Layton-Henry 1990). The Ireland Act from 
1949 vested the Irish with the same rights as those of every other UK citizen. 
Caribbean and Asian migrants to Britain were British subjects, either directly 
as members of British colonies or as citizens of British Commonwealth 
countries. Thus, they benefited from the residues of the imperial notion of 
subjecthood which viewed citizenship as allegiance to the Crown resulting in 
an idea of a common citizenship with freedom of migration throughout the 
former Empire. In this capacity, the Irish and Commonwealth immigrants had 
exactly the same political, civil and social (narrow sense) rights as indigenous 
citizens (Brubaker 1989; Dummett & Nicol 1990; Layton-Henry 1990). Until 
1948, all persons within the dominions of the monarch were British subjects. 
There was no specific citizenship status for colonies, for Britain itself or even 
for independent Commonwealth countries. 
The new situation of the dismantling of the Empire, of ex-colonial 
subjects of geographical and cultural distance entering Britain, and of the 
notion of common allegiance to the Crown giving way to the notion of rights 
(Dummett & Nicol 1990) resulted in the 'need' to slow down immigration 
and to define legally who was British. This 'need' was met in form of 
consecutive immigration acts culminating in the British Nationality Act of 
1981. 
Although citizenship has traditionally been easy to acquire or to 
reclaim and has been detached from the traditional nation-state, the 
introduction of immigration legislation and nationality laws were to make the 
acquisition of citizenship more difficult and to tie access to citizenship rights 
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more closely to nationality. The automatic right to British citizenship by 
Commonwealth countries' nationals has officially come to an end since the 
Nationality Act of 1981, and the trend has been to treat Commonwealth and 
non-Commonwealth citizens on the same basis as far as immigration and 
citizenship rights are concerned. However, the 'patriality clause' - introduced 
by the 1971 Immigration Act - allows privileged access to UK citizenship for 
people with a close connection with the UK through descent from a British 
parent or grandparent (and they tend to be 'white') and thus, it is another 
indication of a stronger link to nationality. Moreover, until the Nationality 
Act of 1981, all persons born in any British territory in any part of the world 
could claim British citizenship whether or not their parents were British 
citizens or legally settled. Thus, the UK traditionally used to be the prime 
example of a country where the principle of ius soli has applied. After the 
Second World War, although countries belonging to the British 
Commonwealth had begun enacting their own citizenship legislation, their 
citizens continued to be British subjects until the 1981 Act. Now, only those 
born in the territory of the UK become British citizens provided that one 
parent has been born or settled in the UK - a fact which does not have serious 
implications for the ethnic minorities under view here as most of them settled 
in the UK some time before this Act existed. However, the whole 'package' of 
legislation dealing with immigration (in particular the 'patriality clause') and 
nationality / citizenship is suggested by some authors as racializing (Gilroy 
1987). 
As a whole, for first generation immigrants and their descendants from 
ex-colonies, the legacy of the imperial notion of 'Civis Brittanicus sum' has 
had beneficial implications and resulted in their enjoyment of full political, 
civil and social (narrow sense) rights. However, the idea of a common 
citizenship and the freedom to migrate seems to be purely theoretical, as Rex 
& Tomlinson have pointed out (1979), especially in the absence of a Bill of 
Rights, and was only acceptable to the indigenous people as long as they were 
not exercised. In this sense, it does not seem too far fetched to argue that 
common citizenship during the days of the Empire, when encompassing an 
enormous range of ethnically and culturally different peoples, was not more 
than an 'imagined' citizenship meaning that as soon as immigration actually 
took place, restrictive laws started to be introduced. Nonetheless, these 
specific historical circumstances, even if lasting in practice only for a short 
time, resulted in a formal citizenship status for first generation immigrants 
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and their descendants which is - at least in theory - totally equal to indigenous 
people which is fairly exceptional throughout western Europe. 
The German case 
In the case of Germany, the close link between the notions of 
nationality and citizenship has appeared from much earlier and has been 
clearer in both citizenship laws and the (written) constitution. Thus, with 
regard to the automatic right to citizenship, a German citizen is in general at 
the same time a German national as the citizenship/nationality law is solely 
governed by the principle of ius sanguinis. 
When labour migrants were recruited during the 1960s predominantly 
from southern Europe13 and Turkey, they did not only enter Germany as 
foreigners, but also originally as guest-workers. In this capacity, these 
workers were not expected to become settled, long-term residents with claims 
to citizenship rights - an expectation which proved false after the recruitment 
halt of 1973 when large-scale family reunification began. Therefore, although 
they enjoy in theory all social rights (narrow sense), political rights - locally 
as well as nationally14 - are denied to them. Civil rights are restricted as the 
law still allows German administration to forbid foreign residents taking part 
in political activities when important national interests are (allegedly) 
endangered. Freedom of opinion can be restricted as well in order to protect 
public order and security (Layton-Henry 1990). The 'Kurdish problem' is a 
recent example of civil rights being limited for long-term immigrants for fear 
13 As Italy, Spain and Greece had not been members of the European 
Community yet, the migrants from these regions had the same 'guest-
worker' status as the Turks. However, in joining the EC, the situtation has 
changed to their advantage - a matter which will be subject to more detail 
in the section on European citizenship. 
14The federal states of Schleswig-Holstein, Hamburg and Bremen passed a 
law granting local voting rights to 'foreigners' from 1991 onwards, but 
after intervention by the conservative parties (CDU & CSU), the Federal 
Constitutional Court ruled local voting rights for 'foreigners' out. In the 
official statement from 31.10.90, however, it appears as if the Court holds 
this matter to be a question of political will and not of legal interpretation 
of the Basic Law (Constitution) (Gottschlich, in: taz, 01.11.90; document by 
TGB 1988; see also Uegmann 1990 in a comparative perspective with 
western Europe). A survey undertaken by Sen & Karakasoglu in 1994 found 
that 83% of the Turkish respondents (of 601 of a total sample of 1412 
foreign residents in Germany) and 67% of the ex-Yugoslav respondents (of 
360) regard local voting rights as 'very important' or 'important' (the 
remaining foreign residents were EU-nationals who have local voling 
rights as a result of the Maastricht Treaty). Hence, there is a lot of interest 
among ethnic minorities to become politically active, even if only on the 
local level. 
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of disruption of public order (source: newspaper articles15). The only right is 
that of the residential permit which entails the permission to work. 
In the absence of ius soli, second and all successive generations remain 
legally speaking 'foreigners', governed by the so-called 'Foreigners' Law' 
(AusUindergesetz). Without German citizenship, they have no political rights 
and only restricted civil rights in the same way as their parents or 
grandparents. As opposed to Britain, where dual citizenship is common 
practice, German law does not allow the holding of two passports, although 
there are exceptional circumstances under which this is possible. 
Nevertheless, it is officially considered as highly undesirable and there has 
always been reluctance to approve of dual citizenship. Naturalization, it 
might be assumed, is under these circumstances relatively speaking easy, but 
this is not the case. In Britain, by comparison, a person born there who is not 
entitled to British citizenship at birth, is entitled to be registered as a British 
citizen after the age of ten years, providing he/she has not been absent from 
the UK for more than ninety days in any of his/her first ten years. Otherwise, 
citizenship can be acquired by registration or naturalization. The latter is 
subject to a condition of residence of between three and five years (de Rham, 
in: Layton-Henry 1990). The knowledge of English, Scottish or Welsh is 
required as well as a 'clean criminal record' and a 'good character' (Bos 1993). 
Germany, on the other hand, has never officially been regarded as a country 
of immigration. As a result, there is more of a 'protectionist' approach 
towards the naturalization of foreigners, and the procedures are regarded as 
among the toughest in western Europe (Cohn-Bend it & Schmid 1992:333). 
Naturalization is referred to as a matter of discretion (Ermessen) and should 
only be effected if in the interest of the German Republic (no matter whether 
it is in the interest of the immigrant) (Bos 1993:628). Among the minimum 
prerequisites for naturalization are a ten-year period of residence, a clean 
criminal record, accommodation in Germany, a regular income, good 
command of the German language, and renunciation of the original 
citizenship is necessary16 (Cohn-Bendit & Schmid 1992:331-32). Moreover, it is 
15 These are a number of articles collected during the period of 28 
September 1994 to 31 January 1995 published by die taz. ] leadlines such as 
Sechs Ilaftbefehle nach Kurden-Dcmonstratioll (Six warrants of arrest 
after Kurdish demonstration; 30.09.94) and Abschiebungcn: Kamher blcibt 
hart (Deportations: Kanther remains tough; 08.12.94; Kanther is the 
minister of the Interior) indicate the content of these articles. 
16 Wilpert remarks in the context and in comparison with ethnic Germans 
from eastern Europe who can claim German citizenship as of right, that "an 
individual non-ethnic German may apply for citizenship and it may be 
granted to him/her. But, this is not his/her right as it is for a Volksdeutsch. 
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desirable for a whole family to have a uniform citizenship which means all 
members should naturalize at the same time (however, this is not obligatory). 
Until 1990 - the year when the 'New Foreigners' Law' (Neues 
AusHindergesetz) was passed - it was not possible to acquire citizenship as of 
right. Since then, naturalization still remains a very 'complicated procedure' 
(Forudastan, in: taz, 25.04.90) and has only marginally improved. Juvenile 
'foreigners' between the age of sixteen and twenty-three who have been living 
in Germany for eight years and who went to school for six years can legally 
claim German citizenship (but again, they would have to renounce their 
parents' citizenship). Moreover, the fees are reduced to DM 100 (about £ 40). 
The other 'category' of 'foreigners' who have the same right to citizenship as 
juveniles are those who have been living in Germany for fifteen years and 
who have, in the case of unemployment, not caused the loss of their job 
themselves - subject to the same condition of having to renounce their original 
citizenship. Apart from the introduction of a legal right to citizenship, the 
New Foreigners' Law is generally regarded as having had no major positive 
impact on the 'foreigners' status, in some respects it has even worsened their 
situation when compared with the old law (e.g. deportation is facilitated, 
'data protection' is completely removed) (Forudastan, in: taz, 25.04.90). 
Newspaper articles carry information of a recent amendment to the 
citizenship/nationality law (Hannoversche Allgemeine Zeitung, 18.11.94; taz, 
14.11.94; taz, 15.11.94). The latest development in the question of formal 
citizenship has arisen from new coalition talks between CDU/CSU and FOP 
after the last general election in October 1994. Pressurized by the FOP, the 
CDU/CSU was prepared to compromise with the following new rule: Third 
generation 'foreigners' shall be granted automatic formal citizenship provided 
that one of their parents had been born in Germany. When reaching the age of 
eighteen, they have to decide which citizenship they are willing to renounce. 
Thus, dual citizenship is still not allowed. This new rule has been ironically 
referred to as 'Schnupperstaatsangehorigkeit' ('sniffle or sniff citizenship') as it 
implies a 'tit-bit' acquisition of citizenship (taz, 21.11.94). Moreover, it does 
not give any protection from deportation nor any help in case of personal 
conflicts with regard to ethnic origin (Frankfurter Rundschau, 14.11.94). This 
new development does not result in any profound changes towards generally 
granting long-term 'foreign' residents formal citizenship, but offers only 
another slow step in a piecemeal process. 
It is the exception in the logic of a non-immigration country." (1993:73, 
footnote no. 7). 
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In terms of formal citizenship, the above shows that post-war labour 
migrants in Britain, although on the basis of particular historical 
circumstances, have the most preferable formal citizenship status within 
western Europe. They enjoy full civil and political rights, whereas labour 
migrants in Germany are denied formal citizenship to a large extent as they 
are not vested with any voting rights and the safeguarding of civil rights is, in 
particular for non-Ee nationals, infringed because of their insecure residential 
status. Generally, 'foreigners' in Germany have a much more insecure formal 
status. In addition, the acquisition of citizenship via naturalization is among 
the hardest procedures in western Europe. 
The comparison shows that the link between nationality and 
citizenship as a legal device affects 'immigrants' more in Germany than in 
Britain. Although the latter has acquired with the 1981 BNA a nationality law 
which is based on ius sanguinis, most of the ex-colonial immigrants and their 
descendants are not effected by it. In the German case, the link between 
nationality and citizenship would be defensible (especially by having in mind 
the historical circumstances as explained in an earlier section) if naturalization 
was an open and straight-forward process for all permanent residents, but 
this is not the case. Furthermore, recent amendments have not had a major 
impact on improving this situation. Therefore, the link between citizenship 
and nationality (and thus the combined effects of nationalism and racism) has 
remained a major obstacle for labour migrants' acquisition of formal citizens' 
rights. However, this link does not only affect formal citizenship, but also the 
substantive side which is subject to the following section. 
6.4 Substantive citizenship in the context of post-war labour miaration 
Substantive citizenship tends to be less easily identifiable as formal 
citizenship, as it refers to what in Marshall's view is described as not only 
encompassing rights to a "modicum of economic security" (Le. social rights in 
a narrow sense), but also entailing a more far-reaching right "to share in the 
full social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the 
standards prevailing in the society" (1950:11). Thus, substantive 'rights' refer 
to 'social citizenship' which is "concerned with the welfare of people as 
citizens, taking 'welfare' in a broad sense to include such things as work, 
education, health and quality of life" (Roche 1992:3). To recall Husbands' 
'dimensions of welcome', substantive citizenship includes all aspects of a 
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'general quality of reception given by the receiving country' which covers the 
extent of racism (and nationalism) immigrants are exposed to. 
Substantive citizenship seems, therefore, to be operationable, for 
instance, within the scope of studies into elite racist discourse by Van Dijk 
(1993b) and Jager (1992) in which the subtle racism of elitist groups such as 
politicians, academics, and industrial elites are scrutinized. Essed's Everyday 
Racism (1991) and Jager's BrandSiitze - Rassismus im Alltag (1993) add to this a 
non-elitist dimension by showing how racist attitudes and discourse are part 
of ethnic minorities' daily experience17. Other studies which explore the role 
of the media in connection with ethnic minorities and/or racism, such as 
Gordon & Rosenberg's Daily Racism - The press and black people in Britain (1989), 
the Council of Europe's Colloquy Migrants and the Media - from 'guest-workers' 
to linguistic and cultural minorities (1987), and Van Dijk's Racism and the Press 
(1991) show the strong tendency in the media to depict these minorities as 
'problem makers' and a burden of the welfare state, and thus to the general 
public. Similarly, the publication "Ausliinderkriminalittit" oder "kriminelle 
Ausltinder" - Anmerkungen zu einem sensiblen Thema (1993b; in English: 
Foreigners' Crime or criminal foreigners - remarks on a sensitive subject> by 
the Federal Commissioner for Foreigners' Affairs reveals how police statistics 
tend to portray 'foreigners' as generally more prone to criminal offences than 
indigenous Germans. Geissler & Marissen's study Kriminalittit und 
Kriminalisierung junger Ausltinder - Die tickende Zeitbombe - ein Artefact der 
Kriminalstatistik (1990; English title "crime and criminalization of juvenile 
foreigners - the ticking time bomb - an artefact of criminal statistics") confirms 
the findings of the Commissioner. On the 'British' side, Gordon's Black people 
and the criminal law illustrates how "the law is not colour-blind, but a means 
by which black people have been subject to a process of criminalization" 
(1992:190) whereby he offers concrete examples, such as 'riot trials', juries, and 
sentencing. In chapter three of There Ain't No Black in the Union lack (1987) in 
which the law and black criminality is topicalized, Gilroy concludes that 
"[t]he idea that blacks are a high crime group and the related notion that their 
17 It has to be noted, however, that the empirical data in f:ssed's study stem 
from the Netherlands and the USA. Aspects mentioned by 'her' 
interviewees, such as racism at work - either from the part of colleagues or 
'clients' - were, however, also mentioned by a number of authors in the 
British context (see, e.g., Burgess-J\.larey, in: Gill ct at. 1992). 
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criminality is an expression of their distinctive culture have become integral 
to British racism in the period since the 'rivers of blood' speech18." (p. 109). 
The Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Racism and Xenophobia 
by the European Parliament (1990) confirms racist tendencies not only within 
British and German society, but also suggests a European-wide rise of anti-
black and anti-immigrant movements, in particular in form of organized 
right-wing extremism. Unorganized, more individual hostile attitudes are 
described in Friedrich & Schubarth's study on Ausltinderfeindliche und 
rechtsextreme Orientierungen be; ostdeutschen lugendlichen (1991; English title: 
hostile and right-wing orientations with East-German youths) and in 
Schonwalder's study Zu viele Auslander in Deutschland? Zur Entwicklung 
auslanderfeindlicher Einstellungen in der Bundesrepublik (1991; English title: Too 
many foreigners in Germany? About the development of hostile attitudes in 
the Federal Republic). The former authors base the increasing hostile and 
(individual) right-wing attitudes on the 'nationalistic-authoritarian syndrome' 
characterized by elements such as feelings of superiority and intolerance 
towards the 'foreigner'. The latter author mentions, too, that hostility towards 
foreigners is based on 'handed down potentials for nationalism and racism' 
(tradierte Potentiale von Nationalismus und Rassismus). 
Another issue is racially motivated violence. Baimbridge, Burkitt & 
Macey quote official statistics by the UK Home Office stating that racially 
motivated attacks rose from 4,383 in 1988 to 8,779 in 1993, although the 
majority of such incidents are said to go unrecorded (1994:427). The 
information brochure by the Campaign Against Racism & Fascism (carE) 
continuously reports on racially motivated attacks and deaths (see edition No. 
18, 1994:4-8). The edited book by Bjorgo & Witte titled Racist Violence in Europe 
(1993) provides an analytical approach to the issue of racially motivated 
violence (see also Gordon, 1990, on the same issue). In addition, there seems 
to be evidence of discriminatory and racist attitudes within state institutions, 
such as the police-force (taz 19.04.94; Korell 1994; Gordon 1993; Holdaway 
1996). 
Furthermore, there are other studies which highlight the housing, 
working, educational and health conditions of members of ethnic minority 
communities by giving concrete evidence of their living standards as 
18 The infamous 'rivers of blood' speech was made by Enoch Powell in 1 c)()8 
in Birmingham. It was characterized by extreme anti-black and anti-
immigrant sentiments and "coined the phrase 'rivers of blood' referring to 
what would follow if we did not drastically reduce prospective black 
numbers." (Barker 1981:38). 
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compared to the general standards prevailing in German and British societies 
(see, e.g., Skellington & Morris 1992). 
This list could be endless. The general message in all these studies and 
publications seems to be that, whatever the formal citizenship status, the fact 
of being of different ethnic origin seems to have a negative impact on the 
ethnic minorities' substantive citizenship status within civil society as 
reflected by studies on the media, right-wing extremist groups, racist 
motivated violence, and 'everyday racism'. Most of these studies implicitly or 
explicitly indicate the symbiotic existence of nationalism and racism19 as 
expressed in Euro/Whitecentrism and feelings of superiority by biologically 
and culturally denigrating ethnic minorities (see for examples Essed's table of 
'Frequencies of the Forms of Everyday Racism', 1991:180). In rough outlines, 
but by acknowledging more complex processes, Friedrich & Schubarth view 
uncertain economic, political and social conditions as responsible for rising 
nationalism and racism whereby their study focuses on East Germany after 
reunification with the West. Here, the theme of 'crisis' is strongly indicated, 
and in this context, the mere presence of peoples of non-European ethnic 
background tends to be abused for political purposes (e.g. during election 
campaigns) by a tendency to put the blame for general problems on 
immigrants as the easy option. In such an environment, the existence of anti-
discrimination legislation could be regarded as one concrete means of 
improving ethnic minorities' substantive citizenship status. 
6.4.1 Situation of the first immigrants 
The British context 
The socio-economic situation arising from first immigration into 
Britain is characterized by Rex & Tomlinson as a rather antagonistic 
relationship of formal and substantive citizenship with regard to ex-colonial 
immigrants and is therefore, when compared with most of continental 
Europe, outstanding in two ways. On the one hand, black and Asian 
communities share fully equal formal citizenship with their indigenous 
British counterparts, whilst on the other hand, immigration of West Indians in 
particular has a colour dimension with a specific history that no other 
immigrant peoples in Europe have, viz. the combination of slavery and 
19 Jager, for example, refers to the empirical (interview) findings in his 
study as 'racist and nationalistic statements' (1993:291). 
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colonialism. This has a very distinct impact on the presence of blacks in the 
UK, and in Rex and Tomlinson's words, West Indians have to be recognized 
as people "who were taken into captivity" (1979:292) and that captivity meant 
not only slavery but also cultural suppression. However, Asians too suffer 
from the legacy of colonial society, but maybe even more so, they also 
experience discrimination on grounds of their religion (Modood 1992b)20. 
In general, when immigration from ex-colonies began on the basis of 
freedom to migrate, indigenous British people, confronted with culturally 
distant immigrants entering in unprecedented numbers, tended to react in 
terms of the roles which the immigrants played in British colonial history 
(Rex & Tomlinson 1979). Integration into British society of ex-colonial 
immigrants is, thus, described by Rex & Tomlinson as a 'traumatic experience' 
for lower middle- and working class people, because they tended to feel 
degraded themselves through having to accept these people as equals, as 
fellow workers and neighbours. To live with black and Asian people was 
perceived as a threat to one's own status. Rex & Tomlinson, therefore, suggest 
that the deterioration which indigenous residents in Handsworth (the main 
focus of their study) came to anticipate was not an accelerated physical 
deterioration due to the misuses of buildings by black immigrants, but simply 
a deterioration of the area due to the fact that they were thought of as inferior 
because of colonial people living there. The above authors believe that this is a 
more important factor than that of the cultural differences which did exist, 
but they argue it is more a matter of the place viewed as appropriate for 
colonial people to occupy in an imperial structure. The immigrants, thus, 
found themselves in the place allocated to them: The range of jobs occupied 
by West Indians and Asians was concentrated at the lower levels of the 
occupational system, they were under-protected by their unions in times of 
trouble, they worked longer hours for the money they earned and did more 
shift work. Their houses, apart from the council-built houses, were the worst 
houses in the city and ones which had not yet been demolished even though 
eligible for it. Their children went to schools which were largely segregated or 
were immigrant majority schools. In these schools, they were held back by 
linguistic and cultural difficulties to which teachers tended to react according 
to racial stereotypes. Asians suffered in particular form the lack of fluency in 
the English language, while the West Indians found themselves in a 
20 In the words of one interviewee in Modood et al.'s study on Changing 
Ethnic Identities, the difference between the experiences of the two main 
minority groups is that "they [the Afro-Caribbeans] were slaves, we were 
colonised ... " (1994:96). 
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paradoxical situation as they actually shared British culture more than non-
English speaking Asians (and herein lay the problem, as argued by Rex & 
Tomlinson: They had always been taught things which were not necessarily 
connected to their cultural background, and they had always been called 
upon to appreciate a culture in which they were systematically 
downgraded)21. The above authors claim that Asian children had less trouble 
in school, once they had overcome language problems, because they were 
aided by two factors: They had a degree of security in that their culture had 
not been destroyed and secondly, the instrumental attitude their parents had 
towards education helped them to be quite successful. Their problems tended 
to arise at higher levels. Even though they achieved a good education, they 
could often not get the corresponding jobs (see also Brown 1984). It is 
suggested by Rex & Tomlinson that second and subsequent generations who 
were born and raised in Britain, are likely to be more frustrated by the 
experience of discrimination as they have higher expectations or different 
expectations not shared by their parents. 
The above is similarly expressed by Layton-Henry when noting that 
the "feeling and behaviour of native white British people ... towards Afro-
Caribbean and Asian migrant workers, and their images of them, were 
influenced by the knowledge that these migrants had been subject peoples of 
the British empire" (1993:9). 
Further studies, such as the early work by Rose et al. (1969) and by 
Brown (1984) underpin the, comparatively speaking, worse housing and 
working conditions of immigrants. It seems, therefore, as if the specific 
historical link of post-war labour migrants with Britain has not only had a 
positive outcome in terms of equal formal citizenship, but is also partly 
responsible for a disadvantaged socio-economic position in British society. 
The German context 
In the German case, the above explanations of the formal citizenship 
status of immigrants in the Federal Republic seem to render the discussion 
about substantive citizenship almost superfluous, as the majority of 
immigrants do not enjoy a full formal citizenship status which is the first and 
necessary step towards substantive citizenship. However, in the case of the 
21 A more recent study by Tomlinson quotes the Swann Report (by the 
Department of Education & Science) as having recognized that the British 
school curriculum "was and still is in many ways influenced by the beliefs 
and values of a period of imperial enthusiasm and a final expansion of the 
British Empire." (1990:71). 
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Turks, there is a slowly increasing number of naturalizations, in particular 
since the introduction of the New Foreigner's Law (Beauftragte der 
Bundesregierung fiir die Belange der Auslander 1993a:167). Therefore, it is 
worth mentioning a few of the aspects which indicate similar socio-political 
problems of immigrants in Germany as in the British example. Moreover, 
despite largely lacking formal citizenship, and thus legal inclusion, increasing 
integration on the part of the Turkish minority has been taking place (Sen, in: 
Leggewie & Senoc;ak 1993). 
The first generation of immigrants into Germany experienced equally 
bad, if not worse, housing and working conditions as in the British case, as 
they were recruited as 'guest-workers' and thus, were expected to return after 
a few years. This fact might have justified the pushing of these workers into 
the least appealing jobs as well as the exploitative treatment recognized by 
some Germans as indicated in the 'undercover' operation of Wallraff 
described in his book Ganz unten (1985; English title "The Lowest of the Low"). 
The life experiences of first generation immigrants have been described by 
Schiffauer (1991) and Akc;am (1993) highlighting the bad socio-economic 
conditions under which the first guest-workers lived and worked. Many 
immigrants first lived in hostels provided by the companies they worked for. 
Others went onto the housing market in search for accommodation, which 
did not necessarily improve their living situation. An article in the 
Handelsblatt - a major economist newspaper - from February 1967 (as quoted 
by Herbert, 1986:202-203), for example, describes the most appalling living 
conditions of Greek and Turkish guest-workers. Crammed into dirty, only 
very basically furnished rooms of small size (one example mentions 20 square 
meters for six men), treated in a very inhumane and patronizing way by their 
landlords/ladies, these workers are quoted as having had to pay a 
extortionate amount of rent. Since 1973 - the phase of family reunification -
most immigrants looked for accommodation on the general housing market. 
A concentration in certain areas took place where housing was cheap, but also 
comparatively worse, which led to the creation of 'ghettos' (such as Berlin-
Kreuzberg, e.g.). This happened mainly for two reasons: 1. the 'myth of 
return' was still held onto and cheap housing was required to keep savings as 
high as possible; 2. a general attitude of rejection on the part of 
landlords/ladies in better residential areas (Sen, in: Leggewie & Senoc;ak 
1993). 
Apart from a generally bad housing situation, immigrants were also 
concentrated in unskilled or low skilled jobs in rather dirty and dangerous 
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environments (Castles & Kosack 1973). They tended to do the kind of jobs 
indigenous people began to reject. All these aspects indicate that there was 
hardly any 'dimension of welcome' - to use Husbands' term - which has partly 
to do with the fact that these labour migrants came originally as 'guests' 
(although this term is hypocritical as guests are usually treated preferably) as 
well as with the fact that Germany has never officially been considered as a 
country of immigration, and thus, has never had concrete immigration 
policies (Martin & Miller 1990). This also explains the almost complete lack of 
indusionary measures, such as education policies for immigrants' children. 
Only after 1973 (the year of the recruitment halt) did such policies slowly 
began to be considered (Castles 1995). 
To sum up, the substantive citizenship of first generations in particular 
was affected by the social position of these immigrants and their perception 
by civil society - in Britain as 'colonial subjects' and in Germany as 'guest-
workers' who would return to their countries of origin after a short period of 
time. In the latter case, therefore, it seems to be understandable that the guest-
worker system did not involve governmentally sponsored immigration and 
inclusion policies. This situation should, however, have gradually been 
reversed after 1973 with the arrival or birth of family members. 
6.4.2 Subsequent generations 
The British case 
It is difficult to assess to what extent the situation has improved for the 
generations of ethnic minorities born and brought up in German or British 
society. It depends very much on the criteria chosen to make this assessment. 
In terms of general acceptance, it is assumed here that in the British case, 
colonial attitudes have faded away with the emergence of majority 
generations born after the dismantling of the Empire. Multi-ethnicity of 
British society seems to have found general acceptance - as reflected in a shift 
from assimilationist to pluralist policies (Castles 1995:301) - and upward 
social mobility of ethnic minorities, to a certain extent, can certainly not be 
denied (in the context of the Indian minority see Modood 1992il ). Anti-
discrimination legislation, too, seems to have had some positive outcomes. 
However, since the time of first immigration, the economic situation 
has dramatically changed, and the long-term recession has resulted in high 
unemployment which is suggested by many authors as having had a worse 
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effect on ethnic minorities than on the majority. What this situation has 
certainly brought about is a re-emerging protective, narrow nationalism 
(Goulbourne 1991) represented not only by certain successes of the BNP, but 
also in statements by politicians such as Powell, Churchill Junior, Thatcher, 
Tebitt and Portillo who "openly seek to delineate 'the Other'" (Cohen 
1994:209). 
Ethnic minority youths are still faced with many problems that their 
'white' counterparts do not experience in a similar way. Research done by 
Wrench & Solomos into the "processes of discrimination which exclude young 
migrant-descended school-Ieavers from training and employment 
opportunities" shows the still existing and often "subtle and indirect way that 
institutional procedures perpetuate racial discrimination" (1993:157). 
Collinson notes that the integration of 'second' and 'third' generations22 has 
attracted special attention "since it has become increasingly apparent that the 
marginal position of immigrants in housing, employment and public life has 
tended to be perpetuated in the case of their children and their children's 
offspring" (1994:109). Levels of unemployment among descendants of 
immigrants are often higher than among the immigrants themselves (ibid.). In 
this context, the notion of 'inherited disadvantage' seems to be highly 
suggestive - 'inherited' not as a biological fact, but in a socio-political sense. It 
is, therefore, probably safe to say that the exclusionary effects of racialization 
which cut across class and gender (as suggested by Anthias & Yuval-Davis 
1992 and Essed 1991) have still got a major impact on the daily lives of ethnic 
minorities in Britain. 
Recent studies - in particular those on ethnic minorities' labour market 
position (such as by Owen & Green 1992) - have pointed out that the 
experience of the various ethnic minority groups cannot be seen anymore as a 
monolithic block and that any attempt to generalize about 'ethnic minorities' 
is fraught with difficulty (Mason 1995). Jones' re-analysis of the Labour Force 
Survey, for instance, reveals that the position of ethnic groups is becoming 
more complex as the experience of members of different groups begins to 
diverge (Jones 1996). Male members of some minority groups are beginning 
to experience employment patterns increasingly similar to those of white men 
(i.e. African Asian, Chinese, and Indian men). Among those of Afro-
Caribbean, Bangladeshi, and Pakistani origin, however, there is much less 
evidence that suggests any progress. Some groups display remarkable 
22 An ever increasing population has been born in Britain. According to 
census data of 1991 (Owen 1993a:12), the figure is 46.8%. 
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polarization: Both Indian and Chinese men are represented in large numbers 
in the highest as well as in the lowest job categories. "This may suggest that 
men from these two groups enter a relatively narrow range of occupations, 
either at the top or at the bottom end of the job market." (Jones 1996:72). 
Successive studies (Brown 1984; Jones 1996) have shown that persons 
of ethnic minority groups are more likely to be unemployed than 'white' 
people. Even among Indians who are usually identified as the group 
experiencing progress (Modood 1992btthe unemployment rate was about 25% 
higher than the rate among 'white' men and twice as high among women 
(Owen 1993b:6). Young people are in particular affected by unemployment: 
The rates for 16 to 24-year-olds are higher than those for the economically 
active as a whole (Jones 1996: 127; Owen 1993b:8). Studies on earnings have 
revealed that patterns resulted from earlier studies (Brown 1984) have 
remained the same during the 1980s and 1990s (Mason 1995): Ethnic minority 
employees earn between ten and thirty percent less than their 'white' 
counterparts (Jones 199':81). The growth of minority enterprises in recent 
years has also attracted much interest. Self-employment is generally more 
common among ethnic minority groups than among the 'white' population, 
and more among those classified as 'Asian' than among others. Ram estimates 
that more than one-fifth of Asians in employment are either self-employed or 
employers (1992: 601). However, Bangladeshis are much less likely to be self-
employed than other South Asians (Owen 1993b:4-6). Ram has revealed in 
this study (1992) the specific problems most of these enterprises encounter, 
partly because they are run as 'family businesses'. He concludes that many 
employers still faced severe 'racial' constraints which had negative effects on 
the development of their businesses. He argues, however, that racism "is a 
force that employers manage rather than accede to." (1992:601). 
With regard to education, there is evidence that members of ethnic 
minority groups are more likely to remain in full-time education between the 
ages of sixteen and nineteen than are their 'white' counterparts (Jones 1996). 
Ethnic monitoring has shown that South Asians were admitted to institutions 
of higher education in larger numbers than were the same age groups in 
the population as a whole. Those of Afro-Caribbean origin were represented 
by a percentage that matched their presence in the population as a whole 
(Mason 1995). It has been suggested that high rates of unemployment by 
ethnic minority youths might explain this higher rate of prolonged education. 
Jones showed that for those no longer in full-time education, 'white' men are 
generally more qualified than members of other ethnic groups. Bangladeshi 
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and Pakistanis are the least well qualified (1996':36). Those of African Asian 
and Indian origin tend to be better qualified than 'white' people. Mason has 
pointed out, however, that one should not disregard the issue of continuing 
disadvantage. Pakistanis and Bangladeshis appear to be less qualified than 
other minorities, and Afro-Caribbeans are more likely to be in possession of 
vocational qualifications than those which are 'purely' academic. Also, despite 
higher levels of achievement, there is evidence of 'everyday racism' - for 
instance, as part of ethnic minorities' experience at school (Mason 1995:71-76). 
Housing is also an area still characterized by patterns of disadvantage 
and discrimination. More than twice as many ethnic minority as 'white' 
households do not have self-contained accommodation (Mason 1995:89), and 
more Pakistani and Bangladeshi lack central heating (op. cit.:91). 
Jones' re-analysis of the Labour Force Survey data and the census data 
reviewed have shown that the labour market experiences among Britain's 
ethnic minoritiesQ~increasingly diverging. The growth of a middle class of 
professional and managerial workers among some ethnic minority groups 
might suggest that the class structure of some groups is converging towards 
that of the 'white' population. According to Mason, however, the conclusion -
as often arrived at by the political right - that "the success of members of some 
groups gives the lie to the claim that discrimination lies at the root of 
differences in achievement and opportunity between groups" (1995:124) 
should be treated with caution. He points out that marked differences remain 
in the performance of members of different ethnic groups and that those of 
Pakistani and Bangladeshi descent suffer in particular from the lowest 
positions in the labour market. Moreover, the distinctive patterns of exclusion 
experienced by British Muslims - regardless of their class position - should 
also not be ignored. 
The German case 
Similarly, in Germany the fashionable idea of multi-culturalism (Cohn-
Bendit & Schmid 1992; Geissler 1991) has gained a higher level of awareness 
and acceptance by the majority. Despite these first signs of changes in 
attitudes, studies of the Turkish minority have shown how relative the 
improvement of subsequent generations' socio-economic position23 is. There 
23 One fourth of the seven million foreigners were bom in Germany 
(Migration News 1996a). 
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is evidence for some social upward mobility. Sen, for instance, has done work 
on Turkish entrepreneurs. According to him, in 1985, there were 22,000 
enterprises run by the Turkish minority - a figure which has increased to 
35,000 in 1992. This trend has contributed to the establishment of a Turkish 
middle class (in: Leggewie & Sen~ak 1993: 27). 75% of these businesses are 
run as 'family businesses', which means that there could be similar problems 
as in the British context with regard to management and expansion (Ram 
In educational terms, more and more children of immigrants complete 
their school education and thus, gain the necessary qualifications to get a 
good job training. This happens mostly at the level of Mittlere Reife (GCSE 
level). They still remain underrepresented in tertiary education (there are 
only 16,000 Turkish university students; Migration News 1996a) and 
secondary schools (only 22% of foreign youths attend these schools -11% less 
than German youths; Mansel & Hurrelmann 1993:175), but they are over-
represented in Hauptschulen (pre-GCSE level; school leavers are usually 
fifteen years old) and Sonderschulen (special needs schools). Hence, there 
seems to be evidence for "structural disadvantage" (Wagner, in: Leggewie & 
Seno~k 1993:106). Foreign youths are now increasingly interested in gaining 
professional skills as part of voca tional training schemes, but a report quoted 
by Sen concluded that compared to 1984/85, foreign youths could improve 
their participatory quota in such schemes by only 1.3% (in: Leggewie & 
Senoc;ak 1993: 29). Almost double as many indigenous German adolescents 
than their foreign counterparts had been successful in finding a trainee post 
(Ausbildungsplatz) with the help of job centres (ibid.). 86% of the foreign 
youths under twenty years of age who are jobless have not learned an 
occupation (Migration News 1996a). A study undertaken by Wilpert shows 
that in 1985, '''foreign youths were two to three times more likely to be 
registered as unemployed than their German peers" (quoted by Collinson 
1994:109). Moreover, almost 90% of those who were working occupied 
manual jobs and only 20% of those were employed as skilled workers (ibid.). 
This has not changed much: According to Mansel & Hurrelmann, foreign 
youths are five times more often unemployed or in unskilled jobs (1993:176). 
Since reunification, jobs have become even more scarce, and 'foreign' 
residents might find it even harder to find employment. 
One of the main problems in Germany remains the legal aspect and 
thus, the fact that most labour migrants and their descendants do not have 
formal citizenship. Also, anti-discrimination legislation does not exist in a 
clearly defined and operational way as in Britain. Mansel & llurrelmann 
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(1993) summarized these aspects as the result of their report of a youth survey 
of the reasons for the increase in psycho-social stress in young foreigners 
growing up in Germany, undertaken during 1989 and 1990: There have been 
no differences in the evaluation of peer group interaction and leisure-time 
pursuits. However, the picture changed after the transition from school to 
work. Foreign adolescents were obliged to accept jobs with a lower social 
status and were frequently unable to realize their vocational options. They 
scored higher on emotional tension, and foreign girls had lower self-esteem 
than their German peers. The authors concluded that these findings are not 
particularly due to a low level of integration or to growing up in two different 
cultures. Daily discrimination in interaction with Germans, public 
administration, and the structures of social and legal inequality seem to be far 
more relevant. This is unlikely to change in the post-reunification period 
where huge socio-economic problems have created a climate of narrow 
nationalism with rising anti-foreigner sentiments and racially motivated 
violence. 
For both countries, it can be said that the continuing terminology of 
'race' and 'Aus/f:i'nder' also indicates social exclusion for subsequent 
generations to a greater or lesser extent. Furthermore, it should be noted for 
both countries that most of the recent studies mentioned in the more general 
section on substantive citizenship, such as the studies on racism and the 
media as well as on 'everyday racism', cover expressions of racism during the 
1980s and early 1990s. Thus, they refer not only to first immigrants, but also 
(or even more so) to those generations born and brought up in Germany or 
Britain. This type of discourse in Germany, however, hides exactly this fact as 
these non-immigrant generations are always referred to (in the media, in 
political, and in 'everyday' discourse) as foreigners in the same way as their 
parents or grandparents. 
As a result, it can be said that, despite differences in ethnic minorities' 
formal status, on the substantive level racism and nationalism in combined 
form continue to have exclusionary effects on ethnic or immigrant minorities 
to a lesser or greater extent in both countries. 
The discussion of citizenship, however, does not end here as there is 
the European dimension to consider. The implications of the emergence of 
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European citizenship for ethnic minorities in Germany and Britain are, 
therefore, subject of the next section. 
6.5 European citizenship 
The issue of citizenship has gained a new dimension with the 
finalization of the Maastricht Treaty - not only in terms of supra-nationality, 
but also as it involves scope for sub-national innovations. It is the aim of this 
section to investigate whether the European level offers any different 
provisions for ethnic minorities' citizenship or whether the nationally 
occurring effects of nationalism and racism are merely perpetuated. In this 
context, the issue of European citizenship functioning (or having the potential 
to function) differently as a mechanism for inclusion will be examined. In this 
respect, the developments at the European level are also of importance for 
future prospects. 
6.5.1 Supra-national developments 
With ratification of the Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty), 
European citizenship as the "most important innovation" (Europe on the 
move 1993:15) has come into existence as stated in Article 8 of the above 
Treaty: "Citizenship of the Union is hereby established" (Council of the ECs & 
Commission of the ECs 1992:15). As citizenship is historically associated with 
nationality, the introduction of Union citizenship has special significance with 
political as well as cultural implications (Federalist 1993:3). 
Until the Maastricht Treaty, the European Community did not assert 
any substantive list of entitlements for individuals living within its 
boundaries. The individual rights of Europeans implicit in the Treaty of Rome 
and the subsequent Single European Act were somewhat limited in scope and 
rudimentary political rights were introduced .with the first election of 
Members to the European Parliament in 1979 (Welsh 1993). However, the 
minimal legislative competence of the European Parliament limited the 
emergence of a strong and coherent notion of Community citizenship (Closa 
1992:1144). Welsh suggests that a rough idea of a European citizenship slowly 
began to emerge around two main practical realities: the rights that the 
gradual completion of the internal market has granted to individuals 
regardless of (EC member-) nationality and the increasing need to delineate 
those individuals from citizens of non-member states (1993:27). 
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Content of Union citizenship: Article 8 
European Union citizenship as a relatively new concept in the 
Community sphere is laid down by Articles 8 to 8e of the Treaty on European 
Union which include the following elements: 
- the right to free movement within the EU; the right of residence in 
any member-country of the EU; 
- the right to vote and stand as candidate in municipal elections in the 
country of residence; 
- the right to vote and stand as candidate in European elections in the 
country of residence; 
- citizens of the EU in third countries have the right to the diplomatic 
and consular protection of the authorities of any EU member-state in 
that third country; 
- citizens of the EU have the right to petition the European Parliament; 
- citizens of the EU have the right to apply to an ombudsperson 
appointed by the European Parliament concerning issues of 
maladministration in the activities of the Community's institutional 
bodies with the exception of the Court of Justice (articles 8a to 8d). 
Article Be opens European citizenship up by setting out a procedure for the 
further development of citizenship should current rights need to be 
strengthened or new ones added. In this capacity, the Maastricht Treaty's 
conception of European citizenship has notably advanced from the Rome 
Treaty and Single European Act. However, the Maastricht provisions are also 
considered weak in certain respects (Closa 1992; Welsh 1993:25; Federalist 
1993). 
Shortcomings 
One of the shortcomings crucial to this thesis is the paradoxical 
situation that on the one hand, there is a separation between citizenship and 
nationality in that all EU member-state nationals enjoy a common European 
citizenship (in the formal sense). On the other hand, long term resident third-
country nationals (as, for instance, the Turkish community in Germany) are 
not included as most of them are not nationals of one of the member-states. 
Thus, Welsh speaks of 'inherent exclusiveness towards non-EU nationals' 
(1993:25) and criticizes the concept of Union citizenship for its strong reliance 
on the framework of the nation-state. Similarly, Closa deplores that 
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nationality of any of the member-states becomes the prerequisite for the 
enjoyment of citizenship (1992:1161). 
The issue of nationality indeed remains a matter to be decided upon by 
each individual member-state as stated in the final declaration on nationality 
in the Maastricht Treaty (Declaration No.2), using the following wording: 
..... the question whether an individual possesses the nationality of a Member 
State shall be settled solely by reference to the national law of the Member State 
concerned. Member States may declare, for information, who are to be considered 
their nationals for Community purposes ... " 
(European Union 1993:644). 
Therefore, the character of Union citizenship, although "determined by the 
progressive acquisition of rights stemming from the dynamic development of 
the Union" (Closa 1992:1167), does not work as an inclusionary mechanism 
for non-European immigrants as such since national formal citizenship is its 
prerequisite. 
Provisions for third-country nationals? 
The Maastricht Treaty marks the beginning of specific provisions for 
third country nationals within EC law. As described in Chapter Four, title II 
Article G inserts the new Articles 100c and 100d into the EEC Treaty which 
provides for the European Council (comprised of Heads of Government), on a 
proposal from the Commission, to decide which third country nationals will 
require visas. These articles, therefore, give the Community the ability to 
devise a common visa policy if it so wishes. 
Title VI Article K establishes inter-governmental co-operation in the 
area of justice and home affairs, including rules regarding third country 
nationals crossing external borders and immigration policy as areas of 
common interest. 'Immigration policy' regards conditions of entry and 
movement of third country nationals, conditions of residence and 
employment. If the draft Convention on the crossing of external borders (see 
Appendix I) is ever finalized and passed, it will abolish internal visa 
requirements for legally resident non-EU nationals travelling to another 
member-state for a short period of time. So far, however, free movement of 
non-EU residents within the EU territory is not guaranteed (Fernandes 1992). 
Overall, there is considerable potential for the implementation of 
provisions for third-country nationals. As yet, however, European citizenship 
does not offer any benefits for post-war labour migrants of non-EU 
nationality and/or citizenship. Thus, as denizens of Europe, they pay taxes 
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and enjoy most social welfare rights, but cannot fully participate in political 
decisions via European elections or enjoy economic benefits provided by the 
freedom of movement. Under the Maastricht Treaty, as Garcia argues 
(1992:20), this group should have been given the right to participate in local 
elections, but so far this is only possible via naturalization - which Garcia 
regards as a discriminatory decision in view of the difficulty of the 
procedures involved in countries such as Germany, Austria, Belgium and 
Luxembourg. Moreover, Plender (1990:609) holds that the establishment of 
common rules relating to the immigration of non-EU nationals is necessary in 
order to achieve the objective spelled out in Article 3(c), namely the abolition 
of obstacles to the movement of persons between member-states. 
As a result of the above explanations, European citizenship has not 
superseded nationality in much the same way as the European Union has not 
abolished the sovereignty of its member-states with regard to 
nationality / citizenship laws, although the Maastricht Treaty upgrades the 
condition of citizens with EU-nationality under Community law (Closa 1992). 
Welsh concludes that even during the post-Maastricht period, the decisive 
social and political status for individual Europeans has not been citizenship of 
the Union, but nationality in one of the member-states. Therefore, the 
European Union is, according to her, of intergovernmental character rather 
than supranational (1993:31). 
European citizenship for ethnic minorities in Germany and Britain 
What are the implications of the above for ethnic minority 
communities in Britain and Germany? European citizenship as defined by the 
Maastricht Treaty applies only to citizens and/or nationals of EU-member-
states. The implication for most of the ethnic minority groups from former ex-
colonies in the UK is that they in fact enjoy formal EU citizenship in the same 
way as any other indigenous European person. This is different in Germany: 
Turkish long-term residents who are not naturalized (and most of them are 
not; see Beauftragte der Bundesregierung 1993a:166) cannot enjoy the 
freedom of movement nor any of the other provisions. Therefore, they are as 
much excluded on a European level as on a national. In addition, there is not 
only unequal treatment between Turkish immigrants and German citizens, 
but also different treatment of Turkish immigrants and residents of any EU-
nationality - whereby the latter enjoy a more preferable status despite the 
longer periods of residence of the former. 
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In Britain, the situation is much more complex. For those members of 
the ethnic minority groups who are British citizens, they enjoy in theory the 
same rights associated with formal citizenship in Europe as every other 
indigenous person. There are, however, members of certain ethnic minority 
groups, such as the Indians, who are Indian passport holders (because India 
does not allow dual citizenship), but nevertheless enjoy full formal citizenship 
rights in the UK (such as, e.g., voting rights). For them, Europe creates a 
rather anomalous situation as they cannot take part in the freedom of 
movement in order to work in another European country, but they could be 
members of the European Parliament as they have the right to stand for any 
election in the UK (according to the President of the EU Migrants Forum, 
there is the example of an Australian MEP representing Britain), For British 
citizens of different ethnic background (blacks and Asians), another problem 
appears in practice when travelling to continental Europe: They have 
numerous experiences of being stopped and checked because they are not 
considered British24. On the basis of this experience of black and Asian UK 
citizens travelling on the continent, some organizations expect black and 
Asian Europeans to be more harassed than white citizens by random checks 
inside borders (Meehan 1993b:154). Ethnic minorities in Britain, according to 
King, "will in the future face comparative disadvantages in their ability to 
travel and work in Europe which will seriously affect their ability to live their 
lives as freely as their fellow citizens" (1993:4). Apart from the threat of being 
the "object of unwelcome attention from right-wing extremists", ethnic 
minorities "could also be the object of the interest of the police themselves, 
who may take him or her as an illegal immigrant or an illicit overstayer" 
(ibid.). These aspects indicate problems with the substantive side of European 
citizenship. In the case of Britain, the above explanations show that large 
parts of ethnic minorities enjoy the same formal European citizenship rights 
as the majority (at least in theory), but on the substantive level, the combined 
effects of nationalism and racialization might curtail their freedom of 
movement. It seems, therefore, to be the case that substantive European 
citizenship for ethnic minorities in Britain is similarly encroached upon as 
substantive citizenship on the national level. In Germany, the main problem 
24 The article in the Guardian of March 25, 1995, Challenge lo I:V border 
scheme, reports that the president of the EU Migrants forum - with regard 
to the implementation of the Schengcn agreement on March 2() - launched 
an action by which his members would be travelling within the EU by 
plane to test the new arrangements by refusing to show any travel 
documents. If there was any denial of entry, it would be taken to the ('ourts. 
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which exists on the national level- i.e. the non-holding of formal citizenship-
is exactly the same problem for most non-EU nationals on the European level. 
The issue of European citizenship, however, does not only involve 
developments on the supranational level- as explained so far - but also on the 
sub-national level. 
6.5.2 Sub-national developments: subsidiarity & the Committee of the 
Regions 
The idea of the European Union as an ever closer union of the peoples 
of Europe by way of 'Europeanization' beyond national governments and the 
remote Ee policy-making seems to have been of concern when the principle 
of subsidiarity and the clauses on the Committee of the Regions were 
included in the Maastricht Treaty (Taylor 1995:74). Both of those new 
elements, however, are not considered in the same way by each member-
state. There seems to be a particularly divergent interpretation or motivation 
behind the inclusion of these elements in Britain versus continental Europe as 
suggested by Teasdale (1993) and Scott & Peterson & Millar (1994). This begs 
the question "what do subsidiarity and the Committee of the Regions mean". 
Subsidiarity 
Subsidiarity, generally speaking, is the principle "that decisions should 
be taken at the lowest level possible" (The European 1992:34). This means that 
decisions (by parliaments, governments and other authorities) are to be taken 
as close as possible to the citizen, in other words, at the lowest level (i.e. local 
or regional authority). They are to be taken at higher levels (central 
government, the European Union) only if there is good reason (Europe on the 
move, 1992). The new Article 3b of the Treaty defines subsidiarity in the 
following terms: 
"The Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by this 
Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein. In areas which do not fall 
within its exclusive competencc, the Community shall take action, in accordance 
with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives of the 
proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can 
therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better 
achieved by the Community." 
(Europe on the move 1992). 
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Subsidiarity, thus, appeared as the guiding principle to delineating the 
competencies of Brussels versus other administrative authorities, such as 
national states and regions. The debate between governmental and EU 
officials has centred upon the question to what extent subsidiarity provides a 
clear separation of responsibilities between the European Commission, the 
member-states and sub-national governments or other local authorities 
(Kersbergen & Verbeek 1994), and herein lies the difference in approach by 
each member-state. In Germany, for instance, subsidiarity is considered to be 
a guiding principle for federalism and thus, the Germans believed these two 
principles to be coterminous. The British government, on the other hand, sees 
them in opposition to federalism (Teasdale 1993) and the debate on 
subsidiarity in the UK has mainly centred upon how policy can be 'de-linked' 
from Brussels (Scott & Peterson & Millar 1994; The European 1992). 
The Committee of the Regions 
A further contrasting process of decision-making below the nation-
state can be found in the emergence of the European 'Committee of the 
Regions'. Article 198A of the Maastricht Treaty states: 
"A committee consisting of representatives of regional and local 
bodies, hereinafter referred to as the "Committee of the Regions", 
is hereby established with advisory status .... The members of 
the Committee may not be bound by any mandatory instructions. 
They shall be completely independent in the performance of 
their duties in the general interest of the Community". 
Article 198C adds: 
"The Committee of the Regions shall be consulted by the 
Councilor the Commission where this treaty so provides 
and in all other cases in which one of these two institutions 
considers its appropriate". 
Hence, the Committee is comprised of representatives of regional and local 
authorities with only advisory power. The new consultative mechanisms, 
however, are viewed by Barber & MilIns (1993) as capable of devolving more 
influence to sub-national governments. According to them, there are three 
main roles for local authorities: the implementation of European regulations, 
the enabling of the local economy to respond to opportunities and risks of the 
Single Market, and as co-ordinators of applications for the funding of local 
projects. The Committee is also a good forum for exchanging experiences and 
opinions on certain policies. It seems to Barber & Millns (1993) as if European 
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institutions see local government through subsidiarity and partnership as 
more integral to the process of European government than some national 
governments do. 
There is, however, again a problem with different approaches in 
different member-states. For countries like Germany with a long tradition of 
federalism and a strong position of regional independent decision-making, 
the establishment of the Committee of the Regions releases fears of its Uinder 
losing their power within the European structure. In the UK, by contrast, the 
national government attributes only a subsidiary legitimacy to local 
government and continues to deny it any form of constitutional recognition 
through such means as signing the European Charter of Local Self-
Government (op.cit.). The high centralization of the British political structure -
a process which has increased in the period of Conservative rule since 1979-
thus represents "a major 'democratic deficit' by comparison with other 
member-states of the ED, with the possible exception of Greece and Portugal" 
(Taylor 1995:74). The matter at issue, however, is not only local government's 
restricted constitutional status in the UK. Taylor argues that the central 
government has highly limited the elected local governments' power via a 
series of interventions in local affairs. In areas of direct service provision 
especially, local governments have lost many of their powers to non-elected 
and generally unaccountable quangos. How and to what extent the member-
states will harmonize and standardize their traditional approach to 
regionalism is, therefore, still unclear. Taylor (1995) speaks of a 'quiet 
revolution' in local government in Britain and Barber & Millns (1993), too, 
view that re-organization of the British structure is necessary. 
Generally speaking, the Maastricht Treaty created a Committee of the 
Regions as a step towards the recognition that sub-national governments have 
to be involved as a formal component of the ED decision-making process. In 
this way, the fact that people tend to identify most strongly with their close 
community (European Commission 1994) finds political recognition and 
renders the principle of subsidiarity concrete and operationable. 
There are, however, problems with regard to the interpretation of these 
developments by national governments which means that the precise role of 
the Committee of the Regions seems to be very much a matter for future 
agreement. Also, there are other issues which need clarifying and improving. 
For this purpose, a campaign mounted by the national associations of local 
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authorities in Britain with a clear set of objectives for the IGC25 is said to 
include: 
- a legally enforceable definition of subsidiarity; 
- a legal basis for the principle of local government; and 
- more power and independence for the Committee of the Regions 
(Taylor 1995:79). 
Implications for citizenship 
These sub- and supra-national developments have very important 
implications for the issue of citizenship - in general as well as in particular 
with regard to ethnic minorities. The widely deplored democratic deficit 
existing at the European level seems to be compensated by the Maastricht 
Treaty's reinforcement of greater decentralization and subsidiarity. The 
'European idea' - occasionally criticized for being elitist and technocratic 
(Taylor 1995) - could gain feasibility for the majority of European citizens by 
confronting the basic problems of their everyday life in the form of a local 
dimension to citizenship. 
Generally speaking, as part of the Committee of the Regions, regions 
could "learn from one another about practical problems and solutions" 
(Meehan 1993b:183) and they are linked "directly into European decision-
making" (Smith 1994:3). 
Co-operation of local authorities could also have positive implications 
for ethnic minorities. As Britain has the one of the most sophisticated 
legislation for the elimination of 'race' discrimination and has developed the 
most progressive 'race' equality policies at local level, its experience could be 
of great value for local authorities in continental member-states. One further 
objective for amendments to the Treaty of Rome, as proposed by the national 
associations of local authorities in Britain, is a legal base for EU work on racial 
equality (Taylor 1995). Moreover, the sub-national developments could 
benefit ethnic minorities probably to a larger extent than supra-national 
developments if, for instance, the subsidiarity principle dictated that racial 
equality be an issue for the 'regions'. Furthermore, co-operation of local 
authorities could also result in a more successful prevention of racially 
25 Intergovernmental Conference is planned for July 1997 during which 
the Treaty of Rome with all its present amendments will hc rcyiscd. 
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motivated violence26 and also "everyday 'low-level' forms of harassment" 
(Collinson 1994:118) - issues which have a local dimension as noted by 
Oakley: "Such harassment is an effective means of maintaining racial 
boundaries at the local leveL.[and] of keeping victim communities 
subordinated." (quoted by Collinson, ibid.; emphasis added). 
For third country nationals who do not have EU member-states' 
citizenship, this means an even more urgent need to be granted political 
rights at least on the local level. They should be able to elect and be elected as 
local representatives. Therefore, the provision of European citizenship which 
allows EU-nationals political rights at the local level should be extended to all 
long-term resident non-EU nationals. 
6.6 Concluding remarks 
It has been shown in this chapter that citizenship is the key indicator of 
inclusion into a socio-national community. Citizenship constitutes legal, 
economic, political and social practices which define social membership and 
which counteract social cleavages. 
In this way, Marshall's concept of citizenship - which was the starting 
point of a general theory of citizenship - rightly becomes a method of social 
inclusion. Historically, in western Europe the concept of citizenship evolved 
from the city to the nation-state widening the circles of social inclusion. There 
are, however, signs of a reversal of this process. Ethnic minorities who are of 
non-European origin and whose presence in Europe derives from post-war 
labour migration are one group which experiences increasing social 
inequalities in terms of their legal status as well as in terms of social 
acceptance by the majority. Hall and Held (1989), therefore, seem to be right 
in claiming that one of the most important arenas in which issues of 
citizenship have remained virulent, is that of immigration and 'race', The 
construction of racializing boundaries according to many-sided criteria of in-
and exclusion belongs to the most important 'arenas of contestation' with 
regard to citizenship - a matter which was ignored by Marshall's concept 
(Yuval-Davis, in: Institut fUr Migrations- und Rassismusforschung 1992:220). I 
have argued, however, that racialization is not the sole factor responsible for 
exclusionary tendencies, but that nationalism is equally as important. 
26 See for example the chapter tilled A Local Rcsponse 10 Raci.l} Violencc hy 
Bowling and Saulsbury (1993). 
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To demonstrate legal and social exclusion, it has been suggested that 
the concept of citizenship in the context of immigrants' settlement and their 
transformation into 'new' ethnic minorities should be sub-divided into formal 
and substantive citizenship. The emphasis for the former has been put here on 
the degree of ease with which citizenship can be acquired (Le. provisions of 
dual nationality, naturalization, ius soli). Political and civil rights would 
follow as a matter of fact. The latter - substantive citizenship - covers social 
rights in the broad sense including housing, employment, and anti-
discrimination policies. In this way, citizenship would not only involve a 
formal relationship with the state, but also a more substantive relationship 
with civil society. This sub-division does not only apply to national 
citizenship, but also to the European level. 
As formal citizenship includes nationality/citizenship laws, this 
concept was also employed to illustrate the strong link to socio-Iegal 
membership being based on descent. Despite rather different histories of 
concepts of nationality and citizenship, a tendency towards ius sanguinis and 
thus the acquisition of citizenship being closer linked to nationality (Le. ethnic 
descent) can be identified in both Germany and Britain, if not even 
throughout western Europe. Britain has departed from its very liberal 
position vis-a-vis non-European immigration by implementing immigration 
and nationality legislation which clearly racializes black and Asian 
immigrants. Although Germany has slightly improved the procedures of 
acquisition of citizenship, it has never moved away from its sole principle of 
ius sanguinis and still has one of the toughest regulations of naturalization -
an area in which Britain has remained much more liberal. 
Despite these differences, both countries have had their 'privileged 
immigrants' who were granted full formal citizenship rights without any 
restriction: the ethnic Germans and ex-GDR citizens in the case of Germany, 
and the Irish and (now mainly white) Commonwealth citizens in the case of 
Britain - a fact which implies, apart from any understandable historical 
reasons, national identity being closely linked to the identity as an 'ethnic 
group', or rather as a 'race', in both countries. This clearly has exclusionary 
effects on non-privileged immigrants or on those who have become 
stigmatized by changes within laws. 
The above led to the following conclusions. First, on a formal basis, 
third country nationals in Germany cannot be described as citizens, but rather 
as denizens as suggested by Hammar (1990). In this respect, their position is 
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clearly much worse than that of Commonwealth immigrants in Britain, 
although it has been suggested here that the latter has to do with very specific 
historical circumstances. With regard to substantive citizenship, post-war 
labour migrants in both countries suffered from their allocated position as 
either 'guest-workers' and Auslander or as 'colonial subjects' and a different 
'race'. Even for subsequent generations, their ethno-cultural background has 
been partly the reason for their less equal substantive citizenship status as 
opposed to the majority. 
Secondly, it has been suggested that citizenship is more and more 
defined on the basis of ethnic origin and specific cultural criteria. Therefore, 
this might be referred to as 'ethnicization' of citizenship as the law, in defining 
citizenship, refers specifically to criteria which are, according to Heckmann 
(in: Bielefeld 1991) and Bos (1993), sociologically regarded as criteria of an 
ethnic group (such as common culture and origin). However, as 'origin' 
clearly carries the notion of 'descent' and 'blood-relatedness', the distinction 
between 'ethnicization' and 'racialization' is not seen here in such a clear-cut 
way. The argument was, therefore, that what is at stake should rather be 
referred to as excluSionary processes as the outcome of racialization and 
nationalism. 
Thirdly, in a world divided into states, the separation of a 'people' from 
a 'non-people' seems to be inevitable. The formal mark of belonging to a 
people is the legal concept of citizenship. A certain relationship or link to the 
state is an important element of this concept. A genuine link is usually seen in 
birth or place of upbringing, however, this link could also be established via 
the social reality of residence and work-place (Franz, in: Institut fUr 
Migrations- und Rassismusforschung 1992). Therefore, it has been widely 
suggested that the idea of a 'new citizenship' (in a multi-ethnic/multi-cultural 
setting) should be recognized without consideration of nationality (Neveu 
1989). For immigrants, citizenship through participation is not necessarily 
established on the basis of nationality, but rather residence (Withol de 
Wenden, in: Institut fur Migrations- und Rassismusforschung 1992). 
Similarly, at the European level, a concept of citizenship is required which is 
also detached from nationality (Tassin, in: Mouffe 1992). The right of EU-
nationals to vote in local elections in any member-state indicates the tendency 
towards the formation of a new community citizenship and that participation 
in the life of public institutions takes precedence over nationality (Withol de 
Wenden, ibid.; Tassin, ibid.). However, this right has to be extended to long-
term resident third-country nationals. Thus, if citizenship is to remain the 
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basic symbol of inclusion in the context of the complex composition of 
European societies, it has to be based on criteria of residence. This would not, 
however, solve the problem of substantive citizenship. 
Fourthly, supra-national developments as the outcome of the 
Maastricht Treaty on European Union have not provided long-term resident 
third country nationals with any solutions to solve the kind of problems they 
have with regard to their full citizenship status at the national level in 
Germany and Britain. Sub-national developments within the European 
Union, however, indicate that national citizenship is not the only form of 
citizenship. The principle of subsidiarity and the establishment of the 
Committee of the Regions are phenomena which could have the general effect 
that all citizens participate more actively in local, national and European 
issues. Also, sub-national developments are regarded by Garcia (1994) as 
'number one importance for identity formation', i.e. for the preservation of 
social and cultural identities at the local, regional and national level while 
developing a European identity simultaneously - a matter ethnic minorities, 
too, could benefit from. Overall, these subnational developments could have a 
positive impact on ethnic minorities' substantive citizenship by involving 
them actively in community matters and thus, creating mutual 
understanding. 
As it stands now, however, citizenship in general (in law and in 
practice) conveys the effects of nationalism and racism to settled immigrants. 
This was shown with regard to access to formal citizenship (provisions of 
acquisition of nationality / citizenship) as well as with regard to substantive 
citizenship. I have also argued that equal formal citizenship as such can not 
work against the effects of racism and nationalism. The British example in 
particular has shown that immigrants' formally equal status is not necessarily 
recognized by civil society. It does, therefore, not provide a panacea against 
the power of racism and nationalism. 
Substantive citizenship, which is only to a very limited extent made up 
of actual rights, is suggested here as being more or less equally affected by 
racism and nationalism in Germany and Britain. In this sphere, rights seem 
very much to be powerless. This does not, however, lead to the conclusion 
that citizenship - formal and substantive - cannot sufficiently work as a 
mechanism for inclusion. If formal citizenship was detached from nationality, 
it would function more inclusively. With regard to substantive citizenship, 
the 'solution package' would have to be much more complex and thorough. 
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What has been particularly stressed here, however, is that local citizenship 
and local participation would enhance understanding and enable dialogue 
leading to compromises and negotiations of a basis on which social peace 
could be promoted and fragmented identities maintained. 
Formal, but even more so substantive, citizenship status of immigrant 
'newcomers' is often questioned by the 'indigenous' population. In the 
following chapter, therefore, the ways in which ethnic minorities' citizenship 
is affected by nationalistic and racializing attitudes on the part of the majority 
will be further investigated. 
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7. Mass discourse 
In this chapter, the viewpoints of the 'indigenous' population about 
nationalism, racism, and citizenship will be investigated. For this purpose, a 
number of social attitude surveys and opinion polls have been selected. These 
surveys and polls provide information on broad views held by 'the public' 
towards ethnic minorities and immigrants. It is precisely this high level of 
generalization of these surveys which allows the assessment of the conceptual 
link between racialization, citizenship and nationality in the wider perception 
of civil society at large. 
I will first provide a brief review of selected polls and reports of social 
attitude surveys conducted in Germany and Britain. In the British context, 
these are aspects of the British Social Attitudes - a series of surveys produced 
annually since 1984 - and the Gallup political & economic index. The Gallup 
Organization conducts opinion polls mainly on behalf of newspapers and 
broadcasters with tight deadlines and budgets. The media use these polls in a 
rather "topic-specific" and "peremptory" way (Jowell & Airey 1984:4). The 
material produced over the years by polling organizations such as Gallup has 
been described as an "incomplete patchwork" (ibid.). This can be confirmed 
here: Racial discrimination, prejudice and nationalism are attitudes which 
have not been subject to more 'in-depth' attitude surveys. 
In the German case, a number of IPOS studies, conducted on behalf of 
the Ministry of the Interior, were the main surveys consulted, as well as an 
independent survey by the Zentrum fiir Tiirkeistudien. Relevant Infas surveys 
and surveys conducted by the Institut fiir Demoskopie Allensbach - as 
summarized by Koch-Arzberger (1993) - are also included. They operate in a 
similar way as the Gallup Organization. The Commissioner for Foreigners' 
Affairs in Berlin published a number of surveys whose sample were an equal 
number of indigenous Germans living in the western part and the eastern 
part of the city (AusHinderbeauftragte 1990a & 1990b). Apart from the latter 
surveys and the survey conducted by the Zentrum /iir Tiirkeistudien, none of 
the remaining surveys has exclusively dealt with attitudes towards ethnic 
minorities. The IPOS studies and the reports on British Social Attitudes tried 
to repeat the same questions every year to show trends, but new questions 
were almost always added to each report. Because of the 'patchy' nature of 
these surveys and polls, the review sections are structured chronologically 
(year of publication) and by type of survey. 
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I will then comment on the findings with particular reference to the 
extent of 'racial' discrimination and acceptance of ethnic minorities or 
immigrants in both countries. Although as such not relevant to this thesis, 
aspects of future immigration or asylum seekers - which have tended to 
dominate the public debate on ethnic minority related issues - will be added 
to show that there is a link between public opinion and politicians' rhetoric -
an issue which is subject to further exploration in the following chapter. 
Also, the results of a number of Eurobarometer surveys which show 
trends in all EU-member-states will be reviewed. The last section deals with 
the findings of surveys which reveal attitudes about national identity. 
7.1 Social attitude surveys and polls in the British context 
The 1984 report 
The first British Social Attitudes (hereafter: BSA) report in 1984 (Jowell 
& Airey 1984: 122-130) suggests high levels of awareness of racial 
discrimination amongst sections of the population as represented by the 
sample!. Around 90% of the respondents thought that there is prejudice 
against Asians and blacks, albeit as an attitude held by others and not as the 
respondents' own attitude2 . When asked how they would describe 
themselves, around a third of the total sample thought of themselves as 
prejudiced against people of other 'races' who live now in Britain (Jowell & 
Airey 1984: 125). Asians were believed to experience slightly more 'racial' 
prejudice: 54% of the respondents perceived that there is 'a lot' of prejudice 
against Asians, whereas 50% thought the same for blacks. Only 6% of the 
respondents replied that there was 'hardly' any prejudice against Asians and 
7% thought so in the case of blacks. On a personal level, asked how they 
would describe themselves, 35% of the respondents can be classified as 
1 The sample in the British Sodal Attitudes Surveys consists of adults aged 
18 and over who live in private households. The sample was selected with 
the help of the electoral register (twenty-six addresses in each of the 
eighty-eight polling districts). The 2,288 respondents were selected by a 
random selection procedure. Only 84 of those were members of ethnic 
minority groups and it is not clear which groups exactly they represent. 
Because of the small size and the non-identification of origin, special 
reference to their views has, therefore, to be treated with caution. 
2 The precise questions asked were: "First of all, thinking of Asians - that is 
people originally from India and Pakistan, who now live in Britain. Do you 
think there is a lot of prejudice against them in Britain nowadays, a lillie, 
or hardly any7": "And black people - that is West Indians and Africans -
who now live in Britain. Do you think there is a lot of prejudice against 
them in Britain nowadays, a little or hardly anyl" (BSA 1984: 123). 
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'prejudiced' or 'prejudiced-inclined', more so against Asians than against 
blacks. 64% thought of themselves as 'not prejudiced at all'. This means that 
more people perceived higher levels of prejudice in others than in themselves. 
As for party alliance, Labour voters (28%) were less likely than Conservative 
voters (46%) to describe themselves as prejudiced (op.cit.: 126). 
The degree of social recognition or inclusion of ethnic minorities into 
British society was explored by two questions. The first tested what people 
would think if a suitably qualified person of Asian or black origin was 
appointed as boss over a white person. Again, more people perceived more 
prejudice in others than in themselves: Half thought that the population at 
large would object to an Asian or black boss, around 20% said they would 
object personally. The second question referred to cross-'racial' marriage: 
Over three-quarters thought that the population at large would object to an 
Asian or black marriage to a close relative, between 50% and 60% of them said 
they would object personally. These findings show that respondents made a 
sharp distinction between inter-'racial' contact in the workplace and in the 
family, both in their assumptions about other people's reactions and in their 
own reactions. The objection to a West Indian or Asian person was greater in 
the context of family links than in the context of work3. 
The way in which existing prejudice translates itself into 
discrimination was tested by asking a question about job discrimination. Just 
under two-thirds believed that Asians and West Indians suffer job 
discrimination. The Race Relations Acts were supported by 69% and opposed 
to by 28%. The authors of this report, however, remarked that having told 
people that such acts exist, it was to be expected that a high proportion of the 
population endorsed the acts' existence (p. 129). Polls taken between 1967 and 
1968" - before the introduction of the Race Relations Acts - found that such 
legislation was supported by only about 45% (Rose 1969). Since then, people 
seem to have become used to the idea of anti-discrimination legislation. And 
yet, a quarter of the 1984 BSA sample were still opposed to such a law. On the 
whole, opposition to a law against discrimination increased with age, and it 
3 This is also confirmed by the findings of a qualitative study (Le. via in-
depth interviews) conducted by f'.1odood et al. (1994) in which ethnic 
minorities' thoughts and experiences on a variety of issues were tested. 
Some respondents felt that "011 deeper and more personal levels barriers 
were put up" and that "acquaintance was permissible but 'serious' long 
term relationships were out of bounds" (p. 90). One respondent is quoted as 
follows: "They [white people] corne in for a cup of tea, but that's as far as it 
goes. The day your son wants to marry their daughter it's a different story." 
(p. 90). 
132 
was also greater among Conservative than Labour voters (Jowell & Airey 
1984: 129). 
As far as immigration and settlement are concerned, the 1984 report 
reveals that very few people supported the notion of more settlement by any 
group (choice was among Australians, New Zealanders, Indians and 
Pakistanis, EC-nationals, West Indians), but Australians and New Zealanders 
were more popular (15%) as potential immigrants than any of the other 
groups (p. 129). The proportions wanting less settlement were decisively anti-
Asian and anti-black. The majority of respondents was also in favour of 
stricter controls of settlement of close relatives of those who have already 
settled in Britain (the ethnic minority respondents were the only group with a 
sizeable vote for less strict control of dependants). Conservative voters 
favoured stricter controls to a higher extent (62%) than Labour voters (49%) 
(op.cit.: 130). 
The 1986 report 
Two years after the 1984 report - a period in which racial incidents and 
reports of racial discrimination had received much media attention - the 
pattern of attitudes had changed only a little (Jowell, R. et al. 1986: 150). It 
remains the case that nine out of ten respondents believed that there is 
prejudice against Asians and blacks, but the proportion believing that there is 
"a lot" of prejudice against Asians has increased. It also remains true that just 
over a third of people admit to being racially prejudiced themselves. More 
Conservative party supporters are likely to describe themselves as prejudiced 
than supporters of the other main parties (ibid.). 
The 1992 report 
The 1992 BSA report states that between 1983 and 1991 only a very 
small proportion of British - fewer than one in ten - viewed their society as 
prejudice-free (Jowell, R. et al. 1992: 181). The percentage of those who 
answered that job discrimination existed against people of Asian and West 
Indian origin has risen from 60% prior to 1991 to 64% (ibid.). The authors of 
this report suggest that this does not necessarily mean that there was 
quantitatively more job discrimination, but rather that the perception of such 
discrimination has increased. In the 1992 report, a new question was added 
about the treatment of innocent 'black persons' or 'white persons' to be 
expected from the courts. 44% of the respondents (and 58% of the small 
number of black and Asian respondents) thought a 'black' person was more 
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likely to be found guilty of a crime they did not commit than was a white 
person (Jowell et al. 1992: 181-82). This indicates the level of criminalization of 
'black' people in Britain. The question about how the respondents would 
describe themselves (as 'very prejudiced', 'a little prejudiced' or 'not 
prejudiced at all') showed that still almost a third of the sample admit to being 
either 'very prejudiced' or 'a little prejudiced' against people of other 'races'. 
Only a quarter of Labour supporters admitted to any degree of prejudice, 
compared with a third of Liberal Democrats and 40% of Conservative voters. 
This represents a further polarization of party difference since 1983. 
Findings about the level of acceptance of a black or Asian person as a 
boss or as a marriage partner of a dose relative did not change much in the 
1992 survey. As opposed to as many as two in five people who would still 
mind, and half of those 'a lot', if a close relative were to marry a black or 
Asian person, there was relatively widespread acceptability of a West Indian 
or Asian boss. Around a third even of those who described themselves as 
non-prejudiced would mind a black or Asian marrying into their family. 
Support for the 'race relations' policies pursued by successive 
governments in Britain (1. tightening of immigration controls; 2. introduction 
of anti-discrimination laws) has remained more or less firm. There was hardly 
any support for increased settlement, and slightly more respondents were in 
favour of less Asian immigration (62%) than immigration from the West 
Indies (58%). However, large majorities also supported the anti-
discrimination law (76%) and the policy of helping those who have settled in 
Britain (62%)4 (Jowell et al. 1992: 187). 
The 1995 report 
The BSA report of 1995 recorded a further progress in the shape of a 
drop with regard to the proportion of white people who would object to 
having a 'West Indian' or an 'Asian' boss. And yet, the proportion of people 
attributing similar egalitarian sentiments to others had scarcely changed since 
1990, nor the proportion of the respondents (around half) who believed that 
the legal system treats black and white defendants equally (Jowell et al. 1995: 
201). There has been a rise in the proportion who assert that racism in Britain 
is likely to get still more widespread over the next few years. The editors of 
this report commented on this that "one might have expected these responses 
as society actually becomes less racist in its attitudes and behaviour. We 
4 More precisely. 62% of the sample supported the statement "t-.[Of<! or same 
aid to Asians and West Indians". 
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might then anticipate rather more public awareness of and sensitivity towards 
racism in Britain than had existed beforehand - which may be no bad thing." 
(op.cit.:202). This is underpinned by the strong support of the principle of 
anti-discrimination legislation (between two-thirds and three quarters of the 
respondents), although only around one in four people would implement the 
existing law 'more strictly'. There is also only a third who supported bringing 
in a 'special law against racial violence' (36%) (ibid.). 
Apart from introducing 'tough' controls on immigration to Britain, 
recent years have also shown that Britain is among the least willing of the 
developed states to admit large numbers of refugees. The BSA report of 1995 
tested the extent of public support for these policies. In 1990, 48% of the 
respondents were in favour of restrictions on political refugees as opposed to 
44% in 1994 (op.cit.:203). Overall, the public seemed largely in sympathy with 
the government's general stance on restrictive immigration. The least 
welcomed were Indians and Pakistanis (60%), the most welcomed were 
Australians and New Zealanders (30%) - even more than EU-nationals with 
40%. The attitude of 'colour first' and 'culture second' has, therefore, 
continued to influence responses: Settlers from Australasia, Western Europe 
and Eastern Europe would all, in principle, get a warmer welcome from the 
British public than would settlers from the Indian subcontinent, the 
Caribbean or Hong Kong. Although a shift towards 'softer' attitudes towards 
Asians and West Indians has taken place over the last eleven years, it has to 
be noted that this has coincided with a period of very low settlement by these 
groups - as rightly pointed out by the authors of the 1995 BSA report (p. 203). 
These two processes may, therefore, be linked: The more liberal attitudes 
towards ethnic minorities over the years may largely be the consequence of 
the steady reduction in the number of immigrants from these countries. 
The Gallup polls 
Findings from a number of Gallup polls testing broad social trends 
provide some more information on attitudes towards immigration and ethnic 
minority related matters. 61 % of the sample in the issue of September 1995 
(980 persons) supported the statement that immigrants should be encouraged 
to 'blend into British culture by giving up some important aspects of their 
own culture' and only 21 % were in favour of immigrants maintaining 'their 
own culture more strongly, even if it means they do not blend in as well' 
(Report no. 421). The respondents disagreed or agreed in an almost 50% 
divide with the statement that 'Britain is a melting pot in which people of 
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different countries combine into a unified British culture' (45% agree, 42% 
disagree, 13% don't know). In the issue of April 1996 (Report no. 428), most 
respondents (of a sample of 993 persons) saw Britain's future 'as a multi-racial 
society with tensions' (43%) and a further third thought of it 'as a society 
where different groups live separately but with tension' (33%). The slightly 
negative view ('tensions') of the future of 'race relations' in Britain was also 
expressed in the BSA reports. 
In terms of social contact, it is interesting to note that a clear majority of 
respondents in April 1996 replied that there are only a few 'coloured' people 
where they work or live (65%) and 21 % even stated that there are no 
'coloured' people at all. This means that two-thirds of the population have 
hardly any contact with ethnic minorities. The finding of 78% of the same 
sample stating that they thought of non-white people who were born in 
Britain 'as British' might be qualified by the fact that almost the same 
percentage of respondents has hardly or even no contact at all with 'coloured' 
people. Also, as mentioned above, 61 % of the respondents in 1995 stated that 
immigrants should 'blend into British culture'. This could, however, also 
reflect that formal citizenship is no issue, whereas aspects of substantive 
citizenship (and thus the recognition of ethnic minorities in cultural terms) are 
an important part of a public debate. In other words, as far as the legal and 
thus formal status is concerned, ethnic minorities are considered as 'British', 
but culturally they are widely expected to assimilate. 
The ongoing political debate about numbers of immigrants and 
asylum-seekers as well as the claim of large numbers being 'bogus' (see also 
following chapter) is somewhat reflected in public opinion. As found in the 
BSA reports, more people are against new immigration and think of the 
number of accepted refugees as too high (although the percentage opposing 
primary immigration is slightly higher than against asylum-seekers; there 
seems to be, therefore, more sympathy for political refugees). In the Gallup 
poll of September 1995 (Report no. 421), 26% of the respondents thought that 
most immigrants in Britain are 'illegal' as opposed to 55% who thought they 
were 'legal'. Asked about their views on the future (next decade), 58% thought 
that the flow of illegal immigrants will increase (25% thought it will stay the 
same and only 7% thought it will decrease). Half of the respondents believed 
that the country is 'losing ground' with regard to the 'problem of illegal 
immigration (20% thought it is about the same and only 12% thought there is 
any progress). In August 1992 (Report no. 384), a clear majority also disagreed 
with the statement that there should be 'a general amnesty for those asylum 
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seekers who are presently living illegally in Britain' (40% disagree, 16% 
strongly disagree). 
7.2 Gennan opinion surveys 
Trends prior to 1990 
An opinion poll conducted in 1971 5 - before publicly accepted that 
most post-war labour migrants would be settling in Germany - found that 
36% of the population thought that the presence of foreign workers poses a 
difficult problem (46% replied the presence was 'quite all right' and 18% were 
undecided), Asked about people's associations with 'foreign workers' in 
general (in terms of 'cons' rather than 'pros'), most (54%) perceived foreigners 
as 'loud', followed by 'not very clean' (41 %), 'always after the girls' (38%), 
'quick-tempered and often violent' (37%), 'cannot be trusted' (22%), and 'lazy' 
(11 %) (Noelle-Neumann 1981). Most of these statements refer to cultural 
differences whichwere also found in an opinion survey in 1982 (conducted by 
Allensbach as quoted by Koch-Arzberger 1993): It was mainly the 'totally 
different behaviour' of foreigners which caught the indigenous population's 
attention. 69% of the respondents thought so in view of the Turkish minority, 
47% of the Italians, and 42% of the Greek. 
In 1974 - one year after the official recruitment halt - half of the 
population had mixed feelings about foreigners (favourable and unfavourable 
opinions each scored 48%), and half of the population had never met any 
foreigners at all (Noelle-Neumann 1981). To assess the degree of 'racial' 
prejudice, respondents were asked in a survey conduced in 1975 whether they 
would sit next to a foreigner in a bus. Most said 'yes', but the least said 'yes' in 
the case of Turkish people. Asked whether they would invite a foreigner 
whom they know personally to their home for dinner, roughly half replied 
'yes', but again most people said 'no' in the case of the Turks (42%; only 26% 
said 'no' to a Yugoslav). The questions whether people would like to have a 
foreigner as a neighbour or would like to see children of foreigners attend 
school with their own children were mostly answered with 'don't care' , 
In the case of cross-national marriage, the 1975 survey (as quoted by 
Noelle-Neumann 1981) found that more than half of the German men would 
not have married a foreigner, and of those who would have, most would have 
married a Yugoslav, followed by an Italian, a Turk. ,and least a black 
5 This opinion poll was conducted by the InstilUt [ur Dcmoskopic 
Allensbach. 
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person. Women would have married a foreigner to an even lesser extent and 
90% would not have married a Turkish man. There seems to be a distinctive 
dislike of Turkish people - one of the culturally most distant groups of 
immigrants in Germany. 
In the survey of 1975, 42% of the respondents were of the opinion that 
foreigners should return to their country of origin, 37% would allow them to 
stay and 21 % were undecided. A majority, therefore, still perceived foreigners 
as 'guests' rather than 'immigrants'. In terms of equal rights on the job, 57% 
thought that in times of crisis, foreign workers should be fired first. In 1975, 
52% did not think that foreigners who had lived a long time in Germany 
should be able to participate in councilor municipal elections, and 55% felt 
that foreign workers would become a serious problem in the future. 69% even 
thought that German babies would be more intelligent than those of foreign 
workers (Noelle-Neumann 1981)! 
Despite these signs of prejudice and 'racial' discrimination during the 
1970s, Koch-Arzberger (1993) commented on the period of the 1980s that a 
generally hostile atmosphere against foreigners cannot be observed and that 
the agreement by the indigenous population with discriminatory statements 
vis-a-vis foreigners has rather decreased. She has, however, also noted that 
during this period the 'foreigner's issue' (AusHinderfrage) was not highly 
politicized and that the dominant picture of the 'foreigner' in the public's 
mind was that of a hard working person who kept a low profile in everyday 
life. Events in the more recent past, however, have resulted in a polarizing 
trend of attitudes towards foreigners. Issues relating to 'foreigners' invite 
people's views more than ever. Koch-Arzberger notes (1993) that it is difficult 
to say whether the increasing polarization of the public's opinion is related to 
objective perceptions of the situation (such as the number of foreigners) or to 
the politicization of this issue based on reports by the mass media. However, 
even the perception of numbers is not necessarily objective (this aspect will be 
returned to below). 
The 1990 [POS study 
To show to what extent the above patterns of opinions have changed 
since the 1980s, I consulted four IPOS6 social attitudes studies on current 
domestic affairs7, conducted on behalf of the Ministry for the Interior 
6 The abbrevation stands for Institut fur praxisoricnlicrlc S07.iaJforscJlUng. 
7 The sample in each of the four studies consists of persons older than] 8 
and includes only 'indigenous' Germans. In West Germany, 15~() 
respondents were selected and 1171 in r~st Germany. 
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(Innenministerium). The first of the IPOS studies (from 1990) points out that 
topics related to 'foreigners' living in Germany have gained importance in the 
public debate over the last years, ranging from promotion of inclusion (by 
granting voting rights etc.) to the more controversial debate about the number 
of asylum-seekers (p. 41). An important role was played in particular by the 
critical manner with which the Republikaner (extreme right-wing party) 
presented their 'foreigners policy' since 1989. This has, however, somewhat 
changed since re-unification as public debate has been dominated by other 
domestic issues relating to national-political developments8. 
Asked whether foreigners should be allowed to vote, the IPOS study of 
1990 reveals that 80% replied that only those who have German citizenship 
should be allowed to do so (same percentage as in 1989) and only 20% of the 
respondents were of the opposite opinion (p. 42). There is a difference, 
however, between supporters of the Green Party and the other parties' 
supporters: Among identifiers with the Green Party, every second respondent 
thought that foreigners should be granted the right to vote, whereas among 
: the supporters of all the other parties, the majority was against this (92% of 
the CDU /CSU, 74% of the SPD, 81% of the FDP and 95% of the 
Republikaner) 9. 
With regard to the asylum law, most respondents in the IPOS study of 
1990 - regardless of political alliance - were in favour of the right for political 
asylum (70% pro, 30% contra). 66% of the supporters of the Republikatler, 
however, were against this right. ThisJight was m~stly favoured by 
supporters of the Green Party (91 % of all Green supporters). Despite this 
generally positive reply on principle, 58% of all respondents would not grant 
this right to everybody, but wanted it to be limited to a certain number. This 
holds for most parties with the exception of the Republikaner (of whose 
supporters 45% would not accept any asylum-seekers) and the Green Party 
(of whose supporters 57% would accept 'anybody') (p. 43-44). 
8 A telephone survey (sample: 600 indigenous German youths aged between 
16-25) done in 1990 on behalf of the Commissioner of foreigners' Affairs in 
Berlin confirms this: Most Berliners thought that the most important 
problem the Senate of Berlin should deal with is housing (53%), followed hy 
traffic (43%), jobs (35%) and then 'foreigners' policy' (31%) 
(Auslanderbeauftragte 1990a: IS) . 
9 The same telephone survey mentioned in footnote 8 found that only .. H>% 
of the respondents are in favour of local voting rights for Turkish 
residents who are not naturalized (Auslanderbeauftragtc 199001: 1 0). This 
survey does not include any information on party alliance of the 
respondents. 
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The 1992 study 
In the 1992 IPOS study, the attitudes towards foreigners have hardly 
changed since the 1990 study. Asked whether they thought the number of 
foreigners living in Germany was 'all right' or 'not all right', a small majority 
of respondents in East and West Germany opted for 'not all right' (53% in the 
West, 51 % in the East). Supporters of the SPD were split in almost 50% on this 
question, and 60% of the COU /CSU supporters were against the high 
presence of foreigners. Acceptance was somewhat higher among FDP 
supporters, but much higher among the Greens (78% in the West) and the 
PDS10 (78%). The Republikaner showed the least signs of acceptance: 83% of 
their supporters opted for 'not all right' (p. 80-81). 
The next question in the 1992 IPOS study was whether the respondents 
thought that Germany's economy needs foreign workers or not. It seems as if 
most West Germans have become used to the presence of 'foreign workers' 
since the late 1950s as two-thirds positively replied that the German economy 
needs foreign workers. In the East, however, two-thirds of the respondents 
thought that this is not the case. It is suggested in this study that this has to be 
seen in the context of economic restructuring, rationalization of labour and 
high rates of unemployment as well as in the context of the little experience 
East Germans have had with the presence of foreigners 11 (p.83-84). The 
respondents were then asked how much contact they have with foreigners at 
work or in the area where they live (p. 85).30% (three out of ten) in the West 
did not have any contact as opposed to 70% who had. In the East this was 
exactly the other way round. Two results are particularly interesting in this 
context: In the East and West most supporters of the Green Party said they 
had contact with foreigners (and are the most liberal minded in this respect), 
and in the West most supporters of the Repub/ikancr also said they had regular 
contact with foreigners (82%!). The latter, however, are comparatively the 
most hostile-minded. It seems, therefore, as if political party alliance or prior 
prejudice can have a greater influence on people's opinion about foreigners 
than actual contact 12. 
10 The PDS (Partei des Dcmokratischen Sozialismus) replaced the former 
SED and exists only in East Germany. 
11 This is also confirmed by the surveys done in Berlin on behalf of the 
Commissioner for Foreigners' Affairs (Aus]andcrbcauflragte, 1990 a+b). 
12 This is also supported by the findings in a study ~y the 7cnlrum fOr 
TOrkeistudien titled "Das Bild der Auslander in dcr Offentlichkcil" (the 
image of foreigners by the public) (1995). In their qualitative study on 
'Changing Ethnic Identities' (1994), tvlodood ct at. have found that despite 
140 
The general opinion about asylum and the 'high' numbers of asylum-
seekers has hardly changed between 1988 and 199213 (p. 86). The 1992 IPOS 
study includes the question whether the respondents thought that the asylum 
law is being abused (p. 93). In the East and the West, two-thirds of all 
respondents replied 'yes' and 68% thought that the Asylum law needs to be 
changed (supporters of the Republikaner thought so the most, followed by the 
CDU/CSU). 90% of those who did not find the asylum law 'all right' thought 
that the law was being abused. 74% of the SPD supporters replied that there is 
abuse, but only 66% wanted the law to be changed. Apart from a general 
agreement with the existence of the right for political asylum, the steadily 
increasing numbers of asylum-seekers (and the politicization of this issue!) 
seems to have led to the belief, that the law was abused and that 'political 
action' was necessary. Whether this indicates rising 'hostility towards 
foreigners' is difficult to say. The authors of the IPOS study suggest that since 
almost 50% of respondents thought that the number of foreigners was 'all 
right' and the majority thought that foreigners are needed by the economy, 
hostility might not be rising (p.97). However, it may also be the case that a 
'shift in attention' has taken place from 'foreigners' to 'asylum-seekers', partly 
caused by political rhetoric. This rhetoric has pointed out the rising number of 
asylum-seekers by leaving settled foreigners largely aside (as a political issue 
which needed immediate attention). 
The 1993 study 
The IPOS study of 1993 pointed out that the 'asylum and foreigners' 
issue' was still perceived as one of the most important problems in Germany 
since October 1991 (according to research done for the Politbarometer). The 
increasing numbers of asylum-seekers as well as the rising attacks on 
foreigners around that time demonstrated the importance of this issue very 
well (p. 78). The acceptance of foreigners has, however, only decreased by one 
percent: 54% thought now that it is not 'all right' that so many foreigners live 
in Germany (in 1992: 53%). Less respondents in the West thought in 1993 that 
the German economy needs foreigners (62%) and in the East, this figure was 
again exactly the opposite (p. 81). The support of the asylum law in principle 
contact with one 'nice' member of an ethnic minority, the 'white' majority 
take this person as an exception and nevertheless hang on to their 
prejudices - as e>..-pressed in the following quote (by an Afro-Caribbean 
man): "Sometimes you will get all white people in a group and they hate 
black people, but you will be there and they will say 'you are all right' and 
it's because they know you so you are all right." (p. 67). 
13 East Germans have only been part of the sample since 1990. 
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has decreased by two percent (72%; in 1992: 74%), but the proportion of those 
who thought the law was being abused has also decreased by two percent (p. 
84). 
A new question was included in this study about whether refugees are 
accommodated in the vicinity of the respondent's home and if so, whether 
this causes any problems (p. 89). Almost half of the respondents replied that 
there were refugees living in their neighbourhood, and 34% thought that this 
does not lead to any problems. However, the same phenomenon of party 
alliance and perception can be observed here as in the context of 'contact' (see 
above): Many more identifiers with the Republikaner thought that they are 
confronted with refugees in their immediate environment and almost half of 
them thought that this leads to problems. It seems therefore as if acceptance is 
very much linked to subjective perception. Whether foreigners or refugees are 
regarded as a 'problem' seems to play an important role in this context. 
The 1995 study 
The 1995 IPOS study states that the issue of 'asylum' has lost a lot of its 
importance since 1993 as the result of the revised asylum law and the reduced 
numbers of accepted refugees (p. 1). It now seems as if the most important 
issue is the provision of jobs. Nonetheless, issues related to the presence of 
foreigners and asylum-seekers were still among the ten most important topics 
in domestic politics (p. 10-11). General acceptance of foreigners is said to have 
slightly increased by three percent: 48% of the respondents thought that the 
number of foreigners in Germany is 'all right' (1993: 45%). But nevertheless 
more than half of the population (52%) thought that this is not 'all right' (in 
the East even 54%) (p.84-86). 
With regard to formal citizenship, in both the East (69%) and West 
(64%), most of the respondents did not support the facilitation of 
naturalization procedures (and thus, the acquisition of German citizenship) 
(p. 87). However, 54% in the West and 57% in the East thought that in future 
those who were born in Germany should be granted citizenship, even if one 
of the parents is not a German citizen (p. 88-89). This means that a slight 
majority would support the addition of the territorial component to the 
citizenship law. Supporters of the CDU/CSU were less in favour of the ius 
soli than supporters of the SPD and FDP. Identifiers with the Green Party 
were most in favour. Two-thirds, in the East and West alike, would reject the 
provision of dual nationality (83% even of CDU /CSU supporters, but only 
46% of Green supporters) (p. 90). The replies to the issue of citizenship 
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showed that the public largely supports the non-radical stance of the 
government in this matter. 
Other surveys 
The polling institute Emnid has conducted a survey in 1990 on behalf 
of the Commissioner for Foreigners' Affairs in Berlin. It found that only 39% 
of 'West Berliners' would invite a foreigner to their home or visit at his/her 
home and 32% of 'East Berliners' would do so (AusUinderbeauftragte, 
1990b:12). This survey also reveals that indigenous Germans still shy away 
from closer relationships to foreigners: Only 25% of 'West Berliners' and 12% 
of 'East Berliners' would marry a foreigner (op.cit.: 13)14. 
Another way of testing the inclusion of 'foreigners' was done by the 
same institute on behalf of the magazine Der Spiegel in 1992 (quoted by Koch-
Arzberger 1993: 20): Respondents were asked for their views on the idea of 
recruiting foreigners into the police-forcel S. 17% of the respondents thought 
of this idea as 'very good', 41 % as 'rather good', 22% as 'rather bad', and 15% 
as 'very bad'. A clear majority (58%) was in favour. This high percentage 
could, however, be interpreted as a reaction to the numerous arson attacks on 
foreigners in Germany during 1991 and 1992, and thus, not as a fundamental, 
long-term change in attitudes. 
7,3 Commentary 
A comparison of the above social attitude surveys and polls conducted 
separately in Germany and Britain is not a straight-forward matter as the 
actual questions were not always identical in both countries, neither in terms 
of timing, nor in terms of content. However, a few general trends and 
phenomena can be observed. 35% of the British respondents have been 
identified as 'prejudiced' or 'prejudiced-inclined'. 52% of the German 
respondents thought the presence of foreigners in Germany is too high -
which might be an indicator of prejudice. A study undertaken by the Zetltrum 
14 As opposed to the Allensbach surveys during the 1970s (Noelle-Neumann 
1981), this survey does not make a distinction between the various groups 
of 'foreigners', The sample consisted of l,353'East Berliners' and 1,505 'West 
Berliners', 
15 'Foreigners' are largely excluded from employment in the police-force -
as from most positions in the public service - based 011 their nOll-German 
citizenship. 
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fUr Tiirkeistudien (1995)16 developed a scale to measure discriminatory 
statements and concluded that 25.1 % of the respondents are 'prejudiced' and 
47.3% 'prejudiced-inclined'. It seems as if respondents in Germany are more 
prejudiced, but the problem with the British surveys is that respondents were 
directly asked whether they thought they were prejudiced. In the German 
case, the level of prejudice was established indirectly. It can be assumed, 
therefore, that less British respondents described themselves as prejudiced 
than they might actually be17. There is also a difference between what people 
state that they are and how they behave or act. In other words, people might 
not be aware of their prejudices. Moreover, opinion polls and attitude surveys 
do not provide any information on group pressure and how the individual 
would act as part of a 'mass' (or crowd of people). More significant, therefore, 
might be the fact that more than half of the respondents in both countries 
object to a cross-'racial' or cross-'ethnic' marriage which shows a quite low 
level of acceptance on a personal level (moreover, in the British case, even a 
high proportion of those who claimed not to be prejudiced objected to such 
marriages!). There is also evidence that 'racially' or culturally more distant 
people are less welcomed (and less accepted). In Britain and Germany, 
Muslims seem to encounter in particular high levels of hostility, prejudice or 
'racial' discrimination. 
In addition, a European survey of 1995 established a 'xenophobia 
index' and concluded that 21 % of the sample are very xenophobic, 27.5% 
xenophobic, 28% a little xenophobic and 24% very little to not at all (European 
Commission, Eurobarometer No. 42, 1995). Those percentages indicate a 
much higher level of 'xenophobia' compared with the surveys reviewed 
above. This might have to do with the definition of 'xenophobia' which is, 
unfortunately, not provided in the survey. The overall European attitude 
towards the number of immigrants residing in EU-member-states is, however, 
very similar to the nationally conducted surveys: 52% thought in 1993 that 
there are 'too many' non-European residents in their country (Commission of 
the European Communities, Eurobarometer No. 39, 1993). 
16 This study was conducted in Dortmund in 1994. The sample consisted of 
263 persons older than eighteen and limited to indigenous Germans. The 
respondents were interviewed (45 - 60 minutes) whereby certain issues 
were addressed in an 'open ended' way to let the interviewees express their 
views in their own words. The results are said to be transferahle to the 
context of other large cities of the same social structure as Dortmund. 
17 A survey (1990a) conducted on behalf of the Commissioner for 
Foreigners Affairs in Berlin found a similar phenomenon as in the British 
case: When asked directly, the majority of respondents thought that other 
people are prejudiced, but only 24% thought of themselves as prejudked. 
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In Britain, a lot of the questions centred upon ethnic minorities' 
substantive citizenship status: Respondents were asked about their views on 
job discrimination on the basis of 'racial' differences, on the Race Relations 
Acts, and on criminalization of ethnic minorities. By contrast, questions put to 
German respondents dealt more with the formal citizenship of 'foreigners'. In 
both countries, the replies revealed that governmental policies were largely 
supported: i.e. the restrictive policies on future immigration and existing 
legislation (the anti-discrimination legislation as it exists in Britain; the 
naturalization procedures as they exist in Germany since the introduction of 
the 'child citizenship model': Most of respondents were in favour of the ius 
soli principle by rejecting dual nationality). It has also been suggested that 
slightly more liberal attitudes towards settled immigrants in both countries 
coincides with steady reduction in numbers of those 'newcomers'. 
Two observations are particularly interesting when comparing the 
selected surveys: In both countries, despite the described general trends, an 
increasing polarization of the various political parties' supporters seems to 
have taken place. Identifiers with conservative and right-wing parties are by 
tendency more 'anti-immigrants' than any of the other parties' supporters. In 
the British context, this was suggested as a phenomenon starting around 1983. 
It could, therefore, have to do with the rise in populism as promoted by the 
Conservatives under the government of Mrs. Thatcher (Clemens 1983). In 
Germany, the representation of the Republikaner in a few local governments 
has certainly had some impact on the CDU/CSU's move further 'right'. It 
must also not be forgotten that left-wing parties are aware of the support they 
get from ethnic minority groups. In Britain, the Labour Party began to 
respond to minorities' needs since elections are being more determined by 
marginal constituencies in which large ethnic minority populations hold the 
power of balance (Mason 1995:113); in Germany, most ethnic minorities 
would vote for the SPD if they could (Sen, in: Leggewie & Seno~ak 1993; Sen 
& Karakasoglu 1994). The Green party is particularly popular among young 
Turkish people. 
The second observation is that there seems to be a higher level of 
awareness, and an advanced understanding, of 'racial' discrimination in 
Britain, for instance with regard to job discrimination and criminalization. 
This must have to do with the existence of the Race Relations Acts. In 
Germany, by contrast, settled immigrants are still being seen much more 
explicitly as a 'problem' - already in the way in which questions were put in 
some of the surveys. In both countries, however, future immigration and the 
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increasing number of asylum-seekers were similarly perceived as a 'problem'. 
Politicians' rhetoric of 'bogus' has, thereby, been taken on by respondents 
most of whom thought that the asylum law was being abused (as in 
Germany) or that a lot of immigrants were 'illegal' (as in Britain). 
Overall, the surveys show that ethnic minorities do not enjoy an equal 
status with the indigenous majority in terms of citizenship - formally and/or 
substantially. The surveys reviewed above have linked this issue mainly to 
'racial' discrimination. However, these surveys fail to address the issue of the 
differences between ethnic minority groups to a more satisfactory extent. 
Also, the issue of national identity has only indirectly been dealt with. In 
Britain, for instance, most people thought that immigrants should adjust to 
British culture, and in Germany 'foreigners' were perceived by fairly high 
percentages as not valuing what stereotypical Germans allegedly value 
(cleanliness, etc.; these surveys were, however, fairly 'old'). This issue needs, 
therefore, to be looked into in more detail. 
7.4 Surveys on national identity 
In this section, I want to discuss whether there is an association 
between a sense of national pride or identity which has exclusionary effects 
on ethnic minorities. A special international report as part of the British Social 
Attitudes series compared British and German levels of pride in their country 
(Jowell et al. 1989). West Germans are according to this report still 
conspicuously reluctant to express pride in being German. In 1986, only 20% 
of the German respondents thought of themselves as 'very proud' and 13% as 
'not proud at all', as opposed to 53% of the British ('very proud') and 3% ('not 
proud at all'). This has changed however. A Eurobarometer survey of 1995 
showed that although the Germans are still the least proud, the percentages of 
those feeling 'proud' were 45% and 'not proud' 35%18. For Britain, 81% opted 
for 'proud' and 15% for 'not proud' (European Commission, Eurobarometer 
No. 42, p. 67). Feelings of strong national pride are concentrated in the age 
group of 55 and over, and six out of ten EU citizens are reported as saying 
they are proud of their nationality either because this is seen to be a citizen's 
duty or because it is simply seen as 'something natural'. 'National identity' 
was also tested in connection to 'European identity'. In the six founder 
18 It has to be noted that the Eurobarometer survey offered only two 
options ('proud' and 'not proud', whereas the British Social Attitudc survcy 
had two more ('very proud', 'not proud at all'), 
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member-states is the highest proportion of respondents who say that they see 
themselves most of the time as 'Europeans' in addition to their nationality 
(and Britain is not one of those six). When all EU-respondents are taken 
together, 10% see themselves as 'European' first and then as a national of their 
country; 46% first as a national and then as 'European'; and 33% in terms of 
their nationality only. The UK is by comparison still the least European 
country, and the Germans have the highest figure for 'European first and then 
nationality' (15%). The answers to these questions are dearly related to those 
on national pride. Those who are 'fairly or very' proud of their nationality 
tend to identify themselves as such, while the less proud respondents tend to 
identify more with Europe, either additionally or exclusively. 
The findings for 1996 reveal a further change wi th regard to the 
German data: Only 9% now think of themselves as 'Europeans first and then 
nationals', 43% as 'nationals' first and then European' and 38% as nationals 
only. There is, therefore, a remarkable increase in those who see themselves in 
nationality terms only. This must be related to post-reunification 
developments and an increase in confidence as a 'nation', but also part of an 
'anti-foreigner' atmosphere in the light of huge socio-economic problems such 
as rising unemployment. The EU overall average in this matter is worse in 
1996 than the year before (European Commission, Eurobarometer No. 44, 
1996) which might be related to the increase in membership and the low 
European consciousness in the new member-countries (Sweden in fact has 
taken the place of Britain as the least European country in terms of identity). 
So, for whatever reasons, there seems to be increasing retreat to an emphasis 
on national identity. This trend might, therefore, indicate rising nationalism. 
On the other hand, high self-esteem does not automatically have to 
correspond with a feeling of superiority or degradation of others. However, 
with respect to more populist right-wing governments - at least in Germany 
and Britain - there might be rising nationalism at least among supporters of 
right-wing and conservative parties. 
A survey conducted in the German context by the Zentrum fur 
Turkeistudien (titled "The image of foreigners by the public"» found that 
particularly among those people to whom national identity is a very 
important matter on a personal level there is the tendency to agree with anti-
immigrant statements (1995:119). A relationship was, therefore, established by 
the authors between nationalism and racism. The data showed a strong 
correlation between total agreement with nationalistic statements and the 
characteristic 'prejudice-inclined' (20% of sample). For example, most 
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respondents agreed with the statement 'Germans should have more rights' 
and most respondents emphasized the differences between foreigners and 
Germans based on the 'non-adaptability' of foreigners when asked for the 
causes of 'inter-ethnic' problems (however, more than one-quarter, 28.9%, saw 
the main cause for those problems in the prejudices and ignorance on the part 
of the indigenous majority - so, here again, a polarization can be noted). 
Overall, half of the respondents who identified with their nationality were 
classified as 'prejudice-inclined', followed by respondents who rather 
identified with the region they live in or who felt first of all 'cosmopolitan' or 
'European' and who expressed the least anti-immigrant attitudes (op.cit.: 121-
22). In terms of political alliance, the most who expressed rather 'nationalistic' 
and 'prejudiced' statements were identifiers with conservative and right-wing 
parties, the least nationalistic and prejudiced were supporters of the Green 
party. A similar survey could not be found for the British context, but as the 
previous section has shown that identifiers with the Conservatives were by 
tendency the most prejudiced and as the British Conservative Party is also 
well known for its nationalistic rhetoric (Gilroy 1987), it is assumed that a 
similar survey would have very similar results. 
7.5 Concluding remarks 
Ethnic minority and immigrant related issues appear in the surveys 
reviewed as quite controversial and seem to polarize respondents' views in 
both countries. It has also been suggested, that the replies to questions in 
public opinion surveys can be highly influenced by single or multiple events 
at a particular time and do, therefore, not necessarily indicate long-term 
changes in attitudes on the part of the respondents (Zentrum fUr 
Tiirkeistudien 1995). 
Shortly after the infamous arson attacks in MolIn and Solingen, for 
instance, a survey conducted by the Emnid Institute on behalf of the magazine 
Der Spiegel in 1992 found that before the attack in Molln, only 43% of the 
respondents disagreed with 'anti-foreigners' attitudes and phrases, but after 
the attack this percentage rose to 69. Another survey undertaken in Germany 
shortly after the attacks resulted in 70% of the indigenous respondents being 
in favour of granting the local voting right to foreigners which had been 
rejected four years ago by 72% of the respondents. The same is likely to be 
observable in the British case after incidents such as the Rushdie Affair or 
riots such as in Bradford in 1995. A short-lived increase in pessimism with 
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regard to the future of 'race relations' in Britain - as identified in one of the 
British Social Attitudes surveys - for instance, has been linked to the riots in 
1985 (Jowell et al. 1992). It might, therefore, be true that it is more plausible to 
assume that certain events have a strong influence on the responding 
behaviour rather than that there has been a sudden change in attitude. Hence, 
events can function as a 'shock effect' (Zentrum fUr Tiirkeistudien 1995). 
The surveys reviewed show that with regard to general attitudes 
towards ethnic minorities, fluctuations are rather minor. Instead of seeing 
these fluctuations only as a result of events, however, Koch-Arzberger (1993) 
suggests that an increase in the agreement with more liberal or more 
discriminatory statements is linked to the level of politicization and 
politicians' rhetoric. It is, thus, questionable - as rightly observed by Koch-
Arzberger - whether these fluctuations really mean a change of attitude or 
rather a change of conditions under which it is more acceptable to utter 
discriminatory or hostile remarks (or to even 'act' out intolerance through 
violence). A climate of more or less acceptability of anti-immigrant statements 
could again be created by politicians' rhetoric. If they depict foreigners or 
immigrants as a problem and if they show sympathy with anti-immigrant 
attitudes and depict them as 'justified', it is only to be expected that such 
views are taken on by the wider public. 
On the whole, it can be observed that most respondents support 
governmental policies which underpins the hypothesis by the Zentrum far 
TiJrkeistudien (1995) that the language used by politicians in the context of 
asylum and immigration (which is then reproduced by the media) causes and 
stabilizes prejudices vis-a-vis foreigners and immigrants. This is, however, 
not only the case in negative terms: Politicians' rhetoric can also cause more 
liberal attitudes. This was shown in the case of major support for existing 
anti-discrimination legislation in Britain and the future willingness to accept 
the ius soli principle (albeit without the provision for dual nationality) by the 
German public. 
Another proposition relevant in this context is that the asylum and 
immigration issue is used by politicians to distract from other, more 
important, but less easily solvable, socio-economic problems. In other words, 
the issue of asylum and immigration is made into a serious problem more or 
less deliberately to deter the public's attention from other socio-economic 
problems. Unemployment or the fear of potential unemployment, for 
instance, is often suggested as being the cause of racially discriminatory 
attitudes. Those attitudes are first of all directed against non-European 
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immigrants and are expressed in many different ways (Zentrum fiir 
Tiirkeistudien 1995). This can be well illustrated in the German context: 
reporting on the results of a public opinion survey, Ms. Noelle-Neumann 
wrote in an article for the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung of 8 November 1992: 
"Economic problems and also resentments in the new Lander 
towards the West Germans are pushed into the background due 
to problems of 'floods' of asylum-seekers which then has the effect 
of uniting the East and the West. Under such circumstances, the 
worry that more conflicts between East and West Germans could 
break out becomes a minor issue. This remarkable result is hardly 
acknowledged by the public.H 
(quoted by Zentrum fUr Tiirkeistudien, 1995:56; free translation) 
More important than the actual socio-economic differences between the East 
and the West was the issue of the increasing numbers of asylum-seekers. This 
topic functioned, therefore, as a 'unity construct' to overcome social and 
psychological problems between the East and West. 
In the British context, forthcoming elections have been suggested as 
resulting in increasing pandering to populism (Clemens 1983) and in the 
'abuse' of the 'immigrant and asylum issue' (or the 'race card') in order to gain 
votes. Public opinion surveys seem, therefore, to be used to induce and 
accelerate political 'action' in a directed way, i.e. towards 'action' which is 
realizable. As the issue of immigration and asylum has gained increasing 
importance in political discourse in Germany and in Britain since the 1980s, if 
not even earlier than that in particular in the British context (Powell's 'river of 
blood' speech!), it seems that phrases such as 'bogus asylum seeker' and 
metaphorical references to numbers as part of argumentative patterns within 
political discourse have been reproduced as part of the wider public's 
opinion. These linguistic metaphors or phrases often depict the foreigner as a 
problem. 
One issue which warrants caution when assessing results from opinion 
surveys is the aspect of personal contact with ethnic minorities. A study done 
by the Leipziger Zentralinstitut far /ugendforschung, for example, came to the 
conclusion that 50% of the respondents judge without ever having had any 
contact with 'foreigners', In answer to the question of whom they think first 
when they hear the word 'foreigner', 48% replied 'the Turks' although no 
Turkish people lived in the former GDR (Zentrum fUr Tiirkeistudien 1995). In 
the British context, a Gallup poll has found a similar phenomenon: Two-
thirds of indigenous people have hardly any or even no contact at all with 
ethnic minorities. Interesting in this context - applicable to both countries -
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also is that there seems to be evidence that individual preference of a party 
can lead to differences in perception. In other words, if a respondent is a 
supporter of a right-wing party such as the Republikaner in Germany, this 
person is more likely to perceive foreigners in a more negative way than, for 
example, a supporter of the Green Party (IPOS 1993). Hence, increasing 
contact does not have to result in more acceptance and tolerant behaviour. 
A typical German issue is that 'racial' discrimination and prejudice 
have often been regarded as a more serious problem in the eastern part since 
unification (Commichau 1990). The new surveys reviewed here, however, 
have shown that the East is not fundamentally different from the West 
(Zentrum fiir Tiirkeistudien 1995). The remaining differences result mainly 
from the fact - as pointed out in the surveys done on behalf of the 
Commissioner for Foreigners Affairs in Berlin - that in the East there has been 
less contact with foreigners at home and abroad. 
On the whole, the above surveys and polls have shown that 
respondents are mostly concerned about members of ethnic or immigrant 
minorities who belong to the largest groups, who have come for economic 
reasons (whereby the public easily forgets that these people were originally 
invited to come to Germany and Britain as workers), and whose life-styles 
appear to be very different from indigenous peoples' customs or habits. 
Hostility, prejudice and 'racial' discrimination are, thus, not directed against 
all ethnic or immigrant minorities alike. This indicates that certain groups are 
racialized for certain purposes. 
Public attitudes - as analyzed with the help of reports on social attitude 
surveys and opinion polls - show that there is a conceptual link between 
citizenship (formal and substantive) and nationality with racializing effects on 
ethnic minorities in both Germany and Britain. This link does, however, not 
appear in a clear and straight-forward way. People often display attitudes in 
contradictory ways. In particular racial prejudice and discrimination may be 
expressed on one dimension but not on another related dimension. This is less 
surprising on the proposition that attitudes can be inconsistent and that 
people rarely conform to tidy descriptions such as 'racist' or 'nationalist' 
(Jowell & Airey 1984:7). 
At the same time, however, the majority of respondents (even if small 
in places) takes on views of immigration and ethnic minority related issues as 
expressed by the governing parties in Germany and Britain. In this context, it 
has been claimed that "what is most important about public opinion in a 
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broader sense" might be "that people are willing to acquiesce in what a small 
set of leading individuals say" (Niemi 1983, as quoted by Margolis & Mauser 
1989:3). In this way, public opinion needs to be treated essentially as 
dependent. Professional politicians play an important role as they draw 
"attention to the existence of problems and the merits of possible solutions" 
(Margolis & Mauser 1989: 309). Their rhetoric usually emphasizes values and 
goals, rather than facts or analysis, and it often consists of arguments in 
symbols or slogans that are misleading or incomplete (ibid.). However, it 
should not be forgotten that the public's opinion is highly polarized with 
regard to many, if not most, immigration and ethnic minority related issues. 
This and some of the other connections raised in this chapter will be further 
investigated in the following chapter. 
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8. Parliamentary debates on ethnic or 'racial' issues 
Reports of a number of key parliamentary debates in Britain and 
Germany will be investigated in this chapter to provide an elite 
perspective on the effects of racism and nationalism on ethnic minorities' 
citizenship. Despite the fact that there has been a development towards 
more multi-ethnic or multi-'racial' discourse and practices in politics 
during the post-war period, racism and nationalism have not been 
eradicated in contemporary western Europe. As has been indicated in the 
previous chapter, politicians can undeniably be regarded as a crucial part of 
this problem (Miles 1989). There is, of course, a difference between some 
extremist right-wing parties which express their racist positions quite 
explicitly and the majority of the mainstream parties in most western 
European countries (European Parliament 1990). Most governments and 
mainstream parties actually distance themselves from explicit racist 
attitudes and practices (van Dijk 1993). 
In this chapter, I will examine the definitions and language 
politicians use in formal speeches with regard to 'race relations' as well as 
the connections they make between the elements of racism (or 
racialization), nationalism, and citizenship. When taking a position on 
ethnic minorities or 'foreigners', politicians' assumptions about German 
and British society in terms of legitimate membership often reveal this 
connection. The focus will thereby be on the more subtle and indirect 
forms of 'white' dominance as expressed by elites operating on the basis of 
minimal consensus within society (van Dijk 1993). That is to say that the 
indigenous majority's dominance tends to be taken for granted since it is 
regarded as legitimate to treat ethnic minorities or 'foreigners' differently 
from the indigenous population in certain areas and situations 
(Hoffmann & Even, 1984). This consensus is tied into everyday language 
and comes to the surface as soon as issues related to ethnic minorities or 
'foreigners' appear. The 'legitimately' different treatment of ethnic 
minorities excludes them partially from rights and liberties regarded as 
natural for indigenous people. On the basis of this consensus, political 
elites are involved in the reproduction of a system of ethnic or 'racial' 
dominance "in many apparently innocent and impeccable ways" (van Dijk 
1993:59). Thus, the issues of immigration and asylum become subject to 
legislation in order to partially solve, or at least not to aggravate, 
unemployment, serious housing shortage, or for other 'good' socio-
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economic reasons. However, such legislation tends to affect immigrants 
from non-European countries more than any other immigrants which 
means that 'colour' and religion (in particular Islam) become the issues of 
discrimination and racialization. This has implications for ethnic 
minorities' formal and/or substantive citizenship status. 
The role of parliamentarians in all this is obvious: Not only do their 
official statements reflect their party's position, but they are also well 
aware that their speeches will appear in the records and may be quoted in 
the mass media, which play an important role in linking elites and the 
public (Margolis & Mauser 1989; DISS 1992). Hence, politicians are fully 
responsible - politically and morally - for their verbal contributions which 
have an impact to a lesser or greater extent on media coverage and public 
opinion (Zentrum fiir Tiirkeistudien 1995). This is especially important in 
the context of 'race relations' "since the controversiality and sensitive 
nature of most ethnic topics require that the politicians be aware of what 
they can say and what should not be said." (van Dijk 1993:66). 
S.l Some general remarks on the debates 
After having established which prominent debates expressing elite 
political views on immigration issues had taken place during the 1990s, a 
selection of parliamentary verbatim records was collected from the British 
House of Commons (Hansard) and the German Bun des tag 
(Stenographische Berichte). In the German case, these were the principal 
debates preceding the New Foreigners' Law of 1991 (AusHindergesetz) and 
concerning the call for dual citizenship for long-term resident immigrants. 
In the British case, ethnic or 'racial' affairs and related issues are not topics 
that are very often discussed in the House of Commons and most debates, 
therefore, centre upon immigration and asylum. Increasing focus has 
thereby been on the various measures to control the entry of refugees and 
other immigrants. The control of their numbers and of expenditure on 
social benefits has been debated by way of referring to the majority of 
asylum seekers as 'bogus'. The effects of the new immigration and asylum 
bill proposals on long-term resident ethnic minorities - in particular those 
from the Indian sub-continent - were of particular concern to the 
opposition parties. One exception to the debates which focused 
predominantly on asylum and immigration matters during this period 
was the 'Opposition Day' debate on 'Ethnic Minorities' on 9 June 1992. 
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The overall style of parliamentary debates in both countries is quite 
similar, characterized by much open aggression, constant interruption, 
derision, and protests against the respective parties 1. In both countries, 
governments were formed by the conservative parties throughout the 
1990s. In Britain, the governing Conservative Party debated against Labour 
and the Liberal Democrats; in Germany, the governing coalition of the 
CDU/CSU and FDP debated against the SPO, the Green Party (Griine) and 
the PDS (successor of the former SED and represented in Parliament since 
reunification). In particular, the critical remarks and unconventional style 
of the latter two (such as the call for a 'Schweigeminute' - a minute's 
silence and the fixing of a banner to the lectern) usually led to furious 
reactions from the more conservative Right. 
In Britain, the following debates have been consulted: 
1. debate on the Asylum Bill of 13 November 1991; 
2. debate on the Asylum Bill of 21 January 1992; 
3. debate on Asylum & Immigration of 2 March 1992; 
4. Opposition Day of 9 June 1992; 
5. debate on Asylum & Immigration Appeals Bill of 2 November 
1992; 
6. debate on Asylum & Immigration Bill of 11 December 1995. 
In the case of Germany, the following debates have been dealt with: 
1. debate on dual nationality for citizens of the FRG and GDR 
(Doppelstaatsangehorigkeit fUr Burger und Biirgerinnen der 
BRD und DOR) of 8 November 1989; 
1. debate on the Bill for Amendments to the Foreigners' Law 
(Entwurf fur ein Gesetz zur Neuregelung des Auslanderrechts) of 
9 February 1990; 
2. debate on the same Bill of 26 April 1990; 
3. debate on the Bill for the Facilitation of Naturalization and 
Acceptance of Dual Nationality (Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur 
Erleichterung der Einburgerung und Hinnahme der Doppelstaats-
angehorigkeit) of 29 April 1993; 
4. debate on the Bill for Amendments to the citizenship law 
(Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Anderung und Erganzung des Staats-
1 This is the case when reading the transcribed debates. It is a different 
matter when actually listening to the debates: in Britain. there is far more 
'noise' (laughter etc.) than in Germany. 
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angehorigkeitsrechts) of 11 November 1993; 
5. debate on SPD Bill for the Facilitation of Naturalization and 
Acceptance of Dual Nationality of 28 April 1994; 
6. debate on the same SPD Bill of 9 February 1995. 
In all the quotes, I have chosen remarks by major proposers of bills and 
opponents (all of whom elected Members of Parliament). The quotes from 
German debates appear here in free translation. 
8.2 The German debates 
8.2.1 Ausltinderfeindlichkeit and racism 
Dr. Burkhard Hirsch (FDP) remarked that "hardly any other political 
topic divides public opinion more than that of the correct 'foreigners' 
policy." (9 February 1990, p. 15031) - and this is also the case among 
parliamentarians of the various parties2• One of the areas of differences is 
the approach politicians take to the terms of Ausliinderfeindlichkeit and 
racism. None of the established parties (CDU/CSU, FDP and SPD) used 
either of the two terms explicitly in all of the above mentioned debates. In 
a debate on amendments to the existing Foreigners' Law, the Horne 
Secretary in 1990, Wolfgang Schauble, only mentioned the positive 
version of Ausliinderfeindlichkeit when insisting that German society 
has been ausltinderfreundlich (friendly towards foreigners) and that it 
would remain so in the future with the help of the proposals for a new 
Foreigners' Law (9 February 1990, p. 15023). There are, however, a number 
of ways in which parliamentarians' hostile, or racializing, rhetoric - albeit 
expressed implicitly - can be pinned down conceptually. Even in their 
criticism of the government's policies and in their demands for more 
radical advances in naturalization and citizenship law, members of the 
SPD and FDP expressed the discriminating effects of the existing laws and 
the new proposals by using terms such as 'exclusion' and 'lack of 
participation'. 
2 Hidir <;elik came to the conclusion in his work on media coverage of the 
'foreigner' issue (AusHinderfrage) between 1980 and 1990 that the policies 
proposed and/or pursued by the SPO, FOP, and COU/CSU were characterized 
only by minor differences. Having read the key parliamentary debates 
during the 1990s, however, I can not support this view - at least with 
regard to ve rbal articulation of the SPO's policy demands or proposals (and 
some members of the FDP) as opposed to the conservative Right. 
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Only members of the Green Party (Grune) and the PDS explicitly 
referred to 'racism' in the course of the debates. 
"We don't need a further Foreigners' Law whose expression and driving force 
is a racist attitude which declares certain people as a risk on the basis 
of their nationality and devalues them by denying them elementary human 
rights." 
(Trenz, Griine, 9 February 1990, p. 15034) 
The same MP argued in another debate that the present law as well as the 
proposals for the New Foreigners' Law would encourage 'routine racism' 
and the scapegoating of immigrants and refugees, and thus would make 
foreigners responsible for increasing social problems in the post-
reunification era (26 April 1990, p. 16288). She referred to a number of 
proposals (such as restrictions on family unification) as 'institutional 
racism' (p. 16289) which was perceived as a provocation by members of the 
governing coalition and led to the following reaction by Dr. Hildegard 
Hamm-Brucher (PDP): 
" ... a chill ran down my spine when our colleague, Ms. Trenz, said this bill was a 
form of institutional racism. As the older ones among us had to live under 
institutional racism for twelve years, Ladies and Gentlemen, I beg you, and in 
particular our younger colleagues, to show respect for these terrible experiences and 
not to introduce such concepts into our everyday political business." 
(26 April 1990, p. 16295) 
Here, reference is clearly made to the Nazi-period during which, 
undeniably, an extreme form of institutional racism existed and which is 
believed to warrant the concept of racism being treated as a taboo in the 
post-1945 period. In this view, the contemporary approach to, and 
treatment of, ethnic minorities and immigrants cannot be racist. The use 
of the term itself is experienced as a moral accusation, never as a factual 
description of the situation - and Trenz justified her previous remarks on 
similar lines: 
"I have been criticized for having used the word 'racism' .... Racism is a word that 
always provokes outrage here in the German Bundestag. Racism does not always 
have to be homicidal. Racism is a word which, for instance, is normally used in 
France. In the Federal Republic of Germany .... I am not allowed to mention it .... 
According to its definition, racism merely means that people are being evaluated, 
devalued and discredited on the basis of their different nature, their different 
nationality, etc. That is exactly what happens in this bill. That is why I said it." 
(Trenz, Grline, 26 April 1990, p. 16298) 
Despite the reluctance to use the term 'racism', there is, however, a 
general understanding among the opposition parties that the proposals for 
157 
a New Foreigners' Law do not abolish the distinction between peoples of 
different cultural and phenotypical backgrounds and that this distinction's 
main function is the maintenance of particular power and material 
relations. There is, therefore, an implicit understanding of racialization. 
This also becomes clear in the way in which the need for a new type of 
collective identity and the demand for full citizenship rights for settled 
immigrants has been debated (see also below). By avoiding the explicit use 
of that term, however, contemporary forms of racism are being mitigated 
or even denied. 
The classification of peoples into the different categories of 'citizens' 
or 'residents' has, however, not only appeared in the debates as a matter of 
Ausllinder!eindlichkeit or racialization, but also as a sign of nationalism. 
"We will not support a single line ... of this proposal which is founded on the 
classification of people by means of ethnic criteria (volkische Abstammungs-
kriterien) and which tries to gloss over the government's planless immigration 
policies with the help of nationalistic pathos." 
(Trenz, Griine, 26 April 1990, p. 16289; my emphasis) 
"In view of the nationalistic and restorative tendencies in our society, in view of 
assaults on foreigners and arson attacks, and in view of ~ aberration ... thc 
delaying of reforms of the citizenship law has to come to an end." 
(Weiss, Grline, 28 April 1994, p. 19411) 
In the above quotes, both nationalism and racism are perceived as being 
on the rise (probably since reunification) and as affecting immigrants in a 
negative way. This could be interpreted as an elite view, on similar lines 
as done by Bauman who claimed that nationalism is the 'racism' of the 
intellectuals (1992:675). One way of counteracting these negative effects for 
'immigrants' would be a re-definition of Germany's concept of 
membership. 
8.2.2 Collective identity 
There are a number of elements - based on minimal consensus -
which constitute collective identity: the image a society, or nation, has of 
itself; common values; and the collective upgrading and depreciation of 
groups of people (who are usually outsiders, i.e. 'the other'). 
Images a society or nation has of itself include all those elements 
which are perceived as 'normal' and 'natural' to the indigenous majority. 
These images tend to be founded on positive values, but they become 
negative when contextualized with 'the other' (Hoffmann & Even 1984). 
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The then Minister of Interior, Wolfgang Schauble (CDU), said the 
following in his introduction of the Bill for a new Foreigners' Law: 
"One of the traditional values of the occidental society is tolerance 
vis-A-vis different life-styles." 
(9 February 1990, p. 15023) 
As residents in Germany, foreigners and their 'different life-styles' are, 
however, often perceived as a threat or a problem - either on the basis of 
the length of their residence or their numbers. Schauble's statement, 
therefore, seems to apply to foreigners who come to Germany only as 
'guests' and return at some point, but not necessarily to the context of 
permanent settlement. As opposed to the above quote, it is often pointed 
out that the existence of 'foreigners' constitutes a danger to German 
national identity because the indigenous majority will become a minority 
in its own co un try. 
"The less we rob the Germans of their feeling that they can live in a nation 
[Heimat] of Germans in the future, the more openly they will welcome and 
accept foreign residents. The more we convey to the Germans the feeling they 
will live in a ... fluid multi-ethnic society tomorrow, the more hostile they 
will act towards foreigners." 
(Gerster, CDU/CSU, 9 February 1990, p. 15035) 
Here, clear fear of Uberfremdung 3 is expressed and thus, an indirect 
reference to numbers of foreigners - and in particular those who originate 
from distant cultures. Moreover, the speaker, Gerster (CDU/CSU), 
indicates in this excerpt sympathy with hostile reactions on the part of the 
majority. The numbers of foreigners play an important role as there is the 
general perception of "limits to the ability to integrate and the willingness 
to integrate" (Schauble, 9 February 1990, p. 15023). 
However, not all foreigners are perceived as such a threat. 
"We receive them [East Germans and ethnic Germans (rom 
Eastern Europe] in our midst as Germans among Germans." 
(Chancellor Kohl, CDU, 8 November 1989, p. 13013) 
"All borders are open to [East] Germans and ethnic Germans ..... 
The fact that national and ethnic minorities belong to this country .... is 
usually ignored .... " 
(Trenz, Crune, 9 February 1990, p. 15033) 
3 There is no perfect equivalent of this expression in the English language. 
'Foreign infiltration' is what the dictionary has to offer, but 'swamping' 
comes much closer. Oberfremdung is politically loaded - and so is 
'swamping' since the Thatcher-era. 
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There seems to be consensus about the 'naturalness' with which East 
Germans and ethnic Germans are incorporated as 'Germans' into German 
society. However, opposition parties deplore the fact that long-term settled 
immigrants are excluded from this collective identity which thus gains an 
ethnic/racial character. The negative depiction of certain foreigners has 
been criticized by a number of parliamentarians. The following two quotes 
illustrate the clash in approach by Conservatives and the sPO: 
[In addressing Manfred Kanther, the Minister of Interior] 
"Why do you make statements about Muslims which almost always imply 
that these are people we have to fear?" 
(Oaubler-GmeJin, SPO, 9 February 1995, p. 1232) 
"Will the Federal Republic of Germany be able to get rid of violent foreigners 
or foreign drug dealers, if they possess dual nationality?" 
(Marschewski, CDU/CSU, 28 April 1994, p. 194060) 
These quotes show that some foreigners are in particular seen as a threat 
to national identity on the basis of their religion (mainly Muslims, i.e. 
Turkish people) or as potentially violating law and order. There is a 
tendency to criminalize certain groups of immigrants and thus, to 
deprecia te them. 
A further aspect of collective identity are common values. As 
opposed to the opposition parties which relate common values mainly to 
constitutional aspects ("We should concentrate on our central 
constitutional values", Daubler-Gmelin, SPD, 9 February 1995, p. 1230), the 
governing CDU/CSU adds rather diffuse ideas to these values as expressed 
in the following: 
" ... citizenship is the expression of the fundamental relationship 
between social and legal membership .... Citizens' rights and duties 
are .... the most integral part of our state and our democracy. There is 
one reason for this: as history has taught us, every nation [Yolk) is 
a Schicksalsgemeinschaft (a community sharing the same fate)." 
(Schauble, COU/CSU, 29 April 1993, p. 13199) 
The above statement shows how the speaker focused on a positive 
approach to a certain understanding of German society and life within it 
rather than on an explicit approach towards foreigners. Schauble 
attempted to separate the assessment of foreigners as people of different 
cultures from the legitimate membership in German socio-national 
community. He has thereby ignored the fact that two-thirds of all foreign 
youths have meanwhile been born in Germany and that in everyday 
language, the term 'foreigner' has ceased to mean exclusively members of 
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other nation-states, but that it is also used to refer to certain ethnic 
minorities in German society. In doing so, Schauble holds on to the 'old' 
image of Germany not being a country of immigration and settlement. 
The opposition has very different thoughts about this: 
"We make a clean sweep of the life-long lie of our country, namely 
that it has never been a country of immigration." 
(Schroer, SPO, 9 February 1990, p. 15030) 
"We are de facto a country of immigration. We have to realize that. 
Not only by putting it in nice phrases, but by adapting this reality to 
our legislation." 
(Sonntag-Wolgast, SPO, 11 November 1993, p. 16274) 
In this way, members of the opposition show the contradiction between 
the traditional image of German society and the existence of fairly large 
numbers of long-term resident 'foreigners' within this society. By 
referring to Germany as a country of immigration, or a multi-
cultural/multi-ethnic society, the traditional image is not adjusted to 
reality (as attempted in the CDU/CSU rhetoric), but reality is adjusted to 
the image of German society. 
Furthermore, the CDU/CSU arguments mostly come from the 
point of view of the indigenous majority. Rarely is the position of 
foreigners taken into consideration from the foreigners' perspective. It is 
the Federal Commissioner for Foreigners' Affairs who points out the 
dilemma young foreigners are facing: 
[about the situation of foreign youths] 
"Many of them are in a contradictory situation .... Part of these contradictions is 
that on the one hand, they are brought up in a democratic country and are educated 
at school to be responsible citizens .... on the other hand, they experience that they 
cannot take part in elections. The image which they have of themselves - namely: 
"we live like German youths" - does not correspond with the image that others 
have of them .... On the one hand, it is demanded of them to integrate, and on the 
other hand, they stumble again and again against the limits of Ithis interpretation 
of] integration." 
(Schmalz-Jakobsen, FOP, 11 November 1993, p. 16277) 
It is, therefore, not only the indigenous majority which seems to have 
problems with its (traditional) image and reality, but the immigrant 
minority too - with the crucial difference that the latter are excluded from 
citizenship on the basis of these wrong perceptions. 
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8.2.3 Citizenship and nationality 
In particular the debates about the facilitation of naturalization 
procedures by allowing for dual nationality make very clear that the 
CDU/CSU's understanding of citizenship is strongly linked to nationality -
as for example in the following quote: 
[Explaining why he is against dual nationality] 
"For me, to be a German citizen means to accept this country with its advantages 
and disadvantages, to identify with the past and the present, with our history. For 
me, to be a German citizen means to belong to this Schicksalsgemeinschaft 
(community sharing the same fate), which one cannot join or leave as one pleases. " 
(Marschewski, CDU/CSU, 28 April 1994, p. 19407) 
Resulting from this, Erwin Marschewski explains the CDU/CSU policy 
position: 
"In the context of the comprehensive reforms of the citizenship law, we will 
adhere to the principle of descent (Abstammungsprinzip)." 
(28 April 1994, p. 19408) 
The member of the SPD, Dr. Cornelie Sonntag-Wolgast, rightly 
commented that this term 'community of fate' describes a society "to 
which foreigners do not belong" (9 February 1995, p. 1219). A member of 
the Green Party, Konrad Weiss, referred to this term as "typically German" 
because it actually is about "German blood". He demands a "modern 
citizenship law" which allows that those "who want to be German, can be 
German" (28 April 1994, p. 19411). Here again a clash can be observed 
between the traditional image of a community of descent (as adhered to by 
the CDU/CSU) and the reality of a country which has become the new 
home of fairly large numbers of immigrants. 
German citizenship in its legal sense is, of course, not totally 
exclusive as naturalization is possible. There are, however, different views 
on the requirements. A member of the Green Party criticized the COU 
proposal for a new Foreigners' Law on the grounds that it means effective 
facilitation 
"only for the third generation whose ties with the country of their 
parents' origin have totally - I quote - "been severed"." 
(Trenz, Grline, 9 February 1990, p. 15034) 
The requirement of 'severing ties' with one's country of origin can be 
interpreted as a definition of 'integration'. The COU/CSU is of the 
opinion that naturalization presupposes integration (Schauble, 29 April 
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1993, p. 13199) and even more so, there is the view that granting German 
citizenship is not only the precondition for integration, but "the evidence 
for its success." (Kanther, Minister of Interior, COU/CSU, 9 February 1995, 
p. 1220). As opposed to this definition - which again entirely comes from 
the indigenous majority's point of view based on a definition of 
'integration' which is very close to 'assimilation' - the opposition parties 
developed an understanding of integration which takes into account that 
immigration is a long-term process that requires "mutual recognition" 
(Sonntag-Wolgast, SPD, 9 February 1995, p. 1219). 
"We don't demand that [foreigners) tear down all bridges. For us, 
naturalization as of right does not presuppose 'mastering' the German 
character." 
(Sonntag-Wolgast, SPD, 28 April 1994, p. 19405) 
The opposition parties define citizenship as separate from nationality. For 
them, it is crucial to provide immigrant minorities with the necessary 
legal changes which give them the status and the feeling to be "a 
responsible citizen of this state" (Schmalz-Jakobsen, FOP, 29 April 1993, p. 
13202). They have to be able to participate as fully recognized citizens, and 
not only by way of 'duties' such as tax-paying - as summarized by a 
member of the sPO: 
"It is about mutual recognition and the living together of people of different 
origin. The immigrants who have resided here for a long time, should be able 
to feel at home and recognized, not only as tax-payers, as 'stopgaps' in the 
labour- market, as providers of our pensions, but also as partners who arc able to 
participate fully in the political and social formation of the will of the public." 
(Sonntag-Wolgast, SPD, 28 April 1994, p. 19404-405) 
The emphasis in all of the German debates is clearly on the formal status 
of long-term resident immigrants and their children. But there is also 
appreciation of a substantive side to citizenship, albeit the COU /CSU uses 
this as an argument against dual nationality. The opposition parties, 
similarly believe that formal equality will not eradicate verbal or physical 
assaults on people of non-European origin. However, they also think 
"that the 'hopeless' [die UnvcrbesserlichenJ among us might not so easily uller 
the phrase "they take our jobs and flats away", when they learn that the 
'foreigners' are citizens in legal terms." 
(Sonntag-Wolgast, SPD, 29 Apri11993, p. 13208) 
The opposition parties are clearly against the treatment of immigrant 
minorities as "second-class citizens" (Weiss, Griine, 29 Apri11993, p. 13203) 
and demand their full equality with ethnic Germans who migrated from 
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Eastern Europe and in whose case "dual nationality is tolerated and 
accepted" (Cern Ozdemir, Griine, 9 February 1995, p. 1236). The latest 
amendment of the Citizenship Law by the so-called 'child citizenship' 
model has not satisfied the opposition parties. The Minister of Interior, 
Manfred Kanther (CDU /CSU), described this new model as "an alternative 
to the concept of territorial rights [ius soli] and to the general acceptance of 
multi-nationality" (9 February 1995, p. 1223) - a compromise which has, 
according to the Federal Commissioner for Foreigners' Affairs who 
represents the coalition-partner FDP, not been "the FDP's baby" (Schmalz-
Jakobsen, FDP, 9 February 1995, p. 1227). This amendment has been 
criticized for not providing immigrants with "equality", but for pushing 
foreigners into a further "special law" instead (Jelpke, PDS, 9 February 
1995, p. 1229). 
8.3 The British debates 
8.3.1 Racism 
The British debates show a more straight forward use of the 
language of 'race' and 'racism' to the extent that some parliamentarians 
refer to each other as 'racist', but overall - as in the German case - there are 
differences between the governing Conservatives and the Opposition 
parties with regard to their general rhetoric and content of their 
statements. Those parliamentarians who represent the Conservative 
Parties usually deny the allegations that aspects of the Immigration and 
Asylum Bill have racist implications and that their way of responding to 
the phenomenon of asylum seeking is in any way "racialist" (Kenneth 
Baker, Home Secretary, 13 November 1991, col. 1085). When comparing the 
British situation with continental Europe, they come usually to the 
following conclusion - as expressed by the then Home Secretary - that 
"[wle have been working at improving race relations in Britain for over 30 years, 
under successive governments. Some of the speeches by politicians of all parties 
on the continent in recent months would be simply unacceptable from a 
politician in Britain. I draw some comfort from that fact, because it reflects our 
maturity with such matters." 
(Baker, Home Secretary, Conservative, 13 November 1991, col. 1(83) 
There is certainly some truth in the claim that Britain is well advanced in 
its anti-discrimination legislation which does, however, not mean that 
racism as such is eliminated. When it comes to rhetoric, British politicians 
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are not far off their European counterparts - as rightly remarked by two 
parliamentarians; 
"We have heard in what I can only describe as the intemperate rantings of the 
hon. Member of Welwyn Hatfield (Mr. Evans) what the extremists - the 
hardliners in the Tory party - really feel about foreigners ..... The han. 
Gentleman's speech might more appropriately have been delivered at a 
National Front rally." 
(Watson, Labour, 13 November 1991, col. 1132) 
"[The] decline of the National Front owes more to the swamping speech of the 
former Prime Minister which led to members of the National Front leaving in 
droves to support the Conservative party, than to any immigration or 
asylum policy." 
(Austin-Walker, Labour, 2 November 1992, col. 94-95) 
The above statements might represent a somewhat provocative and 
exaggerated picture of the Conservative rhetoric style. Nevertheless, it can 
be observed that the governing party's racializing discourse is mostly 
embedded in a rhetoric of 'fair, but firm', the 'bogus asylum seekers', 'law 
and order' and the never ending 'numbers game'. 
"Good race relations are heavily dependent on strict immigration control. Race 
relations in Britain are not perfect - they could be better - but they are better 
than they are almost anywhere else in western Europe or north America. One 
reason for that is that our host population feels comfortable with a system 
that restricts to manageable numbers the influx of people from overseas." 
(Clarke, Home Secretary, Conservative, 2 November 1992, col. 21) 
"Race relations in Britain are much better than in many other European 
countries, but we have to tread carefully to ensure that they stay so. Above all, 
we must act in a way in which prejudice is not fanned, and people must not be 
led to believe that immigration is out of control. It that happens, racial tension 
will rise, and the whole country will be the loser." 
(Howard, Home Secretary, Conservative, 11 December 1995, col. 711) 
Firm immigration controls are regarded as the prerequisite for 'good race 
relations' (Layton-Henry 1992). This means that the presence of 
immigrants is seen as the cause for 'bad race relations'. The above quotes, 
thus, imply that in the light of increasing immigration, rising 'racial 
tension' would be a natural and 'understandable' outcome. As much as in 
the German case, therefore, the Conservatives in Britain mainly focus in 
their rhetoric on the indigenous majority'S point of view and the general 
public's minimal consensus on the issue of immigration. In doing so, they 
convey to the wider public that their attitude is fully acceptable. 
"The Government want to protect genuine refugees and will work for solutions 
to their problems, but domestic asylum policy is only part of that process. To 
achieve the wider objective, it is essential to preserve public sympathy for 
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refugees - and public confidence in the fairness and firmness of our 
determination system is crucial to that." 
(Baker, Home Secretary, Conservative, 13 November 1991, col. 1094) 
Being depicted as 'firm, but fair', this rhetoric hides the fact that the 
proposed Bill's main purpose is to keep black and Asian people out of 
Britain. By referring to the 'public's confidence', the Conservatives pander 
to populism and the anti-immigrant sentiments within the wider public -
an aspect taken up in the following quote: 
"Reference has been made to the rise in racism, particularly on the continent. We 
should not pander to that racism. We should condemn it and remember that 
immigration is not the cause of racism. Immigration is simply an excuse for racism." 
(Darling, Labour, 13 November 1991, col. 1164) 
This statement makes clear that it is not the immigrants as such who are 
to be seen as the cause of racism, but that racialization takes place in 
connection with wider social problems for which immigrants are not 
responsible. 
"Racism and fascism are on the increase in Europe [including Britain] because the 
ingredients on which they feed are present: unemployment, poor housing and 
poverty .... such elements have little to do with immigration controls, which arc 
entirely independent of those who feed on people's fears and turn understandable 
concern into prejudice by pandering to the worst of those fears." 
(Darling, Labour, 9 June 1992, col. 194) 
"I am concerned that a pattern is emerging of black and migrant communities being 
blamed for the economic failures of the countries in which they happen to be 
living. That blaming process .... cannot be separated from the arguments about the 
position of refugees and asylum seekers. There is a serious and sustained attempt to 
deflect the failures of capitalism .... " 
(Simpson, Labour, 2 November 1992, coJ. 100) 
Interesting are the Conservatives' rhetorical tactics aiming to hide the fact 
that their proposed Bill includes racializing elements. 
"Differences in race and colour matter a great deal less in Britain than they did, 
but numbers matter very much indeed. They matter regardless of race and 
colour; they matter because this is a relatively crowded island; ... they 
matter because of the importance of keeping our communities, diverse as they are, 
together as Britons." 
(Baker, Conservative, 11 December 1995, col. 740) 
Concern for 'numbers' is claimed as replacing 'concerns for race and 
colour'. Implied is that the British are not anti-immigrant or 'racist', but 
legitimately worried about their overcrowded country. Again, it is hidden 
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here that the 'concern for numbers' is dealt with in the new Bill by 
refusing black and Asian people entry into Britain. 
A further rhetorical tactic of the Conservatives is their repeatedly 
stated aim to crack down on 'bogus applicants' which they have 
mentioned in connection with phrases such as 'flooding' and 'waves of 
immigrants'. In doing so, they blatantly generalize and give the wrong 
impression to the public about immigrants. This rhetoric has, therefore, 
been rightly criticized as Ita thinly disguised campaign of racism" 
(Maclennan, Liberal Democrats, 2 November 1992, col. 54) and as treating 
"all asylum seekers as a guilty group" (Watson, Labour, 21 January 1992, 
col. 257). 
Concern has also been expressed about cultural dilution. 
"If I am concerned about the cultures in the town that I represent, which have 
changed so much over the past few years because of so many activities, then I admit 
to being a racist." 
(Carlisle, Conservative, 13 November 1991, col. 1133) 
It is acknowledged in this statement that colour does not have to be the 
only element of racism, but culture as well. By admitting so openly to be 
racist (despite the word 'if'), however, John Carlisle conveys that his 
concern is understandable and natural, and thus legitimate. Cultural 
concerns could also be interpreted as elements of nationalism, and 
elsewhere Carlisle said that he stands "purely on the basis of being 
nationalist" when asking for the protection of his community by keeping 
the numbers of immigrants down (2 March 1992, col. 57). The co-existence 
of nationalism and racism is, therefore, evident in this quote, too. 
8.3.2 Positive self-representation and collective identity 
References to positive values and characteristics are made for a 
number of purposes: 1. they can represent collective identity of the whole 
'nation' on the basis of minimal consensus, 2. they are used to show that 
certain parties have better principles than other parties (opposition to the 
opponent); and 3. they are used to defend policies. 
The following statement makes clear reference to the whole 
national collectivity. 
"fC]ood race relations .... require a sense in the host community that the law of 
reason is being applied to the level of immigration and the degree of 
assimilation or integration that is thus required.' 
(Brooke, Conservative, 11 December 1995, col. 723) 
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It is implied here that British people's concern for increasing numbers of 
immigrants is guided by 'the law of reason'. Being reasonable is, 
therefore, part of the British character and justifies the concern for high 
numbers. By using the term 'law', this fits into the populist 'law and 
order' rhetoric of the Conservatives. 
"We shall represent legislation that will be fair to the genuine applicant - fair to 
everyone indeed - but the system will be governed by the rule of law." 
(Oarke, Home Secretary, Conservative, 9 June 1992, col. 162) 
The Conservatives 'sell' their proposals by claiming to pursue 'firm, but 
fair' policies within the 'rule of law', and thus, make the general public 
feel good about taking these concerns on. They point out that these 
policies are part of their party's principles and that they are, therefore, to be 
preferred to the opposition by saying that the Labour Party "represents a 
weak policy. [Whereas] we represent a strong policy." (Baker, Home 
Secretary, Conservative, 13 November 1991, col. 1106). 
Another element of positive self-presentation in the debates is the 
recurring reference to the British tradition of tolerance. 
"Historically, the United Kingdom has been tolerant of asylum seekers. The 
public have always felt that they should tolerate those who have faced 
harder circumstances than their own and who have been forced to leave their 
country of origin. We should applaud such tolerance, which has always been a 
fact of life. However, it has been subject to enormous strain in the past seven years 
because of the number of asylum seekers who have been proven bogus." 
(Duncan Smith, Conservative, 2 November 1992, col. 52) 
"We have a long and honourable tradition in the United Kingdom of offering 
political asylum to those who flee to this country from their country where they 
face individual persecution ... The Government intend to uphold that fine tradition." 
(Oarke, Home Secretary, Conservative, 2 November 1992, col. 21) 
"Britain has a proud record of giving refuge to those fleeing genuine pcrsl'Cution, 
but we cannot ignore the fact that our procedures are being abused." 
(Howard, Home Secretary, Conservative, 11 December 1995, col. 699) 
Phrases such as 'historical', 'long and honourable' and 'proud record' all 
imply that Britain has always been a tolerant country. The myth of this 
claim has, however, been uncovered by the work of Colin Holmes (1991) 
in his historical account of reactions to immigrants and refugees since 
1871. By implying that "Our party, Our country, Our people, are humane, 
benevolent, hospitable, tolerant and modern" (Van Dijk 1993:72), 
however, politicians open their rhetoric line for negative 'other' 
representation. If 'we' are the 'good ones', then 'they' must be the 'bad 
ones'. This in fact happens in the British debates which centre upon the 
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'bogus' nature of immigrants and asylum seekers. Ethnic minorities' 
marriages are described as 'arranged' (and thus, not the result of a 'love 
relationship'), therefore they are subject to suspicion by the immigration 
authorities who operate with the help of the 'primary purpose rule' - a 
fact highly criticized by the Opposition. 
"In the official mind the arranged marriage is confused with a bogus marriage. 
""The primary purpose rule by which applicants who wish to join their wives 
in Britain are judged is intellectually absurd and morally indefensible." 
(Hattersley, Labour, 9 June 1992, col. 156) 
Overall, a clearly negative depiction of the immigrant and asylum-seekers 
can be observed, partly based on their criminalization4. This has been 
regarded by the Opposition on numerous occasions as having negative 
effects for settled ethnic minorities. 
8.3.3 Discriminatory effects for ethnic minorities 
As opposed to Germany, 'racial' discrimination in Britain is mainly 
to be identified with regard to substantive citizenship, as most ethnic 
minorities enjoy an equal formal status as citizens. This becomes clear in 
Roy Hattersley's introductory speech on Opposition Day about Ethnic 
Minorities: 
[He begs] 
"that this house recognising that the ethnic minorities within British 
SOciety receive less than their fair share of national resources and remain 
victim of discrimination and prejudice, calls upon the Government to introduce 
and implement policies which initially reduce and eventually eliminate the 
disadvantages which are suffered by these British citizens." 
(Hattersley, Labour, 9 June 1992, col. 149) 
Although formally British citizens, Hattersley claims that ethnic 
minorities "are denied the full rights of British citizenship" (9 June 1992, 
col. 149). This is based on many facts, according to Hattersley, such as: the 
denial of bail for 'black' defendants in circumstances in which it would be 
granted to 'white' suspects; rejection of highly qualified black and Asian 
job applicants for no other reason than their racial origins; and the 
unemployment rate among 'black' males which is twice as high as among 
'white' males. In particular Muslims and Sikhs are regarded as 
4 The aspect of criminalization has been debated by the Opposilion in 
particular with regard to fingerprinting of asylum seekers. 
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"permanently condemned to second-class status" in terms of their 
substantive citizenship (Hattersley, 9 June 1992, col. 151). 
Despite the fact that ethnic minorities enjoy full formal citizenship 
rights, 
"there is a tendency by officialdom when confronted with a black, brown or 
yellow face to suspect that the person is not a genuine British citizen and to 
require him to prove his status." 
(Hattersley, Labour, 9 June 1992, col. 155) 
The idea of nationality and citizenship being identical seems, therefore, to 
be still present in the attitude of some parts of the indigenous majority. 
The Conservative Party interpreted the statistical evidence in a 
different way when suggesting that 
"[t]here is a large and successful Asian entrepreneurial and professional middle 
class .... We need a stronger black middle class (col. 169) .... Many people from 
all minorities are rising in the professions (col. 170)." 
(Clarke, Home Secretary, Conservative, 9 June 1992) 
The Opposition used the figures to support their claims that "low 
numbers in professions" and the high numbers of black and ethnic 
minority inmates "demonstrate institutional racism" (Abbott, Labour, 9 
June 1992, col. 172). So, in some respects there have been improvements, 
but they are not entirely satisfactory to all members of Parliament. Jim 
Lester (Conservative), for instance, explained that the numbers of ethnic 
minority recruited into the police force have risen, but that more should 
be represented "in the magistracy, as barristers, judges and at all levels of 
our legal system." (9 June 1992, col. 188). Only in that way can it be assured 
that the special privilege of living in Britain is exercised by all citizens. 
There is also the issue of racially motivated "harassment, abuse and 
often violent attacks" which are the "daily experience of many black 
citizens." (Austin-Walker, Labour, 9 June 1992, col. 189). This shows that 
certain sections within the majority do not recognize ethnic minorities as 
equal. Moreover, this also means that apart from indirect racial 
discrimination, there are instances of direct· racial discrimination in the 
form of physical attacks and abuse. 
As ethnic minorities' issues are rarely debated in the House of 
Commons, most of the debates from which quotations have been chosen 
in this chapter centre upon the Immigration and Asylum Bill. Although 
this Bill is mainly about restricting new immigration and the number of 
asylum seekers, it has been criticized as having implications for settled 
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ethnic minorities, too. The Bill has been described by various members of 
the Opposition as "stirring up racist feelings" and thus, as having 
"repercussions on the general attitudes to the black population in the 
United Kingdom". (Hoey, Labour, 13 November 1991, col. 1144). The 
proposed restrictions on housing and the crackdown on illegal workers 
were also seen as having negative effects for settled ethnic minorities. 
"The boss of the firm will immediately cross out from the list of applicants all 
the people whom he or she thinks might possibly be bogus asylum seekers or 
illegal immigrants. The people crossed out will not be called Howard and 
Hattersley: they will be called Khan and Patel. I do not suggest for a second that 
in doing so that employer would be intentionally racist. However, he would be 
doing what so often happens in this country. Without wishing to and almost 
without knowing, he would be discriminating against one section of the 
popula tion." 
(Hattersley, Labour, 11 December 1995, col. 729) 
One member of Parliament even referred to this situation as "job 
apartheid" (Henderson, Labour, 11 December 1995, col. 788) - a provocation 
which could have resulted in outrage in the same way as Trenz's (Griine) 
reproach of 'racism' received in one of the German debates. But this did 
not happen. Another important issue of concern for settled ethnic 
minorities is the separation of 'bogus' and 'genuine' visa applicants. This 
was claimed to affect black and Asian citizens' right "to be visited by their 
friends and families" (Hattersley, Labour, 9 June 1992, col. 154). 
All of these criticisms relate to ethnic minorities' substantive 
citizenship as racial discrimination in the British context mainly takes 
place in connection with substantive rights and liberties. 
8.4 The European level 
In the selected German and British debates, the European 
dimension of ethnic minority related issues has also been mentioned -
albeit not in a comprehensive way, as these debates dealt with 
amendments to national laws. 
Opposition parties have deplored the creation of "a Fortress Europe, 
so that the European Union can turn its back on those who are seeking 
refuge from violence, from persecution, from war, and from torture." 
(Madden, Labour, 21 January 1992, col. 278). Concern has also been 
expressed in both, British and German debates, about the status of non-
European long-term residents in countries such as Germany where they 
usually do not have formal citizenship rights and can, thus, be "denied the 
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status of free movement throughout the European Community." 
(Godman, Labour, 2 March 1992, col. 27). By not extending European 
citizenship rights to non-European settled immigrants, the Community 
has been criticized for "creating an underclass" (Corbyn, Labour, 2 March 
1992, col. 63). In the British debates, this was mainly seen as a problem for 
"immigrant workers long domiciled in ... France or ... Germany" (Godman, 2 
March 1992, col. 27) and not for ethnic minorities residing in Britain. In 
Germany, too, concern was expressed about preferable treatment of EU-
nationals as a result of the Maastricht Treaty (in terms of granting local 
voting rights) by excluding long-term resident non-EU nationals from 
these provisions (see, e.g., Daubler-Gmelin, SPD, 29 April 1993, p. 13196). 
This has led an MP representing the SPD to claim that 
"one could regard the privileges for EU-nationals as a form of discrimination 
of the remaining permanent foreign residents - such as the approximately 
1.9 million Turks - in the FRG ." 
(Andes, 28 April 1994, p. 19413) 
The lack of formal citizenship is, therefore, recognized as a problem not 
only on the national (German) level, but on the European level, too. 
Despite being formally recognized citizens, ethnic minorities in 
Britain might also encounter problems in the form of a clash between 
their formal rights and their substantive liberties on the European level. 
"[T]he Maastricht Treaty .... will create problems for people from black and ethnic 
minority communities. The Act is supposed to allow free movement of people, but we 
know that, because of racism, people are not being allowed to move frccly around 
Europe. They are being stopped on the borders and on the streets of European cities 
and asked to produce documents, purely on the basis of the colour of their skin." 
(Grant, Labour, 9 June 1992, col. 183) 
Definitions of European citizenship are thus not only legal issues, but also 
issues of identity. This has been mentioned in the German debates, too. A 
member of the Green Party, for instance, has criticized the positive 
evaluation of the collective 'European' majority by depreciating 'the [non-
European] other'; 
"What kind of Europe do we want? .. .In this Europe, where new definitions are being 
preached, the collective depreciation of social groups which are not European, are 
reinforced .... A social civil war is stirred up betwccn Europeans and non-
Europeans. A Europe where Arabs, Asians and Latin-Americans are stigmatized -
such a Europe .. .is not open as long as it reduces its Ausliindcr!rcundlichkeit 
(friendliness towards foreigners) to Europeans." 
(Menenes Vogl, Grone, 26 April 1990, p. 16277) 
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As a result, it appeared in the debates that ethnic minorities' formal 
and/ or substantive citizenship is negatively affected on the European 
level, too, on the basis of racialization and traditional images/identity on 
the part of the majority as 'white' and 'culturally homogeneous'. 
8,5 Concluding remarks 
The tendency - starting around 1980 - of rendering immigration 
issues increasing importance in political discourse (Zentrum fUr 
Tiirkeistudien 1995) has not ceased during the 1990s. Parliamentary 
debates in both countries, Germany and Britain, have played an important 
role in this. 
The selected parliamentary debates in both countries have shown 
that the reproduction of racism is a complex process and often appears in 
connection with nationalism. What happens in political discourse is not 
simply a matter of imposing a dominant ideology of 'white' supremacy. 
On the contrary, as van Dijk has rightly remarked, "contemporary ethnic-
racial attitudes and practices are usually much more sophisticated and 
even contradictory" by incorporating "general egalitarian and 
humanitarian norms and values" (1993: 113). This is mostly done in a 
subtle and indirect form by focusing on positive self-presentation. The 
purpose often is indirectly to hint at negative construed properties of other 
groups of people. 
Moreover, political discourse on immigration and asylum policies 
seems to be largely polarized. This shows that ethnic or 'racial' dominance 
is not absolute, but rather that "different elite groups and subgroups may 
be variously involved in the reproduction as well as in the challenge of 
dominance" (van Dijk 1993:113). This polarization has become especially 
clear in the German case where the majority of conservatives hold on to 
the claim that "Germany is and cannot be a country of immigration from 
countries outside the European Union", whereas a minority of Green 
party members is in favour of an 'open door' policy (Kulluk 1996:302). The 
SPD, the majority of the Green Party, and some members of the FDP 
represent a third, and more realistic, position: They press for the 
improvement of the legal and socio-economic status of current 
immigrants with long periods of residence. The Greens and the regional 
SPD groups do not demand citizenship of origin to be given up at any 
point (Kulluk 1996; Cohn-Bendit & Schmid 1992) - which represents a 
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more radical policy than the new 'child citizenship' model which includes 
'toleration' of dual citizenship until immigrant children come of age. 
In Britain, the polarization of the parties is not quite as evident as 
the Conservatives and Labour are both against an 'open door' policy and 
the reduction of 'bogus asylum seekers'. They disagree on measures for 
ascertaining and defining 'bogus applicants' and also on the general effects 
this has on settled ethnic communities. Members of the Labour Party are 
in general more concerned about racial discrimination with regard to 
ethnic minorities' substantive citizenship. Both parties recognize the 
diversity of ethnic minorities' experience and socio-economic position in 
British sOciety, but Labour is far more critical of remaining areas of evident 
. racialization (such as the criminal justice system) and the shortcomings of 
European citizenship. The polarization of political parties in Germany and 
Britain is reflected in public opinion, as illustrated in the previous chapter. 
And yet, on the whole, public opinion reflects the power position of the 
governing parties as the majority - at times overwhelmingly, at times 
narrowly - holds the same views as the conservative parties in both 
countries. 
Overall, it can be observed that there is a more advanced 
understanding of racism and its indirect effects on ethnic minorities' 
citizenship in Britain. This has to be linked to the fact that formal 
citizenship is not an issue in the British context and that comprehensive 
anti-discrimination legislation exists. By contrast, political discourse in 
Germany centres upon formal citizenship. However, the governing 
Conservatives in both countries make use of similar populism and 
dangerous rhetoric about immigrants, foreigners, and asylum-seekers by 
negatively stereotyping these groups in association with crime and 'bogus' 
(Husbands 1994) - dangerous as this rhetoric tends to result in blatant 
generalizations about ethnically or 'racially' different people in general 
and thus, can have negative effects for settled migrant communities (in 
particular on their substantive citizenship). This type of rhetoric has been 
described in both countries by the opposition as 'pub talk' (Hattersley, 
Labour, 2 November 1992, col. 48; Sonntag-Wolgast, SPD, 28 Apri11994, p. 
19405-406; the German equivalent is 'Stammtisch'). Thus, despite national 
differences in content and use of terminology, the prevailing political 
discourse in both countries is remarkably similar as to rhetorical and 
argumentative strategies of legitimation, rationalization and persuasion -
as also observed by van Dijk (1993). References to positive self-evaluation 
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and depreciation of 'others' are thereby signs of racialization and 
nationalism. 
These strategies in German and British parliamentary discourse can 
also be interpreted as constituting an 'us' and 'we' pattern: 'We' are above 
all suspicion with regard to racism and nationalism as opposed to 'them', 
the political opponent. It is thereby arguable to what extent left-wing 
parties are genuinely more liberal and free of a sole interest in securing 
votes (a criticism made against the Conservative Right). In both countries, 
the asylum issue has shown a 'change of heart' of the Left (SPO and 
Labour) and thus, a move towards 'the right'. The example of the asylum 
laws shows that "at the end of the day, it is the professional politicians 
who decide often ignoring the considerations and the recommendations 
made during hearings and motivated solely by securing maximum success 
and their own power in the next election." (Kulluk 1996: 313). And yet, it 
cannot be denied that left-wing parties are perceived as being more 
concerned about ethnic minorities' interests (Sen & Karakasoglu 1994) and 
that the right-wing parties tend to use a more populist rhetoric than their 
left-wing coun terparts5• 
Kulluk comes to the conclusion that "rethinking and restructuring 
of political discourse in ways which could contribute further to the 
projects of 'citizenship in Europe' and open, transnational citizenship, 
cannot be left primarily to the professional politicians." (1996:318). Her 
suggestion that "it calls for the active efforts of both the immigrant and the 
German [and British, N.P.] populations" (ibid.) leads to my conclusion as 
explained in chapter Six: that this is best done by way of local citizenship. 
This chapter has shown that the symbiotic relationship between 
nationalism and racialization appears in parliamentarians' rhetoric, 
expressed in positive self-presentation of the indigenous majority by 
(mainly culturally) depreciating ethnic minorities. The views of 
representatives of ethnic minorities' pressure or interest groups on these 
issues will be the subject of the following chapter. 
S A fact which Clemens (1983) has underpinned by empirical evidence in 
his work on the Conservatives' electoral success in 1979 and the move 
towards populism in British politics since then. 
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9. The Interviews 
Having reviewed most of the relevant academic literature, I wanted to 
find out the way in which the theories I had read and my own thoughts about 
them - as outlined in the chapters Four, Five, and Six - match up with the 
opinion of organizations who are actively engaged in improving 'race 
relations' in Germany, Britain, and on the EU level. In addition, having 
identified some common trends regarding general public attitudes and 
patterns in parliamentarians' discourse regarding immigration and ethnic 
minority related issues in Germany and Britain, it was also of interest to find 
out whether the selected organizations made any reference to these attitudes 
and politicians' rhetoric. 
The objective of this chapter is, therefore, to explore the views of lobby 
groups and governmental or semi-governmental organizations working in 
the 'race relations' field (or AusHinderarbeit - the German equivalent) 
concerning the three main issues of interest here: racism, nationalism or 
national identity, and citizenship. The issue of the extent to which nationalism 
and racism affect (in a combined form) immigrants' citizenship status and the 
extent to which the concept of citizenship could minimize these effects, and 
thus function as a mechanism for inclusion, has so far not been explored by 
empirical research. Therefore, in their capacity as experts and opinion leaders 
influencing policy-makers by lobbying and as general campaigners for issues 
of their concern (aimed at 'the public'), the thoughts and ideas of the 
interviewed representatives of selected organizations are regarded as very 
useful for the understanding of the interrelated workings of racism, 
nationalism and citizenship. 
The proposing of actual policies is an area only a few of the selected 
organizations engage in. More importantly, though, as most of them are 
involved in grass-root work or have strong links to grass-root organizations, 
they are familiar with ethnic or immigrant communities' concerns and needs. 
If not directly active at grass-root level, they offer personal advice to single 
members of ethnic communities in matters of integration/inclusion and are, 
therefore, in one capacity or another an important source from which to find 
out the nature of the 'dimensions of welcome' - to use Husbands' words -
within British or German society. Thus, the interviewed groups were also 
expected to express their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with available policies 
of inclusion as well as their demands for future improvements. 
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The interviews were expected to yield information with regard to the 
main arguments developed in the previous chapters, i.e. the argument for 
1. a symbiotic relationship between racism and nationalism and its 
impact on citizenship as reflected in the close link of citizenship and 
nationality in law (state level) as well as on the level of acceptance or 
rejection of the ethnic/immigrant minorities by the indigenous 
majority (i.e. within civil society); 
2. a conception of citizenship which is a) sub-divided into a formal and 
a substantive notion to grasp conceptually the difference between the 
legal status and a wider social status; and b) three-layered. 
This should allow the assessment of the inc1usionary powers of such a 
conception and its usefulness as a mechanism to resist the power of racism 
and nationalism. 
As for a three-layered conception of citizenship, these groups' 
awareness of developments on the European level and their understanding of 
European citizenship will be identified (or similar notions within their 
common sense thinking) with the implications for the emergence of a new 
type of (sub-national and/or supra-national) citizenship. Therefore, the 
interview replies were analyzed according to the additional question whether 
the EU has made or might make any difference to national citizenship 
regarding the minimization of the powers of racism and nationalism. 
The structure of this chapter follows the structure of the previous 
chapters in that there are three main sections on racism, nationalism/national 
identity, and citizenship. The order of appearance was different during the 
actual interviewing (see Appendix IV) as the interviews began with the issue 
of national identity/nationalism, followed by the issue of racism and then by 
the issue of citizenship. The thought behind this was that in the actual 
interview situation, it was tactically viewed as better not to start the 
interviews with the controversial and 'touchy' issue of 'racism' (which is 
maybe more the case in Germany than in Britain), but rather with national 
identity. However, to maintain the same structure and line of argument, the 
sections of this chapter will follow the order of the previous chapters. 
9.1 Racism 
In this section, the objective was to explore the variety of the selected 
groups' views on, or definitions of, racism and the consequences or 
177 
limitations for immigrants' citizenship. For this purpose, the questions 
focused on: 1. whether the interviews conveyed the idea that racism exists in 
German and British society (and if so, how); 2. whether the interviews 
expressed the notion of radalization and racisms (or similar notions in their 
common sense thinking), i.e. different racisms across time and space in terms 
of target groups and articulation; and 3. whether they yielded any evidence 
for the argument of a symbiotic relationship between nationalism and racism. 
As a reminder, in Britain, five organizations were interviewed: one 
semi-governmental organization which is in charge of monitoring the 
workings of the Race Relations Acts; and four non-governmental groups (one 
of which is run by and mainly for the Indian community; the remaining three 
engage in all sorts of lobbying and consciousness raising activities). In 
Germany, seven organizations were interviewed ranging from two federal-
state institutions (one of which is directly involved in policy-making) to five 
lobby groups (three Turkish groups, two established by indigenous 
Germans). On the European level, the EU Migrants Forum was interviewed as 
it is the only 'pan-European' lobby group. 
9.1.1 The British organizations 
a) General definitions 
The existence of racism in general was not disputed by any of the 
interviewees. However, there were differences in their views on its broad 
definition - a fact which could have to do with the different nature of each 
organization's 'field of activities'. 
The head of a voluntary organization which mainly engages in public 
campaigning without any policy-making power thought of racism as: 
" ... [P]rejudice plus power .... And a lot of politics ... .It is about power, 
it is about systems of control...Jt is the system of capitalism also." 
(Int. 3/B) 
In this definition, two different dimensions of racism are combined: 
'prejudice' as an individualistic notion and 'system' as an institutional or 
systemic form of racism. This rather simplistic 'prejudice + power' view could 
be interpreted as reflecting the type of activities this organization is involved 
in, which seems to require a rather symbolic, challenging and rhetoric 
language (i.e. persuasive speech rather than the reflection of 'objective' 
reality). The 'prejudice + power' definition might, therefore, function as a 
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'catch-phrase'. Such a broad view could also hardly be translated into actual 
policies - an area outside this organization's capacity. 
A different view, however, was expressed by the director of another 
voluntary organization whose main objective is to publish research type of 
literature on 'race relations' matters and related issues. In the interviewee's 
own words, this organization is "in principle interested in philosophical 
issues." There is, therefore, no need for a 'catchword' type of definition and 
the involvement in research seems to result in a more complex definition: 
"I have a view of racism itself as a complex set of interactions ... There 
is a whole range of things and I do not want to say the one thing is 
more important than another. I rather speak in terms of a package ... 
And I think if one did say this is the thing and in fact only this, then 
that is what is mostly called tokenism ... when we criticize things for 
tokenism, what we often mean is that something which is good in itself 
.... has been split off from other things ..... " (Int. l/B) 
The distinction between 'catchword' and 'complex' definitions can be made 
for all the interview replies. Most of the non-governmental lobby groups 
expressed a 'prejudice + power' view (with the exception of the above quoted 
group), whereas the semi-governmental organization had a far less simplistic 
approach to the definition of racism. 
Despite this distinction, the ideas on racism merged when they were 
applied to concrete situations. 
b) Concrete manifestations 
The interviewees referred to a range of elements as reflecting racism: 
attitudinal, structural and discursive elements. Taking them all together in "a 
complex set of interactions", they present racism as all-pervasive in British 
society. 
"Racism .... really, that is from just name calling or graffiti to ... dcaths. 
Extreme levels of prejudice played out in that way [are] mainly in 
hOUSing. Black people have the worst housing, education, social 
services, employment. Black people are more likely to be unem-
ployed than their white colleagues. And there is racism within the 
state, the police or the judiciary, the criminaJization of young black 
people - in all forms of life racism ... raiscs its dirty hand ... " (Int. 3/B) 
The attitudinal elements, according to this view, cover verbal abuse and 
physical violence. This form of racism is also reflected in the social structure, 
i.e. in the area of housing, employment, health etc., and as part of the control 
machinery of the state. These elements were mentioned by other interviewees 
as well (SIB; 2/B). 
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One interviewee added another type of element - discursive racism. 
ItIn particular, if I look at the effects - the unemployment figures, for 
example, I would say they measure racism. Figures from health, 
figures from housing, education, achievement - there is a whole 
range of things which represent structural racism. In terms of 
discourse as distinct from structure, [there is) the discourse of 
the extreme right-wing party .... but also the more coded discourse of 
the tabloid press and The Times and The Telegraph, I would mention .... " 
(Int.l/B) 
The first quote sterns from the same interviewee who defined racism as 
"prejudice + power" which is clearly of a rhetoric nature. But when looking at 
the elements mentioned as concrete reflections of racism, they are as 'complex' 
as the elements mentioned by the second interviewee (who described racism 
straight away as a complex phenomenon). There is consent among all the 
interviewees that racism is reflected at all levels of (British) society and that it 
is manifested in a variety of ways. This is underpinned by the many different 
types of research done on racism in the area of housing (Rex & Tomlinson 
1979), employment (Brown 1984), racial violence (Gordon 1990), state 
structure (Gordon 1993), criminalization (Gordon 1992; Gilroy 1987), 
education (Gill et al. 1992) and health (Skellington & Morris 1992) as well as 
discursive racism (van Dijk 1993). There is, therefore, plenty of empirical 
evidence underpinning this view of racism as existing within many 
institutional spheres as well as the discursive realm. 
c) Articulation 
All interviewees agreed that contemporary forms of racism are less 
expressed in biological terms and more culturally. It was, however, not 
suggested that a biological way of thinking has completely disappeared from 
people's minds. This means that Barker's notion of a 'new racism' (1981) or 
Balibar's notion of a 'culturalist racism' (in: Balibar & Wallerstein 1991) 
focusing on cultural differences was similarly expressed by the interviewees. 
At the same time, however, Mason's belief that the 'old', i.e. biological racism, 
has not completely 'died out' (1992:23) was confirmed by most of the 
in terviewees. 
1t ••• As for articulation - overtly, most certainly, there is much less 
discourse of a biological difference, though I think that has not 
disappeared, it is just beneath the surface ... there are still meta-
phors or words which imply biological belief ... But I do not think 
that any educated person will still maintain and expand a biological 
basis for racism. They would still expand the belief that any country 
should be culturally as homogeneous as possible." (Int. l/B) 
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It is interesting that this interviewee mentions education as one criterion for 
the way in which racism is articulated. An educated person would 'wrap up' 
racist thinking in cultural explanations - a statement which shows clearly how 
close this cultural type of racism is to nationalism,. In other words, the belief 
that a country "should be culturally homogeneous" could very well be read as 
a nationalistic idea. The view that in particular educated people express their 
racist views in cultural terms is also suggested by Bauman who defines 
nationalism (i.e. cultural explanations) as the racism of the intellectuals and 
racism as the nationalism of the masses (1992:675). 
This aspect of education could also be the reason why another 
interviewee thought that, from a personal point of view, racism "is less 
articulated than ever before". And yet, when it comes to his professional 
experience (as senior information officer in a semi-governmental organization 
which monitors the workings of the Race Relations Acts), he qualified this 
statement: 
"When we get involved in race discrimination cases, we continue to 
find a - I mean I could show you piles of cases which we have taken 
to courts when black workers going to a factory are abused, assaulted 
in a way in which somebody like me who never experiences it would 
assume this is gone. But no, it is alive." (Int. 4/B) 
The view that racism is "less articulated than ever before" might, therefore, 
refer to the interviewee's private environment with people who are as well 
educated as he is. However, when it comes to cases revolving around racial 
discrimination, the open and blunt type of racism seems to be very much 
alive. Hence the kind of conclusion the interviewee arrived at: 
"I do not think, the roots [of racism] have changed. The expression 
of it may have changed. There is no doubt that English people 
have different layers of prejudice." (Int.4/B) 
Not only might predominant expressions of racism have changed depending 
on different historical periods, but also the main target groups. 
d) Target groups 
As for target groups of racism, some interviewees mentioned different 
historical periods during which certain groups suffered most from racist 
attitudes. The notion of racisms (Hall 1978b) and racialization - in particular 
the idea that not only people of colour can be radalized (Miles 1982; Small 
1994) - was, therefore, touched upon. 
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"If we look at British history, the main target groups of racism earlier 
in the century were Jewish refugees from eastern Europe settling 
in Britain." (Int. 51B) 
"The victims have included Jews, of course. And to a certain 
extent - we have just published a report on that - gypsics, but 
less than on the continent. The Irish in the 19th ccntury - but lots 
of Irish people maintain that at the present time." (lnt. l/B) 
Although Irish and Jewish people have not ceased to be victims of racism, 
post-war labour migrants seem to be the main target groups in today's context 
- in particular immigrants from Asia, as explained by one interviewee: 
"I think a lot also depends on economic [circumstances] - wcll, 
say in that group [the Asians], the Bangladeshi community came 
here latest, has been here in an economic reccssion and has becn 
less able to move on economically and therefore, is still stuck in 
a much more dangerous position than, say, some people from 
India ... " (Int. SIB) 
'Lateness' of arrival, length of residence and socio-economic conditions are 
seen here as decisive for the different degrees of racism the various groups of 
immigrants suffer. 
e) Origin and sources of racism 
There was the predominant view among the interviewees that the 
'economy' is one important source of racialization processes, i.e. as a 'system' 
(capitalism) which creates circumstances under which racism flourishes (such 
as in times of a recession). The media and political parties were largely seen 
as playing an important role in creating an 'anti-foreign' climate in which 
immigrants are blamed for socio-economic problems. In this way, most 
interviewees established a macro and micro level of racism suggesting that 
the roots of racism are lying very deep. 
"I think it is an alliance between the media and the parties ... Jt is 
undoubtedly the media, daily conversation ... cducation .... Thosc 
are the three biggest places, I think, wherc the world is - as the 
phrase is - constructed on a daily basis ... A vicw of the world 
is maintained." (Int. liB) 
The term 'maintain' is highly suggestive of 'tradition' and the passing on of 
fairly unchanged ideas. This can, therefore, certainly be interpreted as 
referring to deeper historical roots of racism - an aspect which the same 
interviewee expressed more clearly elsewhere: 
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"I think political parties respond to forces and use these forces .... 
forces in society, the forces in civilization. And the political parties 
do their best to respond to this and to claim that they can do some-
thing about it." (lnt. lIB) 
The role of politicians and the media are understood here as crucial 'sources' 
of racism in the 'micro level' context, but it is also suggested that there are 
deeper forces within society as a whole. It is, therefore, probably better to 
refer to the role of politicians and the media as 'triggers' of something which 
already exists in the midst of society. 
The idea of 'deeper roots' was much more explicitly expressed in 
reference to history by the following interviewees (the first being a member of 
an ethnic minority, the second being a member of the majority): 
[Where do racist ideas originally come from?] 
"It is from society .. .!t is based on history." (lnt. 2/B) 
"From our past.. .. We have been in competition with other nations, 
we have dominated - our peoples have dominated other nations 
for so long. It is part and parcel of our way of thinking .. .!t is there, 
it has been passed on from one generation to another one ... [Thusl 
[r)acism appears to be at every level." (Int. 4/B) 
This shows quite explicitly how racism has become an almost inevitable part 
of British society. The latter quote also expresses the idea of racism being 
rooted in imperialism and colonialism (a racist attitude was developed by 
dominating other peoples). This leads to the depiction of racism as being 
linked to the formation of an identity as a (superior) 'race' or an identity as a 
dominating nation vis-a-vis the inferior and dominated 'Other'. It might, 
therefore, not be too far fetched to interpret this quote as indicating a 
symbiotic relationship between racism and nationalism. 
9.1.2 The German organizations 
a) Racism - a taboo? 
For German organizations, the first question was why there is a 
general recognition of the existence of 'hostility towards foreigners' (i.e. in the 
media and political discourse) but a reluctance to refer to this phenomenon as 
'racism'. All interviewees (members of the majority as well as Turkish 
minority) thought that the Nazi-past has something to do with this. But there 
were differences among the interviewees with regard to their personal 
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opinion and further explanations about the influence of the past on the 
contemporary context. 
"Racism - that was always murder of Jews." ([nt. BIG) 
"The term 'race' has become a taboo because of the 'race 
policies' of the National Socialists. Therefore, it is di{(icult (or 
us to talk about it because it is the instant reminder of these 
absurd 'race policies' aimed at extermination." (Int. 2/G) 
The experience of extreme racism during the Hitler-era has obviously left its 
imprints on today's general understanding of racism which is first of all seen 
in the context of anti-semitism and genocide. Because of racism's "direct 
historical connection with Hitler", there is the wide-spread belief in Germany 
that "Hitler is done with since 1945, therefore racism does not exist anymore" 
(Int. 1/G). But what are the interviewees' personal or organizational 
opinions? 
"The fact that 'hostility towards foreigners' is more talked about in 
every day life, might also be an avoidance of the issue, but it has also 
got to do with the fact that the recruited foreigners are referred to. It 
is not so much about 'race', but that they are non-Germans, whereas 
.... Hitler placed 'race' in the foreground. There is a 'race problem' 
... when it is about blacks and whites, namely German blacks or Afro-
Germans ... and white Germans. In this case, I would explain the problem 
as racism .... " (Int. l/G; emphasiS added) 
This interviewee believes that because the 'targets' of contemporary hostile 
attitudes include the recruited labour migrants (Le. former guest-workers), 
the terminology of 'race' is not applicable. According to her, labour migrants 
are thought of as 'non-Germans' in a cultural sense, whereas Hitler's racist 
ideology and policies were clearly based on biological explanations about the 
differences between Jews and Gentiles. Interestingly, the same interviewee 
would use the terminology of 'racism' in the contemporary context of 'Afro-
black' and 'white' relations which shows a predominantly biological 
understanding based on phenotypical criteria, such as the colour of the skin. 
Differences based on culture are not viewed here as racist. Thus, the 
distinction between 'new racism' in culturalist terms and 'old', pseudo-
scientific racism - as argued for by Barker (1981) and others - is not reflected 
in this statement at all. On the other hand, there is the hint that the official 
denial of 'racism' could also be a matter of avoiding the issue - an aspect 
another interviewee mentioned in a similar way: 
"[The reluctant use of 'racism'} is also about the bad image abroad . 
... Seiters, the [then, N.P.] Minister of the Interior, was standing there 
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in front of the burning house in Rostock 1 and said that this damages 
our image! And if you admit that racism exists, it sounds even worse 
than hostility towards foreigners .... ! think it has got a lot to do with 
playing down." (Int. 3/G; emphasis added) 
There seems to exist particular pressure - based on recent history - on 
Germany with regard to its international standing. Parallels to its Nazi-past 
are drawn quickly by other countries, conveying that Germany 'relapses' into 
Nazi practices. This might indeed be a reason for the (official) attempt to 'play 
down' the seriousness of recent arson attacks by avoiding the terminology of 
racism. This aspect was also mentioned by the following interviewee: 
"It is clear that the importance of events in Germany - Solingen, and 
before MoIIn or Rostock - meet a stronger echo within the world 
public than if it had happened anywhere else. That has got to do 
with the German past." (Jnt. IIG) 
Although the past has certainly something to do with the reluctant use of the 
terminology of 'racism' in the contemporary context, most interviewees did 
not express the thought that there might be some sort of continuity and 'racist 
tradition' within society at large. Kalpaka & Rathzel's view of racism - as an 
'issue of historical connection' (Frage nach historischer Verbindung; 1990:18)-
does not find any equivalent interpretation among most of the interviewees. 
Only one of the respondents expressed this idea quite clearly. Her view also 
summarizes very well the prevailing attitude towards 'racism' in Germany: 
"There are certainly differing opinions [on whether hostility towards 
foreigners or racism is the 'correct' terminology] .. .In politics, it has 
been maintained for a long time that there is no racism at all in 
Germany, because we lost our colonies during the First World War . 
... Racism is perceived as a negatively discriminating attack on 
(Afro-)black people by whites ... And that leads to the fact that the 
term racism must not appear. However, it is individualized by saying 
"hostility towards foreigners". Moreover, it was made clear in politics 
that Germany was not a racist country ... and the term 'hostility' was 
[used] as an individual matter [in the sense that1 there are only individual 
'nut cases' who are hostile towards foreigners. But a general climate, 
for which the term racism is much more suitable [in my opinion1, docs 
not exist. This is the point, why the term is not used, because it is 
generally denied that something like that exists .. .J personally think 
that racism does exist co]]ectively in such a society - you can sec it 
institutionally ... And it is also in our minds .... at least since colonialism 
it has been in our minds." (Jnt. 4/G; emphasis added) 
1 This refers to one of the many arson attacks on refugee or immigrant 
homes during 1992. 
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This view refers to the issue that the term 'hostility towards foreigners' 
characterizes an individual attitude, implying that only single persons are 
responsible for hostile 'activities' (Bhavnani 1993). Another interviewee (Int. 
2/G) expressed such an individualizing interpretation as her own opinion of 
racism. She actually believed in the so-called 'Einzeltiiterthese' (single 
perpetrator thesis). This understanding, however, does not describe a general 
climate as expressed by the interviewee in the above quote (Int. 4/G), who 
viewed racism as resulting from a long history beyond the Nazi-era, 
including Germany's involvement in colonizing other countries. Therefore, 
this interviewee seems to have a view of racism as an inevitable logic within 
all levels of German society (collectively and institutionally). This could 
further mean that there is an implicit understanding of historically different 
racisms and racializing processes. 
The distinction between 'hostility towards foreigners' as an 
individualistic notion and a general 'climate' reminds of the distinction made 
by the British organizations between 'prejudice' and 'systemic' forms of 
racism. 
The view of racism being connected to Hitler's 'race policies' or to the 
colonial context of 'black and white' relations - meaning that in the 
contemporary context of Germany, it is 'hostility towards foreigners' as a sole 
individual matter which exists - was expressed by the interviewees l/G and 
2/G. They both work in the same semi-(state)governmental organization (one 
as the head, the other one as the senior information officer). This could stem 
from the fact that the head of this organization was a former CDU member of 
the city-state parliament. Her general political views are, therefore, likely to 
be similar to those of the Conservatives - the main party denying any 
contemporary (German) forms of racism2 - and this organization's approach 
to the issue of racism seems to be influenced by these views. 
The understanding of racism as a general climate rooted in history, as 
expressed by interviewee G/4, on the other hand, might reflect the fact that 
this department was created by the Green Party. Also, the interviewee - the 
head of this department - has never been a politician herself, but has worked 
in grass-root organizations for many years. Her knowledge of 'ethnic minority 
issues' based on her long-term grass-root activism and her personal history 
(born of a 'mixed' couple, married to a 'foreigner') might have led to the 
recognition that racism exists at all levels of society. 
2 See chapter Eight as well as Van Dijk (1993:111). 
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The acknowledgement of racism on official or political level is 
mentioned by one interviewee as coming slowly to the surface - albeit in the 
limited context of the city-state Hamburg. 
"[NJow, for about five years, the tenn 'racism' is likely to be used in 
the new guidelines for the policy on foreigners of the Senate [state-city 
government of Hamburg, N.P.J. In this way - I don't know whether 
consciously - [something has changed]." (Jnt. 8/G) 
This changed official approach to racism might be the result of the successful 
campaigning and 'educational' work of this organization which concentrates 
on Hamburg and the policies of its state-city government. Also, the party in 
power has for a long time been (and still is) the SPD, many of whose members 
and MPs - in contrast to the CDU /CSU - do not deny the existence of racism 
in contemporary Germany. 
b) Articulation and elements 
As for the question of how racism is articulated, the issue of the 
difference between a more subtle, culturally based definition and a cruder, 
biologically based expression was mentioned by those interviewees who did 
not minimize the existence of racism in the contemporary context. Most of 
them thought that 'culture' is predominantly used today as a criterion to 
distinguish between peoples, but there are slight differences in their views on 
the extent to which biological thinking is still alive. 
"[Racism is linked with] ethnicity and culture. This is now new racism . 
.. [Biologically based racism] exists only within the right-wing extremist 
scene ... But it is also difficult when an Afro-black person marries a 
white person. This is somehow biologically explained ... [With a Turkish 
person it is] the religion which does not fit in." (lnt. 8/G) 
" ... Religion plays a role .... but biological factors, I think, play still 
a hidden role in Germany SOciety." (lnt. 6/G) 
"There is one dominant culture and others. It is more cultural. 
Biological- nobody dares to mention that anymore .. .1 think that has 
gone. Or it only appears latently .. .1 maintain that there is a hierarchy 
of cultures in the minds of people." (lnt. 4/G) 
All these statements suggest that 'biology' has not disappeared completely 
from people's minds and most interviewees suggest a co-existence of cultural 
and biological expressions of racism. This reminds of the 'British' interviews 
which similarly referred to what has been termed 'new racism' (1981) by 
Barker (Le. culturally-based) by denying the 'death' of biological forms of 
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racism. It seems to depend on the recipient of racially motivated 
discrimination (Afro-black or Turkish) and the social group involved in 
discriminating (such as right-wing extremists). Important is that - no matter 
whether it is on biological or cultural grounds - distinctive boundaries are 
drawn between indigenous Germans and ethnic minorities which are 
supposed to demonstrate that the latter 'do not fit in'. Moreover, it seems that 
these boundaries have the tendency to be based on a hybrid or a link of 
racism and nationalism as expressed by the following interviewee: 
" ... [It] has turned out that this [rejection of Turkish people) is clearly 
based on or is substantiated by 'Gennany for the Germans'. The 
non-Germans, the foreigners, the other ethnies, don't belong here. 
They should disappear." (Int. 71G) 
The slogan 'Germany for the Germans' has frequently appeared since 
reunification. It is referred to by this interviewee as a clear sign of racism. 
However, it could also be interpreted as a sign of nationalism (other 
commentators, such as Oberndorfer, 1993, related this slogan to rising 
nationalism since reunification). In any case, the aim is to draw boundaries 
between Germans and foreigners, whereby the latter are not seen as 
legitimate members ("they don't belong"). Nonetheless, it is suggested here 
that this interviewee's view demonstrates an understanding of racism which 
is not clearly distinguishable from nationalism. 
As for concrete racist elements in Germany, in the replies of many 
interviewees the emphasis was put on the nationality I citizenship law (Int. 
S/G; 7/G; 8/G) - a matter which will be returned to in more detail in the 
sections on national identity and citizenship. 
c) Target groups 
A few interviewees mentioned that there is a hierarchy of 'foreigners' 
which indicates that the sole factor of being 'foreign' does not necessarily 
result in racism - an idea mentioned by authors such as Forsythe (1989). For 
instance, western Europeans (in particular ED-nationals) and North 
Americans are not necessarily perceived as foreigners. One interviewee also 
observed 
"in Berlin the following phenomenon: Japanese people are regarded 
as western Europeans without any problem, although their culture ... 
is so different...It depends on the social and economic position 
of the respective non-whites ... Therefore, I think racism also has 
a lot to do with the social position of the minority." (Int. l/G) 
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This view could also function as a critique of the terminology of 'hostility 
towards foreigners' which is seen by many commentators as referring to any 
group of foreigners (which is obviously not the case). The sole factor of being 
from a different cultural background, therefore, does not have to result in 
racism. Rather, certain socio-political processes are involved. This links up 
with the notion of racialization as a social process of constructing boundaries 
between ethnic minorities and the majority (Small 1994). Although the 
interviewee did not explicitly come to this conclusion, she gave another 
example which fits this notion: 
"[B]efore the Wall came down, the Vietnamese in West-Berlin were 
considered the best integrated group among the foreigners. But they 
had something very special: they were so-called boat people who 
came to Germany as Kontingent-F1iichtlinge3. And from the very first 
day they had a secure status and received certain 'starting aids' from 
the state. After the fall of the Wall, the ex-GDR citizens claimed that the 
Vietnamese, the contract workers, were not integra table. The main 
difference between those Vietnamese was ... that in East-Berlin, the 
contract workers were accommodated in hostels, they were controlled 
and there was an absolute 'contact barrier' to the 'normal' German 
population. And therefore, they did not have the opportunity to learn 
German." (Int. l/G) 
This example illustrates that the sole fact of being from a very different 
cultural background (here: Vietnam) does not have to result in low degrees of 
integration or in the view of 'cultural incompatibility'. It is rather concrete 
immigration (integration) policies which help 'foreigners' to be generally 
accepted. The non-existence of such policies could result in racist attitudes 
and practices on the part of the majority. The active role of the government is, 
therefore, very important. This somehow shows that racism is not a 'natural' 
reaction to culturally distant people, but rather a political and social process -
a phenomenon which is best grasped by the concept of 'racialization'. 
d) Origin and source 
In every day life, governments and politicians were seen by many 
interviewees as being immediately involved in spreading racist ideas. The 
role of the media was also emphasized in this context. The role of politicians 
was suggested as reinforcing racism for their own ends, i.e. in order to catch 
3 Kontingent-FJachtlinge are refugees who were admitted through 
humanitarian 'aid' actions or through an official statement by the 
Ministery of the Interior. This means they are offically recognized 
refugees whose legal position results from the articles 2-3...J of the Geneva 
Convention (Agreement on the legal position of refugees) of 28.7.85. 
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votes and to appear competent with regard to solving socio-economic 
problems. This links up with the theme of 'crisis' and the increase of anti-
foreign propaganda claiming that the solution is 'to get rid of immigrants'. 
One interviewee explained the relationship between 'crisis' and the racializing 
role of the media and politicians: 
'The media surely playa role ... When [news] is about foreigners, 
the impression is enforced that there is a direct link between the 
presence of foreigners and e.g. crime .. .! cannot make a clear 
statement concerning the government. [But] we are here in the 
middle of an enormous phase of radical change, and [the problems 
which are related to unification] are not openly debated, because 
nobody knows the solutions. Thereby the atmosphere against 
foreigners is indirectly enforced ..... Thcre is no difference between 
the parties." (Int. l/G) 
Other interviewees, however, thought that the reason why politicians and the 
media pick foreigners as scapegoats has deeper roots. In particular politicians 
are suggested as having a 'trigger' role. 
"I think these things are passed on. Passed on from generation to 
generation. And we underestimate the unspoken messages .... 
Politicians and the media are also responsible .. Young people only 
do what is already going on in the midst of society .... lt [racism] 
exists in one part of this society and latently in many more parts, 
and children are aware of that .... And there, something has snapped. 
A break of taboo, and those [politicians] who always wanted to get 
through try to get ahead ... .I regard 'big politics' as the trigger." 
(lnt. 4/G) 
"It is passed on from mouth to mouth .. .!t was passed on from 
generation to generation." (lnt. 6/G) 
These statements carry the connotation of 'history' and the deeper roots of 
racism within society and thus, support the view of racism being an inevitable 
logic within German society - as similarly expressed by the 'British' 
interviews. The notion of a 'macro' and 'micro' level of racism is, therefore, 
indicated by the 'German' interviewees, too, whereby politicians and the 
media are seen as responsible for supporting and even aggravating a 
generally racist climate. 
e) Ausltinder 
As a specifically 'German' issue, the interviewees were asked for their 
opinion of the term 'Ausltinder'. In particular those who were members of the 
Turkish minority rejected this term completely by calling themselves 
"immigrants. But this does not actually apply to those who were born here." 
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(7/G). For the non-immigrant generations, it was strongly felt that only a 
term which reflects their belongingness is appropriate. 
"We are not Ausliinder anymore. I do not use this term at all. 
We are Nicht-Deutsche (non-Germans}." (lnt. 6/G) 
"For me, the term minority does not exist in this way. And also 
the term non-German citizens or foreign fellow-citizens does 
not exist. .. For me, we are immigrants and I refer to the younger 
generations as neue Inlander .. .1nliinder of Turkish or Yugoslav 
background." (lnt. S/G) 
[neue Inlander - new 'insiders'j Inlander is the opposite to 
Auslander] 
Whatever the preferred choice of the organization or individual - the main 
message of the suggested alternatives is that these people have become new 
ethnic minorities, Le. established parts of German society. However, there is 
still the problem of their legal status as most of the Turkish immigrants are 
legally still defined as Ausltinder. This aspect was referred to by two 
interviewees (members of the majority): 
"I know of people who use the term Auslander because it is a 
legal fact. So, from this perspective they say: legally, we or they 
are Auslander and one should not try to pretend [that they are not] 
... and others say that the reality is that they have been living here for 
20,30 years and have, therefore, settled [for good) ... " (lnt. S/G) 
"We have stayed with the term Auslander .. .! think that the content 
has to change. The change of a term alone does not improve 
anything." (lnt. 3/G) 
These views clearly show the discrepancy between being legally defined as 
Auslander, but being socio-culturally Inla'nder (as a result of long periods of 
residence, birth and/or upbringing in Germany). The choice of terminology, 
therefore, becomes a matter of which 'reality' each organization (or 
individual) wants to emphasize. 
The insistence on calling settled immigrants in Germany Ausltinder to 
highlight their legal situation links up with the suggestion in Chapter Four as 
to what the best solution to this terminological dilemma could be: a change in 
law (Le. the easing of the acquisition of citizenship) and thorough 
inclusionary policies. As it stands at present, the interviewed organizations 
showed a very pragmatic approach to this dilemma. Depending on the type 
of 'activity' (in a speech or in a piece of writing), on the purpose at the 
moment of usage (educational, challenging), and on the 'addressees' of the 
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'activity', most organizations are compromising in order to achieve the best 
result. 
9.1.3 The EU Migrants Forum 
a) Definition 
The official definition of racism of the EU Migrants Forum is laid down 
in the introduction to its Manifesto Against Racism4 where it is stated that 
racism is not so much the expression of individual people, but more so "that 
of masses". Furthermore, racism "is no longer the mere and appalling 
expression of rejecting other people's colour of skin, but a differentiating 
expression of non national cultures" (Manifesto, p. 1). This definition is 
applicable to every ethnic minority group and to every country's immigration 
history and thus reflects the Forum's structure as an organization which 
represents the various ethnic minorities in all EU-member-states. In this 
approach, racism is not only based on colour, but also on culture and 
(alleged) national differences which links the issue of racism to the issue of 
nationalism, implying that the boundaries between those two are not that 
clear. 
b) Origin and purpose 
The general existence of racism within the EU is not disputed by the 
interviewee who believes that the 
"European society which is now being planned is based on racism ... 
Historically, ... racism is endemic in the European society to a 
greater or lesser extent according to the country." 
Racism is here viewed as being deeply rooted in history. This could be 
interpreted as suggesting that racism is an inevitable logic within western 
European societies because of that long tradition. 
As for the purpose of racism, it is viewed by the interviewee as 
" ... a weapon which the institutions are effectively using against 
us [the ethnic minorities] ... They [officials, politicians] are using racism 
as a weapon in order to .... consolidate the white man's position." 
4 This document and other leaflets on the activities of the t-.1igrants rorum 
were provided by the interviewee on the day of the interview as a further 
source for more detailed information as the interview schedule was very 
much delayed because of an unexpected matter the interviewee had to 
attend to. As a result, there was not as much time left for the actual 
interview as originally planned. 
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Being used as a 'weapon' means that racism is a purposeful construct rather 
than a matter of biological facts, and thus, a link is made here to Small's 
notion of racialization. Furthermore, the expression of 'the white man's 
position' seems to refer to the era of colonial expansion and imperialism as 
well as economic exploitation. There is, therefore, a link between historical 
and systemic processes involved in racialization. The Migrants Forum's 
definition of racism is, thus, 'complex' and pervasive within society rather 
than the expression of individuals. 
As western European countries have similar histories and systems, the 
European Union as a whole is likely to be influenced by this. 
c) European racism and racism in Europe 
As a European issue, racism is viewed by the interviewee as a two-
dimensional phenomenon: 1. as an institutional problem of the EU as a whole, 
in that it created provisions for EU-nationals by not including long term 
resident non-EU nationals; and 2. as a common problem within each 
individual member-state, partly triggered by the generally worsening 
economic climate. The theme of 'crisis' is indicated here, and the politicians 
are again seen as mainly responsible for using immigrants as scapegoats. 
"Racism is thriving ... because of the present economic climate. The 
politicians without exception in all countries ... are pampering to the 
lowest instinct of the constituents ... They are looking at us [immigrant 
minorities] as a problem, not as an opportunity. They are talking 
about immigration, and not about integration." 
The interviewee refers to the fact that EU policies (as a result of 'co-operative 
talks' as part of the pillar structure) do not include integrative measures but 
revolve mainly around immigration issues such as 'external border controls' 
and visa requirements (see Chapter Three). This has negative effects on 
settled minorities because in this context, they are depicted as 'problems' and 
not 'opportunities'. 
Certain differences with regard to anti-racist policies within every 
member-state are, however, acknowledged - in particular those based on the 
effectiveness of anti-discrimination legislation. According to the interviewee, 
some sort of legislation exists in every member-state with the only exception 
of the Republic of Ireland. However, not every country applies its legislation 
and not every legislation is as effective as the British. 
"[I]n this country [UK] because they have got a Race Relations Act 
which they have generally tried to implement, overt racial discrimi-
nation is practically eradicated ... But what is happening, is what I call 
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'lace curtain racism' ... 'Lace curtain racism' is how to say 'no' to a 
person of colour or race without being proven that I am racially 
discriminating against him. So ... you cannot prove it." 
This statement shows that the interviewee recognized that, although anti-
discrimination legislation has some impact on the minimization of racism 
('less overt'), it does not result in the complete eradication of racism. It rather 
re-appears in other forms Clace-curtain' racism). This could be interpreted as 
referring to the 'endemic' or inevitable nature of racism. 
d) EU-action? 
On the institutional basis of the EU as a whole, the Migrants Forum 
confirmed that competence in the 'race relations field' does not exist. 
n[T]hey [the officials, politicians] kept two things out of the 
Community control: immigration and race." 
One of the important initiatives of the Forum as a response to the Maastricht 
Treaty and its failure to enable EU-wide activities in the 'race relations field' is 
the above quoted European Manifesto against Racism. In this Manifesto, the 
Forum calls upon the member-states to review or abrogate "legislation of 
Union Member States which could include non-egalitarian measures between 
migrants and native persons and would express a latent institutional racism" 
(p. 2) and to actively support 'the Starting line'S. Furthermore, the powers of 
the European Parliament should be extended "in terms of controlling 
governments in the implementation of anti-racist legislation" (p. 3). 
So far, the Manifesto has not been very successful and is unlikely to be 
so in the near future for various reasons mentioned by the interviewee: 1. 
because countries like Germany impede any progress by denying the 
existence of racism and by not acknowledging an official status to minorities 
("In Germany, when I saw Eduard Lintner [Permanent Under-Secretary, 
CDU/CSU, N.P.1 he said: 'No, [racism] does not exist.' These were his 
words."); 2. because of the present economic climate, and 3. because of general 
elections in the member-states during which the "race and immigration card" 
was used which is viewed as most likely to be continued in forthcoming 
5 This document, which is the idea of various individuals and organizations 
throughout the EU, is a draft directive in the form a real Community 
directive might take, agreed upon in 1993. So far, the drafting group has no 
power, it simply offers this document as a basis for discussion and 
lobbying. The aim is to obtain a directive eventually, but the first step is to 
get the Treaty amended in 1996, so as to enable the Community to produce 
such legislation (The Starting Une 1994; introduction by Dummcll). 
194 
election campaigns, although the Forum had made an appeal to all politicians 
to publicly denounce doing so. The interviewee's comment on their success so 
far, therefore, was: 
"[W]e have lost our European Manifesto of Racism." 
9.1.4 Commentary 
The interview data in this section show that different historical 
backgrounds of racialization in Britain and Germany have resulted in 
different understandings of 'racism' - officially and partly also by the 
organizations. 
In Britain, a clear distinction can be made between a 'catch-phrase' type 
of definition and a 'complex' definition of racism. When those two definitions 
were applied to concrete situations, however, they merged resulting in a 
concept of racism seen as a structural, behavioural and discursive device 
present at all levels of society. This is reflected in the official recognition of 
racial discrimination in the Race Relations Acts. Racism was understood by 
most of the interviewees as existing on a macro and micro level, whereby the 
main target groups as well as prevailing articulation of racism differed. I have 
suggested that the two broad definitions of racism ('prejudice plus power', 
'complex set of interactions') do not seem to reflect anything else but the 
organizations' different fields of activities and/ or levels of influence on actual 
policy making. 
In Germany, the interview replies showed that racism is officially 
denied by the Conservative government and many other politicians, as well 
as on policy-level, underpinned by the absence or non-application of anti-
discrimination legislation - partly on the assumption that racism only refers to 
anti-semitism and genocide6 and thus, to a particular phase in Germany's 
historical experience, or to a colonial context of 'Afro-black and white' 
relations. There seems to be a preoccupation with the definition of racism in 
terms of the National Socialist ideology and 'race' policies7 with the reverse 
effect that racism is treated as a taboo term in the contemporary context. Not 
only on official level, but in the 'German' interviews, too, references to this 
6 In actual fact, most cases in which anti-discrimination legislation exists 
and is applied have to do with antisemitic propaganda (Gesetz gcgen 
Volksverhetzung: law against public incitement) or the so called 'denial or 
Auschwitz' (Auschwitzltige). 
7 Albeit only in the case of antisemitic racism. Racist atrocities committed 
against gypsies (Sinti and Roma) arc even today not officially recognized. 
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particular era were predominantly made when defining racism. This 
understanding is quite limited as it ignores other historical processes of 
racialization during the colonial and expansionist period and thus, ignores the 
racialization of, e.g., eastern European peoples (Burleigh & Wippermann 
1991; Herbert 1986). Many of the interviewees, however, disagreed with this 
official view (most of them were members of an ethnic minority) and 
acknowledged the existence of racism in contemporary German society. 
The official line in Germany - supported by two of the interviewees 
(1/G; 2/G) - shows a limited understanding of racializing processes at the 
state level, as well as within civil sOciety. The denial of racism is equated with 
the common usage of the terminology of Ausliinderfeindlichkeit (in political, 
media and academic discourse), reflecting an individualizing understanding 
of 'hostile' attitudes. The non-existence or non-application of anti-
discrimination legislation is one of the consequences, another could be that 
such an individualized 'hostility' might be regarded as resistible, or even 
eradicable, as it is not perceived as existing at all levels of German society. 
The British interviews, on the other hand, conveyed a clear understanding of 
racism as ineradicable and all-pervasive - an idea the EU Migrants Forum 
supported. 
In Britain and Germany, all of the interviewees who recognized 
'racism' as the cause for anti-foreign practices believed that cultural 
expressions of racism prevailed over the biological. However, biological 
explanations or views were not regarded as 'extinct', but rather as co-existing 
with cultural explanations - albeit not to the same extent or not with the same 
outspokenness. Furthermore, the idea of deeper historical and systemic roots 
of racism support my argument that the emphasis should rather be on the 
historical processes and purposes involved in distinguishing between 'insider' 
and 'outsider' (see Chapter Four). This also links up with the idea that racism 
is an inevitable logic within German and British society - or in (western) 
Europe as a whole, as claimed by the EU Migrants Forum. 
Despite this notion of 'inevitability', politicians in particular, as well as 
the media, were regarded by most of the interviewees (also by the EU 
Migrants Forum) as having a crucial role in 'triggering' stronger anti-foreign 
sentiments and the rising outbreaks of violence within sections of civil 
society. The influence of political discourse on public opinion - as 
demonstrated in the previous two chapters - is, therefore, confirmed by the 
interviewees. This is also supported by authors such as Jager and Cohen. The 
latter refers to influential (governmental) politicians in Britain as 'open 
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frontier guards' (1994:200), the former calls German politicians' rhetoric 
'BrandStitze' (1993)- a linguistically brilliant creation (Brandstitze actually 
means 'arson attacks'; but Stitze can also mean sentences; this term, therefore, 
refers to people who 'set fire' by their rhetoric) - as they influence the way 
how the public expresses its opinions on the presence of foreigners. 
On the European level, the argument for a distinction between 
European racism and racism in Europe (as made in Chapter Four) was 
implicitly underpinned by the EU Migrants Forum. 
The effects of the different understandings of racism as well as the 
general relationship between racism and nationalism will be further explored 
in the context of national identity. 
9.2 National identity and nationalism 
The aim of this section of the interview was to document the meaning 
of 'national identity' as defined by law (in nationality terms) and as perceived 
within civil society. To do so, the questions were to explore the following 
aspects: 
1. which points of reference are chosen to represent British or German 
national identity; 
2. where do these definitions originate from (i.e. who or what has the 
authority or power to define); 
3. do these definitions include immigrant/ethnic minorities? 
9.2.1 The British organizations 
a) Subjectivity 
This section began with the general question "Do you think British 
people have a sense of national identity?". Most of the replies of interviewees 
who were members of the majority referred to an individual understanding, 
and there did not seem to be an easy and straightforward answer to the 
essence of Britishness in general. Thus, most of the replies from members of 
the majority indicated that on a personal level, the issue of national identity is 
a very subjective matter. 
"I suppose if you ask 50 people, they all say something totally 
different." (Int. 5/B) 
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"I think, it is contested of course." (Jnt. l/B) 
For ethnic minorities, however, 'being British' refers first of all to citizenship, 
i.e. the holding of a passport, and national identity is defined in cultural or 
historical (or maybe even in political) terms. One interviewee explained: 
"What does British mean? I have got a British passport. [But) I 
see myself as an African and that is my nationality ... .It [also] 
depends on whom you speak to." (Jnt. 3/B) 
According to this view, it is also a very personal question as to how ethnic 
minorities define their own national identity. 'Being African' seems to refer to 
this particular interviewee's cultural and historical background. This could 
also be read as a political statement of the head of an organization which 
represents members of ethnic minorities, i.e. as a response to racism within, 
and non-acceptance by, British society which results in a reverse orientation 
back to the minorities' ethnic roots. In this way, the statement 'being African' 
could be interpreted as 'ethnic identity' rather than 'national identity', as it 
derives from the position of an ethno-cultural minority. 
'Britishness' is suggested here as meaning first of all (formal) rights attached 
to citizenship of the country of residence, but it does not seem to have an 
explicit cultural meaning. This was further expressed by the same interviewee 
as follows: 
"[nn terms of how I conduct myself, my sense of history, my 
experience and so on, I certainly would not describe myself as 
British even though I argue strongly for a multi-cultural Britain 
and even a multi-cultural Europe." (lnt. 3/B) 
'National identity' appears here as an issue which is linked to personal history 
and experience - an aspect which leads to the question about the elements 
generally viewed as demonstrating 'Britishness'. 
b) Boundaries and source 
The next questions referred to the content of national identity as 
predominantly claimed and who or what the source of these ideas is. It 
appeared in most replies by members of the majority that the way in which 
Britishness is perceived can be a question of political alliance. Precise ideas 
were suggested as coming from the right-wing conservative political angle, 
promoting a 'narrow' understanding of national identity in the sense that "far 
fewer things are defined as British" (Int. l/B): 
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"They are things connected with authority. So, the Royal family, for 
example, and the symbols around that. English literature, Christian 
religion, authority generally .... Conservative politicians such as Michael 
Portil1o hint in a coded way about what distinguishes British identity 
from foreigners. We ought not to criticize anything British using foreign 
models or examples or implying that foreigners are anyway better or 
have solved problems better .... so that we have things to learn. So there 
was a defiant view of all foreigners ... " (lnt. l/B) 
The distinction from foreigners is explained here as the (main?) purpose of 
defining national identity in clear (i.e. narrow) terms. Points of reference are 
thereby institutional symbols such as the monarchy, cultural symbols such as 
English literature and the Christian faith - elements named by other 
interviewees as well (Int. 4/B; 5/B). 
Right-wing/ conservative claims as the source of clear ideas about 
'Britishness' appeared in many interview replies which seems to be the case 
for two reasons: 1. the Conservatives have been the party of government for a 
long time; 2. the 'right' is usually seen in connection with the promotion of a 
'narrow' (i.e. 'ethnic') type of nationalism (Goulbourne 1991; Gilroy 1987). 
Many interviews implied that there is a (right-wing) notion of national 
identity as defined vis-a.-vis 'the Other' (distinction of British identity from 
foreigners), whereby 'the Other' is depicted in a negative way (defiant view of 
all foreigners). This links up with what has been described as the "formation 
of national identity vis-a.-vis the Other" (see also Cohen 1994; Colley 1992), 
whereby one's own national group is regarded as superior. In this way, 
national identity becomes a matter of (positive) self-identification. Apart from 
institutional and cultural symbols, another point of reference said to be 
chosen by individuals representing the Conservative Party, which illustrates 
this point, is a particular key moment or period in history: imperial Britain. 
"Margaret Thatcher based much of her ideology on a traditionalist, 
backward looking view of British nationhood. She called on the 
small-town chauvinism of England ... the imperialist, racist, chauvinistic 
prejudices that are still very strong in much of middle England. That 
sense of a desire to be a great nation again." (lnt.4/B) 
"[There is the] Thatcherite discourse [on] 'make Britain great 
again' ... " (lnt. l/B) 
The reason why this particular historical period is chosen for national 
identification is explained by interviewee 4/B with the fact that "there is not 
that sense of challenge to our past [as in Germany]". Identity as a 'great 
nation', therefore, derives from a particular understanding and perception of 
British/English history. An additional explanation could be the desire of the 
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government to reshape national identity during a period of prolonged 
recession and rising unemployment. In such a moment of 'crisis', 'old' values 
and symbols are revived. 
Imperialism is not the only impersonal historical period or element 
chosen for a positive image of collective identity. Among others, it is, 
however, an important period which also resulted in self-identification as a 
superior 'race' - as expressed by the following interviewee: 
" ... [T]here is a lot of subconscious racism in Britain in assuming 
that they have been around for an awful lot of time, we are the 
mother of democracy, the British Empire brought civilization to 
the rest of the world. A lot of that background is in many people." 
(Int. SIB) 
As mentioned above, the source of a clear definition of national identity is 
claimed by most of the interviewees to be the party of government, whereby 
individual names such as Margaret Thatcher, Michael Portillo and Norman 
Tebbit were mentioned. There are, therefore, individuals who are perceived 
as having great definitional influence (referred to by Cohen, 1994, as 'open 
frontier guards'. 
Moreover, these individuals are not only interested in distinguishing 
'British' from 'foreign', but "what [they] are talking about is London 
dominating England dominating Britain." (Int. 4/B). There seems to be an 
element of cultural domination by the English and, therefore, an exclusive 
element of national identity vis-A-vis 'insiders' such as the Scots, the Welsh 
and the Irish people, as well as vis-A-vis 'outsiders' ('imperialist, racist, 
chauvinistic prejudices'). 'Britishness' seems, therefore, to be a definition for 
'Englishness' (in this narrow Conservative view). 
As for drawing boundaries along the blurred notion of 'racial' and 
national identity, it is, however, not only the party of government or any 
other politicians who are seen as influential in promoting these ideas, but also 
the print media, as explained by this interviewee: 
"Some terminology ... - a word like stock -... is a metaphor from the 
language ... [of] breeding animals .... It is sometimes used in the 
mainstream press, in The Telegraph, people of British stock, people 
of Bangladeshi stock, implying that there is actually something 
genetic and racial in human beings." (lnt. l/B) 
The multi-'racial' composition of contemporary British society seems to be 
depicted by much of the mainstream press and many members of the 
government as negative. The role of the prime minister is thereby seen as 
powerful in shaping the general perception of a socio-national community. 
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"[F]or eight years, Margaret Thatcher never made a speech about 
race relations. From 1979 to 1986 she never made a speech about 
race relations. An amazing achievement for a prime minister of a 
multi-racial society where there were race riots, where there is race 
murders, where there is the most awful problem of race discrimination. 
She never once made a speech about it." (lnt. 4/B) 
In times of 'racial' conflict and rising 'racial' discrimination, a clear statement 
by the prime minister recognizing the fragmented identities of contemporary 
Britain is regarded by this interviewee as helpful to 'de-narrowrize' (and 'de-
racialize'). and thus broaden, British national identity to make it more 
inclusive. This could help to improve the relationship between the indigenous 
and immigrant parts of the population. 
c) National identity in legal terms and as perceived by civil SOciety 
The official recognition of immigrants as part of the 'nation' could help 
to promote their acceptance by civil society at large - an aspect authors such 
as Wrench & Solomos (1993) and Gilroy (1987) refer to when claiming that 
there is a discrepancy between legal belonging (nationality in legal terms, i.e. 
citizenship) and cultural belonging (national identity). Although post-war 
labour migrants and their descendants are legally full members of the British 
'nation-state', they are not necessarily perceived as such by sections within 
civil society in terms of identity and cultural belonging. One interviewee (a 
member of the majority) refers to this aspect: 
"In Britain, the prejudiced white person has a view of what is 
British or English, but that is not coterminous with who has got 
the right to be British. So, you can go to the East End of London 
and you can hear the racists and the fascists screaming abuse at 
the Bangladeshi, but the Bangladeshi will be walking into the 
polling booth to vote for the local members of Parliament. And while 
the BNP person does not see their Asian neighbour as being one of 
us or being British ... , in terms of political rights, they arc - which docs, 
I think, quite transform the power relationship." 
(Int. 4/B; emphasis added) 
It might be arguable how strong the influence of the 'ethnic vote' on British 
politics in fact is (and thus the 'power relationship'), but the point that 
nationality and citizenship are not necessarily coterminous is very 
interestingly put here (and reminds of the statement above made by a 
member of an ethnic minority): 'Being British' can, according to this view, be 
explained in terms of cultural belongingness (that is why the BNP person 
does not recognize an Asian immigrant as British) or in terms of formal 
citizenship (and thus, including political rights such as voting). The latter is 
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seen by the interviewee as crucial in the sense that no matter how much 
racism there is (within civil society), the immigrant has the legal right to stay 
and can also be politically active. Although national identity is perceived by 
certain sections of civil society as exclusive, in legal terms immigrants are 
included. The emphasis could, however, be put differently, i.e. that moments 
of racism and nationalism within civil society have exclusionary implications 
for immigrants despite their legal equality. 
Furthermore, the above interviewee's view ignores the gradual link 
between nationality (in an ethno-cultural sense) and citizenship, as 
established by immigration acts since 1962 and by the British Nationality Act 
of 1981. This ignorance might be based on the fact that large parts of the post-
war labour migrants are not directly affected by these acts. It is recognized, 
however, that the link between nationality and citizenship exists within the 
perception of civil society - as expressed by a member of one of the ethnic 
minorities: 
"The British people still recognize those who migrated to [this] 
country over the last 50 years by their colour, by their religion ... 
One of the difficulties [the ethnic minorities] are facing in this 
country is that in spite of the fact that they have taken up British 
citizenship, ... the way they contribute towards society .. .is not fully 
recognized in nationality terms. Therefore, there is this idea 'perhaps 
they are not loyal to this country'. That is rubbish, because the 
second generation has not got another country ... There are .... 
difficulties because of the initial attitude in this country because 
of the past historical...perception of the ethnic minority communities 
who came from former colonial countries." (Int. 2/8) 
Reference to non-recognition in 'nationality terms' means here in 'terms of 
national identity'. The last remark in this quote links post-war labour 
migration to the type of society Britain used to be - namely colonial- and the 
perception of immigrants' position in such a society. This refers to the 
particular difficulties the first generation of immigrants had in their role as 
'ex-colonials'. Their children seem to suffer from this 'inherited disadvantage', 
despite their birth or up-bringing in Britain, and are still not regarded as parts 
of the 'nation' - or at least not to a satisfactory extent, as felt by the above 
interviewee. Therefore, the above quote expresses the same idea that being 
British in the legal sense does not necessarily correspond with being British in 
cultural terms, as perceived by influential sections of civil society. 
Racist attitudes among sections of civil society are also viewed as 
preventing immigrants from identifying with the socio-national entity of 
Britain. 
202 
"I think when things like that happen [racist attacks and abuses) 
I think ... the less they [black people) feel British." (lnt. 3/B) 
It can be said, therefore, that racism too functions to draw boundaries 
between the majority and ethnic minority populations and makes the latter 
feel not accepted as legitimate, equal members. Thus, racism and nationalism 
(as the source of an ethno-cultural identity) are suggested to exist in a 
combined form, with both having exclusionary effects on ethnic minorities. 
d) Recognition as belonging 
The notion of 'belonging' - being a key feature of collective identity -
was further explored by asking whether cultural contributions and/or 
particularities of ethnic minorities are adequately recognized by, and whether 
ethnic minorities are 'visible' or 'invisible' parts of, the British socio-national 
community. The head of a voluntary organization - a member of the majority 
- expressed his opinion on this matter: 
"Well, to answer that it is helpful to have a yardstick, both in time and 
place. In some ways we are worse than - in time - than ten years ago. 
It has got worse in terms of British identity ... But ... (as forI the recogni-
tion of pluralism, with other respects there are advances in time ... There 
are ... MPs in the House of Commons in both the main parties who are 
black - well, there is one in the Tory Party and five in the Labour Party . 
... That would have been unthinkable a few years ago. Well, six MPs is 
not enough. Ten years ago [however1 people would have said there is 
no way that by 1994 there would be as many as six ... .In the youth 
culture ... my impression is that teenagers are creating a new culture 
which is much more pluralistic because of the presence of the black and 
Asians ... We have to look in comparison. Comparatively to ten, fifteen 
years ago, they are far more visible in public life and in popular culture." 
(lnt. l/B) 
'Youth culture' appeared a few times as an area of 'improvement' which could 
be interpreted as supporting the argument (as explained in Chapter Six) that 
imperial attitudes on the part of the majority are vanishing among younger 
generations who were born and brought up after the break-up of the Empire. 
This could also have to do with a generally higher level of recognition by 
younger generations because they are used to the long-term "presence of the 
black and Asians". Again, length of residence appears here as an important 
factor. 
Another area which is supposed to demonstrate general recognition of 
ethnic minorities is sport. This view was expressed by two representatives of 
the majority, one of whom explained: 
"Afro-Caribbeans are probably the most dynamic and forceful 
influence ... in sport. There is no doubt that in big parts of sport 
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now, the presence of black sports figures ... is very important ... 
There is this picture of Linford Christie and suddenly it is the 
Union Jack and he is us .... there is no doubt that that has had an 
impact on [people]. It could not have happened thirty or 
twenty years ago." (lnt. 4/B) 
This view, however, shows a rather stereotypical, if not racializing, way of 
thinking about black athletes.8 Moreover, if they are indeed accepted as 
legitimate members of the national community on the basis of winning 
championship titles and Olympic medals, it should be rather assumed that 
this kind of acceptance is based on the positive image of 'winning' and 
'strength' or 'power' and thus, suits any national identity. 
In the context of other professions, it is admitted by the same 
interviewee that, although ethnic minorities might be rather successful in 
(certain) sports, it is 
"less so in business and academic life. The professions in Britain are 
still very, very white ... Academia is still very white ... [and) the upper 
reaches of medicine ... The further you go up, the whiter it gets." 
(lnt. 4/B) 
Although the existence of a few black and Asian MPs has been described 
above as an improvement, a member of an ethnic minority does not quite 
agree with this. He would like to see more blacks or Asians in ministerial or 
administrative key positions - such as in foreign affairs, defence and the civil 
service - as in those areas "the loyalty of the person ... can be tested, whether 
the person is trustworthy to be given a position in [e.g.] the foreign office." 
(Int. 2/B). 
With regard to professional life and representational key positions, and 
thus as part of the higher levels of deciSion-making, the degree of recognition 
of ethnic minorities as part of the British 'na tion' does not seem to be 
satisfactory. It has been acknowledged, however, that there is a slow "process 
of developing a multi-cultural, multi-religious society" (Int. 2/8) and it is 
again among the younger generations, that the level of acceptance seems to be 
higher - as experienced by one interviewee (member of the majority): 
"Undoubtedly things have changed enormously in my life-time, 
the whole atmosphere. The part of London where I live in, .... there 
is this little sort of town centre, and you can walk through the town 
centre late at night and there are black and white young people 
together, .. , black boys and white girls. Now, twenty years ago that 
8 See for more details on black stereotypes and racializalion in sports in 
Small (1994:101-106). Also, Bhikhu Parekh has commented on the 
disrespectful treatment of Unford Christie by the British media and the 
police in an article for The In dcpel1dCI1 t ( 19 June 1 995). 
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would never have happened. Now it happens and it is not commented 
on, nobody looks, nobody is surprised, it is acceptable .... Particular[lyl 
among young people ... that open stark prejudice as an overwhelming 
prejudice within an age group, I think, that has gone." (lnt. 4/B) 
All interviewees agree that there has been improvement to some (albeit not 
necessarily to a satisfactory) extent with regard to general recognition and 
acceptance of ethnic minorities. This might be the result of their length of 
residence and younger generations being more used to a multi-'racial' / ethnic 
society than older generations. This could also partly have to do with anti-
discrimination legislation and equal opportunity provisions. 
As the very first quote in this section (d) indicated, however, in terms 
of 'identity' the situation has rather become worse which stands in direct 
connection with the claim by many interviewees that nationalism has been on 
the rise (see also section f). Therefore, the statements in this section could be 
interpreted as supporting the idea of a discrepancy between legal recognition 
(by nationality laws and 'Race Relations' legislation) and social recognition 
(by civil society). And yet, a generational shift towards a kind of new type of 
identity cannot be denied. 
e) Post-conventional identity 
Both, interviewees representing a minority and the majority, are aware 
of positive changes - albeit very slowly - towards multi-culturalism or ethnic 
pluralism. This means that a new type of collective identity is slowly 
emerging. 
A further 'boost' towards this change seems to have been given by the 
successor of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher as explained by an 
interviewee who works for a non-voluntary, semi-governmental organization: 
"When John Major came, he adopted a completely different 
approach ... He made a major speech in September 1991 which 
repeated our [the organization's] view on that question ... He said: 
"We value people for their differences. Britain is a multi-racial, 
multi-cultural, multi-ethnic society. We have unity in diversity in 
which we value the fact that we have as part of our society people 
who are different. ..... [This is] not necessarily the majority opinion 
in government, but it certainly is very strongly his opinion and .. 
that has helpcd ... The principle idea that we can be different and 
yet all be part of the same [collective, N.P.] identity has come 
on to the platform." (Int. 4/B) 
This statement seems to suggest a certain move towards what has been 
described as post-conventional identity de-linked from the necessity of 
205 
common ethnic or 'racial' roots (see Chapter Six). This could also be 
interpreted as promoting the idea that cultural identity as part of nationality 
should not be the decisive element of a collective identity. So far, however, 
this idea has just appeared "on the platform" which means that this 
understanding has not (yet?) penetrated most sections of civil society. 
f) European identity 
New developments with regard to identity formation might also be 
under way as part of the European integration process, of which European 
identity might be a result. Therefore, the question whether national identity is 
nowadays still an important issue was asked. The replies stated that the 
nation-state as a source of collective identity is still very strong, and one 
interviewee thought that national identity is not only still "extremely 
important", but also that "it is even becoming more so." (Int. l/B) as 
nationalism is on the rise (of which a more emphasized national identity is the 
outcome). Various crises have triggered this increasing nationalism: 1. a 
general political crisis in the West since the collapse of the Soviet Union and 
the end of the cold war9; 2. the economic crisis; and 3. the crisis with regard to 
Britain's transition from the Commonwealth to Europe. In other words, it is 
"certainly the increasing closeness of Britain in Europe that is 
[resulting in] increasing nationalism in this country .... Very, very 
few people have ever learned foreign languages or felt 
European. There has been a general suspicion and mistrust 
rather than a sense of 'we are Europeans'." (Int. l/B) 
The thought that there is a rather weak feeling of being European among 
British people is supported by empirical evidence as the result of an European 
survey on that matter: Britain ranked last among EC-member states with 
regard to the development of a European identity (see Chapter Three). So, 
political as well as economic crises are suggested here as causing narrow 
nationalism and a reinforcement of national identity preventing the 
development of a post-national, i.e. European, identity. 
And yet, there are signs that a 'pan-European' identity (in the west) 
exists which, however, seems to be exclusively 'white'. Politicians are again 
viewed as very powerful in this definitional process. They support 
nationalistic tendencies by putting the blame for any crises on foreigners or 
9 According to the interviewee (liB), this idea draws heavily on the article 
by Alain Mine in The Guardian of 31 January 199 .. t 
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immigrants and "the solution is partly to get rid of foreigners." (Int. l/B). 
Politicians are seen as a highly influential source in drawing boundaries 
between indigenous Europeans and those who are regarded as not belonging 
- as expressed by one interviewee: 
"There is a real danger [that European identity is as exclusive as 
national identity]. Some discourse about Europe is coded discourse 
for white, and again there is an element of Christianity. Mrs. Thatchcr 
in her famous speech called the Bruges spcech .... spoke of what we 
Europeans have in common is that we dvilizcd the world. That was 
the phrase. And that is quite strong." (lnt. l/B) 
As on the national level, an exclusive type of European identity seems to be 
promoted. The element of Christianity, for example, had also appeared in one 
of the replies on the essence of national identity. This type of exclusivity 
based on religion has been of great concern to authors such as Seno~ak (1994) 
and Said (1995) with regard to anti-Islamic attitudes in (western) Europe. 
In some respects, European identity seems to work in an even more 
excluding manner for ethnic minorities in Britain than national identity, as 
expressed by two members of ethnic minority groups: 
"What is European identity actually? .... I am a British citizen. 
Germany, France, Holland, Italy - are they prepared to accept 
me? They are not. [If[ I entered the country on the border, .... 
they would still stop me because of my colour .... SO their identity 
is totally a false identity for us." (lnt. 2/B) 
Here, the problems revolving around border controls, freedom of movement 
and 'Fortress Europe' are touched upon (as explained in Chapter Three). This 
quote also describes the fear that 'black' British citizens (nationals in legal 
terms) are not recognized as such by 'continental Europe' and thus, the fear of 
having to put up with being 'hassled' at intra-European borders. This 
demonstrates a clash of identity in legal terms and cultural identity within a 
wider European civil 'society' - as an outcome of common European policies. 
In contrast to the replies of members of the majority, who relate the 
problems in developing a European identity to elements such as economic 
and historical crises resulting in rising nationalism, interviewees from the 
ethnic minorities relate the difficulties with their identification with Europe 
more to concrete policies such as border controls, visa policies and the 
creation of 'Fortress Europe'. Although most of these policies are actually 
aimed at preventing new immigration, settled minorities feel that these 
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policies have a negative impact on them. Therefore, it cannot be denied that 
restrictive European immigration and visa policies are likely to have 
stigmatizing effects on settled ethnic minorities and might prevent them from 
feeling part of Europe. 
Thus, although representatives of ethnic minorities argue that "we are 
black Europeans as well" (Int. 3/B), the EU as an institution is described by 
two organizations in particular (non-governmental; headed by members of an 
ethnic minority) in very negative terms - as expressed by one of them: 
"For the black community, it [the EU1 is a nightmare .... which has just 
been anti-black .... Every time they [EU-officials1 looked at immigration 
it has been in a negative and hostile way. So, I am afraid that is the 
context in which the black community views Europe. We see it as a 
very difficult, a very hostile environment." (lnt. 3/B) 
This very radical and negative view of the ED must be rather an expression of 
this organization's rhetoric than the description of 'objective' reality. It cannot 
be denied, however, that on the whole, there seems to be a problem with 
European identity for both the majority as well as for the ethnic minorities. 
The latter, however, see themselves excluded on the basis of EU policies and 
racist attitudes, as well as rising nationalism. It does, therefore, not seem to be 
too far fetched to claim that European identity - as far as it exists - conveys the 
problems ethnic minorities have with being excluded from 'national' identity. 
If identification is problematic on the national level, it is even more so on the 
supranational level. 
g) Different levels of identity 
The problem with European identity might, therefore, have to do with 
its remoteness and the fact that there are other levels of identity which are felt 
to be more feasible. One member indicated this from the ethnic minorities' 
point of view: 
"If you had the opportunity to go to Liverpool or Tottenham or 
Brixton or so on, you will see that there is a large black community, 
a large number of unemployed, poor housing etc. ctc., in which 
they are alienated from local councils, never mind national 
governments, never mind [the European Union]. All that seems to 
be totally irrelevant to them because of their reality of pressure, 
racism and bad housing, bad education. That is the reality." 
(Jnt. 3/B) 
From the point of view of the majority, there is a similar statement referring 
the difficulties of identification to unemployment. A third of the white 
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working class is said to have had a "corporate identity as coal-miners, as 
railway workers, as dockers" - areas which suffered from huge job losses. 
Therefore, 
"if you .. go to the communities where these people were, you find 
a sense of loss of identity which can be catastrophic ... Suddenly, 
within a generation, that just vanishes. And these people now have 
no work, no sense of identity, no location in the world at all." 
(Int. 4/B) 
There are various ways of interpreting the above statements, but what they 
indicate for the purpose here is that identity is formed for many first of all on 
a local basis in relation to the familiar working and residential environment. 
Apart from having a national identity, let alone a European, the local or 
regional level of identity is also very important, if not even most important. A 
feeling of 'belonging' seems to build itself from a local to a national to 
European level. Any problems of racism and nationalism should, therefore, 
also be dealt with on the local level. This links up with future developments 
of the Committee of the Regions and the notion of local citizenship - a matter 
which will be returned to in the section on citizenship. 
9.2.2 The German organizations 
a) Subjectivity 
Similarly to the British interviews, 'national identity' in general was 
viewed by those interviewees who are members of the majority as difficult to 
define in an objective way. It was even questioned "whether it is possible to 
speak of an objective [national] identity" at all (Int. 3/G). It was referred to as 
a "catchword", a "sponge" which can absorb a lot" (Int. 2/G). Furthermore, 
one interviewee strongly expressed her doubts with regard to the existence of 
a collective type of identity in cultural terms: 
"It is not possible to say "the Germans" or "the Turks" - this consists 
of many identities." (Int. BIG) 
On a personal level, the interviews with members of the majority showed that 
the notion of 'national identity' is not clearly definable and, therefore, a highly 
subjective matter. However, when approached from a general rather than 
from a personal perspective, national identity can be pinned down. This was 
similarly expressed in the 'British' interviews, but there is one particular 
German problem with national identity at the time of pre- and post-
reunifica tion. 
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b) Identity crisis 
When asked whether reunification has made any difference to a 
generally promoted idea of national identity, there was wide consent among 
the interviewees (of both, majority and minority) that West Germany had 
certain identity problems before reunification in 1990 and that this situation 
has somehow changed since then, in both the eastern and western part. Most 
interviewees thought that before reunification, national identity was "no 
subject" (Int. 3/G), it was "never talked about" (Int. 5/G) or at least "did not 
play an important role" (Int. 4/G). This was explained by reference to 
Germany's experience with extreme ethnic nationalism during the Hitler-era 
and also by its special post-war situation as a divided country located at the 
immediate border to the East Bloc. A member of the Turkish minority 
expressed this very well: 
"A distinction has to be made between what national identity 
has meant in West Germany before and after unification. The 
German identity had surely suffered from its past, and when 
you came from outside, you could notice that the Germans in 
the West had a distance towards their nationality or identity. This 
had without doubt to do with the Nazi-past." (lnt. 1/G) 
The process of reunification, however, has brought vast socio-economic and 
political changes resulting in a wide-spread feeling of insecurity. Rising 
nationalism is said to be the response to this new situation. 
"I think [nationalism) also existed before [reunification], only now, 
[nationalism] is reinforced through the socio-economic crisis, ... , 
through the diSintegration of family structures ... Radical changes 
are happening at the moment resulting in an identity crisis for 
many." (lnt. B/G) 
As a response to such a multi-layered crisis, nationalism is rising, usually 
entailing a stronger focus on national identity by emphasizing common ethnic 
(or racial) roots. This is believed by some interviewees (members of the 
Turkish minority) to have had an impact on the immigrants too. 
"Unification - that was a turning point for us [the immigrants) too. 
Before the Wende [political and social changes, N.r.] we have 
never asked ourselves, whether we should stay or leave. Now, we 
ask ourselves whether we can stay ..... " (lnt. 6/G) 
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It seems, therefore, as if the particular poli tical and socio-economic changes 
caused by reunification have resulted in the drawing of clearer boundaries as 
to who belongs and who does not. 
c) Boundaries 
The reunification process is suggested by many interviewees as having 
triggered rising nationalism and a re-definition of national identity with a 
stronger ethnic connotation. One interviewee explained these changes: 
"I think that the question of national identity has grown since 
unification, that this question did not play an important role 
before, because the West Gennans were doing well materialistically. 
In a way, they had established themselves behind the Wall .... By 
unifying both German states, a massive process of social sharing 
has been set off. This is the main reason for me: [This process] has 
automatically started this exclusion - why do I want to participate 
in the first place and you only second? - and from this developed: "Yes, 
I am German and that is why we belong together, and the foreigner 
shall not get anything." .... With this social sharing, huge legitimation 
problems have emerged and they help to re-establish old ideologies -
suddenly we are a nation, we have got a national identity, whatever 
it is ..... " (lnt. 4/G) 
The phrase 're-establishing of old ideologies' implicitly indicates a link to 
historical continuity. The idea of the 'nation' is supposed to link both 
Germanys. This leads to an ethnic definition of national identity. 
Furthermore, the theme of economic crisis appears very clearly here. 
Before the Wall came down, post-war Germany avoided the issue of national 
identity as a result of its past, by hiding behind its economic success - a 
phenomenon which has been termed Wirtschaftpatriotismus (economic 
patriotism) by Weidenfeld & Korte (1991). The newly arisen situation of 
'social sharing' with the poorer and much more underdeveloped East is seen 
in the above as the link between reunification, rising nationalism and 
exclusion of 'foreigners' (Le. the boundary drawing between 'us' and 'them'). 
The socio-economic problems created by unifying East and West Germany 
have triggered a battle for a piece of the 'cake' and there is a need to define 
who is a legitimate claimer of a piece. As a common denominator, national 
identity is near at hand - and the 'losers' are the immigrants and their 
children. 
In addition to economic problems, in the former GDR 
" ... a value system has been declared null and void. Therefore, only 
national identity remained about which there could have been 
no doubt, because one was born in Germany, one spoke Gennan 
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and one was of German ethnic origin. This was the only thing 
people could hold on to." (lnt. l/G; emphasis added). 
Boundaries are drawn on ethnic lines, i.e. in terms of descent. This involves a 
notion of biology and hence, the identity as a 'nation' is not far from an 
identity as a 'race'. Both concepts are very closely linked as, for example, 
reflected in legal terms. 
d) National identity in legal terms 
The quick 're-establishing of old ideologies' has probably been 
facilitated by the legal and discursive link of citizenship and nationality, Le. 
that there does not seem to be an understanding of a concept of citizenship 
separated from nationality. The 'meshing' of those two concepts was explicitly 
mentioned by two interviewees (members of the majority) who said that they 
are used "interchangeably" (Int. 3/G; 4/G). 
Among members of the Turkish minority, there is, however, awareness 
that both concepts do not mean the same - at least in theory: 
"CitizenShip [i.e. nationality in legal terms, N.r.] is clearly a 
declaration of belief in the social order, the constitution, the 
institutions of the country, so that there is a certain common 
ground for action, whereas nationality has as its background 
ius sanguinis and reminds one very much of the 19th century . 
.. .It is therefore - how can I say? - a backwards oriented term." 
(lnt. l/G) 
Here a clear distinction is made between citizenship based on residence and 
nationality in the sense of blood-relatedness (ius sanguinis). The former is 
described as collective identity, based on common socia-political institutions 
and concepts, whereas nationality is viewed as an historical phenomenon 
which is somewhat inappropriate in the contemporary context. 
From the point of view of another Turkish interviewee, the difference 
between both concepts is also very clear: 
"An immigrant who has got German citizenship ..... has not 
got German nationality. Citizenship is ... a passport ... [and) 
the passport is important when it is ... about legal equality." 
(Int. S/G) 
Here, citizenship is clearly viewed as a decisive element for (legal) equality. 
Nationality has actually nothing to do with citizenship rights. However, this 
matter is said to be treated differently by German law. Two views of members 
of a minority: 
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"Here in Germany, it is associated .... that being a German citizen 
means at the same time to be a German national. This means-
and the naturalization law explains it in detail - that you have to 
prove allegiance to Germanness." (Int. 7/G) 
"For me, the citizenship question is one of the most decisive .... 
The ethno-national element which is embodied in the citizenship 
law and which is constantly reflected in our [governmental] 
policies .. - this is exactly the element we have to get rid off." 
(Int. 4/G) 
Here, the demand to de-link nationality and citizenship is explicitly 
expressed. This issue gained topicality in 1991 when the Federal 
Constitutional Court ruled out the possibility for long-term resident 
immigrants to vote in local elections on the basis of Article 116 of the 
Constitution (the Basic Law) which says that "political power emanates from 
the people [Volk]" (Basic Law, paragraph 20 II) whereby 'people' was 
interpreted as 'Germans' and thus, a clear link to 'blood-relatedness' was 
made (Karpen 1989). Comments on that by two interviewees (members of the 
Turkish minority): 
''Yes, everything emanates from the people. Article 116 .... It is always 
justified by saying that you have to prove allegiance to the state, the 
history and Germanness ... A person in the fourth generation will say "I 
am also Yolk [people]" ... [So] it is a question of ... how Yolk is defined. Is 
Yolk defined nationalistically ... homogeneous or ... multiculturally 
heterogeneous?" (Int. S/G) 
"In the Basic Law, it says 'the Yolk'. What is 'theVolk'? Yolk is, or 
members of theVolk are, those who fulfil their duties as citizens .... 
We [the Turks] areVolk too ... We are not German, but we are 
Yolk, because we too fulfil our citizens' duties .... The Basic 
Law [however] does not define citizens, but Germans." 
(Int. 6/G) 
The prevailing juridical interpretation of the 'German people' as laid down in 
the Constitution has a clear racial connotation. In its link to citizenship, the 
notion of Volk works in an exclusionary way for immigrant minorities who 
view themselves as unjustly excluded from this definition of Volk in spite of 
their long-term residence and their fulfilment of citizens' duties (in particular 
the last quote seems to express the implicit notion of 'no taxation without 
representation'). 
The linking of nationality and citizenship in German law would not be 
quite so strongly criticized if naturalization procedures were fairly easy and if 
there were better immigration/integration policies. A view on this issue was 
213 
expressed by the chief executive of a local government department who used 
to work many years in grass-root organizations: 
"For too long West Germany has not taken into consideration any 
processes of change in the area of migration .. .!t was realized too 
late [by the government] that, if I want to integrate these people, 
that doesn't just mean that they don't stand out, but if I want them 
to participate, if they should identify themselves with the nation 
or republic, with this state - and this is our common ground ..... 
- you can pray how you want, that is not important - that 
[opportunity] was missed by not offering them citizenship and 
political participation ..... " (lnt. 4/G) 
An important aspect for developing collective identification is seen here in 
terms of citizenship and political participation. Citizenship is, however, based 
on nationality and since it is not easily to be acquired for immigrant 
minorities their ability to reallocate their identity to the new country of 
residence is hindered. For immigrant minorities, therefore, the issue of 
national identity in its legal sense is of great importance, as it is tightly linked 
to formal ci tizenshi p. 
Aspects of nationality in the legal sense, such as the ius sanguinis 
principle and the prevailing interpretation of the Volk , were regarded by 
many interviewees - members of the majority as well as minority - as racist 
because of their link to blood-relatedness (Int. 7/G; B/G; 5/G). In legal terms, 
therefore, there are clear signs of an understanding of collective identity 
which is based on racism. Such a legal definition is likely to have an impact 
on social recognition. 
e) Legal and social boundaries: Do immigrants belong? 
The legal interpretation of taking 'citizens' and 'nationals' as identical is 
suggested by some interviewees to have had a profound influence on the 
socio-cultural interpretation of who is a German in the same ethnic/racial 
terms and thus excluding immigrants. 
"What is still in the minds [of policy-makers] is ... the foreigner as 
an alien object, as 'enemy of the state', as endangering ... And this 
is how [the foreigner] is presented in the media, in politics, the 
Foreigners' Law describes him as such .... This is the stranger who 
has got to behave properly, but he remains defined as a stranger 
because he is called 'foreigner' (Auslander), he is not an 'immigrant' 
as in other countries ... And this impedes these people from identifying 
themselves in any form with this republic." (lnt. 4/G) 
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The terminology of 'foreigners' as applied by policy-makers in legislation is 
taken on by sections of civil society. This reflects the low level of inclusion of 
immigrant peoples and their non-belongingness to the socio-national 
community as a whole. Most of the interviewees emphasized that this is a 
particularly serious problem for subsequent generations who do not regard 
themselves as 'immigrants' but as a firm part of the population, raised or even 
born in Germany. 
"The second, and more so the third, generation - for them, a perfidious 
situation emerges. They actually identify with this country. But every 
day they fecI, and this is said and shown to them by their exclusion 
from lots of things, that they nevertheless do not belong .... Those who 
were brought up here, whose country this is and at the same time is 
not - they corne into conflict, and this results in resentment. And this is 
becoming dangerous." (lnt. 4/C) 
The situation in which the majority society treats settled ethnic minorities as 
'foreigners' - in the legal as well as in the social sphere - and in which non-
acceptance of ethnic minorities is based on an exclusionary understanding of 
the majority's 'national identity' can result in a kind of 'vicious circle' as 
explained by one interviewee (member of the Turkish minority): 
"The question is not, do I fecI German or Turkish, the question is 
simply, how am I accepted by society? And ... a very normal reaction 
from the younger generation partIy [is], the more I am excluded 
from society, the more there is the tendency to look back ..... to 
one's own nationalistic feelings and values. And Germany stirs this 
up by making the social sphere hardly accessible for the young 
generation. These adolescents do not fecI that they belong because 
they are forced to come under regulations of a Forei~ners' Law .... 
I think this state produces a 'foreigner syndrome' which does not 
actually exist anymore." (lnt. SIC) 
The statement of there being a tendency to search for their "own nationalistic 
feelings" brings one back to the section on the 'British' organizations where I 
suggested that the term 'their own nationalistic feelings' should probably be 
rather replaced by 'ethnic identity' as the context is again the position of an 
ethno-cultural minority. 
The perception of immigrant minorities as 'foreigners' is, according to 
the above interviewees, clearly reflected in a combination of legal and socio-
cultural exclusion. The latter is also seen as partly caused by racist attitudes 
which have become a particular problem in the form of racially motivated 
violence and attacks (such as the infamous incidents in MolIn and Solingen ) -
on the rise since reunification. In this sort of climate, the lack of any signs - in 
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the form of verbal statements or, more importantly, legal actions - from 
politicians in general and the government in particular, seems to have had 
devastating effects on the immigrant population. One interviewee (member of 
the Turkish minority) explained this: 
"Sections of the [Turkish] community have considered themselves as 
an integral part of this society. For them, it [unification] was a shock . 
.. I would say .. .it was actually the political signal which we [the Turks] 
had expected in those sensitive moments, which we did not get. And 
this was a rather strong 'stab in the back'. And the question arose 
"Where does the police stand? Where does this state stand ... and 
where .. the monopoly of power ... ?" (lnt. SIC) 
This statement seems to suggest that until reunification, the Turkish minority 
assumed they had become an established part of German society. The 
unification process, however, somehow made them realize how little they are 
actually recognized as belonging -legally as well as by civil society - despite 
their long periods of residence or even birth in the country. 
One section of civil society regarded by many interviewees as being 
important for the promotion of immigrants' belongingness is the media. Here, 
a tendency to present immigrants only "via crises" (Int. BIG) is perceived, 
such as the arson attacks, or to present them "as a problem" (Int. S/G). The 
immigrants are said to appear in the media only as part of the relationship 
'foreigners and indigenous people' and never "as Germans. They are not 
invited as Germans." (Int. BIG). Thus, they do not seem to be recognized as an 
integral part of German society which is not regarded as a multi-ethnic or 
multi-cultural society. This could also mean that signs of post-conventional 
identity, if existing at all, appear very faintly in Germany. How about supra-
and sub-national identity? 
f) Post-national identity 
Supranational (European) identity 
On the inter-personal level, it seems as if the ethnic (or racial) 
interpretation of national identity is conveyed on the European level, as 
expressed by one interviewee (member of the majority): 
"I think, there are few [people] who would not regard a Fren~h pcrs~n 
almost as a German or an English person when compared WIth (ft'Chngs 
towards] Moroccans or Tunisians or black Africans. There is a stronger 
common identity." (Jnt. 3/G) 
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This is similarly viewed by a member of the Turkish minority: 
"There are two types of foreigners. There are the European 
foreigners, and those are not perceived as foreigners. They 
are not called 'foreigners' .. .It is those who were recruited [as 
'guest-workers', N.P.] who are mostly referred to as foreigners." 
(lnt. l/G) 
This indicates a situation which Castles describes as follows: "By the late 
1980s, there appeared to be a much higher degree of social acceptance of 
intra-European migrants, which contrasted with strongly exclusionary 
attitudes towards immigrants from the south and minorities who were 
phenotypically different." (1993:26). The reason for this might be a generally 
positive attitude towards membership in the European Union and the 
freedom of movement. This positive attitude might derive from the past two 
wars in this century and the strong desire to live in peace with the immediate 
neighbour countries (George 1991). Another reason, however, might be that 
western Europeans are regarded as culturally closer - an aspect which had 
been mentioned by a 'British' interviewee in the context of Thatcher's Bruges 
speech. This hints at a European identity based on the image of indigenous 
'white' Europeans. The word 'European' seems to be associated with 
indigenous French and English etc., but not with Turks, Algerians, Asians, 
Afro-Caribbeans and any other residents of non-European background. Thus, 
European identity seems to be as much flawed by a racial interpretation as 
national identity. 
Sub-national identity 
Apart from being a source for some sort of 'Pan-European' identity, the 
European Union - by establishing the Committee of the Regions - might 
support or revive a further layer of identity. The question here was whether 
national identity will be replaced altogether by these developments. 
"I think, all this is going to happen at the same time. People naturally 
see themselves as belonging to the environment in which they 
were born, the city to which they belong. And at the same time 
[there is] a feeling for the responsibilities of a nation within a 
larger Europe and at the same time a feeling as a European citizen. 
Which ever is more emphasized, I think, depends on the 
individua1." (Int. 2/G) 
European developments, according to this view, seem to be less a question of 
'replacement', than of 'addition' in the sense that there are different layers to 
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collective identity. It seems to be a personal matter as to which layer is more 
pronounced. Some of the other interviewees, too, expressed this idea of an 
additional European identity whereby the other layers do not cease to exist. 
Legal and socia-cultural boundaries 
For ethnic minorities, there is a similar problem on the European level 
as on the national level: without citizenship rights, it is difficult for them to 
develop a sense of belonging and identification. They might consider 
themselves as Europeans, but this is not reflected in their European 
citizenship rights as opposed to EU-nationals, despite the latter's shorter 
periods of residence - conditions which are viewed as racially discriminatory 
and exclusionary. Here the opinion of a Turkish organization on this matter: 
"Within the EU, there are many immigrants who have not got EU-
citizenship ... That means for them a further intcrnal discrimination 
.... Why should the others [non-EU nationals] who have spent a 
much longer period of their life within the EU be discriminated 
against? .. We [the third country nationals] are also part of Europe." 
(Int. SIC) 
The hope by some interviewees that phenomena such as nationalism, which 
prevent ethnic minorities from identifying with the socio-national collectivity, 
would be minimized by developments on the European level, have not yet 
been realized. The head of an organization representing Turkish people in 
Berlin put it as follows: 
"} always thought the EU would save us from nationalism ... But 
now I realize what it looks like, in Italy etc. This has changed 
my opinion about the EU. I no longer believe that the EU is a good 
union, a humane union .. .It continues to be an economic power, but 
not a union for human rights ... We [the Turks] consider oursclves 
Europeans, but these issues [of nationalism] have suddenly 
appeared ... As long as there is no answer to that, it is not possible 
to identify with the EU .. .I can personally, for myself, feel European, 
but I cannot identify with the European idea." (Int. 6/G) 
Therefore, the exclusionary tendencies of national identity do not seem to be 
solved on the EU level, but rather perpetuated, as "it is again the same 
identity of the indigenous majority and the ethnic minorities are not made 
part of it." (Int. 6/G) 
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9.2.3 The EU Migrants Forum 
a) Rising nationalism 
The president of the EU Migrants Forum felt (in a similar way as it was 
expressed by many 'British' and 'German' organizations) that nationalism has 
risen within each EU member-state despite - or maybe as a reaction to -
further European integration. The present economic climate is seen as the 
driving force for protectionist 'narrow' nationalism, as well as politicians who 
"pamper to the lowest instincts of the constituents." In other words, there is a 
tendency to draw tighter boundaries along 'racial' lines and to make 
'foreigners' responsible for socio-economic problems. This has exclUSionary 
implications for ethnic minorities. 
b) European exclusion of ethnic minorities? 
A distinction has to be made between exclusion based on policies and 
practices of the European Union as a whole and exclusion as the result from 
policies and practices among all member-states. The existence of the EU 
Migrants Forum as such already indicates that inclusion into the EU is not 
satisfactory. 
The Migrants Forum is aware of the different levels of inclusion of the 
various ethnic minority groups in each member-state. This is seen as posing 
various problems with regard to identification with Europe. For example, 
"Germany is entirely different from Britain in as much that the 
German constitution is racially discriminatory ... They would not 
accept the legal resident non-Community citizens as part of 
the Community. They still insist on caIling them 'foreigners'. 
They make it very hard for them to become naturalized. They 
have no arrangements for dual nationality. Their thinking is still 
very much pre-war thinking about German blood ... " 
The strong link between nationality and citizenship in German law is seen 
here as hindering the formation of national and European identity. There is, 
however, awareness that this link does not only exist in German law, but that 
more EU member-states have moved towards stricter nationality laws and 
away from sole ius soli - a tendency which shows a generally more 'racial' 
understanding of national identity. 
[Is there a general tendency in the EU to move more towards 
blood-related laws?] 
"Yes, indeed." 
219 
The main reason for this shift is again seen in the present economic situation 
and the attempt by politicians to find solutions and to gain votes. 
"[This shift is happening] in order to get political votes, in order 
to get power ... They [the politicians] are showing the white 
electorate 'we are getting tougher with these people' so that 
they can win the votes. That is what they are after ... That is where 
racism and xenophobia increase .... They are preaching narrow 
nationalism and that effects us [ethnic minorities}. And therefore, 
... people see us as a problem." 
In view of the above, there is a common tendency among EU member-states 
to define collective identity more narrowly. The formation of an European 
identity is, therefore, rendered difficult for ethnic minorities. There is an 
indication that the main reasons for this encompass both nationalism and 
racism. Both are on the increase as a reaction to socio-economic crises re-
j nforced by politicians' vote-winning rhetoric. Being scapegoated for these 
socio-economic problems, ethnic minorities are the main victims of racial 
nationalism. One way to counteract the force of nationalism could be to 
promote the equal existence of multiple layers to collective identity. 
c) Different layers of identity 
National identity as such is not at all seen by the Migrants Forum as 
something which should be abandoned altogether in favour of European 
identity. 
"What the ultimate objective is, is that everyone should get into the 
European way of life without losing their national identity and that is 
quite possible ... .In some countries, like in this country [UK), they 
have distorted the word 'federalism'. Federalism means that each 
state will keep its identity without losing their national identity. But 
within that, there will be a European Union. Therefore, the national 
identity will never be 10st ... The example is Germany itself: ... [T)he 
Bavarians are very, very independent minded, but they still are 
essentially German. And that is exactly what will happcn on a 
much larger scale." 
This expresses the same understanding of different layers of collective 
identity as in the case of some 'German' organizations. European identity is 
not regarded as a replacement, but as a supplement. This also shows that the 
Migrants Forum has adopted the German understanding of 'federalism' (see 
Chapter Six for details). 
However, as it stands at present, rising narrow nationalism works 
against the development of the European 'identity layer'. Politicians are again 
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seen as a major influence, in particular "[t]hose people who are Euro-sceptics, 
they are distorting the real Europe". 
9.2.4 Commentary 
Immigrant or ethnic minorities define 'being British' or 'being German' 
with the holding of a passport, i.e. with citizenship and thus, a legalistic 
notion. They relate their own 'national identity' to their countries of origin ("I 
am Turkish") which can be explained as a response to 'racial' and nationalistic 
exclusion in their country of residence lO . This might also have a political ("I 
am black") or politico-historical connotation ("I am African"). It was 
suggested, therefore, that this identity should be seen as 'ethnic' rather than 
'national'. For immigrant minorities, the distinction of nationality (or 
ethnicity) and citizenship appeared to be important. 
In particular in times of rising nationalism (which is widely regarded 
as a response to socio-economic crises), most interviewees strongly believed 
that influential sections within civil society were responsible for a clear 
definition of the essence of national identity. The media were seen as 
particularly powerful in Britain and Germany. Right-wing and conservative 
parties were viewed as promoting narrow nationalism and thus, a 'racial' 
definition of collective identity. Although all of the interviewees rejected this 
kind of narrow definition personally, they could not deny its strong influence. 
The right-wing notion of national identity tends to revolve around a negative 
image of the 'Other' and around culturally exclusive elements. The way in 
which 'Britishness' or 'Germanness' is interpreted, thus, appeared in the 
interviews partly as a matter related to political alliance. This connection was 
similarly established in chapter Seven (on 'mass discourse') and Eight (on 
parliamentary debates). 
In both 'German' and 'British' interviews, the link between nationalism 
and racism appeared in a number of contexts. Socio-economic crises, {or 
instance, were suggested as not only having resulted in rising nationalism, 
but also in racism. Thus, boundaries between 'insiders' and 'outsiders' are not 
only drawn on ethno-culturallines, but also based on the distinction between 
'races'. This was seen as reflected in the legal understanding of nationality in 
10 This connection (between exclusion based on racialization and a 
'backward' orientation to ethnic origin) was also made by ~fodood ct at. 
(1994). 
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Germany. The elements on which the German nationality/citizenship law is 
based - such as the ius sanguinis principle, the interpretation of Yolk, the 
harsh naturalization procedures - were implicitly regarded as indications of 
national identity blurred with the identity as a 'race'. Moreover, some 
interviewees perceived the narrow definition of national identity as rooted in 
the same historical periods as it was stated with regard to racism: The 'British' 
interviewees referred mainly to colonialism and imperialism, the 'German' 
interviewees to pre-war thinking about blood-relatedness - which certainly 
means the Hitler-era, but could also include the whole period since the 
creation of the German nation-state (in 1871). This suggests that there is a link 
between national identity and identity as a superior 'race'. 
In Britain, the link between nationality and citizenship is not so much 
recognized in legal terms, as most post-war immigrants and their children are 
legally British. In both countries, however, this link was seen as existing 
within civil society. This means that there is a discrepancy between the legal 
understanding of 'Britishness' and its perception within the wider public. In 
Germany, there is a continuous understanding of immigrants as 'foreigners' 
(and thus, 'outsiders') in legal as well as social terms. 
In Britain, the notion of a post-conventional identity based on 
citizenship detached from the notion of nationality (Le. common descent) 
was implicitly touched upon by few members representing the ('white') 
majority. Among members of the ethnic minorities, however, the necessity of 
a stronger development of such an identity was more explicitly expressed as a 
result from their own experience of immigration. The 'German' interviewees 
showed that multi-culturalism/multi-ethnicity has not yet reached the level 
of Britain. Elements such as a 'mixed' youth culture were not mentioned at all. 
Supra-national, i.e. European, identity appeared as an aspect most of 
the interviewees did not have too much to say about. This could be related to 
the 'remoteness' of European issues to people's everyday lives. Another 
reason could be the 'newness' of developments on the European level. The EU 
Migrants Forum and some of the 'German' and 'British organizations thought 
of supra-national identity not as a replacement for national identity, but as a 
supplement. The idea of different layers of collective identity - i.e. 
local/regional, national and European - was more explicitly expressed by 
'German' interviewees which must be related to Germany's long tradition of 
(politically and culturally) fairly independent Under. 
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It was widely viewed that ethnic minorities have an additional 
problem with European identity. For them, it functions to exclude for two 
main reasons: 1. as the outcome of a predominantly 'white' definition (cultural 
identity); 2. as the outcome of certain EU policies (border controls; refusal of 
EU-citizenship to non-EU nationals). 
By depicting the issue of national identity as related to nationality in its 
legal sense and as an expression of cultural belongingness, all of the 
interviewees - more or less explicitly - linked this issue to citizenship in a 
formal (legal) and substantive sense. 
9,3 Citizenship 
The main objective of the questions in this section was to find out the 
way in which the interviewees viewed the citizenship status of immigrant 
minorities affected by the relationship between nationalism and racism - in a 
formal and/ or substantive sense. Further, Husband's 'dimensions of welcome' 
were explored by questions about anti-discrimination and related legislation. 
The interviewees were also asked about the meaning of European citizenship 
and the potential of the Committee of the Regions. 
9.3.1 The British organizations 
a) Formal equality and its historical connection 
None of the interviewees denied the formal citizenship status enjoyed 
by post-war labour migrants and their children. The specific historical 
circumstances which resulted in legal equality of those immigrants from 
former British colonies were pointed out in particular by two interviewees 
(both members of the majority). They both referred to 'common subjecthood' 
of all peoples residing within the British Empire: 
"We were subjects to the Queen ... The Indian peoples living in our 
Empire in India were subjects of the Queen in exactly the same 
way that my ancestors in this country were subjects to the Queen ... 
Therefore, when immigration started in a substantial way 
from Commonwealth countries immediately after the war, the 
people coming here had the same rights that I had." 
(Jnt. 4/B; emphasis added) 
"Well, before 1948, I mean, everybody from the Empire was a 
British subject ..... " (Int. 5/B) 
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Common 'subjecthood' has resulted in equal formal citizenship of ex-colonial 
immigrants and indigenous British people. Subjecthood did not mean 
belonging to and participation in a socio-national community, but clearly 
defined loyalty and duties to the monarch (Dummett & Nicol 1990). The 
concept of citizenship, by contrast, emphasizes the combination of rights and 
duties - with rights being a very important part of it. The friction between 
these two concepts emerged when the first immigrants actually made use of 
their 'freedom to move' within the Empire after the war. 
Nonetheless, equal formal citizenship has derived from the specific 
context of subjecthood under the British Empire, and thus 
" ... a loophole [was left] ... through which these immigrant groups could 
enter political life on the basis of complete equality with people living 
in this [Britain] country." (Int. 4/B) 
The decisive point made by interviewee 4/B and SIB is that immigration to 
Britain did not result in general in an equal formal citizenship status, but that 
only ex-colonial peoples enjoyed this special 'treatment'. It was these specific 
colonial ties and the concept of subjecthood which provided the immigrants 
from the Indian sub-continent and the Caribbean islands with this quite 
unique legal status when compared with immigration to most of continental 
Europe. 
Moreover, the phrase 'complete equality' in the above quote is rightly 
put in the context of political rights (such as voting rights) and thus, formal 
citizenship. This could mean that in the context of substantive citizenship, 
'complete equality' does not exist. 
b) Substantive citizenship 
As the outcome of these specific historical circumstances, most ethnic 
minorities in Britain enjoy full legal equality in formal terms, but it is 
acknowledged by the interviewees that this somehow does not mean fully 
equal citizenship in general. Racial discrimination is seen as affecting 
immigrants' social (in a broad sense) citizenship. Therefore, the question 
whether ethnic minorities are fully equal citizens in Britain was answered by 
two interviewees, whose organizations mainly deal with legal matters (the 
former mainly in the area of immigration, the latter in the area of anti-
discrimination legislation), as follows: 
"In law yes, but in fact, there is discrimination .... " 
(lnt. SIB) 
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"There can be none of these sort of barriers [to formal citizenship). 
However, they [the immigrants] continue not to share full citizenship 
in practical terms .. .If you look at the statistics, social deprivation, all 
the statistics show that they are worse off. Wherever you look. For 
housing, higher unemployment, poorer health ... " (lnt. 4/B) 
These quotes show that there is an implicit understanding of the difference 
between formal and substantive citizenship. Important to notice is that the 
elements illustrating inequality on the substantive level are identical with 
elements mentioned previously as concrete situations of racism. There is this 
whole range of areas in which ethnic minorities' substantive citizenship status 
is encroached upon - such as housing, the employment situation, education, 
criminalization, depiction in the media etc. Some of these elements did also 
appear in the replies on the exclusive tendency of 'national identity' (as the 
outcome of 'narrow' nationalism). This shows, therefore, that inequality on 
the substantive level is the result of the combined effects of racism and 
nationalism. Hence, one interviewee (member of the majority) concluded that 
"[t]hey [immigrant minorities] are second class in terms of their 
social experience in our society." (Tnt.4/B) 
As for the roots of this unequal substantive citizenship status, one interviewee 
explained that they are 
" ... a result of inherited disadvantage. Because they [the immigrants) 
come lower on the socio-economic scale." (lnt. 4/B) 
The notion of 'inherited disadvantage' in this quote can certainly be 
interpreted in a similar way as done by Rex & Tomlinson (1979) and 
Goulbourne (1991), i.e. as a residue from imperial Britain and the roles which 
immigrants were to fill in such a colonial society. Their socio-economically 
lower position was related to a feeling of superiority on the part of the 
majority resulting in racist and nationalistic attitudes. 
Meanwhile, however, the Empire is a matter of the past and might 
have lost its impact on attitudes among younger generations. This could 
mean that the substantive status of ethnic minorities has improved. 
c} Improvements towards further equality? 
The notion of 'inherited disadvantage' is expressed differently by 
Vogel's notion of 'late coming'. She suggests that the specific disadvantages 
these groups suffer are typical 'problems of latecomers' as they often lack 
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resources that are necessary to make full use of citizens' entitlements (in: van 
Steenbergen 1994). 'Late coming' also entails non-belonging and non-
acceptance by civil society which might, however, have changed for 
subsequent generations born in Britain. Therefore, in a similar way as 
suggested in the section on national identity, it was said by some interviewees 
that there have been certain improvements. An increased level of acceptance 
of ethnic minorities on the part of the majority has had a positive impact on 
minorities' substantive citizenship. With regard to racial discrimination, the 
fact that Britain has implemented anti-discrimination legislation was also 
regarded as having improved minorities' citizenship status. One interviewee 
(a member of the majority) expressed his opinion on this matter: 
"I think it [anti-discrimination legislation] has made some [difference]. 
Yes. It has not removed discrimination in housing or unemployment, 
but it certainly had an impact." (lnt. l/B) 
It is indicated here that this type of legal remedy is not sufficient to minimize, 
let alone eradicate, all forms of racism - as stated by another interviewee (a 
member of an ethnic minority): 
"Though we argue for legislation, we always say that legislation 
is not a panacea to rid ourselves of racial attacks and racial 
violence." (Int.3/B) 
Racially motivated attacks and violence could be interpreted as a sign that 
sections within civil society do not recognize ethnic minorities as 'belonging', 
and thus there is a discrepancy between minorities' equal formal status and 
how this is perceived and 'translated' into an equal social status by civil 
society. In substantial terms, therefore, certain sections within civil society do 
not perceive ethnic minorities as equal members of the socio-national 
community in every respect and express this in all sorts of 'racist' ways, 
ranging from verbal to physical abuse. 
d) Other legislation 
There are other types of legislation which seem to have racializing 
effects and thus a negative impact on the social position of former ex-colonial 
immigrants and their children: restrictive immigration laws (in particular the 
'primary purpose rule'l1) and the Nationality Act. Despite theoretically equal 
11 Interviewee 5/B who works for a voluntary organization speCializing in 
legal issues revolving around immigration e~pIained: "It depends where 
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political, civil, and social (narrow sense) rights, the latter is viewed by most 
interviewees as encroaching on ethnic minorities' ability to acquire British 
citizenship - as expressed by the following interviewee: 
"[t]he Nationality Act ..... has lots of restrictions .. .!t does discriminate ... 
[Therefore], in the eyes of the law, they [ethnic minorities} are 
less equal." (lnt. 2/B) 
Although the British Nationality Act of 1981, as mentioned in Chapter Six, 
does not have direct implications for post-war labour migrants and their 
children, it is viewed as discriminatory and as sending out a message "that 
there is something wrong with these people" (Int. 5/B). By implementing ius 
sanguinis, the formally primary rule of ius soli was given up - a fact deplored 
by some interviewees. The introduction of ius sanguinis could also be seen as 
racializing - but none of the interviewees explicitly mentioned this aspect. 
e) European citizenship 
Most interviewees (in particular those who are members of an ethnic 
minority) recognized the complexity of issues revolving around ethnic 
minorities' citizenship when approached from the European point of view. 
The issues raised by the interviewees allowed the same distinction into formal 
and substantive citizenship as on the national level. 
Substantive citizenship 
The formally equal citizenship status enjoyed by most blacks and 
Asians in Britain seems to meet practical (and thus, substantive) problems in 
the context of the European Union. A member of an ethnic minority 
expressed his view on this matter: 
"1 mentioned the free movement campaign ... cvcn if (blacks did 
regard themselves as fully equal citizens], their movement would 
be restricted, they are stopped and harassed ... Theoretically, I can 
get up tomorrow and get a job in Germany .. ln practice, there is a 
racial side to it and that prevents black people from being full 
you are from and what colour you are how difficult it is going to he I to 
unify or form a family]. [It is most difficult] for men from countries of the 
Indian sub-continent to join their wives already living here. They I policy-
makers] picked a difficult something that is known as the 'primary purpose 
IJ.!k'. One bit of the immigration rules about husbands and wives or 
fiancees coming to join a partner says that the person coming has to satisfy 
the immigration official that the primary purpose of the marriage is not 
immigration to the UK ... Basically that is intended to be used against people 
from the Sub-continent. If you are applying from [North] America, you 
won't be asked these sort of questions." (emphasis added). 
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[European citizens1 ... " (Int. 3/B; emphasis added) 
Elsewhere, the same interviewee continues: 
"Even though I am a black citizen, when I want to travel, I will be 
stopped, searched and harassed. My citizenship will be questioned. 
That is our [ethnic minorities'] experience." (Int. 3/B) 
These quotes refer to problems which also appeared in the section on national 
identity in connection with the crossing of intra-European borders, as well as 
to the issue of identity in general. Not only do 'blacks' tend to be excluded 
from national identity, but also from the identity as citizens - a matter which 
indicates that these two concepts are not necessarily separated in the ('white') 
majority's everyday understanding (Le. 'nationality' and 'citizenship' tend to 
be enmeshed). In the way in which this concern is expressed in the above 
quote, however, it sounds almost like a matter of fact that every 'black' British 
person will always have his/her citizenship questioned. This again is a rather 
provocative and rhetorical way of expression, but this matter must 
nonetheless be taken seriously. Such problems have also been mentioned by 
other commentators as part of ethnic minority members' experience (e.g. 
King, 1993; see also Chapter Six). Furthermore, 'a racial side' is mentioned by 
which the above interviewee seems to suggest that black and Asian British 
citizens are likely to experience racism when trying to apply for a job in 
another member-state. This could refer to the fact that there are differences in 
continental European anti-discrimination laws which are not directly 
equivalent to the British 'Race Relations Act'. 
Formal citizenship 
In addition to these substantive types of problems, formal citizenship 
can also become a problem in the European context - as explained by the 
following interviewees (the former a member of an ethnic minority, the latter 
a member of the majority): 
"And moreover, the Third World citizens, ... those who have not given 
up their own nationality, but [who have got all rights in Britain, N.r.] .. . 
they have no freedom of movement ... So this is false for us .. .It is like a .. . 
closed community." (Tnt. 2/B) 
(The interviewee mixed up 'nationality' with 'citizenship': one cannot give up 
nationality, but when applying for citizenship in the country of residence, an 
immigrant might have to give up his or her former citizenship). 
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"lPJeople from the Indian sub-continent .. have all the rights [in Britain], 
only on the European level, they cannot take part." (lnt. 4/B) 
The specific problem referred to here is that of those immigrants who have 
full formal rights in Britain by still holding their original citizenship (Le. 
passport) because they come from Commonwealth countries which do not 
recognize dual nationality/citizenship (such as India). For them, freedom of 
movement does not even exist in theory because they do not have British 
citizenship. The fact of being formally recognized as a British citizen (in terms 
of rights) does, therefore, not necessarily equal formal European citizenship. 
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Future prospects 
The future likelihood of a beneficial revision of the Treaty of Rome in 
1996 - in terms of adding a 'race' dimension to it - is largely viewed as 
pessimistic, in particular by one interviewee who works for a semi-
governmental organization dealing with the workings of the British 'Race 
Relations Act': 
"I do not think that we will win ... What I think they are doing is they 
are going to give Third country nationals permanently resident in 
Europe basic rights of movement as the buy-off. They will give that 
and they will not put 'race' in [the Treaty of Romc1." (lnt. 4/B) 
In the light of coming general elections in various EU-member-states and with 
the ongoing 'playing of the race and immigration card' - as mentioned by the 
president of the ED Migrants Forum - this pragmatic view on the future 
developments seems to be justified. It may, however, not be necessary to put 
'race' into the Treaty of Rome. One of the arguments in this thesis is that this 
issue could be dealt with on the sub-national, i.e. local, level as part of the 
Committee of the Regions' field of responsibilities. 
f) Subnational developments 
In general, none of the interviewees expressed very clear ideas about 
the future prospects of the Committee of the Regions established by the 
Maastricht Treaty and its implications for citizenship. There was no clarity as 
to what exactly 'regionalism' means. Two interviewees equated it with 
'localism'. As suggested previously, this might be related to the fact that this 
Committee has not existed for very long and that the interviewed 
organizations have not been involved in one form or other. On a general level, 
one interviewee (member of the majority) held a positive view: 
"I would guess ... that it would be a healthy development, both to have 
a greater sense of supra-nationalism .... but also greater localism. I think 
that would be healthy for everybody, both those trends." (Int. l/B) 
As it stands at present, however, the same interviewee cannot envisage a 
move "towards a constructive regionalism" as the British government "is 
either diminishing powers of local authorities or it is actually taking them 
away to itself". According to this view, 'regionalism' is understood as more 
'power' or more involvement of local authorities. A three-dimensional concept 
230 
of citizenship (local, national and European) seems, therefore, desirable. In 
highly centralized Britain, however, this concept might not be realizable. 
The following interviewee explained his opinion with more specific 
reference to ethnic minorities: 
"I am not sure how many black people are in the .. Committee of the 
Regions, but it has just started ... and I doubt that racial equality has 
reached the agenda or will ever reach the agenda .. .In that context, it 
is relevant to the black community .. .! have got to see ... whether giving 
funds to the regions directly or indirectly benefits the black community. 
And from what I have seen, whether it is my involvement in the Association 
of Local Authorities or as a Councillor or some of my work in the 
European field, I have not seen that materialized. But, yes, of coursc, 
I support the concept to give more influence to the regions." 
(Int. 3/B; emphasis added) 
It is recognized here that the Committee of the Regions is a very new 
development and it is, therefore, too early to make an assessment of its 
positive impact on ethnic minorities. Despite the fear that 'racial equality' 
might never be an issue the Committee will deal with, the general idea of 
giving more power to the regions is viewed by this interviewee as positive. 
The recency of the creation of the Committee has also been emphasized by 
other commentators (Barber & Millns 1993; Taylor 1995) who view that there 
is potential for 'race' related issues to reach the agenda. 
According to the above replies, it can be assumed that the general idea 
of 'local citizenship' would gain support from the organizations working in 
the field of 'race relations'. This idea is, however, far removed from present 
day politics in Britain. 
9.3.2 The German organizations 
a) Formal citizenship 
The situation for non-European first immigrants in Germany and their 
descendants has been very different from the situation in Britain in that they 
were not provided with an equal formal citizenship status upon their arrival. 
The reason for this has to be partly related to the lack of any 'historical ties' 
between post-war labour migrants and Germany, as in the British case. All of 
the interviewees mentioned the fact that large parts of the post-war labour 
migrants and their children do not have formal citizenship. However, they 
rendered this issue different degrees of importance. 
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One interviewee (member of majority) made the lack of any historical 
ties very clear when stating that: 
"They [the immigrants) are citizens of another state and they live 
here with a secure residential status, but they are citizens of 
another state. If they naturalize, they are citizens of this state." 
(lnt. 2/G) 
The same interviewee continued to explain the citizenship situation of those 
immigrants who have not naturalized: 
"[Without Gennan citizenship, apart from voting), they cannot become 
civil servants ... Some professions with private practices such as 
psychologists, lawyers, medical doctors, are linked to citizenship ... 
But they can move freely [within Germany) 12 ... There are only a few 
rights which are limited to citizens. The access to social rights - that 
is not a citizenship right, but a right of the residential population. 
Most of the rights are either human rights or rights of the residential 
population in Germany." (Int.2/G) 
These quotes stem from the head of a department which is part of a particular 
city's governmental structure. This head has been very actively engaged over 
the years in campaigning and lobbying for the facilitation of naturalization 
procedures, as well as for ius soli being introduced as a supplement to ius 
sanguinis. She is not in favour of dual nationality and that is most likely the 
reason why she insists that the labour migrants are "citizens of another state", 
which seems to justify in her opinion the non-granting of certain rights, with 
the only way out of this problem being naturalization. 
Furthermore, it is a matter of interpretation to say that there are only a 
few rights withheld from immigrants who otherwise have gained permanent 
residence status. Some of those rights, the political as well as some of the civil 
rights, are very important for the 'struggle for equal citizenship' (Turner 
1990). Without the general right to assemble or demonstrate, let alone to vole, 
a strong social movement is hardly feasible. Moreover, the lack of full civil 
rights has serious implications on the so-called 'secure residential status' of 
immigrants - an issue mentioned by most of the other interviewees. If 
immigrants are believed to jeopardize public peace, they can be deported - a 
matter which recently reached topicality when the government threatened to 
deport members of the Curdish minority for having taken part in blockades 
12 During the very early stages of the 'guest-workcr system' whcn foreign 
workers were recruited to do specific jobs, they werc not allowcd to mm'c 
freely from one employer to another. Meanwhile, of coursc, this has 
changed -and this might be the reason for this rcmark. 
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and demonstrations. The notion of being a 'threat to public peace' is very 
much subject to the discretion of politicians. Without formal citizenship, 
therefore, 
"[f)oreigners are not allowed to be politically active ....... [and) 
they have not got any legal influence." (lnt. BIG) 
"[S]omebody [of the immigrant population] who breaks the law 
and ... who 'jeopardizes German public life' can be deported, even 
when born in Germany." (Int. S/G) 
Social rights (narrow sense) 
It is correct that social rights (such as unemployment benefit, pensions, 
health insurance, child allowances etc.) are in theory not tied to citizenship. 
However, practical problems might occur when immigrants try to claim them 
- an aspect neglected by the interviewee 2/G (quoted above), but mentioned 
by many other interviewees (in particular by members of the Turkish 
minority). 
"[The immigrants have} all social rights [only] to a certain extent, 
because a person who has been living here for 30 years and who 
has an unlimited right of abode, but who ... has been receiving state 
benefits for three years comes into conflict with the job centre (Arbcits-
amt]. This is not equality." (Int. S/G) 
"Social rights are available. But when an unemployed immigrant goes 
to the job centre and asks for unemployment benefit, he is certainly 
tormented ... Day by day immigrants arc coming [to sec me] who arc 
tormented ... by governmental institutions and although they arc 
legally entitled to and fulfil the preconditions, they do not get their 
money .... " (lnt. 6/G) 
There seems to be a discrepancy between social rights as legal entitlements of 
all residents and their perception within the wider public. Discrimination 
(which is based here on ethnic origin) was said to be involved in the issue of 
who is a legitimate claimer of state benefits (Int. 6/G) - an aspect which has 
also been mentioned with reference to the exclusionary effects of national 
identity. Therefore, it is subliminally indicated here that racial discrimination 
within civil society and the state structure has a negative impact on the 
claiming of entitlements. Legal definition as a foreigner is, therefore, reflected 
in every day treatment by civil society. This also means that the legal right to 
social rights (in the narrow sense) is accompanied by substantive problems. 
Thus, the statement that "this is not equality" (Int. 5/G) seems to be justified. 
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Civil rights 
As mentioned above, some of the civil rights, such as freedom of 
assembly and of alliance, are tied to citizenship and not residence. This area of 
rights is 
" ... acutely divided between foreigners and Germans, i.e. 
between Germans and human beings [in generaI] .... A certain 
part [of these rights] is limited to Germans." (Int. 3/G) 
"It was written in the constitution from the very beginning. It is not 
defined who is citizen [Bundesbiirger], but it is defined who is 
German." (Int.6/G) 
Both interviewees (one member of the majority and one member of the 
minority) rightly pointed out that the constitution does not describe rights as 
generally of citizens (by the sole nature of residence and not ethnic 
background), but that they are either for Germans or they are declaratory 
(and thus vague) human rights13. This reflects the idea of citizenship and 
nationality being largely treated as one and the same concept. 
Ius sanguinis 
Ius sanguinis was regarded by most interviewees (and by all members 
of the Turkish minority) as a major barrier to the acquisition of formal 
citizenship rights. One interviewee (member of the majority) thought that 
" ... this principle of descent should be supplemented by the territorial 
principle, because the basis has to be that all the people who live 
together in a country and form the residential population must have 
the same rights and duties." (Int. 2./G) 
A Turkish interviewee explicitly referred to sole ius sanguinis as 
"[r]acism .... People who were born and raised here .... are foreigners. 
This principle of ethnic descent is a unique phenomenon and it is 
open racism." (lnt. 7/G) 
This constitutes more evidence of the enmeshing of nationality and 
citizenship in the German law with clearly racializing effects. 
13 Paragraph 1 of Article 1 of the 'Basic Rights' (Grundrechte), for 
example, states "The dignity of a human being (a person) is inviolable" (Die 
Wiirde des Menschen ist unantastbar). Paragraph 1 of Article 3 goes "All 
human beings are equal before the law" (Alle Menschen sind vor dem 
Gesetz gleich). In contrast, Article 9, Paragraph 1, goes "All Germans have 
the right to form clubs and societies" (emphasis added) (ABe Deutschen 
haben das Recht, Vereine und Gesellschaften zu bildcn). 
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Dual nationality/citizenship 
Another, even regarded by some interviewees as the main, obstacle to 
formal citizenship is the "required waiver of the former citizenship" (Int. 
7/G), i.e. the non-acceptance of dual citizenship 14. One interviewee who is 
the head of a (city)governmental department which exercises policy-making 
powers explained her opinion on this matter: 
"We [the policy-makers] have to accept, in my opinion, dual nationality, 
... because identity ... cannot be changed simply by a 'stroke of the pen' 
and by a different colour passport, but these are processes, and I have 
to take these processes into account by building a bridge. Bridges are, 
for example, the dual nationality. It is not a panacea for everything -
it is only one aspect towards integration, but it is a vital one, because 
in a country like Germany, where formalities are so important, it 
provides for formal equality. Somebody with a dark skin would stiJI 
not be equal, ... but at least he could claim his rights." (lnt. 4/G) 
Important is the metaphor of dual nationality as a 'bridge'. This brings to 
mind the Swedish approach which regards citizenship as the prerequisite for 
integration (Hammar 1985a+b). In Germany, by contrast, integration is largely 
regarded as the prerequisite to citizenship (with the understanding that only 
persons who are, or feel, fully integrated are prepared to give up their 
original citizenship), in particular by the governing coalition (see Chapter 
Eight). This approach totally ignores the fact that immigration is a long-term 
process which might last for a few generations. 
The above quote showed the importance given to formal citizenship -
described by another interviewee as "the beginning" of the process of 
achieving cultural and social equality (Int. SIC). And yet, it is also indicated 
above that formal citizenship is not a "panacea for everything" - an aspect 
which leads to the notion of substantive citizenship. 
b) Substantive citizenship 
It is acknowledged by many interviewees (members of majority as well 
as minority) that formal citizenship does not necessarily mean "equality on 
14 A survey of 1412 foreign residents in Germany (most of which Turkish 
nationals, followed by ex-Yugoslavs, Italians and Greeks), undertaken in 
1994 by Sen & Karakasoglu, found that 55% of the whole sample would 
apply for German citizenship if they could keep their original citizenship 
(62% of the Turkish respondents and 69% of the ex-Yugoslav respondents 
said so). 
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the social level" (Int. 5/G). It was suggested by one interviewee that the recent 
arson attacks have reinforced this awareness: 
"After the terrible arson attacks, many foreigners and Germans who 
are working in the Ausllinderarbeit [equivalent to 'race relations' 
field, N.P.J have said: Of what use is the German passport to 
foreigners? I think, one of the persons who died had a German 
passport. Therefore, as their appearance does not alter, they are 
still recognizable as ethnically non-German." (lnt. l/G) 
Non-recognition and non-acceptance as a legitimate part of the socio-national 
community indicates a dimension which is going beyond legal, civil and 
social (narrow sense) rights and which has been suggested as being best 
expressed in terms of substantive citizenship. This non-recognition is related 
by the above interviewee to immigrants' different ethnicity - an element 
which has also been mentioned with regard to national identity. The 
interpretation of nationalistic and racializing processes being involved in this 
non-recognition by civil society does, therefore, not seem to be too far fetched. 
It is also indicated in the above quote that substantive citizenship is not 
about rights in the same way as formal citizenship, but it is rather a matter of 
personal freedom and attitude - an aspect also mentioned by the following 
interviewee: 
"After all, it is about changing [the majority's] behaviour and 
attitudes. And this is the big problem ... To achieve changes in 
behaviour is a time-consuming and tedious task." (Int. 2/G) 
Legal changes are, therefore, not sufficient. The perception of immigrants as 
belonging, and thus the minimization of the effects of nationalism and racism, 
has to be achieved. This could partly be done with the help of anti-
discrimination legislation. 
c) Anti-discrimination legislation 
Effective resistance to nationalism and racism might result from anti-
discrimination legislation. As for the question why there is no anti-
discrimination legislation in Germany such as in Britain, 
"[t]here are two reasons. There is an objective reason that in Germany 
... there are actually possibilities in almost every legal field to fight 
discrimination ... If they were applied, we would not need [extral 
legislation ... The other reason is ideological. As there are neither 
minorities nor discrimination or racism, we do not need a law." 
(lnt. 4/G) 
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The ideological reason for not having any anti-discrimination legislation or 
for not implementing the legal provisions which already exist is linked to the 
official (Le. governmental) denial of racism. Amendments to the 
Ausltindergesetz (Foreigners' Law) are the only attempt on the part of the 
government to improve the position of Ausla'nder. 
d) The new Foreigners' Law: a source of improvement? 
The question whether the new Foreigners' Law of 1991 has actually 
improved immigrants' citizenship status was largely denied. Only one 
interviewee thought that "a lot of things have changed" (Int. 2/G), In 
particular the lowering of fees for naturalization and other facilitations for the 
first and second generations were regarded by this interviewee as profound 
changes. This might have to do with the fact that this interviewee is the head 
of a (city) governmental department which has been very active in achieving 
formal citizenship status for immigrants by facilitating naturalization 
procedures (the very first quote at the beginning of this section on the 
German organizations was by the same person). This positive view on the 
new law might, therefore, hide the disappointment about the little success of 
many years of work. It could, however, also show a compromising attitude: 
the head of this department was described by a colleague as very realistic in 
terms of her assessment of the progress possible to be achieved under a 
conservative government and in the present (post-reunification) socio-
political climate. 
This positive view of the new law is, however, contested by most of the 
other interviewees: 
"As far as the legal position is concerned, the new Foreigners' Law has 
made a few little improvements, but it has not improved the basic 
situation of total insecurity with regard to their [the immigrants') 
residential status, in particular for young foreigners who can still be 
deported as soon as they somehow breach the law .... " (lnt. 3/G) 
" [There are] aspects [of the new law] that have deteriorated: before, 
everybody could obtain a secure residence permit, now only if you 
have worked here and paid in social security linsurances for five years." 
(lnt. SIC) 
The latter interviewee explains this further with the help of an example from 
her own family. Her brother was born in Germany and was at the time of the 
interview only sixteen years old and, therefore, has not yet been in full-time 
employment for five years as compulsory school education lasts for eight 
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years. Thus, he cannot get a secure residence permit as yet. In his case, 
however, there is the possibility to naturalize easily as the fees have been 
drastically reduced and requirements facilitated by the new law for children 
up to the age of twenty-one. The interviewee calls this policy, therefore, an 
"insidious assimilation policy" because it is not possible at that age to have 
worked for five years and thus, to obtain the most secure residential status 
German law offers, but naturalization is as easy as never before for this 
particular age group - on the same condition, however, of giving up the 
original citizenship. Dual nationality /citizenship is officially still not allowed. 
There is, however, one aspect which was mentioned as a positive 
improvement by the new law: the so-called 'return option' (Riickkehroption). 
This is said to show a change in the official attitude towards the recognition of 
the 'territorial principle'. 
"For adolescents who had to return with their parents as minors, 
there is the possibility of returning to Germany within five years after 
having 'come of age' (volljiihrig). And this is a clear sign that the 
legislators indeed realize that people who were born and brought 
up in a country are rooted there." (Int. t/G) 
This interviewee is the public relations officer of interviewee 2/G - the only 
other person who talked about the new law in mostly positive terms. This 
underpins what had been said above about the long-term activities of this 
department aimed at improving naturalization procedures. The 'return 
option' can certainly be seen as such a 'sign of improvement'. However, it is 
by no means as thorough as automatically granting immigrants' children full 
formal citizenship rights upon birth - an aspect felt by all the other 
interviewees. It is, therefore, a very weak sign of any recognition of a 
principle based on residence rather than on ethnic ties. 
e) European citizenship 
It is widely acknowledged among the interviewees that most of 
Germany's non-European immigrants do not benefit from European 
citizenship as the majority of them does not have German citizenship, which 
is, however, the prerequisite for entitlements such as the freedom of 
movement. The main problem, therefore, is - similar to the national level -
the formal side of European citizenship. 
Interviewee 51G and 3/G thought that European citizenship means a 
new and further 'domestic discrimination' (erneute Inlandsdiskriminierung) 
as it separates EU-nationals from non-EU nationals, whereby the former are 
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given extended rights (such as voting in local and European elections) despite 
the longer periods of residence of the latter. Even travelling, for example, for 
school-children on school trips to European neighbour-countries, is not 
possible without a visa. One interviewee explained this issue further: 
"If an [immigrant] lives in Aachen [city in the West of Germany, N.P.) 
and wants to go on a short visit to Luxembourg, he needs a visa ... We 
always have these problems with our conferences. Just recently, our 
Vice President who is Moroccan and lives and works in Spain - he did 
not get a visa for London. He had to go from Barcelona to Madrid in 
order to get a visa. He had to take off one and half days. Such a 
hassle! .... There is so much of this nonsense which we have to 
abolish." (lnt. 3/G) 
A future 'race' dimension? 
The future prospects for the competence of the EU in the field of 'race 
relations' is viewed as rather pessimistic. 
"I do not think so [that there is going to be action]. They [the EU 
officials] can surely help to increase awareness for this on a national 
basis ... But there is no legal basis for the Community to become 
active in this field." (Int. 2/G) 
"This is not going to work. ... bccause each country's regulations 
are very different. .. I think that would be a bit utopic." 
(lnt. S/G) 
One problem is the fact that the EC has no legal competence in the field of 
'race relations'. The second quote rightly points out that every country has 
different regulations which might be the result of different immigration 
histories. 
Despite a generally negative view on common EU integrative policies, 
it is viewed that 'opinion sharing' on the European level is very positive (Int. 
S/G) which is also reflected in the fact that most of the interviewed 
organizations are involved in 'European networking'. The aspect of 'opinion 
sharing' had been mentioned in connection with the Committee of the 
Regions in chapter Six. It has been suggested that local authorities could get 
together and exchange experiences and opinions on all sorts of issues, 'race 
relation' matters included. 
f) Sub-national developments 
In general, there are slightly stronger opinions on regionalism than in 
the British context which must have to do with Germany's politico-
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administrative structure giving 'regions' more independence. Regionalism 
promoted by the EU in form of the Committee of the Regions was, therefore, 
mostly seen as positive. One interviewee thought that 
"".what is 'decidable' in smaller entities should be solved and 
decided by smaller entities." (Int. 3/G) 
This indicates the concept of 'subsidiarity', i.e. "that decisions should be taken 
at the lowest level possible" (The European 1992:34). 
More specifically in the context of ethnic minorities, it was felt by 
another interviewee that 
"[e]verything has to be done to create opportunities for disadvantaged 
groups to participate." (Int. 4/G) 
And further regionalism is regarded as promoting such opportunities. 
'Participation' could mean 'empowerment' and if coming from a 'sub-national' 
level, this leads to the idea of local citizenship. 
g) Local ci tizenshi p 
When explaining the rather unique responsibilities and workings of 
her 'institution', one interviewee (4/G) in particular mentioned a number of 
aspects which could be interpreted as notions of 'local citizenship'. The 
interviewee is the chief executive of a (city-)governmental department 
involved in policy-making relating to 'multi-cultural affairs'. The task of this 
department is not only to deal with ethnic or immigrant minorities' matters, 
but to incorporate all minorities existing within German society (and so far as 
they exist in that particular city for which this department is responsible). Part 
of the policy-making process is the consultation with 'grass-root' 
organizations - which is not at all a unique feature among the interviewed 
groups, but it is rather the way in which this work is described and 
understood which seems to be special. 
In a multi-cultural and multi-ethnic society, as explained by the 
interviewee, certain mechanisms of solving conflicts (Konflikt16sungs-
mechanismen) are necessary. In other words, 
"the simple mechanisms for solving conflicts - which could mean 
fetching the police or not - those are not sufficient anymore. And 
that is why there have to be other offers which appeal to those 
groups who are weaker within this society and which give [those 
groups] the possibility to be understood and to get their rights ... " 
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One of those mechanisms necessary in a multi-cultural society - and probably 
the most important one - is seen by the interviewee as being communication. 
"The meaning of communication in a multi-cultural, pluralistic 
society, which is not closed, which constantly produces new issues, 
which is full of tensions (is very important to us). This means, people 
have to learn how to solve confiicts, .. a type of 'management of 
conflicts' on the part of the responsible persons· we understand 
[our work as such]." 
The reason why communication is given such a central position in the 
problem solving process is further explained: 
"To create commitment - what is that supposed to mean? To 
create commitment means, I have to create loyalty to this city· 
council, to this state, to this system, to this society. But I cannot 
achieve this by commanding people. I have to demand duties 
from a person [by giving him/her] rights." 
'Communication' is understood here as a process of 'giving and taking'. In this 
way, commitment and loyalty can be achieved which is likely to result in 
collective identification. It is also indicated here that there are different levels 
of loyalty (i.e. a local and a state level) and that they supplement each other. 
The last two sentences of the above quote seem to come from a German 
context where formal citizenship is not enjoyed by most immigrants: Instead 
of only 'commanding' them (maybe by the Foreigners' Law?) and demanding 
duties from them (such as tax-paying), citizenship rights should be granted at 
the same time. 
The idea of 'communication' with, and on, the grass-root level and the 
best solution-finding process for certain conflicts taking place on the local 
level is expressed in the following quote. It is the response to the question as 
to what the interviewee thinks of the recent juridical decisions that Turkish 
girls (as Muslims) do not have to take part in physical education at school 
because of their religious faith. 
"I do not think that is right. I believe one should not decide such 
matters juridically ... What one should have done, is [that] in each 
individual case which appears onc has to negotiate ... This means, 
I have to negotiate [for example] between younger and older 
generations, between different concepts ... Migration is a very hard 
process for aU those involved. It is not solved within one generation 
... Our institutions ... have got the obligation to accompany these 
processes in a reasonable way and to support all those involved ... 
I cannot only [support one person] • in that case I would do 
injustice to the other person ... To do so, a lot of lexperts guiding 
this communication] are needed." 
241 
The interviewee did not only speak here in her professional capacity, but also 
on the basis of her personal experience as the daughter of a 'mixed' marriage 
and as the wife of a member of another ethnic minori ty - and, therefore, her 
reference to generational and conceptual problems is part of her own 
experience with migration processes. 
One of the issues raised in the above quote is tha t not all matters 
should or can adequately be decided juridically. This somehow indicates that 
apart from formal citizenship - which is clearly about a legal status - problems 
or conflicts revolving around the substantive side of citizenship should be 
dealt with in the form of negotiation. It might not be too far fetched (in 
particular as the above ideas came from an interviewee who works within a 
federal political structure) to interpret this as negotiation on the local level 
where these conflicts occur by letting the people involved participate in 
finding solutions. Taken a bit further, this leads to the conception of 'local 
ci tizenship'. 
More concretely, 'local citizenShip' means that in a 'situation of conflict' 
(such as the above example), 
" .. we are trying to make all persons involved co-opcrate .... One has 
to show understanding [for each party] and to lead them [to the 
solution]." 
Roughly, this is meant when speaking of more active participation in a 
solution-finding process. This makes most sense on the local level where 
peoples' everyday lives are taking place. Here, mutual understanding can be 
promoted by, for example, sections within the city council being in charge of 
communicating between all residents. This particular institution, of which the 
interviewee 4/G is the chief executive, is not in favour of specific policies for 
immigrant minorities, but rather for policies promoting inclusion and fair 
treatment of all possible minorities. Only by taking society as a whole, 'public 
peace' is seen by the interviewee as maintainable. 
It should be added here that the study on racial violence by Bji.1rgo & 
Witte (1993) also mentions the local dimension of these kinds of incidents. In 
most of these cases, local residents had been the perpetrators of such acts of 
violence. The authors, therefore, suggest that further involvement of the local 
community (in terms of showing clear rejection of such acts) could help to 
stop or reduce violence. More active involvement of the local community 
could also result in solving other social conflicts. 
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The general approach by this German city-governmental department, 
i.e. to take society as a whole, seems to be similar to the approach as set out by 
the Swann Report (Department of Education and Science 1985), albeit in the 
context of education only (as quoted by Tomlinson 1990). According to 
Tomlinson, since the publication of this report, "the focus of multi-cultural 
education has moved from issues concerned with the education of ethnic 
minority pupils, to issues concerning the education of all pupils in an 
ethnically diverse society, in which acceptance of all groups as part of the 
British nation is becoming socially, politically and economically more 
important." (op. cit.:7; original emphasis). 
Education is surely an important part of gaining 'acceptance' for all 
groups within society, but the emphasis should probably be more on 
'education for citizenship in a multi-cultural society' - which is also the title of 
a book by Lynch (1992) in which he advocates the need for a new concept of 
citizenship to prepare for a life in multi-cultural and multi-ethnic societies. 
The main message in his book is that 
"the old individualistic, utilitarian nco-classical paradigm is no longer 
adequate to the needs of a world with galloping economic, social, 
cultural and economic15 problems, and that an alternative 
community-focused paradigm, which can take account of both 
individual rights and responsibilities and of different levels of 
'community-affiliation' is needed, together with a corresponding shift 
in the paradigm of the education which prepares future members of 
those communities." (op. cit.: 20> 
The future of citizenship might, therefore, lie in a stronger focus on the local 
level which seems the best way to improve the substantive part of citizenship 
- in general as well as for immigrant minorities in particular. 
9.3.3 The EU Migrants Forum 
a) European citizenship - inclusive or exclusive? 
The EU Migrants Forum'S president (the interviewee) viewed 
citizenship as very important in the process to minimize the power of racism. 
I would suggest to add the power of nationalism, although this was not 
explicitly done by the interviewee at this point of the interview, but in a few 
other contexts (such as the 'scapegoating' of ethnic minorities for socio-
15 In the Original text, 'economic' is indeed printed twice. One of them could 
be a printing mistake and should probably be 'ecological' as Lynch 
mentions ecological problems as global phenomena many times in his 
book. 
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economic problems). The reason why citizenship is given such a central 
position could be that it is - in its formal sense - the prerequisite for 
immigrants to become politically active and fight for their own rights and 
social justice on the nation-state level as well as for their enjoyment of 
entitlements provided by European citizenship. 
So far, however, the interviewee acknowledged that there are 
approximately "nine million" people who do not hold citizenship in one of the 
member-states and are, for that reason, at a disadvantage. 
"[TIhere are two types of migrant communities living [on EU territory]. 
One of those .. are Community citizens, others ... are legally resident 
non-Community citizens ... Their position is this: they are not 
recognized. " 
The term 'non-recognition' refers here to third-country nationals' legal 
position, as they cannot enjoy the same entitlements provided by the 
Maastricht Treaty for EU nationals. Thus, formal European citizenship works 
only inclusively for those immigrants who are citizens in one of the EU-
member-states, but exclusively for third country nationals who have not 
naturalized and whose countries of residence do not allow dual citizenship. 
Exclusive tendencies, however, exist not only on the formal level. 
b) Substantive citizenship 
For those nine million third country nationals residing within EU-
territory, the acquisition of formal European citizenship is the first step 
towards inclusion and equality. The interviewee realizes, however, that there 
is a dimension beyond formal equality when stating that 
" .. .Iaw itself is not enough. Education is important to change the 
attitude of the mind ... To understand other peoples' culture is 
important." 
It is similarly expressed here as by the 'British' and 'German' organizations 
that formal citizenship alone is not sufficient and that there is a substantive 
side to it. Educating the 'white' majority is one way suggested by the 
interviewee to promote a different perception of ethnic minorities, namely 
"not as a problem, but as an opportunity". The contributions these minorities 
are making to European societies have to be emphasized, according to the 
interviewee, to gain recognition and acceptance which might help to 
minimize racialization and thus, improve ethnic minorities' substantive 
ci tizenship. 
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c) European solutions 
To establish citizenship rights for third-country nationals, the EU 
Migrants Forum proposes a general European Bill of Rights for every citizen. 
The status of ethnic minorities should also be explicitly enshrined, with a 
definition of 'minority' which would force Germany to recognize third 
country nationals as such (Le. to include labour migrants)16. Furthermore, 
"we are saying that they should amend the Treaty of Rome ... so 
that Union citizenship could also be given to legally resident 
non-community citizens." 
The idea is that third-country nationals can apply for European Union 
citizenship without having to go through naturalization procedures in the EU 
member-state in which they reside. In this way, they could avoid restrictive 
policies set up by countries such as Germany. They would get the same rights 
that have been given to European Union nationals. It seems, however, rather 
utopic that EU officials will and can ignore the various nationally existing 
regulations. As it stands now, this is impossible as the Maastricht Treaty 
contains in one of its appendices that nationality as a legal status remains for 
each member-state to decide upon. In addition, immigration/integration 
policies remain outside the actual framework of the EC as they are deal t with 
in the 'second pillar', i.e. in the form of intergovernmental co-operation (see 
Chapter Three and Six). The only institution of the EC which could be 
sympathetic to the Migrants Forum'S demands is the European Parliament 
which is still not powerful enough to enforce any changes in the legal 
structure. More importantly, however, the EP itself recommended the first 
step towards European citizenship as being changes on the national level 
(European Parliament 1990). Therefore, the idea stated in the above quote 
does not seem to be realizable - a fact which the interviewee is very well 
aware of. However, he relates this negative view more to rising nationalism -
which also means that any changes on the national level are rather unlikely in 
the present climate. Nonetheless, the most likely scenario [or third-country 
nationals to acquire European citizenship seems to be the granting of national 
citizenship by which they would automatically become European citizens. 
16 According to an inquiry by the European Parliament, the German 
government is said to have officially denied the existence of any ethnic 
minorities as its definition of a minority is merely regional or national, i.e. 
only the Danes and Sorbes are recognized as such (Int . ..JIG; see Heckmann, 
1992: chapter 4, for more details on the typologies for ethnic minorities). 
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d) Sub-national developments 
In addition to further integration of the European Community into the 
European Union, regionalism is seen by the interviewee as a parallel 
development. He understands 'regionalism' as 'federalism' (which follows the 
German definition). 
"[F]ederalism is inevitable. Federalism is regionalism. At the moment 
we have got a loose federation of the European Union. So what the 
[European] Council admits [is] "Okay, we should now fund on the 
regional basis to areas which should have more funds like Portugal, 
Spain and Greece, and even Britain is now regarded as one of the 
poor areas recently ... " 
'Regionalism' is presented here as predominantly a matter of financial 
support. The reply to the question how beneficial that would be for ethnic 
minority communities is, therefore, on similar lines: 
"That is something we are fighting for. For instance, ... at the moment, 
... they [the EU-officials] are giving billions and billions of regional 
development aid, but that development is only confined to road and 
transport and that sort of thing. There is not a single penny given for 
housing ... We are now putting to Padraig Flynn, the Commissioner 
for Social Affairs, in his Green Paper, that he should now propagate 
[that] regional funding [for] housing should be [given] ... And that will 
benefit the ethnic people." 
The predominant concern with funding reflects in a way the main purpose of 
the European Community, i.e. economic and developmental matters. 
Nonetheless, financial support for housing would certainly benefit parts of 
the ethnic minorities. It is, however, difficult to imagine how this could 
positively affect the situation of immigrant minorities in Germany, which is 
not exactly regarded as one of the poorer member-states. And if there is any 
funding, it is most likely spent on the reconstruction of the East. 
The interviewee did not express clearer ideas on this matter or, more 
precisely, on the Committee of the Regions' potential. This could mean that 
these developments are too recent and the 'output' too low for any further 
assessment. As for the near future, the interviewee mentioned the particular 
problem posed by the opposition of countries such as Britain to the idea of 
federalism (in the German sense) and local empowerment. This might slow 
down any active involvement of the Committee of the Regions in matters of 
'race relations' in the way envisaged by Taylor (1995; see Chapter Six). 
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9.3.4 Commentary 
The core issues relating to citizenship raised by the interviewees in 
Germany, Britain and on EU level dearly reflect the main concerns mentioned 
in the contexts of national identity and racism. 
In Britain, there was a clear preoccupation with the substantive 
position of ethnic minorities. The interviewees' understanding of racism and 
nationalism were related mostly to substantive elements of citizenship. The 
legal side of citizenship was not perceived as a significant problem which 
must have to do with the fact that post-war labour migrants came from ex-
colonial countries and thus, enjoyed a fully equal formal citizenship status. 
This legal equality was rightly seen as a result of specific historical 
circumstances (Le. the Empire). Important to note is, however, that imperial 
circumstances have not only had positive results. It was rightly pointed out 
by many interviewees that first immigrants' (and to some extent also their 
children's) social position within British society was, and partly still is, 
negatively affected by imperial attitudes and prejudiced ways of thinking on 
the part of the 'white' majority17. Thus, the particular historical circumstances 
were on the one hand responsible for equal formal citizenship, but at the 
same time they resulted in a less equal substantive status. 
In Germany, post-war migration happened in a very different 
historical context as labour migrants came from countries where there were 
no historical links as in the British case. This is reflected in the terminology 
and concept of Auslander which shows that immigrants were and still are 
treated as 'outsiders', legally as well as socially. Therefore, the interviewees' 
main concern with regard to citizenship was the lack of formal equality. 
Those interviewees who acknowledged the existence of racism in one form or 
other thought of citizenship in legal terms as racist since it is clearly linked to 
nationality, i.e. ethnic descent or blood-relatedness. This was also reflected in 
their responses to questions about national identity and nationality as defined 
by law. Many interviewees had mentioned that the official approach (at least 
by the present Conservative government) to racism in Germany is to 
minimize its existence, which is reflected in the non-application of anti-
17 This was also an aspect mentioned by Modood et at. in their study on 
Changing Ethnic Identities in which seventy-four indh'idual memhers of 
the various ethnic minorities were interviewed (19c)~). 
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discrimination legislation and the reluctance to amend the 
citizenship/nationality law to rid it off racializing elements. 
In both countries, the interviews indicated (mostly implicitly) the 
negative effects of nationalism and racism on ethnic minorities' citizenship 
status. The close link of nationalism and racism became clear as some aspects 
were mentioned in both sections on national identity and racism and 
reappeared as encroaching immigrants' (formal and/or substantive) 
citizenship: Both, nationalism and racism were seen as rooted in the same 
historical periods; apart from deeper historical roots, the sources or 'triggers' 
of both nationalism and racism were seen in the economy (recession, capitalist 
system), political parties and the media. These are aspects which belong to the 
category of the substantive side of citizenship and were, thus, rightly seen as 
the most difficult to improve. It would involve a complex set of measures and 
changes relating to education and attitudes. 
As a result of the above, it can be noticed that the interview replies in 
Germany, Britain and by the EU Migrants Forum largely underpinned the 
conceptual division of citizenship into the two dimensions of formal and 
substantive citizenship. The legal side of citizenship was of 'number one' 
importance to all 'German' interviewees. For the 'British' organizations, this 
was more an issue of importance in the European context as many 
immigrants from the Indian sub-continent do not hold British citizenship and 
hence, do not have European citizenship. All three sources, however, equally 
expressed the opinion that legal equality has its limits and is not necessarily 
reflected in social (broad sense) acceptance. It also became clear that the 
substantive side of citizenship cannot be regarded as 'rights' in the same way 
as its legal side and that it is rather about the broader notion of participation 
and acceptance. 
The conceptual division of citizenship into a formal and a substantive 
dimension also appeared in most of the interviews as an issue in the 
European context. However, here again the main concerns of the 'German' 
organizations were related to the lack of formal citizenship on the national 
level, whereas many 'British' organizations raised issues centring upon 
substantive problems and the perception of immigrants within the wider 
European public. The replies of all three sources seemed to suggest that the 
effects of nationalism and racism on ethnic minorities' European citizenship 
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status conveyed the same problems as on national level. Thus, the European 
Union was not seen as having made any difference to these effects. 
With regard to sub-national developments, the long German tradition 
of a decentralized governmental structure, i.e. the federal state system, seems 
to be the reason why these developments occupied a considerable part of the 
citizenship debate among the 'German' interviewees (also reflected in some 
explicit replies to national identity, or rather the different layers of collective 
identity) which stands in contrast to the 'British' replies. The idea of local 
citizenship was also more concretely deducible from the 'German' interviews 
than in the British case. This does, however, not mean that the conception of 
local citizenship could not work in Britain, but rather that this sub-national 
development lies further away than in Germany. 
9.4 Citizenship as a mechanism for inclusion - the nature of the interviewed 
O1:ganizations and their demands; concluding remarks 
Demands 
The issues of nationalism/national identity, racism, and citizenship 
generally appeared in the interviews as the main areas upon which the 
organizations' activities centre. The mere existence of the interviewed 
organizations and their activities (campaigning, lobbying, policy-making) in 
the 'race relations' field already indicate that the power of racism and 
nationalism are not regarded as irresistible. Although the organizations 
linked the exclusion from formal and/or substantive citizenship more or less 
explicitly to racism (or AuslanderfeindlichkeiO and nationalism, citizenship was 
nonetheless understood as a potential to minimize the power of nationalism 
and racism and thus, as a potential mechanism for inclusion. In other words, 
racism and nationalism were seen as having had negative effects on 
immigrants' citizenship status, and yet, the interviews yielded various ideas 
how to improve this situation. 
On the formal level, improvements were of main concern to the 
'German' interviewees. Their replies have shown that racializing and 
nationalistic elements of formal citizenship - such as the sole provision of ius 
sanguinis and the ethnic/racial interpretation of the concept of Volk - can be 
eliminated. These were in fact the main demands addressed to policy-makers 
along with the official acceptance of dual nationality / citizenship. In Britain, 
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the racializing and stigmatizing effects of the 1981 BNA (by introducing an 
ethnic definition of 'Britishness') were deplored by some interviewees and 
therefore, suggested for change, albeit with less serious concern than in the 
German case, as this act affects settled ethnic minorities only indirectly. 
With regard to substantive citizenship, however, measures of 
improvement have to go beyond changing certain laws. The power of racism 
and nationalism functions in a much more complex way, and according to 
many interviewees (including the EU Migrants Forum), any resistance cannot 
work by just amending laws. As it had become clear in particular in the 
'British' interviews, there are many instances within civil society which 
encroach on ethnic minorities' substantive citizenship despite formal equality. 
Their formal citizenship remains challenged and questioned by racist and 
nationalistic tendencies within the majority population. Therefore, there is 
acknowledgement in Britain, Germany, and by the EU Migrants Forum that 
legal equality alone does not function as a mechanism to minimize the effects 
of racism and nationalism. Changes in attitude on the part of the 'white' 
majority - which could be caused, e.g., by different emphases in education -
were suggested by all three sources as important for the promotion of 
inclusion. Hence, the 'solution package' for minimizing the power of racism 
and nationalism on immigrants' citizenship has to consist of complex and 
long-term strategies. 
In one of the German interviews, participation and co-operation in 
conflict-solving processes on the local level were regarded as crucial 
'ingredients' of such a 'solution package' - a suggestion which leads to the idea 
of local citizenship. Some of the 'British' interviewees and the EU Migrants 
Forum, too, implicitly expressed the importance of three layers of citizenship -
local, national and European. This was reflected in a generally positive (albeit 
mostly vague) opinion on regionalism and the potential of the Committee of 
the Regions. The prospects of sub-national developments in Britain were, 
however, viewed as bleak. 
The EU Migrants Forum's demands centred upon a common European 
'Race Relations' policy and a common 'Race Relations Act'. To achieve this, 
the Treaty of Rome needs to be amended in 1996 to allow for the post of a 
Commissioner for 'Racial Affairs'. The acquisition of European citizenship for 
all long-term resident third country nationals could be facilitated by granting 
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it directly from the supra-national level, without the necessity to naturalize 
first. 
Nature of organizations 
The equal formal citizenship status of ethnic minorities in Britain 
seems to have had one important advantage. It has provided them with the 
opportunity to organize and engage actively in politics. This was very well 
reflected in the way in which in particular the two members of an ethnic 
minority (Int. 2/B; 3/B) expressed their views, i.e. the language they used. 
Their replies were quite often of a rhetorical, challenging and rather 
uncompromising nature which somehow demonstrates the kind of activities 
they are involved in: campaigning, 'consciousness-raising', but no policy-
making power. Their main concern was that the present 'Race Relations Act' 
"lacks teeth and bite" (Int. 3/B) and that racial violence should be made an 
offence as part of the criminal law (Int. 2/B; 3/B). The European Union was 
also seen by those two interviewees in a very negative and uncompromising 
way. 
The 'activities' the other three 'British' organizations engage in seem to 
involve a wider range of tasks, such as representing members of ethnic 
minorities at court or other governmental/administrative institutions or to 
produce research type of literature. Those interviewees recognized similar 
problems of racism and nationalism, but tended to be less extreme in the way 
in which they expressed their thoughts and criticisms (Le. more 
compromising). Their demands included: a Bill of Rights (as suggested by 
two interviewees 1 /B; 2/B), the abolition of ius sanguinis and 'racist' elements 
in the immigration law (5/B) and an education which emphasizes the 'multi-
ethnic/racial' reality of Britain (2/B; 3/B). 
In Germany, the fact that most ethnic minorities do not have formal 
citizenship and are only allowed to assemble and to organize if not 
threatening public peace and order might be the reason for a less extreme 
language on the part of the Turkish minority members. Dissatisfaction with 
present policies (such as the new Foreigners Law) was, nonetheless, expressed 
more by Turkish interviewees than by their indigenous German counterparts. 
The demands by the latter did not necessarily go as far as allowing dual 
nationality, replacing the Foreigners Law in favour of an immigration law 
and introducing (or applying) anti-discrimination legislation. The demands 
by Turkish and 'German' interviewees, however, clearly centred upon 
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facilitating the acquisition of formal citizenship and involved only secondarily 
elements linked to substantive citizenship (such as attitudinal changes). 
The developments on the European Union level with regard to settled 
ethnic minorities were viewed by most of the 'British' and 'German' 
interviewees, as well as by the Migrants Forum, as quite negative. Their 
replies, however, also reflected that European issues have not been on the 
agenda for very long and that the national level has priority - this latter point 
was, however, viewed differently by the EU Migrants Forum with regard to 
the acquisition of European citizenship as it proposed to 'skip' national 
citizenship. 
The demands expressed by the EU Migrants Forum somehow showed 
a predominance of 'British' concepts revolving around 'race relations' which 
might have to do with the fact that the President is a British citizen. The idea 
of granting European citizenship without having to acquire 'national' 
citizenship also seems to reflect the more liberal British approach towards 
dual nationality or the granting of formal citizenship rights to every ex-
colonial immigrant, despite not holding British citizenship. This view, 
however, disregards the complexity of different histories of immigration and 
the variety of regulations, and thus appears rather utopic. 
On the whole, the interviewed organizations are involved in a social 
movement aimed at improving ethnic minorities' socio-Iegal position. Like 
politicians, they lead opinion mainly by drawing attention to problems and 
articulating goals. As opposed to politicians, however, interest or lobby 
groups also "stimulate research and encourage the publishing of books, 
articles and commentary that may educate public opinion." (Margolis & 
Mauser 1989:310). In this way, their work is more characterized by long-term 
strategies rather than by short-term tactics (such as the instantaneous winning 
of votes). 
Throughout the interviews, the relationship between racializalion, 
nationalism (Le. the ethnic understanding of national identity) - both 
reinforced by socio-economic crises - and this relationship's impact on 
citizenship for ethnic minorities have become apparent. Ethnic minorities' 
(formal and/or substantive) citizenship was regarded as being encroached 
upon by this relationship on national as well as European level. The 
conditions of (national) citizenship were seen as conveyed on the European 
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level and thus, the EU was not perceived as having had a major impact on 
ethnic minorities' position. 
As it stands at present, therefore, the 'German' interviews have 
confirmed that the interplay of racism and nationalism results in what 
Hammar (1990) referred to as 'denizenship' status of immigrants and their 
children. In Germany and Britain, it was recognized that formal equality does 
not necessarily lead to social equality. In terms of their social experience, 
racism and nationalism continue to affect ethnic minorities' perception as 
equal citizens within civil society. 
As for the possibility of citizenship to function more inclusively, it has 
to be pointed out again that the interviews did not suggest that there are no 
prospects for improvement, although on the substantive level, the suggested 
changes are of a more complex and long-term nature. This means that the 
concept of citizenship could function as a mechanism to minimize the power 
of racism and nationalism. The notion of citizenship as sub-divided into a 
European, national and local level was more or less explicitly expressed by 
many interviewees. The local environment was regarded by some 
interviewees as the most tangible. This could be interpreted as supporting my 
argument (see Chapter Six) that the best potential to counteract racism and 
nationalism exists on the local level as it is there where peoples' daily lives 
take place and where they could actively participate in the decision-making 
process in relation to community issues. This should, therefore, be the focus 
for future policy developments. 
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10. Conclusion 
In this thesis, I have attempted to link the concepts of citizenship, 
nationalism, and racialization. I have argued that there is a symbiotic 
relationship between nationalism and racism, reflected in the mingling of the 
concept of citizenship and the notion of nationality. In its formal legal and 
substantive sense, citizenship defines socio-Iegal membership and is, thus, the 
key indicator of inclusion in a socio-national community. The relationship 
between nationalism and racism, however, has exclusionary tendencies for 
immigrant or ethnic minorities' ability to acquire and practice citizenship. 
My argument linked the theory of racialization with the {ormation o{ 
national identity and what has been conceptualized as 'the Other' (i.e. an 
immigrant or ethnic minority) drawing boundaries between insiders ('us') and 
outsiders ('them'). The identification of an 'inferior Other' thereby parallels the 
definition of the majority as a (superior) 'race' and 'nation', legitimizing the 
granting or withholding of citizenship. 
With regard to legislation, it has been shown that racializing notions of 
nationality tend to be linked closely to the concept of citizenship with 
exclusionary effects on immigrants and ethnic minorities. Exclusionary 
tendencies, however, are not only to be found in law, but also within the 
policy-making process (i.e. as part of parliamentarians' discourse) and within 
civil society (in form of general attitudes). Thus, the main concluding 
argument has been that only a concept of citizenship which is disassociated 
from nationality can function as a mechanism for inclusion and full 
participation in post-war (western European) societies constituted of a 'range 
of fragmented identities' - to use Cohen's expression. Only in this way can 
citizenship become the source of a post-national, or post-conventional, 
identity. This does not mean that any sense of ethnicity (or any other cultural 
identity) has to vanish. The idea and/or practice of treating nationality as the 
prerequisite for citizenship as laid down in law, however, has to disappt."ar 
and be replaced by the practice of citizenship as a signifier of 'gl'nuine 
membership' to minimize conflicts between various ethnic (or cultural) 
groups. I have argued - based on the interview results - that there are ways in 
which formal and substantive citizenship can be made less exclusive and that 
citizenship has the potential to function as a mechanism for inclusion. 
As far as future developments are concerned, I ~nvisage a three-
layered conception of citizenship ranging from local, to national to European 
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level based on the principle of residence. Of those three layers, I have argued 
that the local level is probably the most effective to resist the power of racism 
and nationalism within civil society as it would mean communication and 
problem solving in the everyday environment of citizens. It would involve 
active and feasible efforts of ethnic minorities and the indigenous majority. It 
could also reduce the influence of professional politicians. In this way, 
citizenship would not merely be 'imagined'. 
10.1 Citizenship in Germany and Britain; a comparison 
In the literature on the historical formation of national identities and its 
reflection in the concept of nationality/citizenship, German and British 
developments have been depicted as almost opposing examples. These 
differences, however, seem to become less significant when approached from 
the context of post-war immigration. As for formal citizenship, the British 
notion of the territorial or 'civic' basis of membership and citizenship has 
reached its limits during its post-imperial era. The distinction between 
'patrials' and 'non-patrials' introduced by immigration acts during the 1970s 
demonstrates an increasing emphasis on the principle of ius sanguinis in the 
operation of British citizenship/nationality laws, and thus Ita retreat from 
policies which had allowed the entry, settlement and exercise of citizenship 
rights to substantial numbers of non-white and non-Christian immigrants." 
(Collinson 1994:114). As for substantive citizenship, the colonial experience of 
Britain - which is sometimes suggested to have resulted in a greater 
acceptance of foreign immigration - "almost certainly did more to reinforce 
the ideas of racial or cultural superiority than to foster tolerance" (op.cit.:115). 
Thus, although the colonial link has resulted in formal equality, it poses limits 
on immigrant minorities' substantive citizenship. This was confirmed by the 
interviewed organizations as well as by the parliamentary discourse and 
'mass discourse', all of which placed more emphasis on substantive elements 
of citizenship. The acquisition of formal citizenship is only an issue for future 
immigration, in the case of family reunification (or formation), and in the 
context of European citizenship. 
In Germany, by contrast, ius sanguinis has always been the main 
criterion for membership. In addition, its post-war immigrants originate from 
countries which do not have any colonial ties. These aspects are mainly 
responsible for the lack of formal citizenship. Thus, the most urgent demands 
of the 'German' organizations revolved around the acquisition of formal 
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citizenship (on national as well as European level), with substantive 
citizenship being of secondary importance. Recent parliamentary debates 
have also focused on this aspect of citizenship. 
As a result, it can be said that specific historical circumstances have 
resulted in a variation of concepts and terminologies referring to minorities of 
immigrant origin in Germany and Britain which reflects the bases of 
immigrant minorities' status in the receiving countries. Apart from historical 
reasons, these concepts and terms reflect to some extent objective differences 
in citizenship laws and also indicate the degree to which immigrant 
minorities are excluded. To distinguish between the indigenous majority and 
post-war labour migrants, the terminology of 'race' (Neuveu 1989) and 'race 
relations' is employed in Britain. It has been suggested that this reflects equal 
formal citizenship rights of post-war labour migrants. By contrast, in Germany 
the terminology of Auslander reflects the foreign workers' status as denizens. 
With regard to formal citizenship status, therefore, non-European labour 
migrants in Germany are more directly excluded than their counterparts in 
Britain. 
As for substantive citizenship, immigrant minorities in both countries 
experience exclusionary tendencies. Two important differences in Germany, 
however, render the improvement of ethnic minorities' substantive 
citizenship more difficult than in Britain: One is the absence of anti-
discrimination legislation of the British type - which is partly the result of the 
official denial of discrimination based on racism. The other difference is 
related to immigrants' insecure residential status and limited civil rights as it 
negatively affects the success of any political organization or citizens' rights 
movement for immigrants. The struggle for equality is, thus, a very slow and 
piecemeal process as reflected in the latest introduction of the 'child 
citizenship', 
In both countries, formal and substantive citizenship is clearly 
enmeshed with the notion of nationality (Le. ethnic descent) and, therefore, 
characterized by a symbiotic relationship between racism and nationalism. 
This obstructs the ease with which ethnic minorities can acquire formal 
citizenship. In Britain, there has been a shift from a general notion of 
subjecthood to citizenship as defined by nationality which has led to the 
abolition of the unconditional principle of ius soli. This, however, affects post-
war labour migrants and their children mostly indirectly, and naturalization 
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procedures have remained very liberal. Apart from the law, however, there is 
a tendency in British society, too, towards narrow nationalism and the 
equating of legitimate membership with 'white Britishness or Englishness' as 
conveyed by (mainly conservative) political and media discourse in a similar 
way to that in Germany (Gilroy 1987; van Dijk 1991). One crucial difference in 
Britain, however, is that there is an advanced understanding of racialization 
as debates and discourse on issues related to ethnic minorities clearly focus on 
substantive elements of citizenship. 
It can be concluded, therefore, that in terms of legal status, post-war 
labour migrants have entered Britain on an equal basis as opposed to the 
situation in Germany. This formally equal citizenship status as enjoyed by 
immigrant minorities in Britain gives them the possibility of being politically 
active and to move into representation in public life. In Germany, by contrast, 
this basis for 'help to self-help' (Hilfe zur Selbsthilfe, Bielefeld 1991 :102) is not 
given. With regard to rising nationalism and the general existence of 
racialization and racial discrimination, however, ethnic minorities' status in 
both countries is negatively affected. 
This was also reflected in the different concerns and demands of the 
interviewed groups to render citizenship more inclusive. So far, this was not 
seen as having been achieved to a satisfactory extent, and the racializing 
effects of the link to nationality in law was regarded in both countries as still 
too strong. In addition to legal definitions, the groups have stressed that 
belonging and active participation are important criteria for citizenship, i.e. 
membership is not only a matter of legality and laws, but is also a matter of 
perception and recognition as belonging on the part of civil society. 
10.2 European identity and citizenship 
Based on the findings from the literature, the parliamentarians' 
discourse, opinion surveys/polls, and the interviews, it can be said that, 
although a pan-European identity among the majority population seems 
(more or less tentatively) to emerge, this identity has - in a similar way to 
national identity - the tendency to be exclusive towards non-European 
residents. This is perpetuated by the predominant concern by the EU with 
immigration and border control ('Fortress Europe') and by neglecting policies 
of integration. As yet, there is no evidence of harmonization or co-operation 
in granting citizenship to all third-country nationals with long periods of 
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residence in any of the EU member-states. The image of a 'People's Europe' as 
well as European citizenship does not, therefore, include non-European long-
term residents, and thus European identity and citizenship do not offer any 
mechanisms for overcoming impediments on the national level, but rather 
perpetuate them. 
10.3 Future prospects of citizenship 
According to Garcia, current debates on European and national 
identities seem to revolve around two main lines of thought. The first 
emphasizes the unifying processes taking place in western European 
industrialized societies. The second stresses the remaining strength of 
national identities as opposed to a European identity. The two strands do not 
necessarily conflict, but should be perceived as parallel (1992:9). This view is 
fully supported here. However, apart from national and an emerging 
supranational identity, a consciousness for the local level has continued to 
exist to a lesser or greater extent in western Europe as a third layer of 
collective identity. This should be reflected in the exercise of citizenship. 
With regard to the composition of contemporary societies, citizens' 
identity does not derive from common ethnic and cultural properties but 
rather from the praxis of citizenship which has, however, a limited direct 
impact on national, let alone European, politics. Therefore, the active practice 
of citizenship at the local level would give the other two levels their 
legitimation. Local identity as the first and foremost source of collective 
identity (which seems to be less visible in Britain/England where economic 
and political centralism has undermined local differentiation and 
empowerment) can be directed in such a way that attachments need not 
conflict with national and (the development of a) European consciousness 
and identity. The three layers of identity and citizenship are to a certain extent 
expressed in the notion of subsidiarity and the potential of the Committee of 
the Regions - both of which would, however, need to be clarified to render 
these levels practicality. 
What are possible future solutions for citizenship to function more 
inclusively for non-European ethnic minorities? For those who do not have 
formal citizenship, such as the Turks, special agreements between their 
countries of origin and the EU could allow them the holding of dual 
nationality and thus, vest them with full formal citizenship rights on national 
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and European level. In the case of Turkey, there have been debates about its 
likelihood to join the ED (taz, 19.12.94 & 21.12.94 & 12.01.95 & 18.02.95) which 
would at least result in the same treatment of Turkish immigrants as that of 
EU-nationals. A further possibility would be to grant third-country nationals 
citizenship rights after a certain period of residence without the requirement 
to naturalize, i.e. totally detached from the holding of a passport. This is not at 
all an unknown practice. Countries such as Sweden and the Netherlands 
grant foreign residents at least local voting rights (Martin & Miller 1990:11). 
Also, the European Parliament has recommended the granting of local voting 
rights after five years of residence for immigrants in all member-states (see 
Chapter Three). 
The addition of a 'race' dimension to the Treaty of Rome - as one aspect 
of substantive European citizenship - might not be necessary, let alone 
achieved to a satisfactory extent from the perspective of British ethnic 
minorities when considering the various different immigration histories of ED 
member-states and the tendency to agree on the lowest denominator with 
regard to common EU policies. A better solution might be to approach the 
field of 'race relations' and integration policies via the Committee of the 
Regions and the principle of subsidiarity. To deal with these issues on the 
level of regional/local co-operation may also counteract the rather 
protectionist atmosphere which is at present prevailing (Le. retreat to 
nationalism) - which can partly be explained by the general fear of losing 
influence on the decision making process of issues which are of local and 
national interest to European bureaucrats. 
As a 'solution package', first of all, citizenship should be given to all 
(legal) 1 residents within the EU after a certain length of residence2. The 
impetus should come from the national level as suggested by Hoffmann 
(1992) and by the European Parliament (see Chapter Three) as opposed to the 
way in which the ED Migrants Forum demands changes (by ignoring the 
national level and by granting formal (European) citizenship via the ED). 
According to Hoffmann, it is not a good idea to link the question of 
citizenship with European integration. He rightly claims that it is not Europe 
which overcomes the thinking in terms of nation-states, but it is the 
overcoming of the idea of the nation-state which makes Europe possible. 
Therefore, the potential of the Committee of the Regions is an important issue 
1 The issue of 'illegality' has not been dealt with in this thesis. 
2 The European Parliament has recommended a minimum period of five 
years. 
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for the future and maybe for the re-negotiation of the intergovernmental 
conference in 1997. The Committee has to be given competence to make 
decisions in matters important for the peaceful co-existence of citizens within 
a local community. 
As for European citizenship, it is impossible to mirror national 
citizenship on EU level. There are different levels of participation with 
different degrees of direct influence which exist at the same time. The local 
level has to be extended in order to promote and legitimize the other two. 
This is the same with regard to the formation of identity. The reality is, today 
as much as before, that Europe is only one dimension of collective identity -
an aspect which has also become clear in the interviews. The national and 
local dimensions are equally as important and have to be reflected in political 
representation. The local level is in actual fact the most flexible in that it 
represents the variety of people with their various identities in the local 
community. This has to be recognized, however, in terms of empowerment 
for local governance and citizenship. All three levels cannot work in exactly 
the same way and all three levels have to be responsible for different political, 
economic and social aspects of life. 
Overall, an understanding of citizenship detached from nationality 
should go beyond its formal meaning of the right to carry a passport and 
should be promoted in its comprehensive sense, emphasizing the relationship 
between the individual, the local community, the state and the European 
Union. Only in this way can citizenship minimize the effects of racialization 
and nationalism. I have argued that this can best be achieved by recognizing 
the need for the equal importance of the three layers of citizenship. The local 
level in particular is regarded as being crucial to promote understanding 
among ethno-culturally different residents. The co-operation of all citizens at 
the local level will work its way upwards to co-operation and mutual 
representation on the national and European level, and will thus create a true 
'Peoples' Europe'. 
To sum up, it is agreed here with Meehan that 
Ita new kind of citizenship is emerging that is neither national nor 
cosmopolitan but which is multiple in enabling the various identities 
that we all possess to be expressed, and our rights and duties exercised, 
through an increasingly complex configuration of common institutions, 
states, national and transnational interest groups and voluntary associations, 
local or provincial authorities, regions and alliances of regions .... 
Sometimes interests may coincide with national identity ... Som{'times 
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interests and identities will be regiona1..Social identities and interests 
sometimes cross national frontiers". 
(1993b:185) 
Most importantly for this new kind of citizenship, made up of different layers 
- local, national and European - in the context of settled immigrants, is the 
realization that it has to be separated from nationality to render acquisition of 
citizenship possible via residential criteria. This is the prerequisite for 
reducing those impediments to formal and substantive citizenship which 
result from a symbiotic relationship between racism and nationalism to 
enable all residents to participate and to develop a form of collective identity 
in a world of global movement. 
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Appendix I 
Statistics 
a) Foreign residents in the Federal Republic of Germany 
(by nationality and citizenship) 
1983 1993 
Turkey 1,552,300 1,918,400 
Former Yugoslavia 612,800 929,600 
Italy 565,000 563,000 
Greece 292,300 352,000 
Poland 87,600 260,500 
Austria 171,600 186,300 
Romania 12,300 162,600 
Croatia 153,100 
Bosnia -Herzegovina 139,100 
Spain 166,000 133,200 
Netherlands 108,600 113,400 
United Kingdom 88,000 108,200 
United States 80,100 107,400 
Portugal 99,500 105,600 
Iran 33,000 101,500 
France 71,900 94,200 
Morocco 44,200 82,800 
Former USSR 6,500 63,600 
Hungary 21,100 62,200 
Bulgaria 4,100 56,700 
Lebanon 9,000 55,100 
Former CSFR 26,900 52,000 
Switzerland 29,400 35,000 
Tunisia 25,300 28,100 
Algeria 5,200 23,100 
Finland 9,900 13,000 
other countries 412,300 978,600 
Total 4,534,900 6,878,100 
(Source: DECD, 1995) 
b) Foreign residents in the United Kingdom by nationality 
Ireland 
India 
1984 
491,000 
148,000 
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~ 
465,000 
151,000 
United States 
Caribbean and Guyana 
Pakistan 
Western Africa 
Central and Eastern 
Europe 
Bangladesh 
Italy 
Eastern Africa 
Australia 
France 
Germany 
Spain 
Northern Europe 
Portugal 
Other countries 
Total 
83,000 
131,000 
63,000 
51,000 
53,000 
21,000 
83,000 
28,000 
34,000 
23,000 
33,000 
25,000 
16,000 
'" 
318,000 
1,601,000 
'" Numbers less than 10,000 
(Source: OEeD, 1995) 
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110,000 
106,000 
98,000 
82,000 
78,000 
73,000 
72,000 
48,000 
47,000 
41,000 
34,000 
33,000 
27,000 
14,000 
522,000 
2,001,000 
Appendix II: Drafted EC-documents 
1. The External Border Convention 
Or, in its full title, Draft Convention of the Member States of the European 
Communities on the Crossing of External Frontiers. It was expected to be 
signed in 1991, but the signing has been delayed because of the disagreement 
between Britain and Spain over the status of the border between Gibraltar 
and Spain (the British government considers this frontier as internal, whereas 
Spain considers it as external; Collinson 1994:190, footnote no. 10). This 
convention is central to the opening up of the internal market, since it sets up 
external controls and the information system needed to secure the EC's 
borders, without which the internal borders cannot be removed. Its main 
purpose is to avoid third country nationals entering the EC by imposing very 
stringent conditions on entry. A uniform Ee visa is intended to be developed, 
based on common criteria. Third country nationals legally settled in one Ee 
country are not to have the right to free movement and settlement across the 
EC territory. The only 'improvement' for them is the granting of visa-free 
travel for three months. This convention, when signed, would be another key 
element in the creation of 'Fortress Europe'. 
2. 'The Draft Resolution on Family Reunification' 
This is another draft document which would have much more obvious 
implications for already settled ethnic minority communities. It was prepared 
in 1992 with the aim to limit the dependants who can be brought in by non-
Ee workers who are already living in the Ee, and to impose conditions on 
their admission such as the limitation of family reunion to spouses and 
children aged up to sixteen or eighteen with the exclusion of other family 
members (which stands in sharp contrast to family rights of Ee nationals 
working in another Ee member-state, who are allowed to bring in spouse, 
children under 21 or in full-time education, elderly parents and other 
dependent relatives). This resolution is more stringent than the current British 
law which allows for the admission of elderly parents and of other relatives 
under certain circumstances. Britain's infamous 'primary purpose rule' of 1982 
is also adopted by this resolution meaning that spouses have to prove that the 
primary purpose of their marriage was not to obtain admission to the 
territory before being admitted. 
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3. The Draft Resolution on Admission for Employment 
Prepared by the Ad Hoc Group for submission to the immigration ministers 
in November 1992, looks very much like having a revival of the 'guestworker 
system' as its aim. It defines the limited and temporary nature of immigration 
for employment which the EC will allow to non-EC nationals. It proposes that 
member-states may admit migrant workers on a temporary basis, for six 
months, without a special permit; for up to three years as a trainee, and as a 
contract worker for five years maximum in the first instance. The only 
category which could lead to settlement is the last, but it envisages five years 
of tied employment with the same employer before any opportunity for 
permanent residence arises. There is no guarantee for equal treatment with 
workers of EC nationality, family union rights are also very limited. 
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Appendix III 
The interviewed organizations/institutions: their functions and objectives 
a) in Germany 
Das Amt fur Multikulturelle Angelegenheiten der Stadt Frankfurt am Main 
(Department for multi-cultural affairs of the city of Frankfurt/Main) 
- Function/governance: This department is part of the city council of 
Frankfurt and therefore, it is solely in charge of multi-cultural matters of 
Frankfurt which is the city in Germany with the highest percentage of 
'foreign' population (immigrant peoples without a German passport; ethnic 
Germans excluded here), namely 27,55% (Wolf-Almanasreh 1993:10). 
This department was set up in 1989 by the 'red-green coalition' (coalition of 
the Social Democrats and the Green Party in the city council) with the present 
head of department (Dezement) being a member of the Green Party. The 
head of the department (Dezement) is the political leader and secures access 
to the city's parliament. The department is given its own financial budget, and 
the proposing of bills is in its power. As part of the local politico-
administrative structure of the city of Frankfurt, this department has been 
described as having "taken the lead in defending migrant representation" in 
Germany (Winstone 1993:5). 
- Objectives: Its field of activities ranges from advancing public relations, 
functioning as an ombudsperson, working against discrimination and racism 
towards more integration (such in the areas of school and education, job 
training), to promoting inter-cultural communication (support for clubs etc.). 
The groups these activities are aimed at include all citizens of Frankfurt - i.e. 
any minority group, be it ethnic or social (one example was a homosexual 
organization which was seeking support from this department to obtain 
permission to build a monument to commemorate the homosexual victirns of 
the National Socialists which had been previously rejected). Therefore, the 
point of departure for the department's scope of responsibilities is rnore 
global and spreaded out which means that it does not solely focus on 
lobbying immigrants and ethnic minorities. It holds the view that society has 
to be seen as a whole in order to minimize social clashes. 
- Status of interviewee: The interviewee is the second person in the 
departmental hierarchy, the chief executive. 
266 
Auslanderbeauftragte der Senatsverwaltung der Stadt Berlin 
(Commissioner for Foreigners' Affairs of the Senate of Berlin) 
- Function/ governance: This department is in a similar way as the above part 
of the public sector, but it is not a department on its own, it is a section of the 
Department for Social Affairs of the Berlin Senate (city government). 
Therefore, although it has competence in the specialized field of immigration, 
it does not have any policy-making powers. The Commissioner of Berlin was 
the first of its kind in the whole of Germany set up in 1981 (initiated by 
Richard von Weizacker who was then Mayor of Berlin). It is responsible for 
the city of Berlin. 
- Objectives: Its range of activities include three main areas: 1. the conception 
of immigration or 'foreigners' policies' (Auslanderpolitik) for the purpose of 
lobbying, 2. counselling for individuals in immigration and integration 
matters, 3. public relations (informing 'foreigners' about their rights and 
enlightening the majority on matters of the 'foreign' minorities). 
- Status of interviewee: The two interviewees from this department are the 
head, the Commissioner, and the public relations' officer. 
TGB Hamburg e.V. (Bundnis tUrkischer Einwanderer Hamburg) 
(Association for Turkish Immigrants Hamburg) 
- Function/ governance: This organization is an umbrella organization for all 
sorts of Turkish associations and clubs, political as well as cultural, and 
individuals in Hamburg. It was initiated in 1985 by its present director (as a 
registered association - the meaning of the abbreviation "e.V." - since 1986). 
- Objectives: The originally main objective for the TGB's establishment was 
the campaigning for local voting rights and dual citizenship - the former was 
in fact materialized as a result of the campaigns in the three Nordic liinder 
Schleswig-Holstein, Bremen and Hamburg, but contested by the Conservative 
Parties CDU and CSU and ruled as unconstitutional by the federal 
Constitutional Court. The field of activities ranges now from public relations 
work, to campaigning and lobbying for certain 'foreigners' policies such as 
dual citizenship, anti-discrimination legislation and voting rights. 
- Status of the interviewee: The interviewee is the president and founder of 
this organization. He is also member of the city parliament (which is at the 
same time a liinder parliament as Hamburg is a city-state) representing the 
Social Democrats - a fact which is possible due to him holding dual 
citizenship. 
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BETB e.V. (Bund der Einwanderer/lnnen aus der TUrkei in Berlin-
Brandenburg) 
(Association for Immigrants from Turkey in Berlin-Brandenburg) 
- Function! governance: This organization exists since 1990 and was initiated 
as an 'action group' (Aktionsgemeinschaft) campaigning against the new 
Foreigners' Law (Auslandergesetz). All sorts of immigrant groups from all 
across the political spectrum came together and originally called this action 
group "AktionsbUndnis turkischer Selbsthilfe und Betroffenen Organisation" 
(action alliance for Turkish self-help and organization for the persons 
affected). When the new law was enacted in 1991 despite their campaign, they 
decided to carry on with their work under a new name - BETB e.V, which is 
now an umbrella organization including all sorts of immigrant association 
and individuals. At present, there are twenty-one member organizations. 
- Objectives: They make strong efforts for legal, social and political equality of 
ethnic minorities and for the peaceful co-existence with the indigenous 
German majority. Thus, the field of public relations and campaigning is one 
of their main activities, but also individual counselling. They represent all 
Berliner and Berlinerinnen (people from Berlin) of Turkish origin vis-a.-vis all 
institutions and departments in Berlin as well as in public in all matters of 
immigration and 'foreigners' policies. They also organize cultural events, 
conferences and seminars. 
- Status of the interviewee: The interviewee is spokesperson of the executive 
committee. 
TGB Berlin (TUrkische Gemeinde Berlin) 
(Turkish Community Berlin) 
- Function/ governance: This organization functions also as an umbrella for 
smaller Turkish associations and its members come from all sections of social 
life such as folklore, youth, women, sports and religion. It is non-aligned to 
any political party. They are non-violent and stand for democracy, liberty and 
constitutional rights. They welcome everybody - Turks, Germans and others -
committed to peaceful co-existence of minorities in Germany. 
- Objectives: The Turkish Community engages in social consultant services to 
German authorities, the churches and individuals. They keep up the dialogue 
with administrations and policy makers in order to improve the Turkish 
minority's life in Berlin. They also try to have good relationships with the 
press and educational organizations to promote mutual understanding and 
268 
thus, the Turkish Community functions as a bridge between Turkish and 
German Berliners. 
- Status of the interviewee: The interviewee is the head of this organization. 
Forum Buntes Deutschland e.V. - S.O.S. Rassismus 
(Forum Colourful Germany - S.O.S. Racism) 
- Function/ governance: This organization was established in 1992 as a 
federal body for all small and medium initiatives, associations and 
organizations which are active on the local or Lander level in the area of anti-
racism work. Until its set up, there had not been a federal anti-racism alliance. 
The Forum co-ordinates the activities of these local groups and promotes 
actions from the grass-root level on federal level. It also co-operates with 
other big federations such as the refugee councils. On European level, it is 
engaged in the anti-racist network for equality in Europe. 
- Objectives: Elimination of racism and the spreading of information of 
racially motivated discrimination. 
- Status of the interviewee: The interviewee is the director of this 
organization. She used to be a Member of Parliament representing the SPD. 
WIR - Internationales Zentrum, Hamburg 
(WIR International Centre, Hamburg) 
-Function/ governance: It was founded in 1981 by Germans and immigrants 
and functioned in the beginning as an international meeting place 
(Begegnungsstatte) for immigrants and Germans in Hamburg. It is funded by 
the Hamburg Senate (city parliament). 
- Objectives: It is engaged in individual counselling (social, legal, family 
matters and advice on return to country of origin). They offer German 
language courses as well as cultural courses and organize cultural events, 
campaigns (e.g. for dual citizenship, local voting rights), conferences, 
seminars, work-shops and projects in schools, community centres etc. and in 
particular for people working in the field of education (Multiplikatoren) in 
order to reduce prejudices (anti-racism work). It is a grass-root organization. 
- Status of interviewee: The interviewee is one of the three leading organizers. 
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b) in Britain 
The Commission for Racial Equality 
- Function/ governance: It was set up by the 1976 Race Relations Act. It is 
funded by an annual grant from the Home Office, but works independently 
of the Government. It is run by Commissioners appointed by the Home 
Secretary. 
- Objectives: Its activities cover work towards the elimination of 
discrimination, promotion of equality of opportunity and good relations 
between persons of different racial/ ethnic groups. Its main task is to keep 
under review the working of the Act (monitoring of the way the Act is 
working) and when required by the Secretary of State or when it otherwise 
thinks it necessary it can draw up proposals for amending it and submitting it 
to the Secretary of State. It deals with racial discrimination in the field of 
employment and education, and it is also engaged on the European level in 
the set up of the Starting Line (as explained in the Chapter on the EC). 
- Status of the interviewee: The interviewee is senior information officer. 
The Toint Council for the Welfare of Immi&rants 
- Function/ governance: It was established in 1967 and has been since then 
the only national independent voluntary organization which specialized in 
British immigration and nationality law. It is funded by its members and by 
donations. 
- Objectives: It offers counselling to individuals and gives advice on legal 
matters concerning immigration and nationality legislation. It represents 
individuals to the Home Office, Racial Officers, Racial Appeals, and 
Embassies. It is also engaged in organizing campaigns and lobbying for 
changes in the law. It produces literature and provides up-to-date 
information on changes in the law and other briefings for journalists, MPs 
and its members. It also offers training courses. With regard to European 
matters, there is an European project worker who is specializing in EC 
matters. 
- Status of the interviewee: The interviewee is the training and information 
officer. 
The Anti-Racist Alliance 
- Function/ governance: The Anti-Racist Alliance was established in 
November 1991. It is a black-led, broad-based coalition, campaigning against 
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racism, anti-Semitism and support for the extreme right. The ARA is 
supported by major national black and Jewish organizations. The Executive 
Committee of the ARA is made up of 34 people, who are elected at an Annual 
General Meeting. The EC is made up of representatives of major black and 
Jewish organizations, trade unions, black community groups, youth 
organizations and other organizations. Membership in the ARA is open to 
organizations and individuals. 
- Objectives: They organize and support campaigns and demonstrations 
locally and nationally against racist murders, attacks and harassment, and 
they are involved in putting together petitions and in lobbying. One of their 
main activities is arguing for changes in the racial harassment law. With the 
help of a monitoring system they catalogue racial attacks and violence. The 
ARA gives support to victims and families of victims of racial violence by 
producing leaflets, organizing demonstrations and giving financial help. They 
also work in liaison with anti-racist organizations in Britain and the rest of 
Europe and are engaged in the Anti-racist Network for Equality in Europe. 
- Status of the interviewee: The interviewee is the head of this organization. 
The Indian Workers' Association 
- Function/ governance: It was founded in the mid-1950s. The IW A has 
originally started as a supportive body and has grown up as an anti-racist 
group with one of its major tasks being to fight against racism in Britain. 
They are funded by an annual governmental grant, but recently they have 
been very restricted with their work because of funding difficulties as the 
government is not prepared to give them any further funding on the grounds 
that the IWA has become a political body - an allegation which the IWA 
denies. It claims to be not affiliated with any political party. 
- Objectives: It offers support to the individuals' problems and functions very 
much as a grass-root organization. They provide service to the people and 
give support in issues revolving around education, employment, nationality, 
immigration and citizenship (passport). 
- Status of the interviewee: The interviewee is the director of the IWA and 
also a Labour MP. 
The Runnymede Trust 
- Function/ governance: It was founded in 1968 by Antony Lester, now Lord 
Lester, who was also active in the Charter 88 movement. It is funded by its 
members and by donations. 
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- Objectives: Its objectives are to help strengthen and shape policies and 
projects which work towards eliminating all forms of racial discrimination; 
promote mutual respect, appreciation and learning between different 
traditions and values; release and develop the resources, talents and skills of 
all members of society. The Runnymede Trust does not provide any 
individual counselling, but is engaged in producing literature on race 
relations' matters and other issues such as nationalism and right-wing 
extremism as well as in public relations in general. 
- Status of the interviewee: The interviewee is the director of this 
organization. 
c) EUsource 
The European Union Migrants Forum: 
- Function/ governance: This organization was originally called EC Migrants 
Forum but since the creation of the European Union by the Maastricht Treaty, 
it has changed its name to European Union Migrants Forum. The idea of 
putting together a forum where peoples with immigrant origins could find a 
political voice and have a dialogue with the European institutions derived 
from a report of the late MEP Evregenis, presented to the European 
Parliament in 1985 by the Committee of enquiry on the rise of fascism, racism 
and xenophobia. The Forum was finally set up in May 1991 by which for the 
first time political dialogue was institutionalized between the EC and its 
populations originating outside the EC It is funded by the Commission of the 
European Communities with the European Parliament being involved in 
debating over the Forum's budget. Even though the Forum was initiated and 
supported by the European Parliament and is funded by the Commission, it is 
supposed to be a totally independent advisory body to them, and it is 
politically and religiously non-aligned. It is the only non-governmental 
organization which is allowed to meet and discuss matters with the rotating 
presidencies. 
The ED Migrants Forum is made up of a 'grass-root structure': there are 110 
organizations that are affiliated to the Migrants Forum across the ED 
memberstates with over 50 various nationals from outside the EU. The Forum 
has established support groups in each of the 12 member-states and it invites 
anybody who agrees with their aims and constitutional objectives to join. The 
members are not only drawn from minority communities, but also from 
organizations or institutions such as local authorities, the police, trade unions, 
any European organizations etc. 
272 
- Objectives: With a view to the full integration of immigrants in Europe, the 
Forum sets itself as its objectives and purpose action on attaining equal rights, 
freedom of movement, the fight against racism, observance of the right of 
asylum and integration in all respects into a multi-cultural Europe. The 
Forum lobbies the EP, the Commission, the preSidencies and individual 
memberstates on race relations' and immigration matters. It engages in 
particular in improving the situation for Third country nationals who do not 
hold any EC-memberstates' citizenship, but they are also generally concerned 
about discrimination and racism against any ethnic minority. 
Two of the Forum's main initiatives are the European Manifesto against 
Racism and Suggestions for the White Paper on a Social Europe of 1994. 
- Status of the interviewee: The interviewee is the president. 
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Appendix IV 
The interview questions 
In Britain: 
A 
1. First of all, I would like to talk about national identity: Do you think British 
people have a sense of national identity? 
2. Is the idea of national identity important to British people right now in 
1994? I wonder what you think about it. 
3. That is generally, now I would like to know what exactly is the content of 
national identity for British (English?) people? What does it mean to them? 
4. Do you have any idea where the sense of national identity is fostered? Is 
there any source which promotes this idea in particular? 
5. I wonder, how far the idea of national identity is exclusive? Do you think, it 
excludes any groups in Britain which are not of 'white' British origin? If yes, 
which groups? 
6. Do you think the cultural particularities and! or cultural contributions of 
ethnic minority groups are adequately recognized by British society? Why 
(not)? 
7. Are they in this respect visible or invisible parts of the nation? 
8. Britain has traditionally been the prime example of a country where the 
principle of ius soli has applied. Since the British Nationality Act of 1981 this 
has been modified (in that any child born in the UK is British citizen only if it 
has a parent who is British citizen or 'settled'). What implications does this 
Act have? Does that mean the number of persons born in the UK without 
British citizenship has considerably risen? What is your opinion about this 
Act? 
9. I would like to repeat: Whenever Britain is presented as a nation, do you 
think ethnic minority groups are considered as a part of it? 
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10. Do you think a stronger consciousness for the region would be beneficial 
to immigrants with regard to their ability to feel accepted as an equal 
member? (I am asking this question with regard to Germany which has a 
federal state structure and with regard to the changes in Britain during the 
last 10,15 years towards further centralization; also with regard to the Ee 
which does not only promote the idea of supra-nationality, but also of 
regionalism) 
11. How do you see the future of national identity in view of a more 
integrated Europe? Is the emphasis more going to be on regional and/ or 
supranational, i.e. European, identity? 
12. Is European identity going to replace national identity in the sense that it 
will work in the same exclusive way as the identity of 'white' Europeans or do 
you see any chance for all the various ethnic groups to be included? 
13. Do you think the generally promoted idea of national identity in Britain 
contains any elements which you would call racist? If yes, what are they and 
what are their purposes? 
B 
14. Generally speaking, do you think racism in any form exists in British 
society? 
15. How is this racism recognisable? 
16. If you look back to British history, has racism changed in any way? For 
instance, are the targets/ victims different? Is the articulation different? 
17. In the literature on racism, it is said that racism can be explained/ defined 
culturally in that cultural differences are pictured as innate and 
unchangeable. Do you think cultural racism can be applied to the British 
situation? 
18. I would like to ask you where racist ideas come from? Where are they 
fostered? Maybe you could comment on the following 'list': 
1. by the media? 
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2. by the government? 
3. by politicians? If yes, of which party alliance are they? 
4. by racist groups? 
5. by anybody else? 
19. Does your work include the fight against racism and inequality of 
immigrants? If yes, what is the most difficult aspect in your anti-racism work? 
20. What concerns your fight against racism and inequality of immigrants, 
what is your strongest concern for the future? What would you like to see 
changed? 
21. Do you think there will be joint action against racism by the EC? How do 
you view the future prospectus of an EC-wide anti-discrimination legislation? 
Is it likely to be on the level of the British legal provisions? 
C 
I would like to move on to the issue of citizenship. 
22. Do you think there is any difference between the term 'nationality' and 
'citizenship' in Britain? 
23. In what sense, do you think, are members of ethnic minority groups 
British citizens? Is there any difference to the citizenship status of indigenous 
white British people? 
24. Does your work here include citizenship issues? What is your most 
important concern? Is there anything that you would like to see in the near 
future? 
25. Do you see any future prospects for a European citizenship? Is it going to 
include minority groups? 
Some summarizing/ concluding questions: 
26. Coming back to the activities your organization is involved in, which of 
the three issues we have discussed (citizenship, national identity, racism) is 
the most important? What are your priority concerns? 
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27. Which issue should the national government turn to first and foremost? 
28. Which issue should the Ee turn to first and foremost? 
Terminological question: 
term 'black': what is your approach or opinion? Is 'black' a useful term which 
should be preserved? If not, any alternative? 
Section A: 
The first three questions were asked to find out whether 'national 
identity' exists and whether it is still important (in view of European 
integration) or even more important (rising nationalism) and what elements 
are claimed to be 'British'. Question four was meant to indicate where ideas 
about national identity come from (political parties etc.), question five and six 
should show whether ethnic minorities are included or excluded in these 
ideas and whether their presence is recognized (question seven). Possible 
changes which the BNA of 1981 had brought about were explored in question 
8, and question 10 should test the interviewees' opinion on regionalism (the 
potential of the EU's Committee of the Regions). Question 11 and 12 were 
asked to find out whether the EC as supranational entity has had any impact 
on national identity and where ethnic minorities are placed within it. 
Question 13 was meant to bridge the first issue (national identity) with the 
following issue (racism) 1. 
SectionB: 
Question 14 and 15 were meant to find out what elements in British 
society were viewed as racist. Question 16 should test the theory that there 
are different racisms (or racialization processes) and that there are 'racisms 
without race'. Question 17 refers to the 'cultural racism' theory (as opposed to 
biological racism). With question 18, the source of racist ideas was explored. 
Question 19 and 20 referred to the organizations' activities and concerns in 
1 This question looks like a 'leading question', but it was meant to function 
as a 'bridge' between the two sections. In the actual interview Situation, 
this question was not once asked in this way as the interviewees referred to 
this aspect in one way or another as part of their replies to the previous 
questions in section A. This was the same in the 'German' context (see 
question no. 15, section A). 
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this area. The likelihood of the European Community to become active in this 
field was tested. 
SectionC: 
Question 22 was meant to find out whether there is a sense for people 
being of different nationality but having the same citizenship rights (so that it 
would be possible to be a recognized citizen as an immigrant of different 
nationality). This question was also originally meant (before 'discovering' that 
both concepts might be coterminous in the British context as well) to explore 
whether there is any difference to Germany where both concepts tend to be 
regarded as the same in the sense that a person has to be of German 
nationality to be a German citizen. Question 23 was asked to test in which 
way ethnic minority members' citizenship is equal to the majority's 
citizenship. Question 24 referred to the organizations' activities in this field, 
and question 25 explored the European dimension. 
In Germany: 
A 
1. Zuallererst mochte ich Uber nationale Identitat sprechen: Denken Sie, dass 
die Deutschen einen Sinn fUr nationale Identitat haben? 
2. 1st der Begriff/ die Vorstellung der nationalen Identitat heute, also im Jahre 
1994, wichtig fUr Deutsche? 
3. Das war allgemein. Ich hatte jetzt gerne gewusst, was genau beinhaltet 
dieser Begriff (der nationalen Identitat) fUr Deutsche? 
4. Wo werden diese Vorstellungen am meisten betont/herausgehoben? 
Woher kommen diese Vorstellungen der nationalen Identitat? 
5. Haben diese Vorstellungen sich seit der Wiedervereinigung irgendwie 
verandert? Wenn ja, wie? 
6. Ich mochte gerne wissen, inwieweit diese Vorstellungen eine 
ausschliessende Wirkung haben? Glauben Sie, dass nationale Identitat 
irgendwelche Immigranten- oder andere Gruppen in Deutschland 
ausschliesst? Wenn ja, welche Gruppen? 
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7. Denken Sie, dass die kulturellen Besonderheiten der Immigranten und ihre 
kulturellen Beitrage von der deutschen Gesellschaft angemessen anerkannt 
werden? Warum (nicht)? 
8. Sind die Immigranten in dieser Hinsicht 'sichtbarer' oder 'unsichtbarer' T eil 
derNation? 
9. Das rechtliche Prinzip der deutschen Staatsangehorigkeit/NationalWit 
wird oft als 'blut-bezogen' bezeichnet, weil das ius sanguinis bestimmt, wer 
die deutsche Nationalitat bekommen kann; haben Sie eine Vorstellung, woher 
dieses Prinzip kommt? 
10. Denken Sie, dass dieses Konzept beibehalten/ aufrechterhalten werden 
sollte? 
11. In der Debatte tiber die Interpretation des "Volk"-Konzeptes scheint die 
iiberwiegende juristische Meinung zu sein (wie es ja in der Entscheidung des 
Bundesverfassungsgerichts reflektiert ist), dass mit Yolk nur die Deutschen 
gemeint sind; ich hatte geme ihre Meinung dazu gewusst! 
12. Wie sehen Sie die Zukunft der nationalen Identitat im Hinblick auf ein 
starker integriertes Europa? Wird die Betonung auf eine regionale und supra-
nationale, sprich europaische, Identitat sein? 
13. Wird eine europaische Identitat nur einfach die nationale Identitat 
ersetzen in dem Sinne, dass sie in derselben ausschliessenden Art und Weise 
funktionieren wird als Identitat von einheimischen Europaem oder sehen Sie 
eine Chance fUr alle verschiedenen ethnischen Gruppen darin miteinbegriffen 
zusein? 
14. Denken Sie, dass eine regionale Identitat sich vorteilhaft auf die Fahigkeit 
der Immigranten, sich mit ihrer neuen Heimat zu identifizieren und sich 
akzeptiert zu fiihlen, auswirken wiirde? 
15. Glauben Sie, dass der Begriff der nationalen Identitat Elemente enthalt, die 
Sie als rassistisch bezeichnen willden? Wenn ja, was genau sind sie? 
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B 
16. Besonders seitdem seit kurzem Attacken aller Art auf Immigranten und 
Asylbewerber angestiegen sind, berichten die Medien viel tiber "Auslander-
feindlichkeit" und Xenophobia; ich hatte gerne gewusst, warum wir in diesem 
Zusammenhang zogern, den Begriff 'Rassismus' anzuwenden wie er z.B. in 
Grossbritannien benutzt wird? 
17. Wir wissen von unserer Geschichte, dass Rassismus auf biologische 
Differenzierung basiert, dennoch kann Rassismus auch kulturell definiert 
werden, indem kulturelle Verschiedenheiten als angeboren und 
unveranderlich dargestellt werden; was, glauben Sie, ist heutzutage 
ausschlaggebender in Deutschland: Der auf das Biologische basierende oder 
der auf das Kulturelle basierende Rassismus? 
18. Denken Sie, dass der Rassismus/ Anti-Semitismus der Nazi-Ara irgend-
einen Einfluss auf das Denken der Deutschen Uber heutigen Rassismus hat? 
WUrden Sie irgendeinen klaren Unterschied sehen zur Nazi-Zeit (andere 
Artikulation von Rassismus, andere Zielgruppen?) oder auch eine gewisse 
Kontinuitat? 
19. Ich mochte gerne wissen, ob Sie eine Vorstellung haben, woher 
rassistische Ideen kommen? Wo werden Sie besonders genahrt? Vielleicht 
konnten Sie die folgende "Liste" kommentieren: 
1. von den Medien? 
2. von der Regierung? 
3. von Politikern? Wenn ja, welcher Partei gehoren sie an? 
4. von rechtsextremistischen Gruppierungen? 
5. von anderen? 
20. Denken Sie, dass es Elemente in der deutschen Gesellschaft gibt, die man 
als rassistisch bezeichnen konnte? Welche? 
21. Zuruck zu ihrer Arbeit: Beinhaltet Ihre Arbeit den Kampf gegen 
Rassismus und gegen Ungleichheit der Immigranten? Wenn ja, was ist der 
schwierigste Aspekt in Ihrem Kampf? 
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22. Weshalb, glauben Sie, hat Deutschland kein Anti-Diskriminierungsgesetz 
wie z.B. Grossbritannien? 
23. Glauben Sie, dass es eine 'gemeinsame Aktion' von seiten der EG gegen 
Rassismus geben wird? Wie sehen Sie die Zukunftsaussichten einer EG-
wei ten Anti-Diskriminierungsgesetzgebung? 
C 
Ich mochte jetzt geme zum dritten Thema kommen: StaatsbUrgerschaft 
24. Es gibt ja im Deutschen zwei Begriffe: Nationalitat und Staatsburger-
schaft; konnten Sie mir sagen, ob es irgendeinen Unterschied gibt im 
Deutschen in der Interpretation dieser Begriffe? 
25. In welchem Sinne, glauben Sie, sind Immigranten StaatsbUrger hier in 
Deutschland? Der oft benutzte Begriff "Auslander" deutet ja an, dass die 
Immigranten nicht als gleiche und vollberechtigte BUrger angesehen werden, 
aber was sind die genauen Elemente, die die Auslander von den Inlandem 
unterscheiden? 
26. Konnen Sie sich eine Erklarung vorstellen, warum die deutsche Regierung 
den inzwischen fest etablierten Immigranten immer noch keinen vollen 
staatsbUrgerlichen Status gewahrt? 
27. Wenn Sie zUrUckblicken auf die Anfangsphase des Gastarbeitersystems, 
gab es seitdem irgendwelche Veranderungen bezuglich des staatsburger-
lichen Status der Immigranten? 
28. Befassen Sie sich hier mit staatsburgerlichen Angelegenheiten im Hinblick 
auf Immigranten? 
29. Glauben Sie an Zukunftsaussichten fur eine Europaische Staatsbiirger-
schaft? Wird diese auch Immigrantengruppen einbeziehen? Wenn nein, 
warum nicht? 
Zusammenfassende Fragen: 
30. Wenn Sie an Ihre Arbeit hier denken, welches der drei Themen, die wir 
besprochen haben, ist am wichtigsten? Wo liegen Ihre Prioritaten? 
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31. Welchem Thema soHten sich Ihrer Meinung nach die Bundesregierung 
zuerst zuwenden? 
32. Im Zusammenhang mit der europilischen Integration, welches dieser drei 
Themen ist filr Sie von grosstem Belang? 
Terminologische Frage: 
Was ist Ihre Meinung zu dem Begriff "Auslander"? 
In Section A, the additional questions referred to any changes in the 
perception of national identity since unification (rise of nationalism?), to the 
ius sanguinis principle of German nationality law and the specific Volk-
concept. In Section B, the first question (No, 16) was meant to find out why 
the term 'hostility towards foreigners' is so often used and hardly ever 
'racism' as in the British case. Question 18 was asked to discover whether 
contemporary German approach to 'racism' is still influenced by the 
experiences during the Nazi-period. Question 22 referred to the fact that 
Germany has not got any anti-discrimination legislation and it was asked to 
find out why this legislation does not exist. In Section C, question 25 and 26 
refers to the different approach towards immigrants' citizenship rights in 
Germany and was meant to find out why they are still not given full equal 
(formal) rights. Question 27 has to be seen in the same context: the objective 
was to explore whether there have been any (positive) changes since the days 
of the 'Gastarbeiter' system and it refers to the various amendments in the 
"Foreigners'Law", 
In the case of the interview with the EU Migrants Forum, the 'British 
questions' were adjusted to the European context. Therefore, instead of 
asking, for instance, "Do British people have a sense of national identity", it 
was asked whether national identity plays an important role in each single 
member-state. Moreover, country-specific questions (as on the 1981 BNA or 
the German Volk- concept) were omitted. 
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